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Abstract 
 
The focus of this study is the capacity of sister city relationships to build international 
peace under conditions of ongoing geopolitical conflict. Although credited with high 
potential in popular, political and academic discourses, peace focused sister city 
relationships have been the subject of minimal empirical research. As socially constructed 
realities, these relationships offer an opportunity to uncover processes through which 
personal and collective meanings are translated into structures of social inclusion and 
exclusion at the local/international interface. As a concrete point of reference, I identify 
the ideal function of sister city relationships as the boundary object, an abstract or material 
intermediary through which actors from diverse social worlds work productively together 
on shared projects.  Employing a symbolic interactionist theoretical framework and the 
research methods of observation, semi-structured interviews and discourse analysis, I 
examine sister city peace proposals and relationships between American/Australian cities 
and cities in Palestine and Iraq. I address deficiencies in the existing literature by 
formulating an empirically and theoretically supported and testable analytical model, 
comprising two components: the ‘concept’ (a blend of ‘human family’ and ‘citizen 
diplomat’ tropes) and the ‘structure’ (the local authority/citizen group dyad).  
The sister cities peace model is seen to break down under the pressure of 
competing imperatives to manage risk, preventing the creation of boundary objects. 
Instead, dissonance within the ‘concept’ component produces ‘consensus objects’ (U.S-
Iraqi relationships), which mimic boundary objects by creating a misleading impression 
that communication across significant difference is being achieved in the interests of 
positive social change. Incompatible meanings within the ‘structure’ component result in 
‘risk objects’ (U.S./Australian-Palestinian proposals), which are deemed by local 
authorities to be sources of danger and consequently ejected from council agendas. The 
model is concluded to be highly flexible, but insufficiently robust to meet the high 
expectations placed upon it. For citizen peace actors, its semantic plasticity results either 
in engulfment of their universal sympathies by nationalist agendas, or disappointment and 
resentment when their initiatives are rejected at the local scale.  For local authorities, it 
engenders acrimonious divisions within their municipalities and ambiguities in their 
obligations to citizens.  The single successful Western-Palestinian proposal examined is 
judged to have succeeded due to an atypical absence of local opposition, but is considered 
significant in other dimensions. The thesis concludes with a discussion of alternative 
directions in sister city relationships and implications of the study as a whole for local 
government policy and practice. 
 1 
Introduction 
Purpose and scope of the thesis 
This thesis investigates the limitations of sister city relationships for global 
peace building. Sister city relationships connect urban areas around the world 
for purposes of mutual cooperation, and are established through formal 
agreements signed by the respective municipal governments. In Western 
countries, they are usually supported by citizen groups, which arrange a variety 
of exchange programs and festivals aimed at promoting cross-cultural 
understanding, friendship and knowledge sharing. The term ‘sister’ cities’ is 
also commonly used to refer to metropolitan areas that cross national borders, 
such as Ciudad Juarez in Mexico and El Paso in the United States, and for 
cities for which a compassionate bond is felt, for example when they become 
the victims of terrorism or natural disasters. These last variants lie outside the 
scope of this research.   
Collectively, sister city relationships constitute a popular and rapidly 
growing urban ‘movement’ with a global reach. Sister Cities International 
(SCI), the national headquarters for sister cities in the United States, claims to 
represent 1,749 international communities in 134 countries around the world 
(SCI, 2010). Many more similar relationships are co-ordinated by the European 
Union under the name of town or city ‘twinning’.  Although the terms ‘sister 
cities’ and ‘twinned cities’ are often used interchangeably, I distinguish 
between them on the basis of their primary geopolitical orientation. Sister city 
relationships are also common in Australia, where over five hundred towns and 
cities have at least one international ‘sister’ (Sister Cities Australia, 2009). In 
spite of their near-ubiquitous international urban presence, however, this 
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significant form of inter-municipal cooperation remains under-researched and 
under-theorised across all academic disciplines (O’Toole, 2000, Cremer, Bruin 
and Dupuis, 2001, Mascitelli and Chung, 2008). 
This thesis addresses that deficiency, with specific reference to the 
capacity of sister city relationships in the United States and Australia to serve 
as vehicles for international peace building.  Sister city relationships are 
commonly identified in academic, institutional and popular discourses as 
having a high potential to lead the way to a more peaceful world, particularly 
in opposition to the ‘belligerence’ of nation states. However minimal empirical 
support exists for such claims, and none at all that is applicable to conditions of 
serious, ongoing geopolitical conflict. There is also a disjuncture between the 
theory and practice of what I term ‘sister city peace relationships’ – that is, 
sister city relationships for which international cross-cultural  peace building is 
specifically identified as their primary goal – in that areas of the world that are 
most in need of peace building programs are often bypassed or rejected as 
municipal sisters. This disjuncture is currently most apparent in attempts to 
connect Western cities with cities in Palestine, which have historically met 
with vehement local opposition1.  
The conflict in the Middle East generates stressful background 
conditions which challenge the peace building capacity of sister city 
relationships. Since September 11th, 2001, the U.S-led ‘war on terror’ has 
created a climate of fear in Western cities, in which people from countries 
associated with acts of terror have become primary targets of suspicion. This 
development alone does not, however, explain the specific and ongoing 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Barron (1989) and Hurd (2004). 
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marginalisation of Palestinian cities in sister city practices, since Iraqi cities 
that are also sites of terrorist activity are enthusiastically embraced as 
municipal partners. The processes through which particular Palestinian cities 
come to be rejected as sister cities, while equally, if not more dangerous Iraqi 
cities are accepted, form the primary analytical focus of this study.  
In order to identify the limits of the capacity of the sister city movement 
to build peace at an international scale, I examine individually three proposals 
in which cities in the United States and Australia sought to partner with 
Palestinian cities, and collectively, several partnerships between American and 
Iraqi cities.  All of these proposals were initiated against the background stress 
of the escalating conflict in the Middle East, but had significantly different 
outcomes. I then conduct an overview of alternative directions is sister city 
practices under less intense contextual conditions.  
The data for the study were collected between 2006 and 2009, during 
the administrations of President George W. Bush in the United States and of 
Prime Ministers John Howard and Kevin Rudd in Australia. I employed a 
qualitative methodology within a symbolic interactionist framework, using the 
methods of observation, semi-structured interviews and discourse analysis. The 
research questions to be addressed were as follows. 
 
1 Why are sister city relationships with objectively dangerous Iraqi cities 
accepted uncritically at the local scale, while proposed partnerships with 
similarly dangerous Palestinian cities are strongly opposed? 
2 Through what processes are the meanings given to these cities, and to the 
people who live in them, translated into the structural inequality of formal 
acceptance or rejection? 
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3 What do the answers to these questions reveal as to the capacity of sister city 
relationships to facilitate peace building under conditions of severe, ongoing 
geopolitical conflict? 
4 How do these findings relate to broader sister city practices?  
5 What implications do they have for policy and practice in local governance? 
Outline of the chapters 
In chapter one, I discuss the historical and theoretical contexts which gave rise 
to the research questions. These include an overview of various interpretations 
of the roles of nation states and cities in general, and of sister city relationships 
in particular, in shaping world systems of war or peace. In contrast to 
essentialist representations of cities, and of the sister city relationships they 
enact, as inherently oriented towards peace, I draw on accounts of contestation 
and resistance in sister city discourses. I also provide background information 
on the European twinning movement to the extent that it relates to the broader 
sister cities movement, as well as a summary of the history of sister city 
relationships in the United States and Australia. 
 In chapter two, I provide a more detailed account of the context for the 
Western-Middle Eastern sister city relationships which constitute the primary 
empirical focus of the thesis, and discuss the methodology and methods 
employed in the study.  I also identify the specific goal sought by sister city 
peace actors as the boundary object (Star and Griesemer, 1989), a bridging 
entity that facilitates cooperative endeavour between actors from diverse social 
worlds. I then construct a theoretically and empirically supported analytical 
model of sister city peace relationships to serve as a coherent referent for the 
sister city peace projects analysed in chapters three to six.  
 In chapter three, I conduct an analysis of a public hearing which was 
held in early 2007 in the American city of Olympia, in order to decide the 
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outcome of a proposal to link Olympia as a sister city with the war-torn 
Palestinian city of Rafah on the Gaza strip. Despite being supported by a clear 
majority of speakers at the hearing, the proposal was defeated. I argue that this 
was due to its transformation into a ‘risk object’ (Hilgartner, 1992) at the local 
scale, due to the threat it was understood by the local authority to pose for 
stability within the city.  
The focus of chapter four is the Australian municipality of Marrickville, 
which successfully sistered with the Palestinian city of Bethlehem, also in 
2007. The Marrickville proposal was opposed by the mainstream media and by 
a local Jewish organisation and indirectly censured by the Australian Federal 
Government, but attracted no significant opposition at the local scale. Although 
it became emplaced as risk object variant, I argue that this particular 
relationship has the potential to become a boundary object at the international 
scale. 
In chapter five, I examine a sister city proposal in the neighbouring 
Australian municipality of Leichhardt. In this instance, the Palestinian city 
under consideration as a sister city partner was Hebron, which, like Rafah, is a 
city devastated by war. This proposal was opposed at the local scale, but in a 
more moderate form than that experienced in Olympia. Due to the perception 
by the local authority that it was causing division within the municipality of 
Leichhardt, the proposal was withdrawn from the council agenda, also 
becoming a risk object. 
In chapter six, the focus is on a qualitatively different kind of outcome, 
which I term the consensus object. Consensus objects are exemplified by sister 
city relationships with Iraqi cities, which were introduced in 2004 by the 
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United States government as a strategy for improving its globally damaged 
reputation. Discourses surrounding these relationships create the impression 
that they achieve communication across significant difference in the pursuit of 
global peace. I argue, however, that they allow for only one ‘definition of the 
situation’, which accords with the foreign policies of the U.S. state, and that 
their peace building capacity is accordingly severely compromised. 
In chapter seven, I change direction, in order to provide an overview of 
alternative directions being taken in culture-based sister city relationships. 
These relationships operate under less stressful background conditions than 
those with Middle Eastern cities and offer the greatest likelihood of boundary 
object formation. However the three trends that I identify indicate that the 
sister cities movement as a whole is moving further away from a peace 
building role. Two of these prioritise the economic development of cities, 
while the third also suggests an embryonic turn towards a nationalist agenda in 
Australian sister city relationships.  
Chapter eight is the final chapter in the thesis, and provides a discussion 
of the theoretical and practical implications of the data and analysis. The 
combined results of the study indicate that the high expectations placed on 
sister city relationships, and on the local councils that ultimately bear the 
responsibility for approving and maintaining them, are not only misplaced but 
also unreasonable. I conclude the thesis with suggestions for future research 
and for improved practices in local governance with respect to sister city 
relationships.  
A brief profile of each of the three Western cities from which most of 
the empirical material is drawn (Olympia, Marrickville and Bethlehem) is 
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contained in Appendix 1. These are promotional profiles sourced from city web 
pages and are included to provide additional contextual information.    
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Chapter One: Situating the study 
Seeking solidarity in a disconnected world 
Reflection upon the state of human bonds in the early twenty first century 
would appear to yield scant support for visions of a cohesive world order.  
Global news coverage delivers alarming, up-to-the-minute reports of war, 
ethnic violence, institutionalised human rights violations, famine and 
environmental catastrophe. In the wake of the terrorist attacks of 2001 and 
thereafter, hopes that the end of the Cold War would put an end to international 
conflict have faded (Altman, 2000, Lawson, 2002), replaced by a diffuse 
preoccupation with risk and uncertainty on the parts of political institutions and 
the people they claim to represent (Body-Gendrot, 2004, Gullestad, 2006). 
Human lives are said to lie in fragments (Bauman, 1995), as climbing rates of 
depression and suicide (WHO , 2004), a dominant ideology of selfish 
individualism (Bellah et al, 2007) and widespread civic withdrawal (Sennett, 
1992(a), Putnam, 2000) signal a concerted flight from an apparently 
meaningless and frightening world. The confident expectations of modernity 
seem to be crumbling, giving way to a loss of faith that human endeavour can 
shape a brighter future. Denzin (2003:223) sums up a prevailing mood of 
despondency: “we live in dark and bitter times”. 
The pervasive reach of these manifestations of malaise marks them as 
public problems which, as noted by Mills, (2000), must be addressed by means 
of public solutions. Since Mills identified this aspect of what he termed ‘the 
sociological imagination’ in the late 1950s, the public ‘sphere’ has undergone a 
transformation.  It is now technologically mediated and global in scope (Beck, 
2002), necessitating and facilitating cooperation between racially, culturally 
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and politically diverse ‘others’, whose social and political institutions may 
themselves be internally fraught with division and conflict. It is also 
increasingly ill-defined, merging with domestic concerns of the private sphere 
as political action shifts from structural to cultural framing (Pakulski, 1997, 
Turner, 2001, Stevenson, 2003), democratic institutions realign their policies 
towards a governance rather than government paradigm (Stoker 1998, 
O’Toole, 2005) and private individuals feel “caught up in a swirl of world 
events” over which they have no control (Denzin, 2003:222). Academic 
understandings of the public sphere are also allocating increased attention to 
emotional as well as rational dimensions of civic communication.2 In a world 
of shifting boundaries (Levine, 2007) and contingent solidarities (Bauman, 
2001), the challenge is therefore to construct networked public institutions 
within which significantly diverse interest groups at all scales of human 
interaction are motivated and enabled to work together on the construction and 
maintenance of shared public goods such as peace, social justice and 
environmental sustainability, while also addressing issues of personal salience, 
such as identity and emotional attachment. Such institutions would constitute 
‘spaces of hospitality’ (Dikeç, 2002, Friese, 2004, 2008) in which the 
perspective of the ‘other’ would be heard, acknowledged and, as far as 
possible, understood. As the “political expression of the nation” and “matrix of 
modernity” (Arnason, 1990:224), the nation state has historically constituted 
the principal framework for analysing global connections between 
geopolitically disparate agents. However according to theorists such as Scheff 
(1994), Galtung (2000) and  Beck (2001), it has proved unequal to the task, and 
                                                 
2 For discussions of the role of emotion in the construction of civic identity and 
engagement, see Barbalet, 2002, Elliott, 2003, and Proctor, 2005.  
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new paradigms are required to address the urgent conditions faced by global 
populations in the new millennium. 
The state stands for war 
Scheff (1994) and Galtung (2000) view the nation state as an inherently 
divisive, belligerent and therefore discredited entity, ideologically and 
structurally antithetical to the project of building global solidarity. For Scheff 
(1994), international conflict is the macro-level expression of emotion-based, 
pathological gendered ideologies characteristic of alienated relationships at all 
levels of contemporary civilisations. Building on Anderson’s (1983) notion of 
‘imagined communities’, Scheff (1994) locates ethnic nationalism, and the 
‘primary’ emotion of shame, at the basis of a global war system, within which 
nation states act out cycles of humiliation, honour and revenge. These 
problems are compounded by the reluctance and possible incapacity of national 
governments to acknowledge the role played by emotion in generating and 
sustaining conflict (1994: 65).3  
Galtung (2000) frames the Western state system as a ‘catastrophe’ for 
global peaceful co-existence, as it is affords nation states the legal authority to 
enact violence on their own citizens and, in the context of war, the citizens of 
other states. While allowing for the possibility of state reform, he remains 
pessimistic regarding the prospect of such an outcome, concluding that the 
“state/nation system as we know it today is no peace system and will not 
become one: state/nation systems and peace systems are incompatible” (2000: 
860). Bauman (1995) identifies the conceptual boundedness of nation states as 
                                                 
3 Scheff’s (1994)  identification of  the emotional basis of  international conflicts is supported 
by the work of Costigliola, (1997a, 1997b, 1998, 2000), whose case-based studies demonstrate 
the macro-political consequences of the emotions of gendered individuals during the Second 
World War and Cold War periods.  
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a catalyst for what was probably the greatest moral disaster of the twentieth 
century, arguing that the statelessness of the Jewish people provided a 
cognitive justification for the holocaust:  “In a world fully and exhaustively 
divided into national domains, there was no space left for internationalism, and 
each scrap of the no-man’s land had become a standing invitation for 
aggression. The world tightly packed with nations and nation-states abhorred 
the non-national void. Jews were in such a void: they were such a void” 
(1995:53, emphasis in original).  Finally, Beck (2002) questions the value of 
the nation state as an analytical category, given the reality that people, loyalties 
and risks now “slosh across national borders” (2002:50). States, he argues, 
cannot but react negatively to such flows and the threat they pose to the 
integrity of their boundaries. For Beck (2002), the nation state is obsolete, a 
‘zombie category’; functioning, but without sufficient vitality to address the 
complex tensions between global societies.  
These arguments point to a need for an alternative paradigm around 
which a new world order based on global cooperation might be constructed. 
While Beck’s (2002) suggested model is a ‘cosmopolitan state’, the favoured 
paradigm of many activists and social theorists is a long-established 
geopolitical entity with a somewhat chequered pedigree for peace-building 
capacity - the city.  For Galtung (2000), the peace theorist and sociologist 
whose work most exemplifies this approach, what is required is “more city-
logic and less state-logic in the world” (2000:861); a shift away from state 
structures and symbols, which undergird and legitimate the current ‘war 
system’, towards a system based on the city as a global symbol of peace.  
 12 
The city stands for peace 
Cities are complex and confusing constructions (Kunstler, 2001), permeated 
with ambivalence and ambiguity. Both social institutions (Mumford, 1997) and 
concrete conglomerations of buildings, streets and other functional 
constructions (Toffin, 1990), they are now the standard mode of human 
cohabitation (Swyngedouw and Kaïka, 2003).  The city is also an abstraction, a 
composite of images and subjective interpretations that give it meaning (Toffin 
1990:101). Cities are simultaneously local, embedded in place-based histories 
and experiences, and global, accommodating ceaseless ‘flows’ of money, 
people, information and ideas (Castells, 1991). Their position as commercial 
centres in a globalised world requires them to compete for human, abstract and 
material resources as well as to co-operate and share knowledge and expertise 
(Levant, Kundak and Gülümser, 2004). They are dynamic, at the forefront of 
the development of civilisations (Hall, 1998) but also ‘sluggish’, organised by 
means of physical, social and economic structures that have crystallized 
through the years and do not readily change” (Bollens, 1998:19). They are sites 
of conflict, inequality and social exclusion (Stren and Polèse, 2000, 
Madinipour, 2003) and of cooperation, unification, and civic consciousness 
(Belanger, 2009). As centres of industrial production, they drive wars between 
nations, yet are also the primary victims of war and other forms of political 
violence (Stanley 2003, Graham, 2004). Within the context of broader 
conflicts, a given city can play multiple and oppositional roles, “including 
target for intergroup hostilities, stage for the expression of antagonisms, 
accommodative arena and peace building opportunity” (Bollens, 1998:5).   
The identification of cities primarily as international peace actors in the 
light of this mixed and dubious convenance is thus counterintuitive, but it is 
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predicated on the particular motivations and capabilities arising from the 
structural and symbolic organization of cities, as detailed by Galtung (2000). 
These are summarised in Table One, below. 
Motivations of Local Authorities Capabilities of Local Authorities 
 
Cities cannot have armies, and this affects 
the world views of those who govern 
them: “For he who has a hammer, the 
world looks like a nail”.  As a 
consequence, local authorities are 
disinclined to see solutions to problems in 
military terms and more willing to take a 
stand against such solutions, for example, 
by declaring their cities to be nuclear free 
zones. 
 
Exchanges of people and ideas across 
national borders are city-based. Civil 
society is meaningless without a 
municipal framework. People meet and 
interact, within and among 
municipalities.  
 
Cities do not act as depositories of 
national traumas and myths, which can 
foster a pathological sense of special 
status and unique destiny.   
 
 
Unlike international NGOs, which tend 
to be  internally monochromatic, 
municipalities of all sizes are mirrors of 
society at large, embodying 
heterogeneous mixes  of gender, classes, 
cultures and professions. 
 
The victims of war, maldevelopment and 
ecological breakdown are local, so efforts 
to address these issues must also be local. 
It is therefore in the interests of local 
authorities to link with other human 
settlements, for formulating solutions and 
providing mutual sustenance.  
 
Because of the heterogeneity of cities, 
local authorities are accustomed to 
managing complexity at the coal face of 
everyday experience. The administrative 
structure of cities is conducive to 
expansion to include, for example, the 
formal office of a municipal peace 
councillor. 
Table 1. Peace-building Motivations and Capabilities of Local 
Authorities (Summarised from Galtung, 2000:861-862) 
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As noted by Blanco (2003), cooperation between cities on an international 
scale is an emerging trend in urban management and governance. Horizontal 
networks between cities provide opportunities for disparate social groups and 
bureaucracies to share knowledge, expertise and recreational experiences. Such 
exchanges can translate into an improved quality of life for the residents of 
both partnered cities. By means of organisations such as the World Association 
of Cities and Local Authorities (WACLAC), the United Cities and Local 
Government Association (UCLG), Metropolis, Local Governments for 
Sustainability (ICLEI) and Mayors for Peace, cities around the world are now 
networking in order to address common challenges and inequalities in urban 
life and organisation (Alger, 2005).   
Local governments are also said to be ‘closer to the people’ (Fry, 1998, 
Farazmand, 2004), providing “a far more concrete space for politics than the 
nation” (Sassen, 2004:655).  Concerns that the foreign policies of national 
governments are against the interests of local communities have given rise to 
what has become known as municipal foreign policy or city/municipal 
diplomacy (Falk, 1993). By establishing their own international relations 
offices, or simply by building connections with cities located in countries that 
are problematic from the perspective of national governments, local authorities 
seek to influence or even bypass the foreign policies of states. The Canadian 
city of Hamilton for example, declared itself a ‘mundialized ‘, or ‘world city’, 
as early as 1968, and its people ‘true citizens of the world’ (Fragomeni, 2003).  
As detailed in chapter two of this study, even when not aimed directly at peace 
building, joint urban endeavours that address tasks of mutual concern can 
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provide opportunities for perspective taking and recognition of mutual concern 
among diverse social actors. 
Bush (2004) identifies peace building as a key role of local government, 
arguing that  
 
(m)unicipal governments play a crucial role in 
encouraging/harnessing/facilitating participation of various stakeholders in 
promoting peace including supporting local level, community based peace 
initiatives involving peace advocates from the ground. Public participation 
and community-based mechanisms such as dialogues, consultations and 
public information campaigns may be effectively undertaken by municipal 
governments in partnership with peace advocates and peace bodies in the 
community, possibly even at the national or international spheres (2004:5).  
 
Peirce (2007) posits an essentialist orientation towards peace in the persons of 
individual mayors themselves. “There’s even a practical peace imperative 
among mayors that might restrain power-wielding national governments”, he 
argues. “Responsible for constituents’ everyday safety and welfare, mayors 
speak a practical language and instinctively recoil at warring ideologies” 
(2007:2). Arguing for a new city-based peace paradigm in international 
relations, the Mayor of Hiroshima, Tadatoshi Akiba (2009) also frames city 
mayors as intrinsically trustworthy and peace promoting. 
 
We mayors live in the cities we serve.  We are close to our people.  When 
they suffer, we suffer.  If we say that the roads have been repaired and the 
garbage collected, the people are able to see with their own eyes whether or 
not we are telling the truth.  In other words, there is a fact based trust between 
mayors and citizens.  This trust is the power that will create a better future we 
all aspire for. Cities do not maintain armies.  When we form intercity 
relationships, we do not form military alliances, we form sister-city 
partnerships.  We seek to grow and develop not through competition, 
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dominance and control of resources but through trade, exchange, cooperation, 
sharing of responsibilities, and mutual benefit (2009:17). 
 
Institutional and academic discourses thus frame municipal 
governments as bearing a responsibility as well as a capacity for peace building 
beyond the local scale. Such high expectations, however, can lead to 
inattention to the limits of agency and inclination on the parts of the 
governments and citizenries of the far-from-homogenous twenty-first century 
city. In considering local governments as peace-building institutions, 
particularly in opposition to states, it is necessary also to bear in mind the 
structural and ideological limitations experienced by real institutions operating 
at the local level. Dollery and Johnson (2005), for example, caution that to 
speak collectively of urban governments is to gloss over the complexity of ‘real 
world municipal systems’, which vary considerably in terms of political 
cultures, administrative structures, scope of service delivery, and resources. At 
a time when the responsibilities of local governments are being extended, their 
funding from national agencies is being reduced;  Berry, Portney and Thomson 
(2003) frame  local government as “like a third world country in comparison to 
the federal government in terms of resources available” (1993:117). This 
situation obliges local authorities, as compulsory players in the world 
economy, to focus on developing ever more creative and strategic methods of 
generating wealth as a key priority (van Vilet, 2002).  City councils are also 
subject to rising expectations (Raynsford, 2005) and intense scrutiny on the 
parts of ratepayers (Dollery and Johnson, 2005:83) and the media. Both are 
quick to condemn perceived misuses of the time and energies of their officials, 
and particularly of council income derived from the obligatory payment of 
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rates. Furthermore, councils are required to respond to the sometimes 
incompatible identity-based demands emanating from the complex mix of 
ethnic groups that now characterise even smaller cities around the world.  
It is therefore incumbent upon researchers conducting empirical 
investigations into the potential of local authorities to function as international 
or transnational peace-building institutions to take into account their 
constraints and limitations, rendered visible in the responses of specific city 
governments and urban populations to particular initiatives on the parts of 
citizen action groups.  This thesis constitutes such a project, using the example 
of the rapidly expanding international urban movement invoked above by 
Mayor Akiba of Hiroshima, known in the English-speaking world as sister city, 
or town twinning relationships.  
Sister city relationships as peace building projects 
 ‘Sister city relationships’ is an umbrella term for a highly diverse range of 
urban-based images and practices.  Since the mid twentieth century, there has 
been a growing trend for international cities to create formal inter-municipal 
partnerships, often, but not always, in conjunction with citizen volunteers. In 
recognition of its now global reach, Zelinsky (1991) calls this phenomenon ‘the 
twinning of the world’. There are no binding conventions or expectations as to 
the nature of these interactions, other than that of benevolent intent. They can 
range from “social clubs with an international flavour” (Shea, 2002:219) to 
humanitarian aid projects conducted in opposition to national foreign policy 
(Alger, 1990). Sister city relationships “perform important expressive functions 
by generating the kind of awareness necessary to stimulate concrete action” 
(Hobbs, 1994, cited in Hobbs and Chernotsky, 2001:61).  
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Cahill (2003) identifies productive relationship building as the primary 
purpose of a sister city program. “It’s about experiences with and in another 
language” he reports. “It’s about interaction with various cultures. It’s about 
education and cross cultural understanding. It’s about revenues. It’s about 
helping prepare young people to succeed in a global environment. It’s about 
fun”. In practice, sister city activities routinely involve expressions of mutual 
good will and exchanges of people and information between each partnered 
city. Those who travel in person to sister cities are typically local politicians, 
citizen volunteers or school students. The disparate intentions and practices 
identified by Cahill (2003) may seem relatively humble in scope, but 
collectively they are said to lead to a far higher gain. Despite minimal 
empirical support for such claims, sister city relationships are frequently 
identified as vehicles for the establishment of a new world order based on 
cross-cultural, inter-urban communication and perspective taking.  
For Zelinsky (1991), the rapid increase in sister city relationships 
around the world unmistakably signals “the formation of an interactive 
planetary society, for the first time ever in human history, and that this novel 
interconnectivity has begun to enmesh all strata of humankind, not just a 
privileged elite” (1991:2). Baycan-Levent, Kundak and Gulumser (2008) 
understand sister cities as contributing to the production of a global culture 
through building cultural dialogue and common values (2008:107), while for 
Galtung (2000) they constitute “an excellent and visible example of 
international civil society” (2000:862).  Kavoloski (1990) argues that they can 
function as a site of non-violent resistance to the “bellicose, short-sighted and 
dangerous” policies of nation states (1990:174), while Barash and Webel 
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(2002) see them as playing the role of intermediary, serving to “break down the 
political, geographical and ideological barriers between states” (2002:366).  
Honig (1997) characterises sister city relationships as “affective sites of 
located, institutional transnationalism”, which “interrupt projects of 
(re)nationalisation by generating practices of affective citizenship that exceed 
state boundaries” (1997:131).  For Honig, (1997) the movement “in some ways 
exemplifies and may yet help to build a future democratic cosmopolitanism” 
(1997:131).  
Iriye (2002) identifies sister cities as an example of ‘grassroots’ 
organisations, which may hold the potential to unite humanity on a global 
scale. Echoing Galtung (2000), he argues that, in contrast to states, 
international organisations  
 
have proved quite successful in reconciling differences because their own 
weapons are ideas, a sense of commitment, and voluntary service. They have 
not spent billions on arms, nor have they engaged in mass killing. They are 
civilised societies, and so they have a mission to turn the world into a civilized 
community” (2002:192-193).   
 
Adams (2008) cites Boli and Lechner’s (2005) claim that Cold War era sister 
city relationships served as a means of “cross-pollination of cultures across the 
Iron Curtain”. “From the perspective of world polity theory”, he argues, “it is 
just these kinds of international institution-building activities that form the 
basis of “world culture,” contributing not just to a universal recognition of the 
importance of folk cultures, but also to the universalization of values such as 
human and minority rights” (2008: 626).  `  
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An empirical examination of sister city relationships, however, reveals 
a reality that is more complex and conflicted than such representations would 
suggest. Formalised inter-municipal partnerships can send a clear message to 
the populations of international cities that they are accepted as equal human 
beings and desired as friends, but they can also serve as a means for tainting 
particular international urban others with courtesy stigma (Goffman, 1963), by 
virtue of their association with, and assumed endorsement of, problematic 
governments or ways of life. The German city of Ratstatt, for example, 
suspended links after 30 years with its French sister city, Orange, after an 
inauspicious election result. “Rastatt's Social Democratic mayor felt there was 
no way to work with the "inhumane policies" of the National Front” reports the 
academic information base Migration Dialogue (1995); “The Belgian city of 
Liege also broke ties … with the French city of Toulon”. In addition, a sister 
city agreement with the French town of Nice was torn up by Brisbane Lord 
Mayor Jim Soorley in 1995, in protest over French nuclear testing in the 
Pacific (Heywood, 2002), the Italian city of Reggio Emilia discussed severing 
its relationship with Fort Worth over the issue of capital punishment (Apple, 
2002), and  the Australian  pearling town of Broome suspended its sister city 
relationship with Taiji in order to express the repugnance of its citizens towards 
the Japanese practice of hunting dolphins (Taylor, 2009). However it is 
discourses concerning Chinese sister city relationships that perhaps most 
extensively illustrate the tensions and ambiguities that can complicate sister 
city relations across significant cultural and political difference. 
The macro political implications of sister city symbolism are not lost on 
the Chinese government, which oversees its country’s international municipal 
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contacts and intervenes directly in established sister city relationships when its 
policies are breached. In 2006, the city council of the U.S. city of Irvine found 
itself embroiled in political conflict when details of an agreement it had signed 
with Xuhui district in Shanghai became public. Slupsky (2006) records that the 
new agreement had contained a contentious proviso relating to a prior sister 
city agreement between Irvine and Taoyuan City in Taiwan.  
 
We promise that there will be no occurrence of 'two Chinas' or "one China, 
one Taiwan' and that on any occasions and in any forms the names of 
'Republic of China' and 'Taiwan' will not be used and its so-called 'national 
flag' and 'national anthem' will not be hung and played. The city officials of 
Irvine will not visit Taiwan Province in their official capacities and will not 
attend the so-called 'National Day' celebrations and other activities. 
 
Following vocal local protests in the form of meetings, emails and phone calls, 
Irvine council apologised repeatedly to the people of Taiwan and Taiwanese 
residents of Irvine and renewed its commitment to its sister city relationship 
with Taoyuan. After two years, however, the council was still feeling the 
repercussions of the controversy, and municipal leaders decided to withdraw 
the city’s financial support for the Irvine Sister Cities Foundation. Months 
later, the foundation itself was dissolved (Emery, 2009).  
In 2008, in the Australian city of Melbourne, the Chinese government 
again perceived an international threat in the form of a politically contentious 
film ‘The Ten Conditions of Love’. Following weeks of Chinese protests, 
hacker attacks on the Melbourne International Film Festival’s website, reports 
of death threats to festival staff and boycotts by Chinese filmmakers, Chinese 
authorities threatened to sever Tianjin’s sister city relationship with Melbourne 
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if the city’s Lord mayor did not intervene to prevent its screening (Mangan, 
Stark and Toy, 2008). Despite these warnings, the film was screened on 
schedule, with minimal consequences for the Tianjin-Melbourne sister city 
relationship.  
More commonly, however, China is on the receiving end of attempts to 
regulate sister city relationships. Skelsey (2005) cites a Sydney councillor’s 
contention that Australian local authorities should be wary of sister city 
relationships with Chinese cities, since they are “rife with corruption” and 
“signing the agreements gave extra status to these rotten boroughs”. In 1996, a 
more complicated situation arose when Berkeley city council received a 
proposal from the informal U.S./China Exchange Program, regarding a sister 
city relationship with the Chinese city of Changde.  Immediate protests came in 
to council from groups supporting Tibetan causes, and members of Berkeley’s 
Peace and Justice Commission were faced with a dilemma as to what kind of 
signal should be sent by the city. As councillor Dona Spring explained, “we do 
not want to insult the people of Changde, but we don’t want to make it seem as 
though things are hunky-dory in China” (Chao, 1996). By way of a 
compromise, council voted to make Changde a ‘step-sister city’ (Harper, 
1996), by formalising, but immediately suspending, the relationship. In the 
view of Glen Gilbert, executive director of the Berkeley-based International 
Committee of Lawyers for Tibet, affording formal recognition of the sister city 
relationship “would be rewarding the government of China for its violation of 
human rights”, but for Ann Fagan-Ginger, another member of the Peace and 
Justice Commission, a formalised relationship “could provide a model of local 
democracy” for the Chinese city.  "This is step backward in our understanding 
 23 
that the sister city relationship is city to city” she argued. “It's not city to 
nation. Berkeley legally can't establish a relationship with the Chinese 
government" (Harper, 1996).   
Commissioner Michael Sherman, who had helped draft the proposal 
before the city council, was troubled by the ambiguity and complexity of the 
issue under discussion. “Politically and philosophically”, he remarked to the 
press, “I support sister cities as a way of helping people all over the world to 
get to know other people. But there was a lot of anxiety in my mind about this 
whole thing” (Chao, 1996). Councillor Polly Armstrong abstained on all 
China-related votes, maintaining that such matters were beyond the purview of 
local authorities:  "My theory is that until we get our own problems 
straightened out in Berkeley, we have no time to interfere with other people's 
problems in other places" she declared (Harper, 1996).  
Earlier in that same year, Sukhi Turner, the newly elected Mayor of 
Dunedin, New Zealand, had refused to lead a delegation to her city’s sister city 
of Shanghai, citing China’s “human rights abuses, nuclear testing and other 
unacceptable policies” (Eunson, 1996).  The ensuing public debate focused on 
the proper scope of the mayoral office and the appropriate boundary between 
the mayor’s private morality and official obligations. As one local newspaper 
reported,  
Mrs Turner's advantage is that while councillors are elected from wards, she 
was voted in by the electorate "at large". She sees that as a mandate from 
Dunedin as a whole, but recognises the chain of office symbolises a duty to 
place the city's welfare before her own … [Her stance] has made her the butt 
of business-based criticism, some claiming it is "a tragedy in terms of the 
city's links with Shanghai"; one that she had put her principles ahead of her 
responsibilities as mayor. A former Shanghai resident was quoted as saying 
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that "while China has got problems, India has them too" -- a reference to Mrs 
Turner's Indian background … Mrs Turner is learning it is not enough just to 
be different and to not confirm with the majority of her elected colleagues. 
She has a right to speak out, to stand firm on issues she regards as essential to 
the maintenance of her integrity, and with experience she might well acquire 
an ability to adapt so that what might be seen merely as a personal belief does 
not trip up a wider public concern. Politics is, after all, the art of the possible, 
and requires a degree of compromise to work (Eunson, 1996). 
Ten years later, Mayor Turner’s successor, Peter Chin, was expressing a very 
different ‘definition of the situation’ to the local press. For Mayor Chin, there 
appeared to be no conflict of interest in asserting the primacy of his Chinese 
identity, which accorded with his commitment to re-establish strong ties 
between Dunedin and Shanghai. Responding to a question about human rights, 
Mayor Chin announced that he was aware of the issues but would not be taking 
them into account. “I look at it from the point of view that I'm Chinese”, he 
explained. “That is my background. This is my mother country" (Eaton, 2006). 
Mayor Chin’s approach also accorded well with his city’s economic 
development agenda, with particular regard to of a free trade agreement that 
was under negotiation, As Eaton (2006) reports, New Zealand’s  ‘diplomatic’ 
reticence with regard to human rights issues had brought tangible rewards for 
the country as a whole. 
Trade Minister Phil Goff … is frank about the need to tread carefully.  "It is 
within the context of the foreign ministry portfolio that human rights is raised. 
I don't talk human rights on trade," he said …Sister Cities New Zealand 
director Brian Cross said human rights were not even on the agenda. China's 
growing political and economic importance meant it was often the case that 
suitors tended to walk on eggshells. "I think it is an understandable diplomatic 
approach that we do that," Cross said. "But we like to think, and you see 
demonstrations of it at the micro level, that as we develop relationships and 
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have more trust we can talk to people in a more forthright manner. "That is a 
lot of the philosophy behind the sister cities movement … The regularity with 
which New Zealand officials outside the Foreign Ministry shy away from 
human rights issues has not gone unnoticed in China. One academic at a 
prominent Beijing university said on condition of anonymity that officials 
were surprised but appreciative of New Zealand's "softly softly" approach and 
that it was likely to bear fruit. Without it, New Zealand would probably not 
have got as far as it had on an FTA [Free Trade Agreement]”.  
Also emanating from a New Zealand city was a contested motion put forward 
in 1999 that “the Christchurch City Council include in the proposed criteria to 
be used in the selection of new sister cities and the evaluation of existing sister 
cities, a requirement that sister cities “provide their citizens with democratic 
rights similar to those enjoyed by Christchurch citizens”.  In response, one 
councillor suggested that it “would be like sending missionaries only to 
Christian countries”, while another argued in support, citing Nelson Mandela’s 
statement that severed links had helped bring an end to apartheid in South 
Africa. The serving mayor of Christchurch, Garry Moore, was aghast at the 
proposal, commenting that “(i)t is the belief in this sort of purity which raised 
the Berlin Wall. To cut off China out of a feeling of “purity” would be raging 
hypocrisy” (Crean, 1999:4). Mayor Moore went on to ask a council staff 
member how many of Christchurch’s existing sister cities would be affected if 
the motion were to succeed.  
In reply, the staffer said that USA (Seattle) had been condemned by Amnesty 
International for carrying out summary executions, that recent events had 
shown that UK (Christchurch, Dorset) police were racist, Japan (Osaka) 
continued whaling, that the United Nations had condemned Australia 
(Adelaide) for the way it treated the aboriginal people, and that Korea wasn’t 
democratic as we use the term. He added wryly that even Christchurch would 
fail as our own sister city, for in the past week Pamela Jeffrey had awarded 
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New Zealand only a B+ grade on the human rights scale (New Zealand 
Embassy, 1999).  
The debate over Christchurch’s sister city relationship was still current in 2007, 
when Amnesty International members approached the council, requesting the 
support of Mayor Moore - who was in China at the time promoting sister city 
relationships - in their campaign against human rights abuses in China. 
However the mayor had left instructions that no-one from council should 
receive the group in his absence (Eaton, 2007). A more sympathetic response 
came from the news media, which applauded Amnesty’s opposition to 
Christchurch’s “ugly sisters”.  
Amnesty International is right to challenge Christchurch Mayor Garry Moore 
-- and other New Zealand mayors -- over their dealings with China. Appalling 
human rights abuses are an uncomfortable reality of that country and cannot 
be ignored in doing business with it. The issue should be raised by the mayors 
when they are enjoying Chinese hospitality on the strength of sister- city 
relationships, if only because they represent communities that cherish 
freedom. It is convenient for mayors such as Moore to hide behind the 
traditionally harmless notion of sister cities and the argument that such 
sensitive matters are not the business of local governments. That argument 
fails on two points. As Amnesty points out, Chinese local governments -- the 
guardians of our "sister cities" -- are often implicit in the human rights abuses. 
Second, by seeking to expand those sister-city agreements into something 
more lucrative, New Zealand mayors are unavoidably broadening the scope of 
what is at stake (‘Opinion’, The Press, 2007:A22).  
As these instances illustrate, sister city relationships can serve as a discursive 
resource for stigma application and resistance at the level of international 
municipal relationships. Importantly, though less frequently, the fictive kinship 
and consequent recognition of common humanity that they entail can also 
provide a pathway out of an established deviant status. In the aftermath of 
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World War 11, war-time images of the Japanese as ‘reptiles, insects, rats, 
cockroaches, vermin and baboons’ (Steuter and Wills, 2008) had to be 
transformed in the American public consciousness into images of friends and 
allies. During the 1950s, sister city relationships played a role in repairing 
relationships between these former enemies, by supporting national-level 
projects of reconciliation (SCI, 2004, Kurata, 2008). For the mayor of Dachau, 
the process was more challenging, due to the intense level of stigma attracted 
by the proximity of the notorious concentration camp of the same name. This 
highly committed mayor strove unsuccessfully for many years to find a sister 
city as part of a strategy to counter “unjust prejudices” against the town and its 
residents (Marcuse, 2001:332). Dachau now has two urban partners under the 
European twinning scheme and is seeking to form a reconciliatory sister city 
relationship with Jerusalem (Kalman, 2009).  Meepas (n/d) notes the existence 
of one hundred twinning relationships between German and Israeli towns and 
districts, formed explicitly as part of the post-war reconciliation process.  
Smothers (2005) recounts the less politically significant but 
nevertheless uplifting story of the transformation of Newark-on-Trent, a 
“gritty” English city that in the mid 1980s had been “mired in crime and 
synonymous with urban blight”. In 1987, on hearing of a suggestion that the 
American city of Newark, California might be considering changing its name 
in order to distance itself from its British namesake, the English mayor 
hastened to contact his U.S. counterpart to work towards a positive reframing 
of the Newark image. Together, the two mayors instigated a sister city network 
of cities named Newark around the world.  International Newark residents can 
now “tour local sites, sample local entertainment and food, and generally 
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plumb the significance, serendipity or synchronicity of their common name … 
They will [also] be able to visit a new exhibit at the Newark Public Library that 
examines the history of all the Newarks”. In the words of the mayor of 
Newark, California, “It’s now like a bunch of cousins, and I’m just looking 
forward to seeing my cousins. I marvel at the diversity of all the people from 
all the Newarks. We revel in our Newarkness” (Smothers, 2005:B1). 
 Communication within and between sister cities is revealed by such 
examples to be a far more complex, ambiguous and contested phenomenon 
than is generally acknowledged in public and academic discourses. The broad 
scope and indeterminate nature of this ‘movement’ has particular consequences 
for its application within specific urban settings, especially with regard to its 
peace building capacity. Before proceeding further with this line of argument, 
however, I pause to situate present-day sister city and twinning relationships 
within their historical contexts, since it is there that the high expectations 
currently placed on current sister city relationships have their origins.  
The European twinning movement 
In the wake of the Second World War, a phenomenon known as ‘town 
twinning’ emerged in Western Europe. The combined result of independent 
initiatives on the parts of municipal authorities (Gaspari, 2002, Vion, 2002) and 
local humanitarian groups (Brown, 1998, Weyreter, 2003), the movement 
sought to build solidarity between former European enemies, thereby reducing 
the risk of any further ‘fratricidal’ warfare. While structured friendly relations 
between international cities had existed in the past, the spontaneous efforts 
made by British citizens and citizen groups to help the people of nations 
responsible for the recent decimation of their own cities constituted a new and 
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more popularly significant step in inter-municipal solidarity. Brown (1998) 
writes of the courage needed for the citizens of Bristol, which had been heavily 
bombed during the war, to twin with the German city of Hannover. In 1945, 
the German city had been suffering intense material and symbolic deprivation, 
a time known to the Germans as `Stunde Null' (the Nothing Time). Germany 
had been “completely destroyed physically and civic authorities had ceased to 
exist. The Allies, in their separate occupation zones, were not only conquerors 
but providers, administrators and educators. But the world, reeling from the 
discovery of the concentration camps, was holding the entire German nation 
responsible” (1998:3). The almost immediate humanitarian response from the 
people of Bristol was financed by an eclectic coalition of churches, trade 
unions and Bristol University, and kept in check by occupying military forces 
in the vanquished partner city.  Permission for open contact was given by the 
military government within the confines of its own agenda: humanitarian 
interactions were not to be used for “exercising pressure, either direct or 
indirect … with reference to political matters” (1998:3-4). The idea of 
concerned citizens, non-government organisations and an occupying military 
force working together to restore peace, order and prosperity in a former 
enemy city is an emotionally and morally compelling frame, which, as will be 
seen in chapter six of this study, was to be invoked nearly sixty years later to 
help justify a military occupation of a very different nature, following the US-
led invasion of Iraq.  
The close kinship connections of European royal families and the 
geographical proximity of the warring countries led to a post-war metaphoric 
understanding of the European theatre of war as a ‘fraternal’ conflict. This 
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representation of macro-political processes in terms of fictive kinship tropes 
later provided an interpretive framework, or ‘plausibility structure’ (Berger, 
1967), for what has been argued to be the appropriation of the town twinning 
movement by the European Union. For the EU, the primary allegiance afforded 
by European citizens to their own nation states comprised a challenge to the 
formation of a European identity, which needed to be overcome in the interests 
of consolidating a more peace-prone supranational institution.  North (2002) 
however, is highly critical of the instrumental orientation of EU interventions, 
arguing that while the goal of town twinning had originally been to fend off the 
threat of war,  
 
(w)hat made this project different was that “twinning” itself was not the 
objective.  It had been “hijacked” to become a means of achieving – in the 
eyes of its promoters – a far more noble objective. This is revealed by the oath 
that each municipality was required formally to declare, before it was 
admitted to the scheme.  It was:…to maintain permanent ties between our 
municipalities, to encourage exchanges in all domains between their 
inhabitants so as to develop, through a better mutual understanding, the notion 
of European brotherhood, to join forces so as to further, to the best of our 
ability, the success of this vital enterprise of peace and prosperity: the union of 
Europe. 
 
In the English, French and Italian languages, the names for the town twinning 
phenomenon (if not their usage, as indicated above) denote a gender-neutral 
understanding of urban based fictive kinship between equal siblings. The 
twinning metaphor carries no suggestion as to which city is to be deemed the 
older or younger sibling, neatly avoiding any status discrepancies that might 
otherwise ensue.  The Greek term adelphopoesis, however, shifts the focus of 
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the imagery explicitly onto gender, foregrounding a concept of kinship that is 
at the same time fictive and based on blood. ‘Brothering’ processes draw on 
cultural traditions that stretch back to the pre-modern social order.   As 
Papagaroufali (2005:346) explains,  
 
“(a)delphopoesis” stems from the words “adelphos” (“brother”) and “poesis” 
(or “poiesis”: “making of”). Its male character is due to ceremonies between 
male family/clan representatives, since ancient times, in order to prevent 
mutual feelings of hostility or to amend murderous acts of fighting. Partners 
would cut their veins and mix their blood in order to ensure the immutable 
nature of their fictive kin ties. 
 
Papagaroufali (2005) is critical of what she interprets as the EU’s colonisation 
of local ‘sensory-affective performances’ for the purposes of generating new 
feelings of incorporation into an emergent European identity. Through public 
rituals of ‘twinning’, which she identifies as ‘the master trope of the same’, 
deep and ‘authentic’ emotions of local place attachment and belonging through 
blood are transformed - abetted by indoctrination and the lure of EU funding - 
into political emotions tying the new European subject to otherwise unlikely 
kin.  
The town twinning movement predates and may well have inspired the 
American sister cities movement, which constitutes the primary framework for 
the present study, and the issues it raises have wider implication for inter-
municipal peace building around the world.  However its present primarily 
European focus places it outside the scope of this thesis, which addresses inter-
municipal relations that, at least in theory, seek to build peaceful relations on a 
global scale. Although the terms ‘town/city twinning’ and ‘sister cities’ are 
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often used interchangeably, I therefore reserve the use of the term ‘twinning’ to 
instances of its use in the general data when referring to relationships in which 
at least one of the partnered cities is non-European.  
The American sister cities movement 
American sister city relationships differ from town twinnings in that they 
ostensibly seek a more global reach (Hafteck, 2003) and are discursively 
gendered as feminine. As will be demonstrated in this study, the latter aspect 
has important consequences for the kinds of expectations imposed on sister 
cities in popular and political imaginaries. The present day American sister 
cities movement has been coordinated since 1967 by a central administrative 
body, Sister Cities International (SCI) – identified by Executive Director Tim 
Honey (n/d) as “first and foremost a national membership organization” - 
which is located in Washington, D.C.  The antecedents of the American sister 
city movement prior to the inception of SCI in 1967 can be traced to a 
conglomeration of national and local initiatives. Smith (1990) explains that  
 
(m)ost of the early SCPs [Sister City Projects] in the U.S. grew out of post 
World War 11 aid relations with Western European cities. But by 1956 
president Eisenhower formally announced the establishment of the People-to-
People movement, focusing more on personal relations and understanding 
than on aid. Of the more frequent later SCPs, perhaps a third were basically 
started as a result of external organizations or agencies. Some, for instance, 
were started by the initiation of the educational and Cultural Affairs Bureau, 
the U.S. Information agency or U.S. embassies of the State department of the 
U.S. government … Another important source of initiation was the national or 
state leagues of cities” (1990:180).  
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Smith (1990:180) goes on to locate the origins of the remaining two thirds 
within less formal processes. These include 
• pressure from immigrants, or more importantly, from U.S. citizens with a 
particular ethnic heritage,  
• complementary economic interests in business or trade with the same city, 
• tourist interest from within either or both partnered cities, 
• the prestige for cities of an international status, 
• humanitarian desires to provide assistance for international cities in need, or a 
desire to receive such assistance, 
• a desire to build upon serendipitous friendships between travellers from 
international cities, and  
• mutual recognition and celebration of similarities between international cities 
 
As illustrated by this listing, American-based sister city relationships are driven 
by motives that can be rational or expressive, altruistic or self-serving and local 
or international in focus. However only one version of the origin and impetus 
of the movement predominates in popular sister city discourses (see Cremer et 
al, 2001), which I term ‘the Eisenhower story’. In calling it a ‘story’, I do not 
suggest that it is untrue, but rather that it provides a partial, coherent yet 
ambiguous narrative, in relation to which peace-seeking sister city officials and 
volunteers are able to make sense of and articulate their own positions within 
the movement. On the sister city web pages of cities around the world, the tale 
is told of how Eisenhower developed the program in the early 1950s, as a way 
to involve ordinary people in America’s quest to reduce the risk of another 
world war. In his Remarks at the People-to-People Conference speech on 
September 11th, 1956 (a date that was to hold particular significance for 
proponents of sister city peace relationships in the following century), 
Eisenhower called on ordinary U.S. citizens to reach out to unknown 
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international others, who, despite their differences, were connected to 
American citizens through their common humanity and desire for peace.  
 
A particular part of the work that we expect to do is based upon the 
assumption that no people, as such, want war--that all people want peace. We 
know this to be a true assumption, but we know also that in certain portions of 
the world it is not understood as such. Some people are taught--and they are 
captive audiences--that others, including ourselves, want war: that we are 
warlike, that we are materialistic, that we are, in fact, hoping for cataclysms of 
that kind so that a few may profit, they say, out of the misery of the world. If 
we are going to take advantage of the assumption that all people want peace, 
then the problem is for people to get together and to leap governments--if 
necessary to evade governments--to work out not one method but thousands 
of methods by which people can gradually learn a little bit more of each other 
(Eisenhower, 1956). 
 
This speech sent an optimistic message to American non-elites they could 
personally make a difference in warding off the threat posed to the American 
people, and to the world as a whole, by dangerously misguided communist 
ideologies and a possible nuclear war.  As noted by Endy (2004) however, 
Eisenhower was personally ambivalent regarding popular participation in 
international affairs. Whilst favouring a volunteering ethos, he was concerned 
about the possibility that ordinary Americans representing their country abroad 
might do more harm than good to America’s reputation. “Divided between a 
fear of the masses and a desire for civic participation” (2004:145), the 
president distanced the initiative from the formal institutions of government.   
“Minimizing its Washington origins, [he] praised how the People-to-People 
Foundation was free from the taint of propaganda” (2004:146).  In effect, what 
Eisenhower had managed to set in motion was a popular movement that was 
inherently political, in that it was an invention and tool of the state aimed at 
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strengthening foreign policy objectives, but which would be understood by 
participants as essentially apolitical, and therefore free from partisan interests 
and the taint of conflict. Embedded in his speech are suggestions that, fifty 
years later, were to become particularly problematic for the sister cities 
movement within the context of the U.S.-led ‘war on terror’.  Together, they 
form a message that: 
 
(a) opposition to United States policies is due to misinformation and 
misunderstanding, 
(b) which is about the kind of people that Americans are (not about what they do), 
and 
(c) ordinary citizens are better at solving such problems than governments, 
because 
(d) their activities are cultural and not political. 
 
Subjectively empowered as global ambassadors, citizens were unlikely to 
understand direct confrontation with the policies and practices of their own 
governments to be either an effective or an appropriate dimension of people-to-
people relationships. As honorary chairman of Sister Cities International, each 
successive President could then keep a distanced eye on the operations of 
future sister city relationships, reassured by that organisation’s policy of 
recognising only relationships formed within countries with which diplomatic 
relations with the U.S. had been established. Thus normatively and logistically 
contained, sister city proponents could understand themselves to be loyal 
patriots who were, with their president’s blessing, ‘bypassing their respective 
national and state governments” (Farazmand, 2004:89) in the pursuit of global 
peace.  Only when unwritten rules of conduct were breached, as in the case of 
sister city projects between American and Cuban cities, did the state perceive a 
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need to impose regulatory sanctions upon its own ‘citizen ambassadors’ (see, 
for example, Valanti, 2001).  Sister city relationships between American and 
international cities are now a common feature of urban life in American cities. 
In 2005 alone, “more than 64.5 million people read or saw something about a 
sister city project in their local media” (SCI ‘Media Coverage’, 2006). By the 
end of the twentieth century, 150,000 Americans were travelling each year to 
their sistered cities, either individually or as part of joint cooperative projects 
(Hobbs and Chernotsky, 2001:61). As of 2001, 1,200 American communities 
had formed formal ties with 2,100 foreign cities through Sister Cities 
International (Leroux, 2001). 
Sister city relationships do not remain static over time (O’Toole, 2000, 
2001). As socially constructed entities, they change and adapt to historical 
circumstances.  Lofland (1993), for example, identifies a ‘surge’ of what he 
terms ‘consensus movement’ politics in the United States during the 1980s, 
within which sister city relationships with politically contentious international 
locations became a prominent feature of urban-based peace activism. These 
included partnerships with Nicaraguan cities formed in opposition to the 
Reagan administration’s funding of the Contras, who were seeking to throw 
that country’s elected socialist government (Kline, 1999:19) as well as 
relationships with cities in the Soviet Union. Beginning in the 1990s, sister city 
relationships were also formed between American cities and cities in 
communist Cuba (Schaefer, 2005).  
Interviewed in 2000 by journalist Hélène Papper on the Radio program 
‘Common Ground’, Sister Cities' Executive Director  Tim Honey framed sister 
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city relationships as an enabling local resource for enacting global citizenship, 
by addressing poverty and injustice on a planetary scale.  
 
We see this network continuing to grow and expand, and to deepen in its 
impact upon promoting world peace and understanding, to alleviating some of 
the severest problems that we have as global citizens-problems of abject 
poverty, problems of aid, problems associated with global warming and 
climate change. And Sister Cities provides people at the community level who 
are concerned about these issues, but don't know how they can make an 
impact-well, through Sister Cities they can make an impact. So you don't have 
to sit on the sidelines. You don't have to be frustrated because you can't do 
anything about the AIDS epidemic in Africa. You can do something about it. 
You can get your community to have a sister city in Africa and have that 
focus be on AIDS. And you can take any issue like that and really make a 
difference on the ground at the community level, both in the cities overseas as 
well the impact upon the US communities. 
 
In the same period, American sister city relationships were also taking a more 
pragmatic turn, as urban governments responded to the imperatives of 
economic globalisation. In a globalised economy, cities without the resources 
and initiative to attract visitors and outside investment can find themselves 
“bereft and impoverished” (van Vilet, 2002:37). Potter (n/d) notes that “(o)ne 
of the ways to lower the risks of doing business internationally is to know 
overseas business partners well. Sister city affiliations have created an ideal 
market in which to build trust”. Ryan’s (1988) message is more succinct: 
“Closed minds cannot open foreign markets”. Through listing sister city 
activities on their websites, an international or global status can be claimed 
even by smaller cities around the world (Paul, 2005:2015). City marketing can 
also include the moral appeal of cities. On the thirty-fifth anniversary of its 
partnership with a northern Israeli city, the mayor of San Francisco remarked 
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that “(o)ur renewed sister city relationship with Haifa reinforces our position as 
a compassionate city, respected world wide for our continued dedication to 
equality and acceptance for all” (City of San Francisco, 2008). Despite their 
best efforts, however, particular relationships may become casualties of urban 
growth. When the Japanese  town of Awano was annexed by its much larger 
neighbour Kanuma, the U.S. city of Grand Forks automatically lost one of its 
sister cities (Tran, 2006).   
In a newsletter dated May, 2001, Sister Cities International emphasised 
“the critical importance of creating new opportunities for their citizens and 
institutions to be internationally engaged”.  On August 29th of the same year, 
just days before the September 11th attacks, Tim Honey outlined SCI’s 
competitive “new vision for the future’ of U.S. based sister cities as follows. 
 
As globalization sweeps our planet, we must find ways within our 
communities to engage internationally in an effort to understand and create 
“globally competitive communities,” build bridges to foster world peace and 
human rights, and take tangible steps toward lessening the growing economic 
divide between the developed and the developing world. In the 21st century, 
local communities must foster a new international perspective and create 
innovative avenues for international engagement .. This new international 
engagement imperative is about the ability of our communities to adapt and 
change within our rapidly globalizing planet. It is also about (e)nabling our 
communities to be globally competitive – not only economically, but also in 
every other aspect of life.., providing a platform for our citizens to be engaged 
as “global citizens” in whatever aspect of life they choose, … (e)stablishing 
partnerships, linkages, and coalitions, and unleashing the incredible interests, 
passions and talents our citizens have for making a difference by “thinking 
globally and acting locally. The old bumper sticker of the 1960s has taken on 
a new legitimacy and a new urgency in the year 2000 (SCI: ‘New Visions for 
the Future’, 2001). 
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Shortly afterwards, however, international peace building was back on the 
agenda as a number one priority for American sister cities.  On September 12, 
SCI President Chuck Stokke and Executive Director Tim Honey posted the 
following message on the SCI website. 
All of us involved with Sister Cities International must speak out 
against the horrific events of September 11, 2001. As a country and as 
ordinary citizens, we are now struggling to find appropriate ways to 
respond. We are all filled with questions and doubts. How do we 
ensure that such evil forces can never again strike at the heart of our 
cities? What can we do as ordinary citizens? How can we make a 
difference? In our hearts we must find ways to break down the 
barriers that divide us as human beings - barriers that become the 
breeding grounds for such hatred. We must find ways to communicate 
with those who speak a different language, have a different religion, 
or come from different political traditions. All of us are fortunate that 
through our involvement in Sister Cities we can find tangible ways to 
respond to this tragedy. Our collective commitment to the Sister City 
movement speaks to our personal commitment to foster a more 
peaceful world (SCI, 2006).  
This impassioned response introduced two new elements into sister city 
discourses; the overt identification of particular others as ‘evil’ and the 
inclusion of national security and defence on sister city agendas. The 
conceptual blending of security and peace discourses and the moral 
condemnation of the malevolent ‘other’ contained in this seemingly 
innocuous posting would lead to problematic outcomes in sister city 
interactions with the Muslim world, as will be demonstrated in chapters 
three to six of this thesis. The manifest function of the movement, 
however, as conveyed by its representative and coordinating institution, 
Sister Cities International, remained peace building on a global scale. In 
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its 2002-2006 Strategic Plan, SCI reported that it sought  “to achieve a 
peaceful, orderly and just world by assuming leadership in bringing 
together communities around the world to create a worldwide sister city 
movement for peace (SCI Strategic Plan 2002-2006). In ‘charting its 
future course’, the organization expressed a hope that the term ‘sister 
cities’ would become synonymous with “building a more just and 
peaceful world” and that SCI itself would one day receive the Nobel 
Peace Prize (Honey, 2006).  
Australian sister city relationships 
Australian sister city relationships are the second empirical focus of this thesis. 
O’Toole (2000a) notes that very little research has been conducted into sister 
city type relationships in Australia.  The first Australian partnerships were not 
predicated on notions of patriotism or any direct relationship with the state, as 
had been the case with the American model. Rather, they arose from 
sentimental attachments to Britain and to the homelands of subsequent 
migrants.  The numerous Italian and Greek relationships listed on the website 
of the Australian Sister Cities Association (ASCA) in 2004 reflect the ethnic 
composition of the 1960s diaspora. The first specifically peace focused 
Australian sister city relationship was formed between Lismore and the 
Japanese city of Yamato-Takada in 1963.  It was instigated by Tony Glynn, a 
Marist priest and former Japanese prisoner-of-war, who had worked on the 
notorious Burmese railway. In the aftermath of the war, Father Glynn 
dedicated his life to promoting reconciliation between Australia and Japan. He 
is also credited with founding the sister city relationship between Canberra and 
the prefecture of Nara. The fortieth anniversary of the Canberra-Nara 
 41 
partnership was jointly acknowledged at a national level by the Australian and 
Japanese Prime Ministers in 2003 (Clair, 2004:4). 
Australian sister cities took some time to cohere as a centralised 
movement. In 1979, becoming cognizant of the annual sister city conventions 
held in the United States, a group of interested Australians conducted research 
into similar affiliations based in Australia.  Despite the existence of at least 
twenty-six sister city affiliations throughout Australia, they found that there 
appeared to be no interchange between them. As a result of this research, the 
first Sister City Convention was held in September 1979. Australian 
relationships are now coordinated and supported by Sister Cities Australia, 
formerly known as the Australian Sister Cities Association (ASCA), which was 
formed in 1982.  According to its website, the association was inspired by the 
success of Sister Cities International, and seeks “to provide a forum for 
cultural, economic and educational interchange between communities and to 
encourage friendship, co-operation and understanding to improve peaceful 
coexistence worldwide” (ASCA web page, 2004). Sister Cities Australia now 
holds an annual conference attended by delegates from Australian and 
international cities.   
 O’Toole (2001b) notes the absence of any national policy in Australia 
in relation to sister city partnerships, which might have constrained their 
historical development at a local scale.  He identifies three phases of Australian 
sister city type relationships. The first of these, which he terms the associative, 
is based on international friendship, cultural exchange and ‘a general 
international awareness’. The second aspect is reciprocative, and is 
characterised by ongoing international exchange programmes. The third is 
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commercial, which emphasises the importance of local economic development 
(O’Toole, 2000:43-44). O’Toole (2000) notes that these three categories are 
not mutually exclusive; in fact most current Australian sister city partnerships 
involve all three aspects in varying degrees.  
As will be seen in chapter seven of this study, the last of these phases 
has proven problematic for the peace building agendas of Australian sister 
cities. As in other parts of the world, Australian cities began to feel the effects 
of economic globalisation as the twentieth century drew to a close, and more 
prosaic economic concerns began to preoccupy Australian local authorities. As 
a consequence, cultural sister city projects began to be valued more for their 
instrumental role in boosting economic development, with the attention of local 
authorities being diverted towards the negative risk of failing to keep up with 
other cities competing in a globalised economy. This shift in focus “from mates 
to markets” (O’Toole, 2000) has been particularly troubling for Japanese sister 
city partners, who continue to place high intrinsic value on cultural and 
educational exchange (O’Toole, 2001). Since O’Toole (2000) formulated his 
typology, a new development has arisen in Australian sister city relationships, 
in the form of controversial peace-based projects between inner-Western 
Sydney municipalities and cities in Palestine. These relationships are the focus 
of chapters four and five of this study.  
Sister cities and risk management  
A common theme running in the background of the discussion so far has been 
that of risk management. Sister city enterprises are, and always have been, 
fundamentally concerned with the management of risk, in the sense that they 
seek to manage or ward off conflict or harm envisaged as emerging or 
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continuing in future time.  Sister city relationships are also commonly 
protected from the risk of controversy and unpleasantness by the deliberate 
avoidance of political discussion. As Lofland (1993) and Eliasoph (1999) 
observe, politics are popularly equated with conflict and unpleasantness, and 
consequently avoided by middle class social actors for whom politeness norms 
are a highly salient dimension of social interaction. However, as Maier (1987) 
points out, the boundary between politics are culture is indistinct, and, to an 
extent, arbitrary. Maier (1987) ponders a series of “knotty questions” posed to 
Seattle local authorities in connection with ‘Initiative 30’, a regulation which 
sought to limit the city’s sister city activities "primarily to cultural rather than 
political purposes". 
Nicaragua's vice minister and chief of national police comes to Seattle and 
reads passages from his highly acclaimed autobiography, "Fire From the 
Mountains." Is his visit, sponsored by the Seattle-Managua Sister City 
Association, primarily political or cultural?  A photographic exhibit of 
portraits of Nicaraguans is displayed at the downtown Seattle library under the 
heading "The Faces of Free Nicaragua." Is the sister-city exhibit primarily 
political or cultural?  The Total Experience Gospel Choir, Seattle's dynamic 
chorus of youthful singers from the Mount Zion Baptist Church, visits 
Nicaragua on a goodwill tour. Is the choir's sister-city trip primarily political 
or cultural? … Leaders of the sister-city organizations, insisting that political 
dialogue is an inherent part of cultural exchange, say they have no intention of 
changing their activities.  And city officials say they don't know where to 
draw the line (1987:C1).  
Bill Stafford, acting director of international relations for the city of Seattle, 
took a pragmatic stance, arguing that the lived realities of sister city visitors 
from politically sensitive or difficult parts of the world could not and should 
not be glossed over in the name of polite conversation. “Although sister-city 
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sponsorship of visits may need greater scrutiny by the city, it would be 
unreasonable to put politics off limits for visiting government leaders, 
especially those from a nation at war”, he contended. "What are you going to 
ask them? What's the latest dance craze?” (Maier 1987:C1). 
Pressed to use a sister city visit to Manila to deliver a resolution 
condemning human rights violations in the Philippines, the event organiser 
issued a statement distancing his sympathies as an individual from the 
requirements of official protocol. While he agreed with the sentiment of the 
resolution, he regarded it as “extremely bad form” for the mayor to raise the 
issue. “We are there for trade and cultural exchanges”, he declared, “not to 
right the world in all its facets” (Matier and Ross, 2006).  
As can be seen from the various examples examined so far, sister city 
relationships can be understood as sources of risk in themselves when they are 
perceived to threaten establish moral orders or institutional imperatives. An 
editorial of the Daily Telegraph bearing the title ‘Nobody wants them’ (2005) 
frames the sister city movement as a risk to the moral order, arguing that it 
addresses only the needs of privileged cities, while the most desperate cities are 
passed by. The article identifies the Nigerian city of Nguru Umuaro as one of 
123 African cities, villages or communities listed on the SCI website that are 
unable to find an international local authority willing to accept them as a sister. 
Davis (2005) recounts the resistance encountered in San Diego to a proposal to 
create a sister city relationship between that city and the Irish corporation 
Shannon Development. The proposal was contested on the grounds that it was 
not only “a departure from the sister-city model”, but morally problematic, 
appearing to be “a veiled corporate tax shelter” and “all about money, not 
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people-to-people”. Despite strong support from SCI, the project was 
subsequently abandoned. 
Sister city relationships designed to create public goods may also have 
unintended consequences. Interactions across difference will not always go 
according to plan, and difficult relations between individuals or failed practical 
initiatives can jeopardise future inter-municipal cooperation (Hewitt, 1999).  
Scigliano (1992) claims that the hundreds of North American and European 
cities that established sister city ties in Nicaragua in order to bypass the U.S 
embargo against the Sandinistas created ambivalence and embarrassment when 
the Sandinistas’ opponents were subsequently voted into power. The newly 
elected government, he claims, “didn’t know whether to shun their new 
relations or welcome them as sugar sisters” (1992:12). Furthermore, Flint 
(1999, cited in Maney, 2000) found that sister city assistance had inadvertently 
fostered local discord in El Salvador, as “differential access to resources 
provided by sister cities [had] created conflict among domestic agrarian 
organizations seeking rural development” (2000:338). Cohn, Merrifield and 
Smith (1989:102) warn that local authorities should approach citizen 
‘partnerships’ with care, since particular interest groups might promise “that all 
they needed was the city’s “blessing”, only to leave the city with major sister 
city commitments, a need to allocate staff and budget, and promises less than 
fulfilled”. Business based relationships can also go awry in an unpredictable 
global market. Grossman (1994) reports that  
 
Te Puke, New Zealand and Gridley, Calif., are barely on speaking terms these 
days because of the business interest that brought them together: kiwi fruit. 
Each produces kiwis; each suspects the other has contributed to a global kiwi 
 46 
glut that as bankrupted many growers. “We no longer have anything in 
common except grief” says William Burleson, publisher of the Gridley 
Herald. 
 
A more common form of moral risk held to be posed by sister city 
relationships focuses on issues of accountability, with specific reference to the 
alleged misdirection of council revenue towards entertainment of foreign 
officials and overseas travel for councillors. Almost invariably, such travel is 
described pejoratively as a ‘junket’, defined by the Oxford English Dictionary 
(2002:147) as “an official’s tour at public expense”.  In 2001, the Melbourne 
Herald Sun published a critical report ranking thirty-one Melbourne 
municipalities  according to the cost to taxpayers of sister city travel, based on 
the public register that councils are required to keep under the Local 
Government Act (Hodder, 2001). Armstrong (2004)  quotes retired public 
policy academic Allan Peachment’s assessment that sister city travel is “like 
having a first class ticket to travel anywhere you like for as long as you like” 
and that the spending habits  of councillors are out of control. Alluding to the 
formal exchange of symbolic goods (such as plaques and statues) that is 
standard practice in municipal sister city visits, Laws (2008) dismisses 
travelling councillors as “civic piñatas stuffed with gifts”. At issue in 
objections to ‘junkets’ is the risk they bring to a council’s image, which is 
closely linked to shortages of municipal funds. As the editor of the Knight 
Ridder Tribune Business News (2007) remarked, “(s)ending people to 
Greifswald, Germany, and entertaining those who visit from Germany requires 
a small amount of city dollars. What is at stake, however, [is] a big measure of 
credibility”.  
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 Internal disputes within councils over sister city travel are also often 
aired through the news media. One Berkeley councillor complained to the New 
York Times (1982) that she took “issue with the Mayor’s frequent and long 
absences which prevent him from providing leadership on local issues. He 
doesn’t seem to care about the nuts and bolts of running a city”.  For the city 
council of Fort Collins in Colorado, the answer to the stigma associated with 
sister city travel was to avoid the sister cities name altogether. Their website 
reports that they have opted for “a different path – similar to Sister Cities - but 
not quite as formal. A significant portion of our community views “Sister 
Cities” relationships as an excuse for political officials to travel to luxurious 
locations. We feel this image could compromise our ability to be seen as 
excellent stewards of city resources. “Cities of Friendship” allows us to avoid 
this perception” (City of Fort Collins website, 2002). 
 The reasoning behind Fort Collins’ change of terminology points 
to the salience to local councils of what has become known in the management 
literature (see Power, Scheytt, Soin and Sahlin, 2009) as ‘reputational risk’. 
This is an organisational form of ‘identity management’ (Goffman, 1959), in 
which the objective is to fend off discrediting evaluations of the self on the 
parts of necessary or esteemed others.  Atkins, Bates and Drennan (2006) 
define reputational risk in terms of the putative harm being defended against, 
namely “failure to meet stakeholder’ reasonable expectations of an 
organisation’s performance and behaviour” (2006:23). Reputational risk 
concerns problems of trust in legitimate authority, and its management has 
become ‘a cornerstone of good governance and responsible actorhood’ (Power 
et al 2009:301). In extreme instances, however, local councils may find 
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themselves overwhelmed by competing and incompatible demands to manage 
risk, and may opt for reputational risk as the least threatening outcome. Such 
was the case for the New Zealand city council of Masterton, which was hosting 
a sister cities conference during the SARS pandemic of 2003.  
 SARS is a deadly and highly stigmatised disease (Siu, 2008) which 
triggered global anxiety when it emerged from China and quickly spread 
around the world. In the lead up to the event, more than sixty calls expressing 
alarm about the risk posed by visiting Chinese officials were made to 
Masterton District Council and conference organisers, and some 
representatives of the local hospitality industry had “indicated they would not 
provide catering, transport or accommodation for fear of infection, threatening 
the whole conference” (Katterns, Martin and Thompson 2003). Caught 
between the imperative to protect their own population from physical harm, or 
from the fear of such harm (see Keil and Harris, 2007), their obligations as 
agents of local economic development and their responsibilities to their 
international sister city partners, Masterton city officials decided to ask 
Chinese delegates to withdraw from the convention (Myers, 2003). 
Unfortunately, however, the delegates had already arrived in New Zealand by 
the time the request was made.  
The decision to exclude the Chinese delegation was a reputational 
disaster for the council, which came under attack from all directions. Council 
members received abusive and venomous emails, labelling them as ‘rednecks’ 
and ‘racists’ (Dominion Post, 2003). The editor of the same newspaper was 
quick to condemn the council’s decision, going so far as to frame it as anti-
Asian paranoia.  
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How ironic that a convention specifically organised to encourage cross-
cultural contact and understanding should be torpedoed by worried small 
minds in one of this country's tiniest communities. It is not the first time, of 
course, that Masterton has won headlines for being less than effusive about 
our Asian neighbours and trade partners. Last September, Mayor Bob Francis 
ordered the Japanese flag lowered after some locals, veterans of the Pacific 
War, were furious to see it flying above the council buildings. It had been 
hoisted to welcome a group of visiting students from the district's sister city, 
Hatsukaichi.  Sister Cities Association president Jeremy Dwyer believes the 
immediate damage done by the organisers' decision to advise all Chinese 
guests to the convention not to come will not be long lasting. Perhaps he is a 
born optimist. Anyone who deals with Asian cultures knows the importance to 
them of not losing face, of not embarrassing their hosts and preferring not to 
be embarrassed in return. This country did $1.47 billion worth of trade with 
the People's Republic last year. Our diplomats in Beijing might have a little 
repair job ahead.  
In similarly disparaging terms, the editor of the Taranaki Daily News (2003:8) 
also called attention to the repercussions of loss of face for the Chinese in 
terms of the New Zealand economy.  
Whatever the junketing fraternity of city sisterhood had convinced itself it was 
achieving, it is back to the starter's gun for the massive China-New Zealand 
branch. The well-meaning amateurs of international diplomacy, who gathered 
in Masterton this week for four days of self-congratulation, have undone most 
of their modest achievements of the last decade or two … The Chinese 
culture, which the Kiwi sisters have been eager to explore in endless 
reciprocal visits, places great importance on face -- not losing it, and not 
causing offence to guests …Ignoring the fact that any plane from Asia 
delivers visitors bound for all parts of New Zealand, mayors Dwyer and 
Francis … boldly proceeded where no one from Foreign Affairs would dare to 
go. A more diplomatically attuned Phil Goff -- aware of New Zealand's $1.4 
billion-and-rising worth of China trade, and rapidly growing Chinese tourist 
and student numbers -- hastily organised a consolation dinner in Wellington, 
at which he read a letter of apology from Prime Minister Helen Clark. 
Masterton's loss became Rotorua's gain.  
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Katterns, Martin and Thompson (2003) record in more detail the negative 
reaction of national level officials at the same function. “At a hastily convened 
dinner last night”, they report,  
Foreign Affairs Minister Phil Goff said organisers of the Masterton 
conference were wrong to ban the 43 delegates after more than 60 calls from 
residents worried about catching the severe acute respiratory syndrome.  He 
said they should not have bowed to public concerns that the delegates may 
spread the virus, which has killed more than 70 people worldwide. "Can I . . . 
express my regret that you were not able to participate. It's not redneck or 
racist. It was an over-reaction in terms of the actual level of risk."  The ban 
had been greeted with fury by [the] Chinese ambassador … He warned that 
the ban could have damaging effects for New Zealand's relationship with 
China … Sister Cities NZ president and former Hastings mayor Jeremy 
Dwyer [responded]: "I realise it is very embarrassing for the Chinese, and I'm 
sorry for that but we had to make the call. The level of anxiety within 
Masterton was very high."  
The 2003 SARS debacle illustrates the complexities faced by local authorities 
as they strive to function as ‘risk managers of everything’ (Power, 2004) under 
conditions of fear and uncertainty at the global scale. Faced with the risk of 
bodily harm to the people they had been entrusted to govern, Masterton council 
made a moral decision to protect those citizens, even though it meant placing 
an important sister city relationship in jeopardy. As a result, it suffered a 
hostile backlash from several fronts, had to repay the cost of the failed 
convention (Katterns, 2003) and incurred significant reputational harm. In 
retrospect, council members may well have wondered whether the benefits of 
the sister city relationship had been worth the extra responsibilities and burdens 
that had been placed upon them. 
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 The ordeal experienced by Masterton council would come as little 
surprise to sociological theorists of mid to late modernity. Douglas (1993), for 
example, contends that risk has become a primarily a tool for apportioning 
blame and for holding persons accountable; a remnant of the sweeping 
rationalisation processes that characterise the project of modernity. If risks 
cannot be managed, they are nevertheless framed with reference to science and 
calculability, so as to convey the impression that their management is 
achievable.  
 
Whereas originally a high risk meant a game in which a throw of the die had a 
strong probability of bringing great pain or great loss, now risk refers only to 
negative outcomes. The word has been preempted to mean bad risks. The 
promise of good things in contemporary political discourse is couched in other 
terms. The language of risk is reserved as a specialized lexical register for 
political talk about the undesirable outcomes. Risk is invoked for a modern-
style riposte against abuse of power. The charge of causing risk is a stick to 
beat authority, to make lazy bureaucrats sit up, to exact restitution for victims. 
For those purposes danger would once have been the right word, but plain 
danger does not have the aura of science or afford the pretension of a possible 
precise calculation (1993:3). 
 
For Douglas (1993), the close association of risk with blame offers guidance as 
to who should bear responsibility when calculable negative risks bring negative 
consequences, a framing that has discomfiting implications for decision-
making bureaucrats and politicians. However according to theorists of ‘post’ or 
‘late’ modernity such as Bauman (1998) and Beck (2001), the emphasis of risk 
management has moved away from calculability to reflexivity.  “Risk 
reflexivity makes that which has not yet happened and that which is 
unforeseeable into an object of present-day action” contends Beck (2001a:17). 
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For Bauman (1998), postmodern risks are the human-caused products of 
postmodern freedoms. They are self-perpetuating and inherently 
uncontrollable, and attempts to manage them are fraught with anxiety and 
ultimately futile.  In the postmodern world, argues Bauman, 
 
our society becomes increasingly a risk-producing, risk-monitoring, and risk-
managing society. We do not so much move ‘forward’ as clear up the mess 
and seek exit from the havoc perpetrated by own actions yesterday. The risks 
are our own products, though unexpected and often impossible to predict or 
calculate. This is because whatever we do, we concentrate on the task at hand 
… while the changes we introduce in the balance of nature and society in 
order to perform that task reverberate far and wide; their distant effects hit 
back as new dangers, new problems and thus new tasks (1998:279).  
 
For Beck (2005), the primary issue preoccupying the contemporary world is 
uncertainty. Beck (2005) holds that two different value systems coincide in 
modern societies, which he equates with ‘class society’ and ‘risk society’. 
Under conditions of late modernity, risk society comes to dominate, with 
consequent changes in the primary value systems that collectively shape the 
social world. 
 
(I)n the transition from class to risk society, the quality of community begins 
to change. Schematically, two totally different value systems are expressed in 
these two types of modern society. Class societies remain related to the ideal 
of equality in their development dynamics … Not so the risk society. Its 
normative counter-project, which is its basis and motive force, is safety. The 
place of the value system of the ‘unequal’ society is taken by the value system 
of the ‘unsafe’ society. Whereas the utopia of equality contains a wealth of 
substantial and positive goals of the social change, the utopia of the risk 
society remains peculiarly negative and defensive. Basically, one is no longer 
concerned with attaining something ‘good’, but rather with preventing the 
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worst; self-limitation is the goal which emerges. The dream of class society is 
that everyone wants and ought to have a share of the pie. The utopia of the 
risk society is that everyone should be spared from poisoning … The 
commonality of anxiety takes the place of the commonality of need. The type 
of the risk society marks in this sense a social epoch in which solidarity from 
anxiety arises and becomes a political force (2005:49, emphasis in original).    
 
The experiences of Masterton city council can thus be understood within the 
theoretical context of world risk society to have been an inevitable 
consequence of their own, equally inevitable, engagement with risk. The SARS 
pandemic functioned as a ‘risk event’ (Kasperson et al, 1988), which prompted 
national governments, local authorities and concerned individuals and groups 
to send messages to each other as to the nature of the risk and what should be 
done about it. Ambiguous, conflicting and ultimately incompatible meanings 
and expectations with respect to the risk event, and their own responsibilities in 
regard to it, converged to form a risk event in themselves, which threatened to 
overwhelm the local council.  
Much the same effect, I argue, occurred in the sister city projects that 
comprise the empirical focus of this thesis. In order to identify the limits of the 
capacity of the sister city movement under similar, but different conditions of 
stress, I examine individually three proposals in which cities in the United 
States and Australia sought to partner with Palestinian cities, and collectively, 
several partnerships between American and Iraqi cities.  In the case of all of 
these proposals, the initial risk event was the escalating conflict in the Middle 
East. I then conduct an overview of alternative directions in sister city practices 
under less intense conditions of risk. The combined results suggest that the 
high expectations placed on sister city relationships, and on the local councils 
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that ultimately bear the responsibility for approving and maintaining them, are 
both misplaced and unreasonable.  
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Chapter Two: The development of the project 
Constructing the object of study 
This study began with my observation of an apparent disjuncture between the 
theory and practice of the sister cities movement. While optimistic and even 
extravagant claims are made in popular, institutional and academic discourses 
as to its seemingly limitless peace building capacity, there exists almost no 
empirical evidence to support such claims. In practice, as indicated by the 
broad overview provided in the previous chapter, there are clear obstacles to 
the capacity of this movement to build bridges of understanding across 
meaningful difference. Very often, cities most in need of international 
symbolic and material support are bypassed or rejected as sister city partners. 
When disagreements arise, particularly when they concern moral issues, 
relationships can be unilaterally suspended or terminated, effectively 
dismantling a communicative structure by means of which such differences 
might be discussed and accommodated. Like the practice of ‘unfriending’ on 
popular social networking sites such as Facebook, suspensions and 
terminations of sister city relationships send a clear and public message to 
partnered cities that they are no longer wanted or acceptable – surely a more 
potent and alienating statement than if they had never been friends at all. 
Compromising the legitimacy of framing sister cities as peace vehicles 
are two further anomalies. The first is that the ideology behind urban-based 
peace movements – that it is possible for coalitions between local authorities 
and citizen volunteers to ‘bypass’ and even ‘undo’ the global scale conflict 
caused in part by belligerent nation states – directs responsibility for peace 
building under current conditions of global insecurity and disorder away from 
powerful states in popular imaginaries, placing it instead on the shoulders of 
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under-resourced local governments that are, in many cases, struggling to cope 
with the everyday management of local affairs. The sister cities movement was 
developed in a spirit of optimism that human endeavour could bring about a 
more peaceful, just and prosperous world. In this respect, it can be seen as an 
expression of the project of early modernity, in which “the understanding of 
self and world, the progress of morality, justice in social institutions, and even 
human happiness” was held to be within the range of human achievement 
(Habermas, 1997:45).  However, since the mid twentieth century when the 
sister cities movement was consolidated, the political structures supporting that 
vision, in particular those of the welfare state and class-based politics, have 
declined or vanished, and the impersonal logic of the open market is seen to 
pervade all aspects of human existence. Nowhere, as suggested in the previous 
chapter, is the outcome of economic reform more apparent than in the field of 
local government.  In the light of these contextual transformations, it is both 
pertinent and necessary to question the appropriateness of burdening local 
authorities with such high additional expectations.  
Secondly, sister city relationships are a highly indeterminate and 
ambiguous object of study. As Bell-Souder and Bredel (2005) discovered in 
their explorations of U.S.-Japanese sister city relationships, and, as my own 
experience confirmed, it is not easy to define what a sister city means, as each 
person interviewed is likely to have a different understanding of what is going 
on. This conceptual confusion can also occur at the international scale, as 
O’Toole (2001) demonstrates in his study of Australian-Japanese sister city 
type relationships. Zelinsky (1991), who appears to be the most cited authority 
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on the subject, is pressed to commit to any stable aspect of the phenomenon he 
is struggling to define. 
 
Certain characteristics set the twinning of sister cities apart from other forms 
of long-distance social interaction. The formal agreements, usually made by 
local officials but occasionally by ad hoc citizen groups, are intended to last 
indefinitely (although, of course, some may be canceled, suspended, or 
allowed to wither away for lack of lasting interest). Consequently, the 
relationship does not limit itself to carrying out a single project, but rather 
opens the way for a variety of shared activities, all presumably serving the 
overall objective of advancing mutual understanding and friendship … The 
formula for interaction is that there is no set formula. Each pair of sister cities 
must experiment constantly to realize whatever ensemble of activities ideally 
suits their particular resources and objectives (1991:3).   
 
“Anything that goes on in a community can become the subject of a sister city 
project, including health care, environment, arts, education, economic and 
business development, public safety, municipal training, youth, and much 
more”, reflects de Leon (2002).  The term encompasses “every type of 
municipal, business, professional, educational and cultural exchange or 
project” (Sister Cities International, n/d) and “(t)he program possibilities are as 
extensive and diverse as the sister city network itself” (Honey, n/d). Dawley 
(1996) notes that “(s)ister city programs are developed out of mutual desires 
and interest. There is no standard pattern. Projects are limited only by the 
imagination and resources of the communities”. While Zelinsky (1991) 
understands sister city relationships as “a cheerful subject’, this is far from a 
universal framing, as is demonstrated by the range of contestations outlined in 
the previous chapter.  As enacted social realities, sister city discourses and 
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activities are analytically amorphous entities, saturated with ambiguity and 
ambivalence.   
Further inconsistencies can be seen in sister city relationships that focus 
specifically on peace building under challenging conditions of existing macro-
political conflict. The ongoing violence in the Middle East may well be the 
most pressing obstacle to a peaceful world order in the twenty-first century, 
and thus the area most in need of bridging peace building structures, yet some 
Middle Eastern cities are consistently avoided as sister city partners, while 
others are uncritically embraced. Cities in Iraq that are, by objective criteria, 
among the most dangerous in the world (Gerges, 2010) are not only regularly 
accepted as sister city partners in the United States, but are represented in sister 
city discourses as spaces of relative normality. Cities in Palestine, by contrast, 
are frequently discursively constituted as harmful and polluting, and 
consequently rejected as sister city partners.  
Clearly, there are important historical and political differences between the two 
regions. Iraq has been invaded and is still occupied by U.S. led forces, while 
the Palestinian Territories are locked into violent confrontation with the state of 
Israel, which is a U.S. ally. However there are also salient similarities between 
the two areas. Both are predominantly Muslim and sites of ongoing violence 
and bloodshed, terrorist activity and anti-Western sentiment – a challenging 
context indeed for peace building through sister city projects, given the high 
levels of suspicion and fear of the violent Muslim ‘other’ in the Western world 
(Fetzer and Soper, 2003, Manning, 2004, Werbner, 2005, Sheridan, 2006).  
Furthermore, while internal discrepancies in both cities are glossed over in 
sister city discourses via processes of metonymic reasoning (in which part of a 
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referent is symbolically taken to stand for the whole), this process works 
positively for Iraqi sister city candidates and negatively for Palestinian ones. 
As will be seen in chapter six of this study, complex ethnic and political 
differences within Iraqi populations are generally ignored, and ‘the Iraqi 
people’ are discussed as though they were an orderly and unified nation. When 
considered as sister city partners, Iraqis who are already open to Western 
perspectives, and in particular, their children, stand discursively for the entire 
population of that devastated country, thereby sidelining dissenting and hostile 
Iraqi perspectives. In sister city discourses involving Palestinian cities, 
however, the ambiguous status of Hamas as both a local authority and a 
proscribed terrorist organisation is typically reacted to defensively, but not 
explored in any analytical depth, with the result that the residents of Palestinian 
cities are discursively homogenised as terrorist sympathisers. In this scenario, it 
is moderate and peace loving Palestinians and their children whose 
perspectives and needs are often marginalised.  
Symbolic boundaries (Lamont and Molnár, 2002)  or ‘mental fences’ 
(Beck and Cronin, 2006:5) thus exclude ‘Palestinians’ from the structured 
international spaces of hospitality provided by sister city relationships, while 
freely admitting ‘Iraqis’ who are understood to be open to the American 
government’s definition of their own situation. This disparate and unequal 
positioning of Iraqi and Palestinian cities as sister city partners calls for 
sociological explanation. Why and how do Palestinian cities come to be 
constituted as ‘out of bounds’ for sister city peace relationships?  Why and how 
do Iraqi cities come to be so easily accepted? Within the context of the global 
war on terror, inferences may be drawn as to the reasons for the apparent 
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singling out of Palestinians for rejection as sister city partners. These include 
the ‘malignant positioning’ (Sabat, 2003) of Muslims in Western cultural 
traditions and the fear of importing terrorist violence from conflict zones into 
peaceful Western cities. However, such explanations do not explain the 
apparent immunity of Iraqis to such obstacles. As socially constructed realities 
with global consequences, sister city peace relationships and proposals 
involving Palestinian and Iraqi cities offer the sociological researcher an 
opportunity to uncover the personal and collective meanings behind these 
discrepancies, and the processes through which they are translated into 
structures of social inclusion and exclusion at the local/international interface. 
The data acquisition and analysis for the present study were accordingly guided 
by five research questions. 
 
1 Why are sister city relationships with objectively dangerous Iraqi cities 
accepted uncritically at the local scale, while proposed partnerships with 
similarly dangerous Palestinian cities are vehemently opposed? 
2 Through what processes are the meanings given to these cities, and to the 
people who live in them, translated into the structural inequality of formal 
acceptance or rejection? 
3 What do the answers to these questions reveal as to the capacity of sister city 
relationships to facilitate peace building under conditions of severe, ongoing 
geopolitical conflict? 
4 How do these findings relate to broader sister city practices?  
5 What implications do they have for policy and practice in local governance? 
 
Methods and methodology 
Sister city relationships are social constructions that are brought into existence 
and sustained through the exchange of symbolic meaning. In fact, apart from 
the limited amount of time spent in interactions between embodied officials, 
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citizen volunteers and students, sister city relationships exist primarily in 
discursive space, in the form of mediated images, texts and spoken words. I 
therefore employ a qualitative methodology in this study, in order to access 
those meanings, and to reveal the processes through which they are translated 
into structures of inequality at the level of local civic engagement. Since 
language is the primary means of conveying social meaning, my principal 
focus is on the language used by both supporters and opponents of sister city 
relationships to explain and justify the stance they have taken, and how that 
language operates to challenge or reinforce symbolic boundaries.   
Lamont and Molnar (2002) call attention to the importance of 
differentiating between symbolic and social boundaries when attempting to 
explain social processes of change and continuity. Symbolic boundaries, they 
explain, “are conceptual distinctions made by social actors to categorize 
objects, people, practices, and even time and space, …tools by which 
individuals and groups struggle over and come to agree upon definitions of 
reality” 2002:168). They are mediating devices; definitions of reality through 
which status and resources, such as those provided by formalised sister city 
relationships, come to be unequally distributed. Attention to symbolic 
boundaries allows social scientists to examine the dynamics of social exclusion 
in process, as interest groups “compete in the production, diffusion, and 
institutionalization of alternative systems and principles of classifications”.  
Social boundaries, on the other hand, are “objectified forms of social 
differences manifested in unequal access to and unequal distribution of 
resources (material and nonmaterial) and social opportunities” (2002:168). 
Lamont and Molnár (2002) note that  
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(o)nly when symbolic boundaries are widely agreed upon can they take on a 
constraining character and pattern social interaction in important ways. 
Moreover, only then can they become social boundaries, i.e., translate, for 
instance, into identifiable patterns of social exclusion … But symbolic and 
social boundaries should be viewed as equally real: The former exist at the 
intersubjective level whereas the latter manifest themselves as groupings of 
individuals. At the causal level, symbolic boundaries can be thought of as a 
necessary but insufficient condition for the existence of social boundaries 
(2002:169). 
 
Glaeser (2000, cited in Lamont and Molnár, 2002: 184) identifies one of the 
most basic rhetorical tools of boundary work as the metaphor. Metaphors are 
“the very stuff of worlds promised or denied” (Miller, 2006:63). They structure 
and shape discourse (Turner, interviewed by Underhill, 2001), forming 
“systems that select, emphasise and organise” human experience (Lunt, 2005). 
Since the name given to sister city relationships is explicitly predicated on the 
metaphor of human sisters, attention to the usage and consequences of 
metaphors constitutes the second methodological focus of this study.  The 
English form of the word ‘metaphor’ comes from the Greek word metapherein, 
which means to carry or transfer from one place to another. In metaphorical 
language, what is being transferred is meaning (Miller, 1979:73).  
Metaphors are cognitive constructs that enable complex phenomena to 
be understood in terms of objects and experiences that are simpler and more 
familiar (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). In the terminology of the 
phenomenologist Schutz (cited in Knoblauch, 1999), they are ‘typifications’; 
expressions of the ‘natural attitude’, which draw upon the ‘common stocks of 
knowledge’ that build up over time within particular cultures.  Metaphors have 
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intuitive appeal, as they invoke reassuringly familiar understandings of people, 
places, and the relationships between them. They can benefit human subjects 
by facilitating their understanding of society and social processes (Urry, 2000) 
and by allowing conceptual access to provinces of meaning, such as politics, 
that transcend the world of everyday life (Schutz, 1973, cited in Miller, 
1979:1979).  They can also serve to exclude particular aspects of the social 
world from awareness, by encouraging some thoughts and discouraging others 
(Cresswell, 1997). Metaphors play a primary role in constituting socio-political 
space.  By defining “what and who belong where” in metaphoric terms, 
governments, interest groups and the media naturalise particular practices of 
exclusion, focusing on the “out of placeness” of particular people and actions 
(1997:334).   
Metaphor effects can extend to macro level processes of political, 
cultural and economic change. In order to understand the efficacy of a 
particular metaphor, it is necessary to understand the commonplace cultural 
meanings associated with the source domain (Zashin and Chapman, 1974), 
from which it is derived. Metaphoric speech becomes deontic speech – the 
language of obligation and permission (Forrester, 1989:1) – through the 
recognition of entailments, or expectations of action, arising from the meaning 
of the original source. As Lakoff and Johnson (2001) explain, metaphors can 
 
sanction actions, justify inferences, and help us set goals. For example … if 
love is madness, I do not concentrate on what I have to do to maintain it. But 
if it is work, then it requires activity, and if it is a work of art, it requires a 
very special kind of activity , and if it is collaborative, then it is even further 
restricted and specified … If a new metaphor enters the conceptual system 
that we base our actions on, it will alter that conceptual system and the 
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perceptions and actions that they system gives rise to. Much of cultural 
change arises from the introduction of new metaphorical concepts and the loss 
of old ones. For example, the Westernization of cultures throughout the world 
is partly a matter of introducing TIME IS MONEY into those cultures (2001: 
130-131, emphasis in original).  
 
Symbolic boundaries are ‘built in’ to the concept of sister city relationships, in 
the form of entailments transferred from the source domain of kinship.  The 
name chosen for this loosely structured ‘movement’ has thus been crucial in 
determining how it is perceived and operates. As Grossman (1994) enquires, 
“(w)hy do cities of the world call one another sister, if not for love and peace?”  
Of mixed benefit to the communicative value of the ‘sister’ metaphor, 
however, is the fact that cultural perceptions regarding the appropriate role of 
sisters vary widely between societies and, over time, within societies as well.  
Metaphors that go with the grain of contemporary experience are more 
rhetorically persuasive (Urry, 2000:22), and the capacity of the sister city 
metaphor to incorporate changing ideologies of the family and other intimate 
relationships affords it a resonance and immediacy in popular discourses. In a 
confusion of “muddled metaphors” (Lloyd, 2005), sister city personifications 
of romantic attachments and marriages between sisters reflect the decreased 
salience of family obligations and the increasing preoccupation with romantic 
intimacy in the late modern world (see Giddens, 1991, Beck, and Beck-
Gernsheim, 2002). City ‘siblings’ initially connected through a mutual 
commitment to provide support are now said to fall in love (Munro, 2004), 
have affairs (Masser, 2004) and get married (Wilkinson, 2003). The emergent 
phenomenon of metonymic sister city ‘weddings’ discussed in chapter seven of 
this study provides a concrete example of this trend. 
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 As with their human counterparts, sister city bonds that prove onerous 
on any dimension can always be discarded.  Sister city ‘marriages’, like the 
‘pure relationships’ described by Giddens (1993), are now ‘until further 
notice’, as illustrated by a directive from a Sister Cities International 
conference: “At times divorce is the right alternative to take in a sister-cities 
relationship”, delegates are advised. “Divorce is appropriate when: the sister 
city has reduced/disappeared, the political climate has changed, there is open 
animosity amongst members and when there is absolutely no interest in the 
program. If divorce is the answer, be sure to do it in writing and let SCI 
national office know of the split” (Sister Cities International, 2001). 
Possibilities for the unilateral termination by city councils of sister city 
relationships that are economically unrewarding, become controversial, lose 
community support or are otherwise problematic are thus afforded popular 
legitimacy (see Bauman, 1994: 32).   
Metaphors of kinship regulate patterns of emotional attachment in all 
societies, and those that harness them profit from their power (Verdery, 1999). 
Rigney (2001) notes that “(i)n political rhetoric, kinship metaphors, both 
vertical and horizontal, are frequently mobilized to strengthen bonds of group 
solidarity, as when we refer to the nation-state as the “motherland” (or in 
Germany, the “fatherland”), or when diplomats invoke the image of a “family 
of nations”. Kinship metaphors are invoked “on behalf of “universal 
brotherhood,” the “power of sisterhood,” or concern for the wellbeing of the 
“human family” (2001:16). In such cases, the claimed kinship takes fictive 
form. Shipton (1997:186) defines fictive kinship as ‘the creative imprecision 
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by which an idiom of relatedness is used to strengthen an image or feeling of 
identification between two or more persons or beings’, noting that 
 
(s)ome of the most creative and ramified inventions in kin idiom are found in 
some of the societies where biological families are most fragmented, and 
perhaps most lacking in life altogether, suggesting a vacuum-filling function. 
Fictive kinship can provide art, humor or worldly gain. But it points to deep, 
and sometimes subtle, human needs. The ubiquity and variety of fictive 
kinship testify to the power of close kin and family over the human psyche, 
and of analogy and metaphor over the human imagination (1997:187).   
 
As one board member expressed her own city’s connections to its ‘sisters’, 
“(w)e see them as our extended family. They’re in trouble, and we need to find 
out what they need and how we can help them, just like you do when you have 
a relative in another state who’s in trouble” (Misterek, 2008; see also Duluth 
Sister Cities Commission, 2004).  The sister cities metaphor conveys not only 
kinship but also feminine gender, leading to specific normative entailments of 
caring, nurturance and decorous behaviour.  As Potts (2002) observes,  
 
in geography, those spaces or places known as "nation, regions, cities, and the 
home" are depicted as feminine; in architecture, buildings are personified as 
female (Best, 1995, 181). Similarly, in popular idiom we speak of 'sister' 
cities; cars and ships are referred to by female pronouns, and nature is 
feminized.   
 
The seemingly ‘natural’ association between sororal relations and peace is also 
explicit in the comments of Afghan Studies scholar G. Rauf Roashan (2002), 
who, in support of a proposal for a sister city relationship between Fremont, 
California and Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, argues that  
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Fremont could become a wonderful sister to Kabul. The sisters could love 
each other beyond the ordinary bonds of sister-city relationships.  Afghanistan 
today needs sisters and brothers from the world community to extend their 
hands of help to it especially in its day of need. She needs help, not for war, 
but for peace and development and for this she needs sisters.  
 
On a more quotidian note, Daley (interviewed by Wilkinson, 2003) reflects that 
“there’s a certain warmth involved in having it being called a sister city. I think 
there is something about sisterhood that expresses a kind of closeness, a kind of 
intimacy, a kind of willingness to share secrets, things like that, that maybe is 
implied more by a feminine description”.  
Assumptions of semantic intersubjectivity across cultures can, however, 
lead to communicative disjuncture, particularly in relation to issues of power.  
Brady (2002) explains that the Western conceptualisation of “sister cities” as 
denoting equals cannot be translated directly into Chinese, for example, in 
which there is no word for sisters who are equal. There are older and younger 
sisters, and the power relationship between them is clear. The term used for 
international urban partnerships in Chinese is most accurately translated as 
‘friendship cities’, but this metaphor is also problematic in political terms. It is 
much utilised by the Communist party in China, but denotes a purely strategic 
relationship and lacks any suggestion of warm or intimate personal relations 
(Brady, 2002). Furthermore, as Kopytoff (1982:221, citing Kopytoff and 
Miers, 1977) explains, “to modern Westerners the kinship metaphor suggests 
nurture and closeness; in Africa, and elsewhere, it conveys authority and 
subordination”.  City officials from non-Western cultures are therefore required 
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to make ‘concessions to Western habits of mind’ (MacGaffey, 2005:196) when 
they speak or write about sister city relationships.  
As a cognitive as well as affective accomplishment, bestowing fictive 
kinship upon particular others is an outcome of processes of ‘boundary work’ 
(Gieryn, 1983) and categorisation. Driving such processes is a desire to avoid 
boundary ambiguity (Boss and Greenberg, 2004), by seeking answers to the 
pivotal questions: “which international urban others can be part of our city, and 
on what basis can they be part of it?” For some international cities, the answers 
signal acceptance and inclusion, while for others they convey rejection and 
exclusion. In both instances, the metaphoric classification is ‘real in its 
consequences’ (Thomas, 1928, cited in Link et al, 1999) for the way particular 
groups are to be treated. The acceptance or rejection of sister city proposals 
sends clear messages of trust, acceptance and entitlement to hospitality to the 
people of some cities, and opposite messages to rejected others. The processes 
through which these disparate outcomes are generated form the primary 
analytical focus of this thesis.  
While the methodology for the study was guided by the nature of the 
sociological ‘puzzle’ to be solved, the methods I employed were determined by 
more logistical and serendipitous developments. “Research questions”, as 
noted by Henderson (1999) “are not static but messy. Since they are connected 
to the experiences and networks of the researcher, they change as the 
investigation evolves” (1999:vii).  Such was the case with this project. The 
inspiration for the thesis topic in its present form arose from my interest in 
news coverage of a controversial proposal put forward in 2004, for a sister city 
relationship between the city of Madison in the American state of Wisconsin, 
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and Rafah, a war-torn Palestinian city on the Gaza strip. Until that point, I had 
been researching sister city relationships between my home city of Hobart, 
Australia, and cities in Italy and Japan, but the implications of the Madison 
debate for the capacity of sister city relationships to build peace across 
significant geopolitical difference marked sister city proposals between 
Western and Middle Eastern cities as a more interesting and compelling area of 
study. As will be seen in chapter three, the Madison-Rafah proposal was 
debated in a city renowned for the progressive political stance it had 
historically taken on human rights issues, and the proposal itself had been 
widely supported in the Madison community. After attracting a level of local 
opposition that was unprecedented in its intensity and effect, however, the 
proposal was defeated. The extensive coverage of the Madison debate in the 
electronic media alone4 might have provided ample data for a dissertation 
based on discourse analysis, but I was reluctant to take that path, since I wanted 
to access the deeper meanings that only a more direct engagement with 
participants could provide.  
Two subsequent developments in Western-Palestinian sister city 
relations rendered the topic more practicable as a focus of study for an 
Australian researcher operating under financial and temporal constraints. The 
first was the videorecording and subsequent online posting of a public meeting 
held in 2007 in the American city of Olympia, Washington State, to decide the 
outcome of a proposed sister city relationship with Rafah, the same Palestinian 
city that had been rejected three years earlier by the city council of Madison. 
Tuan (1994) notes that documented speech is likely to be public speech, and 
                                                 
4 An archive of media coverage of this debate is available at 
http://madisonrafah.org/blog1/projects/sister-city-debate/ 
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this is the case with this video recorded public hearing, which constitutes a 
historical record, or ‘time capsule’ of public sentiment towards the Middle East 
in a particular American city in the first decade of the twenty-first century 
(Lyons, 2007). The audiovisual access it conferred also provided a rare 
opportunity to observe the more personal emotional expressions and 
demeanours of participants, as well as to hear the perspectives they were 
expressing. The video was the source of the empirical data for my analysis of 
the Olympia-Rafah proposal in chapter three, using the method of non-
participant observation. This simple but useful method involves the sociologist 
intently watching social action, but taking no part in that action (Stephens, 
Leach, Taggart and Jones 1998:107). Observation as an ‘unobtrusive method’ 
(Kelleher, 1993) brings both advantages and disadvantages to the research 
process. It enables access to actual rather than reported behaviour, is safe for 
both researcher and researched, does not disrupt others, is easily repeatable, 
easily accessed and inexpensive. Disadvantages can include the fact that 
publicly available records may be distorted to hide information or give a 
particular impression, may privilege the perspective of the observer rather than 
the meanings given by the actors themselves and selective recording of data 
(Kelleher, 1993:5-6). However the highly structured format of the public 
hearing placed clear constraints on interpretive licence, rendering the video 
evidence no more susceptible to such pitfalls than any other qualitative 
resource. At the time of writing, the video of the meeting still exists as a public 
record available to any researcher who wishes to compare his or her own 
interpretation with the one proffered in my analysis.  
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I was grateful for the opportunity to replay this video several times, so 
that I would not overlook important data, but I found the process something of 
a double-edged sword.  As Gilbert (2000) observes, engaging with the 
subjective life experiences of subjects in the course of qualitative research can 
have an emotional impact on researchers, particularly with respect to sensitive 
topics. In my personal experience, repeated attention to testimonies in which 
some Olympia residents were able to take advantage of the formal structure 
and civility norms of the public hearing to express ignorant, bigoted or racist 
views freely and without interruption, was an emotionally wearing aspect of 
this research. As with the qualitative interviews subsequently conducted in 
Sydney, I transcribed and later analysed the testimonies from the hearing, in 
order to identify recurring themes in ‘definitions of the situation’ expressed by 
supporters and opponents of the sister city proposal. I then compared these 
frames with the explanations given by council members for their final votes, in 
order to ascertain which citizen-generated definitions had most resonated with 
those of the panel members and had consequently most effectively shaped the 
outcome of the hearing.  
The second development was another public debate that arose later in 
the same year, in two inner-west municipalities of Sydney, capital of the 
Australian state of New South Wales. The municipality of Marrickville had 
announced its intention to formalise a long-standing sister city project with the 
Palestinian city of Bethlehem, and the neighbouring municipality of Leichhardt 
had accepted in principle a proposal to sister with the Palestinian city of 
Hebron. The mainstream media coverage of these proposals drew on many of 
the same objections that had derailed the Madison and Olympia proposals, 
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portraying them as highly divisive, contentious and offensive to Jewish 
residents of Sydney. The proximity of the location of the Sydney debate 
provided an opportunity for me to delve more deeply into the interpretations of 
the issue held by the actual social actors involved, most of whom were high 
profile public figures. I contacted public officials from the Leichhardt and 
Marrickville councils by telephone and explained the nature of my interest in 
the projects. They, in turn, suggested the names of key representatives of 
citizen groups who might be interested in participating in my research. I also 
directly contacted the CEO of the New South Wales Jewish Board of Deputies, 
Mr. Vic Alhadeff, whose strong opposition to both proposals had been widely 
disseminated through mainstream news media coverage. I then conducted 
semi-structured, qualitative interviews with a small representative sample of 
participants from each of the social groups involved. These were the serving 
mayors of both municipalities, the Marrickville councillor who had proposed 
the Bethlehem relationship, a spokesperson for the Leichhardt group that had 
proposed the Hebron relationship, two other representatives of citizen groups 
and Mr. Alhadeff himself. I offered all interview participants the option of 
having their responses recorded under pseudonyms, and all chose to have their 
real names recorded. I have used complete names when reproducing and 
analysing the responses of public officials, but the first names only of 
volunteers. Although each of the volunteers had already spoken publicly about 
her views, I classified their contributions as more ‘private’ than those of public 
figures who were enacting institutional roles, so decided to convey their 
identities less explicitly.  Despite the limited size of the sample, my analysis of 
the Marrickville and Leichhardt interviews in chapters four and five 
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respectively uncovers interpretations that are far more ambiguous and nuanced 
than those suggested by media representations.  
For the Western-to-Palestinian sister city proposals addressed in this 
study, the actions of city-based representatives of the pro-Israeli lobby formed 
an important obstacle to success. The ongoing geopolitical conflict in the 
Middle East is a compelling and emotionally charged issue, and my attention 
was often directed during the course of data collection, by both participants and 
news media, towards the legitimacy or otherwise of the Israeli presence in 
Palestine and of the Palestinian resistance to that presence. The stance I adopt 
in this study is normative to the extent of my contention that if sister city 
relationships are to function as peace building entities at all, they must be 
applicable impartially, and be seen to be applicable impartially, in all cases. If 
Palestinian cities are consistently excluded in practice, then, in my estimation, 
the legitimacy of the entire movement is compromised.  I do not, however, take 
a normative stance on the substantive issue of the Middle East conflict, or on 
the political perspectives of those who do, since the target of my analysis is the 
sister city model. The interpretive theoretical framework adopted in this study 
holds that human actors behave towards the world in terms of the meanings 
that the world holds for them. It is therefore to be expected that social actors 
who identify strongly with Palestinian or Israeli interests will respectively 
support or oppose proposals to link their city in fictive kinship with a city that 
is in conflict with the Israeli state. In order to function effectively as a vehicle 
for peace building under conditions of serious existing conflict, however, sister 
city peace relationships, like any other institutionalised peace building 
program, must be strong enough to withstand local contestation. The data from 
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this study indicate that this condition is not met when the sister city model 
comes under pressure.  
The next step in the project was a discourse analysis of partnerships 
between U.S. and Iraqi cities (see chapter six). Despite subsequent ambiguity 
as to their exact classification, these were introduced as sister city relationships 
by the First Lady of the United States in 2004 and later listed as such on the 
website of Sister Cities International. In line with the pragmatic position taken 
by Zelinsky (1991), I refer to these partnerships collectively as sister city 
relationships for purposes of convenience. Discourse analysis alone is not an 
ideal method for understanding mass participation in movements, in that it does 
not allow the researcher to access in any depth the meanings given by social 
actors to their participation. However it is a useful method of identifying 
patterns in meaning making conveyed through the symbolic medium of 
language, which, collectively, bring about structural and cultural change. For 
this chapter of the thesis, I used an internet search engine and library data bases 
to collect electronic and material publications and audiovisual material 
emanating from relevant organisations such as Sister Cities International and 
related charities, the websites of city councils throughout the United States and 
any other groups for which U.S-Iraqi sister city relationships were identified as 
an issue. The data revealed pervasive acceptance and support on the parts of 
American sister city peace actors of the interpretive frames suggested by the 
Bush administration when these initiatives were first put on the public agenda. 
Such unqualified and enthusiastic engagement with those frames suggested to 
me that they had resonated with particular needs and agendas of the American 
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public, rather than being the outcome of a top-down process of ideological 
‘colonisation’.  
 The final stage (chapter seven) was to provide an overview of existing 
sister city relationships that are currently operating at less intense political and 
psychological registers than those involving controversial Middle Eastern 
cities. I included this chapter in order to locate the case studies of Palestinian 
and Iraqi focused projects within wider social processes shaping the direction 
of the sister cities movement. Three patterns were evident in general discourses 
of sister city relationships.  Two of these were located at the international scale: 
the marginalisation of culture based relationships in favour of purely strategic 
economic partnerships, and the rise of romantic consumerist fantasies enacted 
through metonymic sister city weddings. The third pattern was observable 
specifically in Australian sister city discourses, and points to an embryonic but 
potentially problematic inclination towards nationalism is Australian sister city 
practices.  
A sister cities model 
The collection of data was the least challenging aspect of this thesis. Once this 
had been achieved, I was confronted with an obstacle that I suspect explains 
the paucity of research into sister city relationships identified by previous 
authors. Mascitelli and Chung (2008) record that, in conducting their own 
research into Australian sister city relationships with Chinese cities, they were 
“astonished at the sheer lack of academic and theoretical debate and one might 
add, the dismissal of these relationships as a force in furthering relationships 
between countries” (2008:204). The deficit of scholarly attention to sister city 
relationships has also been remarked upon by O’Toole (2000), Cremer, de 
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Bruin and Dupuis (2001) and de Villiers, de Coning and Smit (2006). The 
obstacle, as indicated in the preceding chapter and at the beginning of this one, 
was that sister city relationships as a collective object of study are ill-defined, 
highly flexible and contestable in meaning, and variable in application. As 
Amin and Thrift (2005:14) ask of cities in general, we can therefore enquire of 
sister city relationships in particular: “how can we grasp an object that is so 
internally inconsistent?”  
As a first step in the process of setting up a tangible object of study, I 
constructed an analytical model of sister city peace focused relationships, 
which is theoretically and empirically supported and can be examined in 
operation under conditions of stress. The ‘sister cities peace model’ that I 
introduce can be understood as an institutionalised recipe for thought and 
action, composed of two distinct but interrelated components. These are the 
concept, which directs the way sister city relationships are to be thought about, 
and the structure, which sets out a framework for practice. The internal 
organisation of the sister cities model can be seen in Figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1. Internal organisation of the sister cities peace 
model 
The sister cities structure 
According to Sister Cities International, sister cities involve “cooperation 
between local government, businesses and a wide variety of citizen volunteers 
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and civil society or non-profit organisations” (Sister Cities International, n/d). 
They are “locally based and focus on the international interests and values that 
emerge from a local government’s collaboration with citizen volunteers. This 
occurs through an organization structure approved by the local government 
governing body” (Florida League of Cities Inc, 2005).  While business 
involvement is a characteristic of relationships directed primarily toward 
economic development, in sister city projects specifically aimed at peace 
building the structure is more basic, comprising an interactive dyad of local 
authorities and various citizen groups. This is the structure invoked in 
discourses of sister cities that include any reference to their role as peace 
building agents, and is the most successful in practice, in terms of its 
demonstrated capacity to facilitate reciprocity, friendship and understanding 
across cultures (Smith, 1990).   
The sister cities structure has particular normative implications, which 
serve to regularise the division of labour and authority within the dyad. Sister 
Cities International (SCI) reports that the interaction “combines public sector 
leadership with the grassroots energy, creativity and commitment from 
volunteer citizens who are then empowered to make sister cities an integral part 
of the fabric of their community” (SCI Strategic Plan, 2002-2006). As O’Toole 
(2001:7) observes, “(i)t is the partnership between community and local 
government that ultimately gives SCTRs legitimacy in the eyes of the local 
electorate”. According to SCI’s (n/d) publication ‘Four decades of Progress 
and Achievement’, it is also the most potent structure for building a more just 
world. 
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[If] this is going to be a better world, if there is going to be a better standard of 
living, if there is to be some relief from human suffering, expanded 
opportunities for the young, security for the aged, increased health care for the 
sick, better education for the children of the world—it will be primarily 
because the citizens and their local governments across the world have 
insisted upon it, have given leadership, and have mobilized the resources that 
are available to assure a better life. 
 
A distinctive feature of sister city partnerships is that they are formalised 
through agreements signed by the mayors of the two municipalities involved. 
In Western countries with relatively egalitarian cultural norms, such as the 
United States and Australia, they are managed at the local level as structured 
interactions between city councils and citizen groups as outlined above.  
However in countries where institutionalised authority and hierarchy are highly 
valued, it is the norm for citizen groups not to be directly involved in decision 
making processes (Sister Cities International, n/d).  This discrepancy can 
generate both ideological and structural asymmetry in relationships between 
Australian or American cities and their counterparts in many other countries, as 
the perspectives of citizen volunteers may only be communicated in indirect or 
mediated form to the international partner. 
The sister cities concept 
The sister cities concept is the more complex component of the model, in that it 
provides a cognitive and moral guide for social action. It comprises a 
conceptual blend5 of two metaphoric constructs, both of which effect collective 
reclassifications of particular international urban others within local social 
                                                 
5 In adopting this term, I do not attempt to apply the complex theoretical framework of 
conceptual blending developed in the field of cognitive linguistics (for example, by Turner, 
2007, Fauconnier and Turner, 2008). I simply assert that the two metaphors normally combine 
in the public imaginary in such as way as to avoid cognitive dissonance.  
 
 79 
imaginaries. Reflecting on citizen mobilisation through sister city partnerships, 
Alger (1987) notes that “there do seem to be two widespread motivations. One 
is some kind of common identity, we might call it species identity, with people 
in other parts of the world. A second is the belief that direct communication 
with people in other countries breeds understanding and contributes to peace” 
(1987:380).  I identify these motivations more specifically in terms of the two 
principal metaphors that drive them in current sister city practices.  The first of 
these, the human family metaphor, has universal (global) application. It is 
derived from the domestic sphere and provides a culturally embedded system 
of meaning, or ‘plausibility structure’ (Berger, 1967), for the transformation of 
unrelated others into fictive kin. The second, the citizen diplomat metaphor, is 
particular (national) in application and located in the public sphere. It derives 
from the people to people frame introduced by Eisenhower, and serves to 
discursively transform ordinary urban populations into authoritative agents of 
the state, with a putative power to influence events on the world stage. 
The human family metaphor 
The United Nations ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (1948) begins 
with a statement that the “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal 
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of 
freedom, justice and peace in the world”. The generic ‘human family’ 
metaphor expresses an ideological orientation towards all of humankind as 
intrinsically worthy, fundamentally similar, and necessarily interconnected. It 
encompasses variants such ‘global community’, as well as metaphoric allusions 
to more specific kinship roles such as sister or brother, wife or husband, mother 
or father. While nuclear family metaphors are more particular in application, 
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the idea is that individual partnerships are embedded within wider social 
networks, as in the case of the human ‘extended family’. This notion of a 
‘natural’ and essentialised human connectivity is expressed in the "Sister 
Cities: We Are One" song, which was written for Sister City International’s 
thirtieth anniversary conference in Los Angeles in 1986, where it was 
performed by the popular singer John Denver. A selection from the song is 
sufficient to convey the overall sentiment of joyous celebration of the unity of 
humanity as a form of species identity. 
 
 
We're all one dream,  
One voice of hope 
Hope for tomorrow 
We're all one life 
One gift of love 
One song forever 
 
Sister cities, brother nations 
Hand in hand in celebration 
Sister cities, brother countries 
One peaceful world, one human nation 
Yes, we are one. 
(Denver and Darnell, 1986) 
 
The human family metaphor infuses civic participation with more affectively 
compelling meanings drawn from domestic lifeworlds. In the words of the 
Mayor of Austin, Carole McClellan (1981), 
 
this is what the world is all about: realizing that we are all of the human 
family - all sisters and brothers who simply are born in different locations. In 
the basics we are the same, with only minor differences to add a spice to life. 
As Sister Cities, Saltillo and Austin will always share the same concerns… 
The Sister Cities organization enables us to more easily share our problems -- 
but better still -- to share our solutions. 
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Understanding communication across difference in terms of kin-based 
reciprocity and mutual support frames sister city activities as rational as well as 
expressive endeavours.  Aguilera (2003), for example, argues that “(s)ister 
cities gives our peoples a way to link our communities at a grassroots level. 
When we work together we have the greatest chance to discover our mutual 
interests are greater than our differences as we work to advance the welfare of 
the whole human family”. The website of Project Gettysburg León (2009), a 
sister city partnership between people in the South Central Pennsylvania 
Region and the people of León, Nicaragua, notes that the organisation “affirms 
a shared membership in one human family and a commitment to work for 
peace and justice”. The human family metaphor can thus operate as a powerful 
incentive for productive cooperation on a global scale. As a founding member 
of the Modesto Sister Cities International Khmelnitskiy Committee remarked, 
“(e)ither we understand that we are all on the same planet earth and learn to 
work together or the future of the human family is dismal (Driskill, 2007).  
However the same metaphor can also inspire highly romantic representations 
of people to people connections that can steer participants’ understandings of 
their engagement towards affective mystification and ‘magical thinking’, as 
seen in the following quote from a member of the US-Cuba Sister Cities 
Association.  
  
Today a great gulf divides the Cuban and American governments.  Jagged 
peaks and barrier reefs bar our closer relations.  Rather than crashing through 
or around the barriers, however, which we have long been attempting through 
politics and force, together …we embark on another, more constructive way. 
We will flood that abyss with so much goodwill, so many positive ideas and 
concrete actions that our joint efforts will lift us above the peaks and snags of 
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petty politics and carry us across the waters into each other’s open arms.  We 
must continue this new-found positive relationship even though our 
government, even though Sister Cities International, cannot at this time 
approve the relationship. Like Romeo and Juliet, we shall continue our 
unblessed affair, despite the efforts of certain parental authority figures, to 
keep us apart.  But unlike the star-crossed lovers of medieval times, however, 
our sister cities must strive to bring about reconciliation between our families 
before more tragedy occurs, rather than afterwards.  This is the true meaning 
of the sister city ideal - helping each other, sharing ideas, problems and 
solutions (Higginbotham, 1999). 
 
In a similar vein, the President of the U.S/Mexico Sister City Association reports 
back from a sister cities conference that he has learned that the true meaning of 
‘citizen diplomacy’ is  
 
the incorporation of the four basic concepts of respect, friendship 
brotherhood/sisterhood, and love into the work and play of our daily lives to 
promote peace and harmony within the human family throughout the world … 
(T)he description of a deep sincere friendship is one soul shared by two bodies 
and these friendships will grow to be one community soul shared by two sister 
cities (Garcia, 2007:2).  
 
This official’s statement illustrates the conceptual blending of the human family 
metaphor with the second metaphor comprising the concept component of the 
model, that of the ‘citizen diplomat’. In a speech by SCI President Sherman Banks 
(2003), however, the same blending process suggests more problematic 
connotations, as the intimation is that some members of the human family are 
‘bad’, and that this is the result of a lack of proper awareness. Only by breaking 
through the false consciousness of ‘the other’ by means of their own, more morally 
worthy version of citizen diplomacy can ‘good’ members of the human family 
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bring these outcasts into the state of truth and enlightenment that they themselves 
already share. “In this world of globalization”, argues Banks,  
 
change within the HUMAN FAMILY is truly the only absolute.  In the most 
bleak of times there in lies the truth of how much we are alike but yet so 
different.  Adali Stevenson said, “However dark the prospects, however 
intractable the opposition, however devious and mendacious the diplomacy of 
our opponents, we ourselves have to carry so clear and intense a picture of our 
common humanity that we see the brother beneath the enemy and snatch at 
every opportunity to break through to his reason and his conscience, and, 
indeed, his enlightened self.”  …  Through the spirit of attaining or projecting 
to ultimate truth within the human family can we hope to have the kind of 
unequaled opportunity for people of all ages, races and ethnicities to 
experience and exercise their citizen diplomacy by creating and strengthening 
partnerships with NGOs in the ever growing age of globalization (Banks, 
2003, emphasis in original).    
 
This national scale framing of the global crisis of peacelessness, and the 
consequences of harnessing the metaphor of citizen diplomacy in its cause, are 
explored in chapter six of this study. 
The citizen diplomat metaphor 
 ‘Citizen diplomat’ is a metaphorical concept rather than a literal description, 
since ordinary citizens possess none of the power, status, authority or resources 
of official diplomatic staff. Furthermore, the semantic ambiguity of the word 
‘diplomat’ bestows coherence and legitimacy on the curious notion that activity 
conducted on behalf of the state can be inherently non-political. The online 
dictionary resource Dictionary.com lists the following attributes of a diplomat.    
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1. a person appointed by a national government to conduct official 
negotiations and maintain political, economic, and social relations with 
another country or countries.  
2. a person who is tactful and skillful in managing delicate situations, 
handling people, etc.  
 
As Garrety and Badham (1999) observe, the terms ‘politics’ and ‘political’ are 
highly normative and fraught with ambiguity. Eliasoph (1999) details the 
discomfort experienced by ordinary Americans over ambiguous boundaries 
between the private and the public, as they struggle to describe their own acts 
of political resistance in apolitical terms. Similarly, Lofland (1993) 
demonstrates how politeness norms in the American sister city peace 
movement of the 1980s served to marginalise political discussion in sister city 
discourses. Anna Post, great-great-granddaughter of the popular etiquette 
advisor, Emily Post, is currently engaged in reinforcing the message that 
political discussion can be a minefield for polite American women seeking to 
‘manage delicate situations’. In an interview entitled ‘Etiquette for the 
Electorette’ (2007), she offers the following reassuring advice to a concerned 
contributor.  
CJP: When talking about things that are very emotional, like the war or 
abortion or even some of the candidates, if somebody says something that you 
don’t agree with, should you say something that’s honest, something that’s 
polite, or can you do both at the same time? 
AP: You can do both at the same time. A mild reply might be, “OK, I hadn’t 
thought about it like that before.” You’re not accepting their opinion. You are 
letting them know that you heard it and that you’re considering it, but that 
you’re not pursuing an argument. That’s one out. Another one is, “I’m sorry, I 
guess I just disagree.” And with both of those, just find a new topic. An 
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argument takes two people, and if you choose not to participate, it’s going to 
shut it down pretty quickly. 
Kinship metaphors are common to all cultures, albeit in diverse applications, 
but the citizen diplomat metaphor is a typically American phenomenon, and is 
less commonly invoked directly in Australian sister city discourses. While for 
Kavaloski (1990), citizen diplomacy is clearly a ‘state-centric’ construction, 
Krotz (207:406) calls attention to the ambiguity of the term, noting that in the 
context of sister cities, it “is suggestive that such activity somehow falls 
between state and society. Yet, such activity also does not properly belong to 
either, and ‘diplomacy’ connotes public officials representing their states”.  
When first introduced into the American popular consciousness through 
Eisenhower’s people to people program, the concept of citizen diplomacy was 
framed as an opportunity for ordinary citizens to participate in international 
affairs. As described by Madden, quoted in Kurata (2008), "(t)he basic concept 
was to get government and formal diplomacy out of the way and let ordinary 
citizens travel abroad, meet other ordinary citizens, walk the streets, see their 
cultural sites, eat their food, and the one thing that they'll realize is that we're 
all the same. We might have some differences of opinion, but we have more in 
common than differences". The conceptual blend of the citizen diplomat and 
human family metaphors illustrated in statements such as this was later to 
provide a bridging mechanism that enabled citizen diplomacy to be reframed as 
an obligation to protect the reputation of the United States government in the 
context of the war in Iraq. As a result, the universal impulses of American 
sister city peace actors were engulfed by nationalist sympathies, as I argue in 
chapter six. 
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The boundary object concept 
Having produced an analytical model, I next sought to identify the specific 
outcome sought by sister city peace actors. The question posed was: ‘What 
exactly are people trying to achieve when they set up a sister city peace 
relationship?”  In keeping with the characteristic vagueness of sister city 
discourses, the primary goal of the movement is frequently cited as ‘building 
peace through understanding’, but the processes through which understanding 
translates into peaceful relations is not rendered explicit. Furthermore, history 
is replete with instances of human individuals and populations living in close 
proximity and understanding each other well, but not liking or approving of 
what they understand. How, then, might positive and productive understanding 
between people from diverse cultural and political perspectives be facilitated 
by means of sister city relationships? A broad sweep of the sociological 
literature on communication across difference revealed a promising pathway in 
the form of Star and Griesemer’s (1989) analytical concept of the ‘boundary 
object’.  A product of symbolic interactionist theory, the concept of the 
boundary object highlights the importance of processes of meaning and 
knowledge construction for the success of cooperative endeavours between 
diverse social actors. Introduced by Star and Griesemer (1989) within the 
sociology of science and technology, the concept has since been taken up and 
developed in a wide cross-disciplinary literature.  
An ‘object’ in the general sense can be “anything that can be indicated, 
anything that is pointed to or referred to” (Blumer, 1967:10). It might be a 
concrete entity, such as a book or a river, or an abstraction, such as a country, 
regulation or idea. Objects routinely mediate human experience (Knorr Cetina, 
1997) and this process may be inimical to or supportive of human well-being. 
 87 
It may for example, undermine the integrity of interpersonal bonds, as in the 
case of consumption-based romantic attachments (Illouz, 1997), but in other 
contexts, such as with human relationships with the natural world, it can serve 
to situate, stabilise and connect the human subject (Knorr Cetina, 1997). 
Objects become boundary objects by virtue of their location at the intersection 
of two or more systems of meaning. As common referents that are broadly 
meaningful to all participants in a joint project, but in different ways for 
specific groups, they facilitate cooperation between interacting groups of 
people who hold discrepant understandings of what the project is about. A key 
feature of boundary objects is that they are “both plastic enough to adapt to 
local needs and the constraints of the several parties employing them, yet 
robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites” (Star and 
Griesemer, 1989:393). In order to be successful, only enough of the meaning of 
the boundary object needs to be shared to make it recognisable, thereby 
orientating all participants to the task at hand.   
Boundary objects “have different meanings in different social worlds 
but their structure is common enough to more than one world to make them 
recognizable, a means of translation” (Star and Griesemer, 1989:393).  As 
Buzelin (2007) citing Latour (1986) explains, the term ‘translation’ “refers to a 
process of mediation, of ‘interpretation’ of objectives, expressed in the 
‘languages’ of the different intermediaries engaged in a project/process of 
innovation – intermediaries who, at the beginning, do not necessarily have the 
same points of view or interests. It refers to the strategies that make it possible 
for objectives to change and evolve, ensuring the participation of the 
intermediaries and the continuation of the project” (2007:48).  
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Cooperative engagement around a boundary object can therefore drive 
creativity and innovation, since the outcomes sought are understanding and 
perspective taking, which facilitate problem solving across meaning systems, 
rather than consensus, which maintains the status quo. As common 
denominators, boundary objects can also serve as tools for the creation and 
management of new forms of identity that allow for shared and dual loyalties 
(Hepsø, 2008). They frame, stabilise and strengthen relationships between 
disparate social actors (Harvey 2006) by bridging the interpretive boundaries 
that would otherwise divide them.  Everyone involved can then “get behind the 
boundary object and work together toward some goal” (Gieryn, 1995, cited in 
Frost, Reich and Fujisaki, 2002:91).  
The creation of boundary objects is therefore of central importance for 
the development and maintenance of coherence in projects where diverse 
interests intersect (Star and Griesemer, 1989).  Examples of boundary objects 
identified in the cross-disciplinary literature include animals (Star and 
Griesemer, 1989) maps (Roth, 1995), a multi-causal model used in 
epidemiology (Shim, 2002), musical scores (Winget, 2007), the category of 
rare diseases (Huyard, 2009) and the concepts of property (Lash, 2009) and 
ecological modernization (Giorgi and Redclift, 2000). Boundary objects may 
have an existence prior to and independent of human involvement, as in 
Goodwin’s (2005) study of scientists from separate fields who work on, with 
and in the sea, or may be consciously set up in specific problem solving 
contexts, as in the use of a controlled vocabulary constructed to coordinate 
patient care in a multidisciplinary team of physicians (Sampalli, Shepherd and 
Fox, 2009). Alternatively, they may operate obliquely by opening up otherwise 
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restricted communication pathways, as demonstrated by Gibbons’ (2008) 
example of two people walking their dogs, whose shared interest in dogs 
establishes enough commonality for them to initiate a conversation, which may 
subsequently develop into a more lasting acquaintance, or even into a 
friendship.  
The principles of the boundary object can be seen to operate in sister 
city relationships at both local and international scales. At the international 
scale, they may function in a way that is similar to Gibbons’ (2008) dog-
walking interlocutors, with the formalised relationship serving as a talking 
point and pathway to deeper and more extensive interactions. The relationship 
between Glen Falls (U.S.) and Saga City (Japan), for example, began with a 
visit from the Glen Falls team for the World Hot Air Balloon Championships, 
but soon developed into exchanges of officials, health care workers, firemen, 
business people, teachers, students, videos, artwork, pen pals and educational 
projects (Benson-Wright, 2003). Former war-time enemies, such as Japan and 
Australia, who remain culturally and politically distinct, whose sister city 
models differ and who hold different understandings of what sister city 
relationships are and should be for (O’Toole, 2001) have nevertheless achieved 
decades of successful exchange and cooperation between their respective urban 
governments and citizens.  Cremer et al’s (2001) notion of ‘municipal-
community entrepreneurship’, through which the ‘economic and social 
vibrancy’ of cities can be mutually constituted and enhanced, is also suggestive 
of boundary object potential. 
At the local scale, urban authorities may perceive particular 
relationships as tools for marketing the city on the global stage, thereby 
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expanding its potential for attracting international tourism and trade. For 
citizen groups involved in the same project, they may function more as a 
vehicle for fostering hybrid identities, as in the case of migrants reconnecting 
with their country and culture of origin. Still other citizen groups might engage 
with the same sister city relationship as a means of accessing a satisfying 
aesthetic experience from the comfort and safety of home (see for example, 
Privett, 2000).  Theorising sister city relationships as boundary objects at both 
scales thus opens up new possibilities for understanding the processes that 
drive existing relationships, and provides a framework for establishing criteria 
of their success other than in terms of economic return. Existing sister city 
relationships are, however, outside the primary scope of this study, other than 
the brief discussion of alternative trends in chapter seven. Instead, I focus on 
the formative processes through which sister city peace-based proposals 
involving Western and Middle Eastern cities come to be consolidated as 
communicative spaces that are potentially hospitable to the formation of 
boundary objects, engulfed by nationalist sympathies, or banished from 
Western municipal agendas as unacceptable risks.  
Setting up a boundary object 
As noted above, boundary objects may arise as a consequence of human 
interaction, or be purposefully created as a focus for inter-group cooperation. 
In either case, a communicative space must be made available at the local level 
for international people-to-people contact to take place in the first instance.  
For sister city relationships, this is achieved via the acceptance of proposals put 
before councils and their subsequent ratification through formal agreements 
with the partner city. In instances where there is strong and uniform local 
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support for a proposal, and the council approached is sympathetic to the sister 
city model in principle, the setting up stage of the process is usually 
unproblematic.  However, when proposals are locally contentious, or are 
appropriated at a higher scale in order to avoid contention, this stage can be 
derailed. The data from this study, drawn from an examination of four sister 
city projects with cities that are controversial by virtue of their geopolitical 
location, suggest that this derailment is likely to result in either of two 
alternative outcomes.  
Building on the work of Lofland (1993), I term the first outcome a 
‘consensus object’. Consensus objects are produced when potential dissent at 
national or international scales is glossed over, giving rise to a reassuring but 
erroneous sense that productive communication across meaningful difference is 
being achieved. As illustrated in chapter six of this study, a consensus object is 
generated at the national level and is enabled by ambiguity within the ‘concept’ 
component of the sister city model.  The second is what Hilgartner (1992) calls 
a ‘risk object’, which is a thing, activity or situation that is perceived to be a 
source of danger.  A risk object, as demonstrated in chapters three, four and 
five, is generated at the local scale, through ambiguity within the ‘structure’ 
component of the model. Consensus and risk objects are failed, polarised 
alternatives to what I argue is the best-case scenario for sister city 
relationships, the boundary object. While the management of risk is not a 
particularly salient issue in the formation of boundary objects, it is the raison 
d'être for the construction of both consensus and risk objects. 
Since the division of  ‘us’ and ‘them’ is the most basic and powerful of 
human categorisations (Bauman, 1995:52), each of the three outcomes has very 
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real consequences for the relational positioning of the particular international 
urban others under scrutiny. A consensus object is based on ‘we-images’ 
(Mennell, 1994), and reinforces connections based on similarity.  It is formed 
by discursively sanitising and homogenising the difference of ‘the other’ and 
limiting the horizon of experience for those without and within (see 
McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook, 2001).  Inside the spaces of practice 
created by a consensus object, the aestheticised other is transformed and 
assimilated into ‘us’, and regulated, harmonious interactions prevail. At the 
other end of the continuum, a risk object also homogenises the difference of 
‘the other’, but renders it unacceptably unknowable and threatening. Risky 
difference becomes a contaminant to be ejected from the body politic and from 
the agenda of local authorities. Within both consensus and risk objects, 
meaningful cultural and political difference is constituted as unacceptably 
risky. In the communicative space sustained by a flourishing boundary object, 
however, it is understood as an unthreatening resource, to be harnessed in the 
development of cooperative and creative endeavours. The relative location of 
these three outcomes is represented in Figure 2.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. The consensus-boundary-risk object continuum 
 
The consensus object 
The concept of the consensus object derives from my observation of 
similarities between the consensus movements that arose in the United States 
during the 1980s and sister city relationships introduced by the Bush 
Consensus 
Object 
(Like Us) 
Risk Object 
(Them) 
Boundary Object  
(Both similar to and 
different from us) 
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administration in 2004. It is informed by, and builds upon, the critical theory of 
Lofland (1993), and to a lesser extent, that of Hollander (1991).  Both authors 
are sceptical of attempts to harness the sister city model to express dissent for 
U.S. foreign policies during the Cold War period. Hollander (1991) is entirely 
dismissive of such endeavours, branding them expressions of a left-wing 
‘adversary culture’ that routinely and naively adopts an oppositional stance to 
U.S. national foreign policy. While disagreeing with his normative framing, I 
find value in Hollander’s critique of the inattention paid by Cold War sister 
city ‘activists’ to the significant ideological and structural obstacles that existed 
at the time to meaningful communication between the residents of American 
and Soviet cities. For Hollander (1991), assertions of sisterly solidarity 
between populations governed by warring or otherwise conflicted macro-
political entities, based on similarities as generic as the sizes of their respective 
cities or their shared hopes for a safe future for their children, border on the 
surreal. In their determination to remain apolitical, thereby avoiding conflict of 
any kind, Cold War citizen diplomats, he claims, confined their conversations 
to innocuous topics such as foodways, families and sport. More to the point in 
enactments of U.S-Soviet sister city relationships, argues Hollander, were 
absent correspondences in political ideologies and enabling civil structures that 
could have supported productive dialogue on topics more pertinent to the 
project of averting nuclear war.  
Lofland (1993) takes a similar position, but defends it with an empirically 
grounded and more extensively theorised analysis of U.S.-Soviet and other 
peace-focused sister city relationships of the 1980s.  For Lofland (1993), sister 
city relationships of the Cold War period were exemplars of a “disguised or 
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timid politics” that he categorises as ‘consensus movements’. Consensus 
movements are “a way of safely posturing as social movements without the 
problems of real conflict that genuine – that is, conflict movements – engender. 
Consensus movements are subterfuge conflict movements; they are derailed 
dissent, and the disguised rebellions of timid rebels” (1993:163). Lofland goes 
on to identify common features which helped to sustain sister city relationships 
as a consensus movement. These include:  
 
• a kind of ideology, or “less-than-formalised collection of ideas” that 
emphasised similarity, celebrated unthreatening difference and maintained the 
grassroots and apolitical nature of people-to people contacts;  
• an emotional motif of joy, upbeat cheerfulness, friendliness, optimism, 
graciousness and good will;  
• core activists who were slightly more likely to be female, typically over forty, 
of upper middle class in lifestyle orientation, engaged in occupations related 
to religion, care of the home, teaching and small business, and disinclined to 
be associated with any confrontational position, including that of peace 
activism; and  
• supportive and enthusiastic support from the general public and by a broad 
spectrum of mainline city groups.  
 
Lofland (1992, 1993) notes that the success of these kinds of sister city 
relationships was partly an outcome of a wider social orientation, or socio-
cultural ‘surge’ in the United States during the period in question.  “Were city 
twinning the only instance of its type – the consensus movement – we could 
politically dismiss it as a flotsam of false consciousness, and social analytically 
file it away among the other minor eccentricities of human coping”, he argues. 
“But even the most cursory acquaintance with events of the nineteen eighties 
suggests that consensus movements were a major feature of the period” 
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(1993:183). All were animated, in Lofland’s view, by four underlying 
assumptions: 
• Correct awareness causes positive social change. This was the assumption 
that social problems are the result of ignorance or misunderstanding. 
Consensus movements were premised on magical thinking that cognitive 
change would miraculously translate into social change. As a result, their 
participants focused on changing awareness rather than conditions. 
• In a world of correct awareness, everyone lovingly resolves conflict. This was 
the assumption that if people all over the world really got to know each other, 
each would realise the inherent goodness of the other and any differences of 
opinion could be resolved peacefully. 
• Other people are not our enemies, only our false awareness. This was a 
movement that did not perceive or want to perceive any enemies other than 
false perceptions. 
• Traditional left and right politics are obsolete. This assumption, together with 
the conceptual association of politics with confrontation, led to an insistence 
that no political statements were being made by the movement.   
 
Lofland (1993) identifies specific, interrelated socio-cultural conditions in the 
1980s which favoured the formation of consensus movements, as well as 
particular unintended consequences, which ultimately rendered them 
counterproductive for the purposes of reducing international conflict. In the 
interests of combining brevity and clarity, these are summarised in Table 2, 
below. 
Social conditions that enable and 
sustain consensus movements  
Unintended consequences of consensus 
movements 
A dearth of culturally and 
organisationally developed political 
alternatives for addressing issues of social 
distress,  combined with a widespread 
perception that “conflict, politics, and 
impersonal, distant relations are negative 
and to be avoided, as opposed to direct, 
Consensus movements inhibit the 
development of oppositional movements 
that addressed the same purposes, by 
channelling off the human energies and 
talent that would otherwise have helped 
to drive them. The policies of the ruling 
class are thus left unchallenged and 
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personal interactions that achieve 
consensus and get beyond politics, which 
are positive” (1993:188) 
therefore protected. 
The rise of citizen diplomacy as an 
organising principle. This provided 
popular reassurance that the national 
government was ‘on the right track’, 
despite failed peace initiatives and the 
dismantling of public-spirited policy 
“virtually across the land” (1993:189), 
and a sense that ordinary citizens were 
doing something to help. 
 
Participants come to believe that they 
have already made the world a better 
place just by participating. The 
consequences of consensus movements 
are even less significant for achieving 
social change than processes of 
‘cooptation’ defined as “the process of 
adroitly absorbing dissident elements into 
leadership structures in a way that 
mitigates their impact on policy” 
(1993:186).  
A dilemma posed by the tension between 
(a) an aversion of negativism, especially 
when expressed through moral 
indignation and the negative emotions of 
anger and fear, because of the psychic toll 
they imposed on participants, and (b) a 
desire to engage those caught up in 
negative thought patterns in order to 
counteract their negativism. Consensus 
movements neatly address this dilemma: 
“The impulse to resist noxious social 
arrangements persists, but attaches itself 
to an ideology that is bland, centrist and 
“mushy”, an ideology that has enough 
latent and implied substance to provide a 
sense of doing something relevant, but 
not enough to create overt conflict” 
(1993:191). 
The extensive use of festivals and other 
spectacles of harmonious interaction by 
consensus movements. These can 
translate into “a mystified portrayal of 
social inequality and injustice, a 
“newspeak” rendering of social 
arrangements in which it becomes 
appropriate not only to feel that in doing 
nothing, one has done something, but to 
be joyous about it” (1993:187. At an 
intellectual level, social causation and 
social change are mystified, appearing to 
be merely matters of incorrect awareness, 
ignorance, or a lack of direct or personal 
relations.  
 
Table 2. Causes and consequences of consensus movements 
in 1980s America (summarised from Lofland, 1993).   
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Applications of consensus objects take the timid politics of consensus 
movements to new extremes. Like consensus movements, consensus objects 
are products of particular historical conditions. Born of the late modern ‘risk 
society’ (Beck, 2001), they also adopt a goal of altered consciousness, but the 
alteration is meant to take place only in the perceptions of misguided 
international urban others. A consensus object is not a movement at all, since it 
is driven by no consistent goal or policy, but is rather a strategy designed to 
foster a compliant and ordered citizenry. In enactments of consensus objects, 
there is no dissent to derail, as potentially problematic civic input is bypassed 
altogether at the point of its creation by the state. The consensus object is 
superficially joyous in mood, but at its core lies a nervous anxiousness to 
please. Its focus is not on the other reflected in the eyes of the self, but on the 
self reflected in the eyes of the other. It is not ‘grassroots’ and spontaneous, but 
top-down, strategic and instrumental. 
A consensus object is similar to a boundary object, in that it mobilises 
people from different social worlds - politicians and citizens - to work together 
at local, national and international scales. The difference is that all participants 
share the same definition of the situation, which has been pre-packaged and 
superimposed from above. Accordingly, I define a consensus object as a 
pseudo boundary object; a top-down, structured vehicle for public involvement 
and reassurance, which mimics a boundary object by creating a misleading 
impression that communication across meaningful difference is being achieved 
in the interests of positive social change.  Its current and perhaps only 
incarnations so far, as I argue in chapter six, are U.S-Middle-Eastern ‘sister 
city’ relationships -  national initiatives in which the sister cities model has 
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been appropriated in order to salvage American status, credibility and security 
in the wake of the U.S. led invasion of Iraq. These relationships provide local 
settings within which Lofland’s (1993) ‘polite protesters’ can metamorphose 
confidently and comfortably into the role of ‘polite carers’, thereby mobilising 
the diffuse ‘affections of the polity’ in the service of the secure state (see 
Berezin, 2002). 
The risk object 
At the other end of the ‘object continuum’ represented in Figure 2 lies the risk 
object. As in the case of the boundary object, the concept of the risk object was 
developed within the sociology of science and technology, using a social 
constructionist theoretical framework. Introduced by Hilgartner (1992), risk 
objects are defined as things, activities or situations which are deemed to pose 
hazards, to be sources of danger; entities to which harmful consequences are 
conceptually attached (1992:40-41). Risk object theory draws attention to the 
social processes through which some entities come to be classified as 
potentially harmful or risky, while others, which could equally have been so 
classified, are not.  In the context of the sister city relationships addressed in 
this study, risk object theory helps to explain why Palestinian cities are 
identified as hotbeds of terrorism and rejected as sister city partners, while 
Iraqi cities are spared such categorisation.  
For Hilgartner (1992), the explanation for such discrepancies is to be 
found, not in the properties inherent in the entities themselves, but rather within 
the meaning systems through which risks are constructed. The selective 
classification of particular entities as risk objects has significant political 
implications, since powerful interest groups will inevitably mobilise to confer 
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legitimacy on the systemic suspicion of others, while directing attention away 
from their own activities as alternative sources of harm. The discursive 
production of risk is accordingly fraught with struggles over meaning:  “Given 
the stakes – for organizations seeking to “disown” or “own” risks … for policy, 
and for the careers of organizations and individuals – it is not surprising that 
intense conflict often surrounds efforts to construct risk objects (1992:43).  
Hilgartner (1992:48) understands the creation of risk objects as  
 
a two-way process, propelled by efforts to emplace risk objects within, and 
displace them from, sociotechnical networks. To emplace a risk object means 
to make the object, and its risks, into significant actors in a sociotechnical 
network. In other words, to emplace a risk object means to turn it into 
something to be reckoned with, something that is capable of influencing the 
future of the network. To displace a risk object means precisely the reverse: to 
strip the object, and its risks, of their significance, to neutralise them; to 
remove their capacity to influence the evolution of the network.  
 
Since none of the risk objects examined in this thesis fits the typology of 
displaced risk objects, I henceforth confine my attention to emplaced risk 
objects, and the social processes through which they come to be emplaced. As 
Hilgartner (1992:49) explains,  
 
(r)isk objects can be emplaced from two directions: First, they can be 
emplaced through construction; that is, entities get emplaced as risk objects if 
people (1) successfully define them as objects, and (2) successfully link them 
to harm. Second, risk objects can be emplaced through resistance to control; 
that is, risk objects can get emplaced if heterogeneous engineers cannot 
remove them from the system or enclose them in networks of control. Risk 
objects can also be emplaced if the networks of control that surround them 
come to be seen as unreliable (1992:49).  
 
 100 
The identification of particular entities as ‘objects’ requires that they be 
marked out and differentiated from all the potential objects that hover in the 
background of human attention. This is a contingent process, explains 
Hilgartner, since “the world does not present itself pre-packaged into 
unambiguous and clearly-differentiated objects; On the contrary, the division 
of the world into objects is a conceptual achievement” (1992:42). Therefore, he 
argues,  
 
(t)o assume that objects are simply waiting in the world to be perceived or 
defined as risky is fundamentally unsociological. Even less can one assume 
that linkages among objects simply exist ‘out there” in reality. Nor should we 
assume, even implicitly, that definitions of objects or the linkages among 
them are invariant, either historically or across social groups. Finally, we 
cannot assume that the process of linking an object to a putative harm is 
independent of the process that defines the object as an object (1992:41, 
emphasis in original).  
 
The sister city proposals examined in this study achieved the conceptual status 
of an ‘object’ when they were singled out for the attention of local authorities, 
and hence for public attention, through a request for a formalised sister city 
agreement. The very act of seeking council approval for their project set in 
motion a risk assessment process which might not otherwise have occurred. 
For example, in the case of the Olympia-Rafah sister city proposal examined in 
chapter three, the group that made the proposal, the Olympia Rafah Sister City 
Project (ORSCP), had an unproblematic status within the Olympia 
municipality until it sought the formal recognition of council, and appears to 
have retuned to that status once that proposal had been rejected and the subject 
had been excluded from the local council’s agenda.   
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During the twentieth century, risk management emerged as a priority 
for governments and bureaucracies at all levels in advanced industrial societies 
(Kasperson et al, 1988), and those charged with its application must remain 
ever on the alert to potential threats. These include risks to the legitimacy of 
the local democratic process itself, as controversy and debate can exacerbate 
divergences between expert and public assessments (1988:178). As the form of 
‘sociotechnical network’ closer to citizens and responsible for deciding 
between diverse and conflicting claims on government resources, local 
governments are risk processors par excellence. In the terminology of Hughes 
(1987, cited in Hilgartner, 1992:45), they are ‘system builders’, spending much 
of their time processing a catalogue of risk objects of which the general public 
remains generally unaware (1992:52).  Hilgartner (1992) argues accordingly 
that looking to ‘the public’ or the mass media as the most likely locations of 
risk object construction, as is done in most risk theory, deflects attention away 
from those actors at the centre of risk processing; namely “those that devote 
sustained attention to constructing facts and machines, laws and regulations, 
organizations and management systems, research programs and data collection 
systems, risk objects and networks for controlling them” (1992:51). These are 
most likely to be “communities of specialised professionals”, such as 
government officials and “political operatives”. “For this reason, he contends, 
“analysts of the social construction of risk who start with “the public” are 
beginning their work in the wrong place. The most important action takes place 
in organizations (1992:52).  Having thus identified the ‘right place’ to start, I 
focus my analytic attention on specific processes and contexts within which 
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peace building projects are shaped and constrained by governments, at both 
local and national scales. 
Hilgartner (1992) notes the problematic nature of linkages between 
objects and putative harm, given the wide range of objects to which harm could 
potentially be attributed. 
 
One can always construct many potential branches to the chains of causation 
that lead to disaster. Moreover, the length of each branch can in principle be 
extended indefinitely; there is no unambiguous end point. Thus, the risk of 
motor vehicle accidents can be attributed to unsafe drivers, unsafe roads, or 
unsafe cars … The risks posed by unsafe drivers, in turn, can be attributed to 
inexperience, irresponsibility, fatigue, or alcohol consumption. Inexperience, 
in turn, can be attributed to inadequate driver education programs, which can 
be attributed to shortage of funds. The networks of objects deemed to pose 
risks can abruptly terminate, can wind their way back to common cause, or 
can diverge. The set of possibilities, in principle, is infinite (1992: 42).  
 
In order to understand how some objects are constructed as risky and others are 
not, argues Hilgartner (1992), it is therefore necessary to unpack the networks 
of risk objects and causal linkages that people construct through processes of 
interaction. In the case of the motor vehicle accidents mentioned above, for 
example, it behoves the sociologist to “look beneath the surface of the category 
“motor vehicle accidents” and examine the heterogeneous collection of entities 
that are deemed to be the sources of danger … Studying risk objects offers a 
way to pry open networks of risk, and look at the dynamics of the process 
through which risks are created, controlled and distributed (1996:47, 52).  
A puzzling feature of the foregrounding of some objects as risky is that, 
by objective criteria, the harm they are capable of causing is far less than that 
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posed by objects that remain in the background. Situations or events that pose 
only minor threats to public wellbeing sometimes produce intense public 
reactions, as in the case of the ‘moral panic’ that followed the murder of a two 
year old child by older children in 1993 (Cohen (2002:ix), while “significant 
hazards” such as cigarette smoking or driving without seatbelts are largely 
ignored. Kasperson et al (1988) attribute this seemingly arbitrary allocation of 
‘risky’ status to a more coherent process, which they term ‘the social 
amplification of risk’. Processes of risk amplification blur the boundaries 
between risk responses and ‘first-order’, embodied harms such as illness, 
wounding or death, enabling threats perceived to be minor or non-existent by 
some groups to achieve the status of officially recognised public perils.  As 
Kasperson et al (1988) explain,  
 
(s)ocial amplification of risk denotes the phenomenon by which information 
processes, institutional structures, social-group behavior, and individual 
responses  shape the social experience of risk, thereby contributing to risk 
consequences … The interaction between risk events and social processes 
makes clear that, as used in this framework, risk has meaning only to the 
extent that it treats how people think about the world and its relationships. 
Thus there is no such thing as “true” (absolute) and “distorted” (socially 
determined) risk. Rather the information system and characteristics of public 
responses that compose social amplification are essential elements in 
determining the nature and magnitude of risk. (1998:181).  
 
Kasperson et al (1988) use the metaphor of the stereo receiver to demonstrate 
how processes of risk amplification occur. Once a ‘risk event’ (identified as an 
‘object’ in Hilgartner’s terminology) enters the public domain, it sends out 
signals that are picked up, interpreted and processed by ‘social amplification 
 104 
stations’, in the form of technical experts, institutions, the news media, social 
organisations and public agencies. The nature and salience of the symbols 
contained in message signals are central in determining how they will be 
received by decision makers, as are the self-representations of those 
transmitting the messages. Simple rhetorical devices such as repetition of the 
same information can increase belief in the validity of a message, especially 
when conveyed by different social actors (1998:180). Alternatively, ‘expert’ or 
high status identities may be invoked, in order to afford legitimacy to the 
perspective expressed.  
In discussions conducted within formal institutional spaces, such as 
public hearings, technical experts are commonly called in to clarify the risks 
involved. In disputes over environmental pollution, for example, the hearing 
itself can function as a risk amplification station (see McComas, 2003). In the 
case of controversial sister city proposals, however, the risk signals flow in the 
opposite direction towards the local authority. Since a core value of local 
councils is maintaining local order and stability, the fact that there is already 
disagreement amongst the populace in relation to a program that is an optional 
extra for councils, constitutes a potent risk signal in itself. This does not bode 
well for a positive outcome for contested proposals. I examine just such an 
example in the following chapter, which uncovers the processes through which 
a risk signal in the form of a contested sister city relationship came to be 
emplaced as a risk object in the context of a public hearing.   
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Chapter Three: The Olympia-Rafah public hearing 
Background: The Madison-Rafah proposal 
On the 17th of April, 2007, a public hearing was held in Olympia, the capital 
city of the state of Washington, U.S.A, to decide the outcome of a proposal to 
sister with the war-torn Palestinian city of Rafah, situated on the Gaza strip. At 
the time of the proposal, Olympia had one existing sister city relationship with 
Kato City, in Japan, dating from 1981. The initial impetus for the proposed 
sister city relationship had come from a local peace activist, a young woman 
named Rachel Corrie, who had since been killed in Rafah while attempting to 
protect a Palestinian home from demolition by Israeli forces. Uniquely for 
sister city proposals, therefore, this initiative was supported by a ‘martyr 
narrative’ (see Peterson, 1996), which, in the minds of peace actors, afforded it 
a particularly high level of symbolic capital and moral legitimacy.  
For proponents of the project, official recognition would have brought 
several benefits. As a supporter of a similar proposal had argued some years 
previously, it would have facilitated the process of gaining clearance from the 
Israeli government for travel to Rafah (Batcheldor, 2007). It would also have 
allowed access to funding through Sister Cities International, and to its 
services, such as interpreters and translators. Although these were significant 
advantages, they were, in a sense, secondary considerations, since the project 
had been operating successfully as an independent endeavour for some time 
prior to the hearing. The primary gain would have been symbolic, in that 
endorsement by an elected government would have conferred official 
legitimacy upon the claims to ‘normal’ personhood by the people of Rafah. If 
they had been classified as ‘ordinary’ people of the kind targeted and 
celebrated in Eisenhower’s people-to-people campaign, and as fictive kin to the 
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residents of Olympia, the inhumane living conditions of the citizens of Rafah 
could not have been normatively countenanced by their prosperous U.S. 
‘sisters’. The outlook for the Rafah initiative was not promising, however, 
since a precedent had been set three years previously in Madison, the capital of 
the American state of Wisconsin, for rejecting a sister city proposal with the 
same Palestinian city. As a writer for the global charity ‘Peace x Peace’ (2005) 
later remarked, such a disappointing outcome for a sister city peace initiative in 
“democratic and liberal Madison” served as a sobering reminder of the 
difficulty of promoting constructive public dialogue on contentious issues at 
the local scale.  
Public understandings as to the risk posed by the proposal varied 
between council and citizen volunteers within the city of Madison. For Marc 
Rosenthal, a co-founder of the Madison-Arcatao sister city project, the Rafah 
project constituted  a positive risk, in the sense of offering an opportunity to 
build a more just world by engaging constructively and responsibly with global 
issues at a local scale. Such an endeavour was “very much within the spirit of 
sistering and what it means to be a global citizen. In today’s globalized world, 
there are no issue that are purely Madison” he argued (Rosenthal, quoted in 
Davidoff, 2004a). In the view of Madison mayor Dave Cieslewicz, however, 
the initiative posed an unfair and unacceptable level of negative risk to the 
integrity of council, and he took the opportunity of local media coverage of the 
debate to remind representatives from other sister city projects who were 
supporting the Rafah proposal that they were venturing onto shaky ground.  
 
This city council and I aren’t equipped and we shouldn’t be expected to 
debate Middle East policy when we have city issues to deal with. Also I am 
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concerned that this issue may put into jeopardy the entire sister city program. 
As you know, it did come under some fire in the last budget and I’m afraid 
that raising this issue will only give those who have raised questions about the 
program more reason to raise questions (Davidoff, 2004). 
 
Beckett (2004) argues that the trajectory of the Madison-Rafah sister city 
proposal should have been a simple matter, since supporters had been 
following established procedures in the form and spirit of the city’s existing 
sister city relationships, many of which had been founded on social justice 
issues and deemed controversial at their inception. “Few communities [had] 
more consistently taken stances on everything from South Africa’s apartheid 
system to Burmese trade policy to the war in Iraq, and few American towns 
[had] forged more international sister city relationships than this one”, he notes 
(Capital Times, May 17th, 2004). For the Rafah proposal, however, the 
symbolic stakes were particularly high. As Davidoff  (2004b) observes, “(h)ad 
the measure prevailed, the Madison-Rafah sister city program would have been 
the first solidarity-model Palestinian sister city pact to be approved by a city 
council in the United States”. Hundreds of citizens filled the Madison City 
Council chambers to take part in the debate (Hurd, 2004), but ultimately, the 
city’s  politically left leaning ‘habitus’ (see Lee, 1997) proved an unequal 
defence in the face of intense, if not representative, local opposition. “After 
more than four hours of public testimony, council members voted 9-8 in favor 
of the Madison-Rafah Sister City Project, but the tally fell two votes short of 
the 11 needed for passage” (Davidoff, 2004), so the proposal was defeated. 
 Looking back, the Madison City Council President pointed to the nub 
of the problem: Councils cannot approve optional proposals that are seen to be 
dividing their own cities. In her judgement, an important civic lesson learned 
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from the Rafah debate had been that interest groups wanting to establish sister 
city relationships must resolve local opposition before putting their proposals 
to council (Barret, 2004). By this assessment, any controversial sister city 
project that comes before local councils is inevitably doomed to failure.  
Despite attempts by some opponents to frame it as such, the Rafah 
sister city issue had not been problematic for the local Jewish community as a 
whole, having been initiated by a Jewish academic with strong support from 
Jewish as well as non-Jewish residents of Madison. Rather it was contested 
partly on the basis of the threat it was considered by pro-Israeli groups to pose 
to the moral and political positioning of the Israeli state in the ongoing Middle 
East conflict. One commentator went so far as to describe the Madison-Rafah 
sister city debate as “a battleground for Israel’s legitimacy, concluding that   
  
(t)his initiative was significant, because only a few American cities have 
adopted Palestinian towns. Its acceptance would have meant a victory for the 
Palestinian Authority and its supporters by advancing their long-term 
objective of delegitimizing the State of Israel and by creating a climate 
congenial to politically correct anti-Semitism … Because the local Jewish 
community and unaffiliated Jews, some belonging to the "soft Left," acted 
effectively, the City Council did not adopt the proposal. Although Madison 
may seem far away from Israel, the decision reached there has considerable 
importance (Fishman, 2004). 
Dittmer (1977) notes that “to the degree that a symbol succeeds in becoming a 
depository of widespread interest and feeling, it can incite prolonged public 
controversy, mobilize demonstrations of support or protest, and otherwise 
influence social behaviour” (1977:569). The ‘special’ relationship between the 
United States and the state of Israel is the subject of global political contention, 
but most apposite for the purpose of this thesis are Friedman’s (1986) 
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observations regarding the affective and identity-related dimension of US 
support for the Israeli state. For Friedman (1986, citing Israeli philosopher 
Rabbi David Hartman), the state of Israel stands as a vicarious symbol of 
courage that is incorporated into American identity, with far reaching 
consequences for US foreign policy, particularly with regard to foreign aid.   
 
Undoubtedly, the Jewish vote in America and Israel's role in America's global 
defense go a long way toward explaining this extraordinary level of aid. But 
they do not tell the whole story. The aid is too out of proportion. It is clear that 
Israel also touches something very deep in the American consciousness. 
''Israel evokes the pioneer spirit of American democracy,'' remarked Rabbi 
Hartman. ''It also touches a deep spiritualism in America and its biblical roots. 
The United States may need Saudi Arabia, but Saudi Arabia doesn't touch 
America's soul, or its sentimentality about the American dream. I don't view 
Israel's dependency on America as something that has gone wrong, or is sick. 
It derives from the fact that this nation is mirroring something very deep in 
America.'' 
For Jewish-American opponents of the Madison proposal therefore, the project 
constituted a high risk to both aspects of their hybrid identities. For Jewish 
supporters of the proposal, on the other hand, attacks came from a different 
quarter. Their public stance attracted intense public vilification from fellow 
Jews for whom Jewish identity and loyalty to the Israeli state were inseparable, 
the most vitriolic diatribes being directed against Jennifer Loewenstein6, the 
Jewish academic who had initiated the proposal (see for example, 
masada2000.org, n/d). Such attacks marked the sister city debate as an in-group 
dispute over the normative boundaries of Jewish identity, as well as one that 
contested the boundaries of the internationally engaged city.  
                                                 
6 See Loewenstein (2004) for a personal account of the marginalisation of Rafah, which she 
describes as ‘a land out of bounds’. 
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As previously mentioned, local authorities are commonly claimed to be 
“closer to the people” and consequently more enabling of democratic 
participation than national or state level governments, but such closeness can 
be a double-edged sword. Jones and Harsell (2007:197) observe that “(t)he 
proximity of municipal governance to its constituents places an emphasis on 
quality-of-life issues, which can be divisive and not readily amenable to 
compromise. Furthermore, for local councils, 
 
 (i)nterpreting public opinion is tricky business, not least because issues are 
diverse and opinions are complicated. Interests, principles, partisan 
attachments, ideological convictions, and more all figure into the views that 
citizens express toward matters of public life. These objects of political 
thought likewise vary, from dull to vivid, practical to emotional, and 
substantive to symbolic” (Nelson and Kinder, 1996:1055).  
 
Governments deal with issues that “cause deep anxiety for large numbers of 
people (Edelman, 1998:131), and Mirza (2005) contends that “(a)ddressing the 
emotional needs of citizens is now a core, rather than a supplementary function 
of government, … [expressing] “the fundamentally psychological aspect of the 
individual’s relationship to society” (2005:263). Such had been the 
complexities of civic office facing the Madison City Council in 2004, as it 
decided the outcome of the controversial sister city proposals that had been 
placed before it.  
The Olympia-Rafah proposal 
The failure of the Madison proposal was met with disappointment and 
resentment by its supporters, who had placed their trust in the sister city model 
as a means of publicly affirming the legitimate place of the people of Rafah 
 111 
within the ‘human family’. Three years later, another attempt to achieve this 
goal via a sister city relationship was launched in the north-Western state of 
Washington, and attracted a similar level and kind of local opposition. The 
outcome of the Olympia proposal was to be determined by a council vote in the 
context of a formal public hearing, following the delivery of pre-registered 
citizen testimonies. In line with the standardised format of public hearings, 
citizens took turns to present spoken testimonies over a microphone to a panel 
of six councillors, who were seated facing the citizen assembly. These 
councillors were ‘system builders’ (Hughes, 1987, cited in Hilgartner, 1992) 
charged with the decision as to whether the proposed relationship would be 
incorporated into the formal municipal system of Olympia. The panel 
comprised the mayor, Mark Foutch, the mayor pro tem, Laura Ware, and 
council members TJ Johnson, Doug Mah, Karen Messmer and Jeff Kingsbury. 
One councillor was absent on the night of the hearing, but had indicated in 
advance his willingness to concur with the majority vote.  
Public hearings, as distinct from public meetings in general, are a legal 
requirement in the United States in order for certain types of legislation to pass 
(Stern and Fineberg, 1996, McComas and Scherer, 1998). They are a common 
form of local democratic engagement in that country, with up to three quarters 
of Americans reporting having visited at least one hearing during their lifetime 
(Karpowitz, 2008). Ninety seven percent of American cities use them as a 
strategy for dealing with citizen concerns Berman (1997, cited Adams, 2004:44 
). For city councils, they have the advantage of being easy to convene, and 
provide a means for publicly recognising citizen perspectives in a regulated 
context. From the perspectives of citizens, they provide a unique political 
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setting in which Americans can air their views for an agreed period of time on 
issues that affect them most directly (Stern and Fineberg, 1996, Karpowitz, 
2008:3).  
As forums for the enactment of local democracy, however, public 
hearings are problematic in several respects.  Citizens who participate are not 
representative of the general community, and the hearing format can ‘invite 
posturing’ (Stern and Fienberg, 1996:200) on the parts of narrow interest 
groups who are ‘hyper-invested in the issue under consideration and 
consequently more extreme in their attitudes and arguments” (Karpowitz, 
2008:8). This can divert councillors’ attention from other, possibly more 
moderate views of the majority of citizens who chose not to attend the hearing. 
Unused to public speaking, citizens can also wander off topic when addressing 
the assembly, unnecessarily depleting public resources of time and energy. 
Elected officials and citizens generally do not engage in discussion at such 
gatherings, except on a superficial level, as the public hearing format does not 
allow for such diversions. Nor is there any interactive exchange of viewpoints 
among citizens, which might enable them to reach common understandings 
(Adams, 2004). Furthermore, councillors tend to be inflexible and conservative 
in style, often providing only technical or legal justifications for their decisions 
(Stern and Fineberg, 1996, Karpowitz, 2008) in response to the frequently 
impassioned normative entreaties of citizen orators. Finally, and most crucially 
for issues of local governance, citizen testimonies at public hearings are 
generally held to have little or no impact on the direction of government policy 
(Adams, 2004, Karpowitz, 2008, Topal, 2009). 
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Citizens march up to the podium, give their two minute speeches, the 
presiding official says “thank you very much,” and then officials proceed with 
their business irrespective of the arguments made by citizens. Citizens may 
speak their mind, but officials do not listen and usually have their minds made 
up before the public hearing. Hearings, in this view, are mere democratic 
rituals that provide a false sense of legitimacy to legislative outcomes: 
Officials can say they received input from the public, and it can give their 
decisions the respect afforded to democratic processes, even though citizen 
input has no impact (Adams, 2004:44). 
 
“In this sense”, agues Karpowitz (2008), public hearings are “more democratic 
show than meaningful deliberation” (2008:6), “best for presenting alternative 
views, information and concerns [but] less useful for dealing with power 
imbalances, creating trust, or promoting dialogue (Stern and Fienberg, 
1996:200). The public hearing format is therefore of dubious utility for the 
resolution of contentious issues at the level of local governance. Drawn by a 
promise of political agency, citizens speaking in favour of proposals at public 
hearings do so within an institutional context that is ultimately more 
constraining than enabling. Since the hearing process itself confirms the 
existence of unresolved local divisions, it can intensify council concerns about 
the risks posed by a contested initiative, thereby better serving the interests of 
opponents of the developments under consideration.   
The setting 
The Olympia-Rafah sister city hearing was preceded by other business relating 
to the city, such as special recognitions and details of community programs. 
Also included was a announcement by Councillor TJ Johnson regarding the 
assassination earlier that day of the Mayor of Nagasaki, a personal friend who 
had been co-chair of the Mayors for Peace campaign. Cr. Johnson linked the 
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Japanese mayor’s assassination with the shootings at Virginia Tech, which had 
occurred only a few days earlier, as “a powerful reminder of the violence in 
every society”. On the front of his desk was a hand-written sign in capital 
letters, reading ‘TOO MANY DEAD’.   Cr. Johnson’s announcement set the 
tone for his subsequent contribution at the conclusion of the ensuing debate. To 
his mind, the normative boundary between the political and the personal with 
respect to a public official was permeable, a perspective later implicitly 
endorsed by his colleague and fellow panel member, Mayor Pro Tem Laura 
Ware. His sobering announcement was followed by the short ‘public 
communications’ section of the meeting, an opportunity seized by one resident 
of Olympia to elaborate on a bizarre, Anti-Asian conspiracy theory. At the 
conclusion of his incoherent speech, he thanked Mayor Foutch, who politely 
thanked him in return. The mayor’s response to such an inappropriate display 
draws attention to the standardised civility norms governing such assemblies.  
Quite remarkably, given the contentious nature of the debate and its live 
electronic streaming across the world, most speakers gave their full names and 
addresses prior to delivering their testimonies. Councillors were seated behind 
desks arranged in a curve, facing the assembled citizens. A council 
spokesperson made a brief statement regarding the background of the proposal 
and confirmed that all of the official requirements for consideration of a formal 
sister city relationship had been met. Speakers had been requested to confine 
their speeches to three minutes or less, and presented them at a raised podium 
to one side, also facing the audience. The hearing commenced at 8 p.m. Since 
many more supporters than opponents had registered to speak, their testimonies 
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were presented alternately, until such time as there were no more waiting to 
speak in opposition.  
The debate 
In line with Adams’ (2004) contention, the evidence suggests that the outcome 
of the long, often emotional and obviously tiring public debate that ensued was 
a foregone conclusion. The process of emplacement of the Olympia-Rafah 
sister city proposal as a municipal ‘risk object’ can be seen to have been well 
underway by the time the hearing commenced, with the local media conveying 
the opposing viewpoints of citizens in some detail. The Olympian (2007), for 
example, published a sample of emails that had been sent to council and to its 
own editor, including a message from a resident who also spoke later at the 
hearing.  This opponent warned the council of the risk to its reputation, should 
it appear to be endorsing symbolic harm to its own residents. “This is a direct 
slap in the face to mainstream Jews in Olympia who have lived here in peace 
for generations and who have greatly contributed to our economy and its 
institutions”, he argued. “I urge you to avoid another embarrassment by not 
associating the city’s good name to this relationship. If there is a local group 
that wishes to engage in relations with Rafah or any other city or terrorist state, 
that should be their prerogative. But, the city need not have their name 
associated with such an ill-fated relationship”. Another resident declared that 
she opposed the proposal because “Rafah is not an “ideal” partner. Other 
localities that respect the human rights of all people would make better partners 
for peace”.  A message from a supporter of the proposal, by contrast, framed 
the issue as an opportunity for council to improve the reputation of the city. “I 
have lived in Olympia for four years and appreciate the diversity that is 
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enjoyed here.” he wrote. “Sister city relationships significantly add to the value 
of living here…The more we as Olympians can become world citizens, the 
better and safer our world will be. ... (T)his very special area cries out for 
peace”. 
Lyons (2007) records that hundreds of letters and emails had “flooded” 
the city on the topic. “Numerous phone calls also came in, according to council 
members. More than 300 people attended the standing-room only public 
hearing on the project. People waited outside the building to get in to comment 
and observe. Forty-eight people spoke in support, 24 people expressed 
opposition”. That theirs was a polarised citizenry was further drawn to the 
attention of council when both groups spontaneously seated themselves on 
opposite sides of the room, leading one opponent of the proposal to question 
how city officials could hope to get people together in the Middle East by 
means of a sister city relationship when they could not get local people to sit 
together in their city hall. The largely predetermined outcome of the hearing is 
further indicated in a comment by the mayor, who recalled later in the evening 
how he had expressed his misgivings about the likely success of the proposal to 
one of its subsequent instigators. 
 
MF: I said “John, do you really want to ask that question?” Because it’s going 
to force the council to take sides in a community that’s probably not going to 
be very unanimous about this.  But if you want to, go do your homework, find 
out what’s required from the city regulations, engage in some people-to 
people work [gestures towards both sides of the auditorium] and see what kind 
of support you can get and it’s possible that you’ll get a majority. You’ve 
done all that work, the Rafah sister city program has done that work, and I 
don’t think you’re going to get a majority on the council. 
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Nevertheless, as with the meting out of justice, which according to the popular 
aphorism must not only be done but must also be seen to be done, the result of 
the formal hearing had to be visible to all as the apparent outcome of a 
democratic and accountable process. To that end, the deliberations of 
councillors, as noted by the mayor at the conclusion of the public testimonies, 
needed to be as publicly visible and audible as the debate among the citizens.  
The debate itself was characterised throughout by competing and often 
incompatible representations of the proper purpose and scope of sister city 
relationships, and of the mutual obligations of citizen groups and local 
authorities with respect to those relationships. Supporters of the proposal 
understood sister city relationships to be a means of bridging difference, while 
for opponents they were about connecting with other cities that were as similar 
as possible to Olympia. For supporters, global peace building fell within the 
proper scope of council concern, since they considered local and global 
interests to be inextricably linked. This group believed that council had a duty 
to lead the city forward in creating an interconnected and more peaceful world, 
even if that entailed overruling local dissent. For opponents, the primary 
responsibility of council was the maintenance of peace at the local scale, and 
they held that council should consequently respond only to ‘safe’ and 
uncontroversial sister city requests.  
Several speakers on both sides of the debate prefaced their arguments 
with claims to moral or expert identities, thereby bolstering the credibility of 
the ‘risk message’ they were about to send to the panel. Supporters frequently 
cited positive personal experiences of Rafah and its people and some referred 
to their travels in the Middle East in general. One supporter identified himself 
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as a former military intelligence officer, while others represented themselves as 
academics and members of religious orders or churches, and peace-building 
organisations, including some that were specifically working on Israeli-
Palestinian reconciliation. Like lawyers for the defence and prosecution 
addressing a jury, each group sought to convince the row of councillors facing 
the assembly of the validity of their respective positions. To this end, 
opponents accentuated the messages that their group had already conveyed to 
council through other means, namely that the proposed sister city relationship 
was a potential source of harm to themselves and to the city. Proponents, in 
turn, denied, disregarded, minimised, or qualified any possible negative 
outcomes, framing their initiative instead as an exciting opportunity for cultural 
exchange and peace building, or indicating alternative sources of harm for 
which the proposed relationship could function as an antidote, such as 
ignorance, unfounded fear and the foreign policies of belligerent national 
governments.  For some opponents, a tripartite relationship that also involved a 
sister city relationship with an Israeli city was a viable compromise, but 
proponents of the proposal responded that this would be discriminatory, since 
no such conditions had ever been imposed upon U.S.-Israeli sister city 
partnerships.  
Both groups urged the council to ‘know its place’ in three key respects. 
Firstly, it should know the nature of the place it was considering 
acknowledging as a ‘sister’ in the collective name of the inhabitants of 
Olympia. Rafah was framed by supporters as a desperately disadvantaged city 
inhabited by interesting, worthy, but nevertheless ‘ordinary’ fellow human 
beings in need of and entitled to humanitarian support, while those against the 
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proposal framed the same city a site of malevolence, pathology and danger. 
Secondly, it was argued that council should know the place it was charged with 
governing.  For supporters, Olympia was an open minded and progressive city 
eager to take its place in the global community, while for opponents, it was an 
imperilled local community, unnecessarily divided within its own population 
and irresponsibly exposed by council to the possibility of symbolic 
contamination. Finally, council members were urged to know their own place 
in relation to the appropriate scope of their concerns. While opponents stressed 
the need for local councillors to confine their activities to matters of local 
importance, supporters reminded them of their duty to lead and of a primary 
imperative to address global issues at the local level. 
Undaunted by what must have seemed unlikely prospects for success in 
the light of their own mayor’s reservations and the Madison-Rafah outcome, 
members of the Olympia-Rafah Sister City Project (ORSCP) had prepared well 
for the public hearing. The proposal had been years in the making, and, during 
that period, they had worked to ensure that their project had met “both the 
letter and spirit of the requirements regarding sister city relationships with both 
Sister Cities International and city regulations” (Lyons, 2007). They had also 
set up a web site outlining their position and objectives, which had recently 
expanded to include a list of ‘frequently asked questions’.  These addressed 
objections and concerns that had been raised throughout their campaign by 
council members and other residents of Olympia.  
In keeping with Lofland’s (1993) observations as to the typical socio-
demographic position of American sister city peace actors, citizens who spoke 
in favour of the proposal presented as uniformly middle class, well-educated 
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and polite. Their arguments also tended to be more abstract and complex than 
those of opponents, who were more likely to employ emotional, personalised 
and antagonistic frames. In their unwaveringly optimistic conviction that a 
sister city relationship with a war-ravaged and impoverished Middle Eastern 
city could help to build a better word, supporters can be understood as 
ambassadors of the ‘project of modernity’ (Habermas, 1997:45), drawing on a 
‘class value” logic as described by Beck (2001). John’s message, for example, 
was that vigorous debate is a public good in itself, and that global peace is 
achievable through positive communication across meaningful difference. For 
John, the real risk lay in doing nothing, as the consequences of failing to act 
could not be known in advance. His testimony, like those of many other 
supporters, conveyed no concrete benefit specifically at the local level - which 
might have mitigated councillors’ perception of the risk it posed - other than 
the fact that it would incur no cost to the municipality. John was, in line with 
the motto of Sister Cities International, “thinking globally and acting locally”, 
and the benefits he anticipated were the global public goods of peace and 
stability.  
 
John: Allowing people the opportunity to express their opinions and thoughts 
on controversial topics such as this is essential for coming to mutual 
understanding where there is disagreement …I’m asking for your support for 
one simple reason; that diplomacy and communication are vital for peace and 
stability in the world. And peace and stability is no more vital than in Israel 
and Palestine right now. This project provides us an opportunity to do that … 
The project would cost the city nothing, but the impact could very well change 
the world. To not engage in this effort, we do not know what the cost of that 
would be … If we ignore the people we disagree with, we lose any chance of 
peaceful understanding with them. We cannot only deal with people who 
agree with us. Our city will soon consider a sister city relationship with China, 
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and China by many is understood to have a history of civil rights abuses, but 
to refrain from engagement with them is to lose any opportunity for us to 
influence change, or to speak with one another. This is why I personally hope 
you will hold sister city status with them soon, just as we are asking for your 
support tonight.  
 
Simona, who identified herself as “an Israeli Jew, a daughter of a holocaust 
survivor, a veteran of the Israeli military and a professor of Peace and Conflict 
Studies” began by invoking the historical success of the sister city movement 
during the Cold War. Like John, she pointed to an alternative source of risk at 
the national and global levels in the form of her country’s foreign policy. She 
concluded her testimony with a direct normative message to council that its 
proper obligations in relation to its citizens extended to overruling dissenting 
local voices in the pursuit of higher goals. 
 
Simona: As U.S. citizens, we feel an urgency to undo the damage caused by 
decades of our country’s flawed and one-sided policy. .. Scholars, myself 
included, have argued that sister city projects that draw clear distinctions 
between government and citizens have the potential to reduce hatred and 
dehumanisation that may result in violence. …When viewed in light of the 
literature on cross-cultural exchanges and people-to-people efforts and the 
potential contribution to conflict resolution and global harmony, it is clear that 
the proposal to make the association between Olympia and Rafah official is 
not divisive … While it is important that we listen to and take into account all 
voices and sentiments represented in our community, as community leaders, 
you are expected to be forward looking. I hope that you would not shy away 
from making the decision that it is in the best interests, of our community, all 
of our community, even if it triggered the opposition of a vocal minority.  
 
Supporters also employed the humanising strategy of linking the proposal 
specifically to domestic concerns, by stressing the benefits of a sister city 
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relationship for families and children in the devastated and desolate city of 
Rafah. One speaker expressed her wish that opponents of the proposal could 
“have the opportunity to look into a Palestinian child’s eyes and see the human 
being beyond your fears”. Others told stories of a small boy in Rafah who had 
not liked Americans until he had seen Rachel Corrie playing soccer with some 
of his friends, and of a Palestinian toddler, whose behaviour was just like that 
of other toddlers around the world.  
 
Therese:  I‘ve worked with Israeli human rights organisations, I’ve worked 
with Jews in the United States and a broad range of people from various 
religious and cultural backgrounds, all of whom recognise that it is a shared 
human need for security and freedom that transcends religious, national, 
cultural boundaries. When I first went to Rafah in 1991, I met a family who 
was living in the ruins of their demolished home. They were a family of 
fifteen. And the father of that family told me “lots of people come and take 
pictures, but nothing ever changes”. I think that this sister city relationship is 
an incredible opportunity for us, as a community, to build on the work that’s 
already been done, and to create change, and to offer an alternative to U.S. 
policy in the region, which has been failing miserably. 
 
Therese’s statement suggested a clear benefit at the local scale, but it was 
couched in terms of unspecified change and included a direct criticism of the 
U.S. state, which rendered the gains she envisaged ambiguous in terms of the 
risk that overt political disagreement could be seen to pose to council. Donna, 
in turn, situated her church’s support of the Olympia-Rafah proposal within the 
broader historical context of its resistance to once commonly accepted social 
injustices, which had since become objects of universal condemnation. She 
also redirected the question of moral personhood from ‘them’ back to ‘us’, 
 123 
urging council to take into consideration the implications of their decision for 
the collective identity of the people of Olympia. 
 
Donna: Quakers are one of the historic peace churches and we have a history 
of taking stands that go against what many people considered to be the truth at 
that time. We were one of the first groups in America to stand against slavery, 
we lobbied to attempt to get the United States to provide refuge to Jewish 
victims during the Second World war, we stood against the Japanese 
internment camps and Quakers are now taking a stand in favour of justice and 
peace for the people of Palestine as well as the people of Israel …What we 
need to do is have human relationships. We need to get to know the people 
that we don’t know. When we don’t know people, it’s easy to forget about the 
fact that they are human beings, to lose touch with the fact that there is that of 
God in them, just as there is that of God in each one of us. I feel that a 
relationship between the city of Olympia and the city of Rafah can do a lot. It 
has a lot to say about the kind of community we are going to be. Are we the 
kind of people who are willing to reach out and get to know people or are we 
the kind of community who just says “everybody says that they people in 
Palestine are terrorists and that’s all I need to know?” 
 
As the mayor himself acknowledged, Carl was a particularly skilled orator. 
Like Simona, Carl framed sister city relationships as a means of addressing 
deficiencies in national scale foreign policy. He highlighted the risks attendant 
on blind inattention to those deficiencies at all political scales, calling for his 
city’s local authority to demonstrate courage and leadership. 
 
Carl: The only thing that I can say to the people who are against it, the 
trepidation that they have with involving us in an area of the world where the 
problems are so complex, maybe we shouldn’t be there. I ask: “what are we 
doing in Iraq then? What are we doing in Iraq?  We don’t know what we’re 
doing in Iraq. People are getting killed because we thought we did. A divisive 
issue? Yes. But I will take a divisive issue, that maybe hasn’t been planned 
very well, that has as its objective the achievement of a little bit of peace, over 
what we did in Iraq.  Poor planning, poor equipment, and what has happened 
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because of that? People are dying. The national government of our country 
right now, and the national government of our country in the past, does not 
have clean hands. The people who say “this is not our business, it’s not our 
part of the world”, we’re in this world and what happens in the rest of the 
world is our business. We learned about that on 9/11, didn’t we? Do we want 
people around the world to hate us, or do we want them to recognise what the 
flag and the statue of liberty stand for – something good? Be bold, Olympia. 
Be brave. Forget the imperfections. Go forth and attempt to achieve 
Olympia’s two cents worth of peace in this world.   
 
For opponents of the proposal, however, it was not at all appropriate for 
council to brave or bold in the name of local citizens. Rather they envisaged its 
duty as one of maintenance and conservation of public order, whether in 
respect to clean streets and safe public spaces, or protecting the ontological 
security (Giddens, 1991) of residents. While Charles acknowledged the need 
for councils to ‘make a difference’, he considered the proposed sister city 
relationship with Rafah to be a misguided and counterproductive means of 
achieving that goal. In his estimation, Rafah was a physically violent and 
symbolically polluting place, and council would do better to direct its attention 
to more worthy, local projects. Like other opponents of the proposal, Charles 
stressed the danger posed by facilitating connections between his own, 
peaceful city and one that was steeped in violence. Furthermore, his testimony 
alludes to the symbolic threat posed by an involuntary shrinkage of social 
distance between opponents of the proposal and the residents of Rafah, which 
would follow from fictive kinship ties. As noted by Hess (2000), interaction 
with disliked others is a necessary feature of mundane social life. However the 
metaphoric entailments of the sister city label when applied to Rafah would 
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have made it difficult for opponents to maintain the level of affective 
dissociation necessary to render such interactions tolerable.  
 
Charles: Many people do not realise that this part of the world is not safe or 
secure for outsiders to travel…We should be very concerned about the safety 
and security of a city and its government before establishing a sister city 
relationship. It’s still an active war zone with a simmering of civil war and its 
citizens, that is, the citizens of the Gaza strip, continue to hurl rockets at 
Israeli towns across the border. Why should we encourage travel between 
these two communities when even the Peace Corps won’t send volunteers to 
that troubled part of the world? The city council should be an instrument that 
brings people together for the common purpose of higher good. The proposal 
tonight before you is very divisive and, let me add, very emotional, for Jews, 
many Jews in this community. It is an affront for the city’s citizens who don’t 
want to be identified with Hamas, a terrorist government …The city of 
Olympia has so many other ways to make a difference. .. protecting children, 
parks, sidewalks, housing the homeless, instead of passing what amounts to an 
anti-Israeli initiative. If private groups want to be associated with this, then 
more power to them. No problem. But why have the city of Olympia’s name 
associated with this proposal?  
 
Naomi, too, emphasised the divisiveness of the proposal and the misguided and 
erroneous nature of claims made by the ORSCP and its supporters. Like 
Charles, she pointed to more appropriate, local issues that would more properly 
occupy the energies and resources of council and drew councillors’ attention to 
the limits of their sphere of concern. Naomi made a clear distinction between 
the harmful and offensive implications of a formal sister city relationship with 
Rafah and the commendable and innocuous nature of private humanitarian aid 
to that city. Of central significance to Naomi and other opponents of the 
proposal was the threatened dissolution of highly valued symbolic boundaries 
between the two cities concerned and their respectively deserving and 
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undeserving populations. She concluded her testimony with an emotional plea 
to council to spare their citizens exposure to unnecessary and alarming risk.  
 
Naomi: This is a very controversial and divisive proposal. It supports one side 
against another in an ongoing military and political conflict in the Middle East 
and it’s divisive in Olympia as well. It is not benign … It galvanises one 
group of us against another group.  It does not create peace and understanding 
in Olympia or elsewhere. But most importantly even, it involves Olympia in 
an international dispute that is not Olympia city business and it diverts our 
attention from what is our business in Olympia …There are many important 
issues that we need to be looking at, to help shape our city, to shape our 
community. We have issues of homelessness, downtown improvement, 
economic development, tourism, just to name a few. And I know that there are 
well-meaning Olympians on both sides of this issue. Those Olympians that 
support Rafah should carry out their programs on their own, as they have been 
doing. We know that all humanitarian efforts should be commended, but I 
urge you as a city council – do not link Olympia with Rafah. As has been 
stated, Rafah is a city that is steeped in violent behaviour, it has helped to 
elect and is governed by Hamas, a known terrorist organisation that continues 
to refuse to renounce violence and that supports suicide bombings and other 
violent activities for political purposes. Don’t, please don’t formally link 
Olympia with Rafah. Don’t do this to our community. It is going to further 
divide us. It is not going to create peace and understanding and it’s so 
offensive to many of us here.  
 
In the lead up to the hearing, the ORSCP had explained on its website that 
Fatah, not Hamas, was the representative power in Rafah. However the 
distinction between the two parties was ignored or glossed over by many 
opponents, who cited the contact with and indirect endorsement of Hamas that 
official approval would bring as a principal objection to the proposal. One 
speaker, who displayed an astonishing level of ignorance of the reality of 
severe and ongoing conflict on other parts of the world, advised the council of 
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a wide array of more appropriate candidates for sister city relationships with 
Olympia. For this speaker, the proper scope of sister city relationships did not 
extend to addressing the extreme violations of the moral order that he deemed 
to exist in the symbolically polluted city of Rafah. 
 
Two cities are proposed to unite as sisters. By drawing a straight line from 
Rafah to Olympia, the authors of this proposal have stepped over several 
continents of peaceful societies, in which we do have much in common. The 
proposal ignores three hundred and fifty million people in South America, 
nine hundred million of Africa, three point seven billion of Asia and hundreds 
of millions more of East and West Europe. For example, our communities 
have much in common with the peaceful aspirations of South American 
countries, whose families look to the future for better education, health, 
economic prosperity and political stability, yet we hardly know each other. 
We should not ignore neighbours and link ourselves to a society that, after 
fifty years, refuses to recognise its neighbour. The honourable citizens of 
Rafah may use as an example the seventy-five million Arabs of Jordan and 
Egypt now living in peace with Israel. A sister city relation with either of 
those two countries would be based on positives, rather than negatives. 
Instead, we are asked to form a sister city relationship with a city ruled by the 
old guard terrorist PLO, and the new guard, Iranian sponsored terrorist 
Hamas. If the honourable citizens of Rafah wish to engage in a dialogue of 
differences, they only have to go a short distance to sit down with Israelis, and 
I can assure you, there are many tens of thousands of progressive Israelis who 
would welcome that opportunity.   
 
For Susan, the fact that council had even entertained the prospect of such a 
relationship was sufficient to alienate her and her friends from their local 
authority, and she delivered a thinly veiled threat as to the consequences for the 
city if the proposal were to be approved.  
 
Susan: It wasn’t until Sunday that most of the people I know knew about this. 
And they were outraged. I’ve gotten comments like “I don’t even want to live 
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in Olympia any more!”… Rafah, if it wants to be a sister city, should partner 
up with another city in Gaza and teach them how to be peaceable and loving 
towards Israelis. I say, this is really going to divide Olympia, so I oppose it.  
 
Striking a less emotional note, Rabbi Seth Goldstein sought to reassure council 
that he understood its dilemma. His own position, he argued, often required 
balancing conflicting perspectives in the interests of maintaining local 
harmony, and the implication was that he was speaking to the panel as a 
colleague and an equal. As such, he reminded them of their duty to represent 
all of the people of Olympia, and to take heed of the manifest reality that the 
city’s citizens were divided and, in many cases, deeply distressed. Most 
appositely for the theoretical framing of this thesis, he stressed the ambiguity 
of the situation and its openness to multiple interpretations, as well as the 
unintended consequences that might ensue if enacted applications of a 
formalised partnership with Rafah were to veer out of council’s control. 
 
Rabbi Goldstein: I recognise that, to the city council, you oversee a broad and 
broad-based community with a variety of perspectives. I too, in my position, 
oversee a broad-based community with a variety of perspectives and I 
understand the role that must be played in terms of one of the primary values 
being maintaining the peace of that community. I mentioned in a letter... what 
I feel is the city councils role as community stewards. Not all sister city 
relationships are created equal.  Rafah is a city in the midst of conflict, and 
more importantly a bilateral conflict…. The city council role is to mindful of 
its citizenry and I need not remind you that for myself and others in the 
Olympia Jewish community that this conflict is not objective or neutral, but 
holds a deep emotional, personal, spiritual connection with Israel, based on 
the notion of Jewish individual and collective identity, peoplehood and 
history. From the perspective of community leadership and its difficulties, I 
also ask the council to if this is a true sister city relationship, with an equal 
exchange of ideas and values and interests … Is the city council prepared to 
say that Olympia as municipality and all of its citizens stand in solidarity with 
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the struggle of the Palestinian people in whatever form that struggle takes? 
Who defines it? The vision of this just and prompt peace – and I think we all 
share a desire for just and prompt peace – is also undefined. So therefore, 
what is the city council supporting by passing this notion? And whose onus is 
it to mind the sister city relationship and that it stays with the cultural and less 
of the political?   
 
Response from council 
The six members of the Olympia city council on the panel that evening were 
themselves conflicted as to the proper scope and purpose of sister city 
relationships and the appropriate roles of local authorities and citizens in 
relation to sister cities. Furthermore, their responses indicate that most, if not 
all, had held firm beliefs about the desirability or otherwise of the proposed 
relationship prior to hearing the citizens’ testimonies. As noted above, for 
councillors Johnson and Ware, there appeared to be little by way of a boundary 
separating matters of personal conscience and their duties as public officials. 
Berezin (2001:83) equates political identities with public identities, noting that 
they are often subordinate to private identities, but for these two councillors 
they appeared to be as one; their support for the sister city proposal was part of 
their all-encompassing moral commitment to addressing global peacelessness 
at all scales. Both spoke of experiencing difficulties in maintaining ‘face’ in a 
world of ubiquitous violence, whether by looking in the mirror, facing the day, 
facing children, or telling a child that it was worth facing the day. Both 
accordingly felt a strong imperative to set an example to others in their 
capacities as local officials, by formally committing the city to an initiative that 
might reduce that level of violence. Like the citizen proponents who had 
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spoken at the hearing, they understood the sister cities model to be a tried and 
tested structure for achieving this goal.  
Indicating that ‘her heart was ready to make a motion’, Mayor Pro Tem 
Ware situated her support for the proposal within the context of the two violent 
incidents that had occurred earlier in the week of the hearing. This councillor 
framed terrorism as a global problem to which no country was immune, 
whether from within or from without. Therefore in her estimation, any means 
for finding global solutions, such as the sister city relationship under 
discussion, deserved to be supported. To her mind, it was the courageous 
citizen group the ORSCP and its supporters that were leading the city of 
Olympia forward with a peace building, global agenda, and she understood any 
negative response on the part of council to be an obstruction of that necessary 
project. 
 
LW: I cannot, in good conscience, do anything but make a motion tonight to 
make an official sister city relationship with Rafah. We are not going to 
change the world if we don’t honour the person to person relationships in our 
local cities. People said, well, we’re talking about relationships with terrorists. 
Yes, there are terrorists in Rafah. No-one’s denying that. There are terrorists 
in this country. I don’t want to be judged by Timothy McVeigh and I don’t 
want to be judged by George Bush. This is about just everybody finding out 
where the common ground is and starting to have dialogue so we can go 
forward, and there’s nothing wrong with that.  If it can happen with Japan, 
after they bombed Pearl Harbour and we dropped the bombs onto two of their 
cities, we can have a relationship here, and it’s the only hope we have in the 
world that we live in today. The stuff in Vermont this week and the mayor in 
Japan being assassinated – it’s sometimes hard to get up in the morning, and 
it’s sometimes hard to face our kids and say it’s worth going on. And till you 
get with a group like this that’s willing to go to a place where it’s dangerous - 
and absolutely it’s dangerous, I don’t want to pretend that it’s not - but there 
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are people willing to go across dangerous borders in order to try and change 
the world. And I am not going to stand in anybody’s way, and if having an 
official city sponsored relationship gets you the resources through Sister Cities 
International for interpreters and other services, then so be it, we need that.  
 
Councillor TJ Johnson also had no doubt as to the legitimacy of the sister city 
proposal under discussion, or the desperate need for sister city relationships in 
general as a means of addressing pervasive violence at a global scale. His 
response was the longest of all speakers, and he introduced it by expressing his 
moral aversion to violence and hope for a sister city alternative that could, in 
the terminology of the Eisenhower story, bypass the constraints of the nation 
state. His response also accorded with Cr. Ware’s in the degree of personal 
subjectivity and emotional intensity it conveyed.  
 
TJJ: I’m absolutely sick of the violence in the world, and I don’t know how to 
get up every day and face the day, or to tell my kid that it’s worth facing the 
day. So when I approach this question, it’s really simple for me. The only 
question is what action has the best chance of reducing violence and 
promoting peace? That’s really simple. That’s all there is to this. And when 
looked at in that context, the answer is clear. Reaching out to people and 
talking to them has a better chance of reducing violence than ignoring them, 
pretending they don’t exist, or demonising them. . … The whole origin of the 
sister city business, it was set up during the Cold War, and as was pointed 
earlier, it wasn’t set up to say but don’t talk to anyone on the other side of the 
Cold War, it was set up to get around that and to get people to understand that 
the only way to solve these problems and to get past the due political state 
stuff is people-to-people.  
 
Cr. Johnson went on to justify the moral stance he had taken on the local issue 
at hand with reference to macro political theory. For this councillor, as for the 
sociological theorists discussed in chapter one of this thesis, urban citizens and 
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their governments offered the best, and perhaps the only, hope for a more 
peaceful word order, and were a necessary foil to the belligerence of nation 
states. To his mind, local authorities had a clear duty to demonstrate initiative 
and community leadership, which outweighed any of the particular objections 
that had been levelled at the Olympia-Rafah proposal.   
 
 
TJJ: Joe Hyer said something really that stuck with me recently. He talked 
about the fact that nation states are increasingly irrelevant, because they can’t 
respond to the challenges of the world today, and Joe made a pretty 
compelling case for the rise of city-states, or the resurgence of city states, 
since they were once the dominant factor. And so much of what keeps coming 
back to this council just seems to point to the truth of Joe’s observation there. 
We’re not solving any of these big problems at the federal level or through 
international agreements; the stuff that’s working and the progress that’s 
happening is happening because of people and it’s happening at the city level. 
Cities are taking on climate change; cities are talking on nuclear weapons; 
cities are taking on the war; cities are taking on impeachment, because nobody 
else is doing this stuff. And this is another opportunity for a city to show 
leadership and to get around the roadblocks that are created by the nation state 
and by our government and by the government of Israel and by the Arab 
governments that support the terrorists in the Middle East. None of that stuff 
is going to fix the problem. …The only hope of diminishing the violence, of 
making it less of a mess, is trying something new. Like talking to each other. 
Like reaching out to people that you might not agree with, that are culturally 
different, that have linguistic differences and trying to find your common 
humanity in the context of all of that.  
 
The remaining four council members all voted against the proposal. In line 
with the framing of opponents of the sister city proposal, they were 
unanimously troubled by the effects it was having on their local community, 
and might have in the future if it were passed.  Councillor Doug Mah was the 
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next to speak. In a brief and measured speech, he responded specifically to 
three of the arguments that had been made by opponents of the proposal:  
divisiveness within the city, the suggestion of a trilateral arrangement and the 
absence of any necessity for council approval of an already successful 
humanitarian project. Like Cr. Johnson, he attributed international agency to 
local authorities, but in a form that seemed to him to be more evenly applied.  
In his opinion, the sister city project would cease to be divisive and become a 
tool for peace building in the Middle East only if a sister city relationship were 
also established with an Israeli city, through which Olympians could work at a 
local level to reconcile all afflicted parties.  
 
DM: I believe that the proposal, although well-intended, has created conflict 
in our community. It is divisive, because, although it may be again 
unintentional, it requires the council, and subsequently, the community, to 
choose a side, to make a political statement. And we’ll be choosing a side in 
an ongoing conflict, not only from afar, but also now the conflict that is in our 
own community. And I think it’s an ongoing conflict that is best served by a 
trilateral arrangement between Rafah, an Israeli city and the city of Olympia. 
And I would encourage the council to support a trilateral arrangement that 
would allow us to play a needed reconciliation role between Israel, Palestine 
and the United States. .. I also want to encourage the group to continue the 
people-to –people and humanitarian efforts without the support or recognition 
of the Olympia city government and without the divisiveness and conflict that 
such support may bring.  
 
Councillor Karen Messmer’s response also illustrated her preoccupation with 
the issue of divisiveness, but she referred in addition to two other significant 
factors that had shaped her decision. The first was that the consequences for 
council and for the people of Rafah of rejection of the proposal would be low, 
since the ORSCP would continue its humanitarian work regardless of the 
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decision made.  The second was the distinction she drew between a 
‘government’ program and a ‘people to people’ program. For this councillor, 
the kinds of activities conducted by the ORSCP were clearly not the legitimate 
concern of council. Not only did they require a policy statement on matters that 
fell outside its area of jurisdiction, but they also threatened its integrity within 
that jurisdiction. Cr. Messmer’s speech points to a paradox within the 
‘structure’ component of the sister city model: formal municipal endorsement 
constitutes both its greatest strength and its greatest weakness. Proponents of 
contentious sister city proposals seek council approval because of the high 
level of symbolic legitimacy it confers on their projects, but that same 
symbolic legitimacy is anathema to those who oppose those proposals. It is the 
symbolism of official naming, rather than the ideologies or activities of the 
proposing groups themselves, which generate the public opposition that 
ultimately dooms them to failure.  
 
KM: I think people-to-people relationships are very important and … I am 
very impressed that this organisation has done some amazing work. You’ve 
done all this work without necessarily having a government endorsement of 
that work and I’m not clear that designating a sister city from this government, 
the city government here now, would be the appropriate thing to do. I don’t 
think that not giving the designation diminishes at all what is going on. I want 
to encourage it to continue to go on. But this is a people-to-people program, 
not a government relationship, and by endorsing this, whether we want it to or 
not, it does make a policy declaration. It makes a policy statement. And 
unfortunately, that official government involvement could worsen the kind of 
disagreements that we’ve heard here tonight, about whether we should have 
this kind of relationship in an official way. I didn’t hear anybody say that the 
people who are doing the sister city activities shouldn’t do them. I heard them 
saying that a government endorsement of that is going to create a situation 
that they’re uncomfortable with. The proposal that’s before us to make an 
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official sister city should be something that we can endorse that is extending a 
hand where we’re saying we represent the community at large to do this. And 
with all the emails and the testimony that we’ve heard on this issue, I don’t 
hear a uniformity, or even a large majority one sided or the other, about this 
situation. There is a large support, but there’s also a lot of people who are very 
uncomfortable with this, with the governmental endorsement. So I want to 
encourage the Rafah group to continue to do what they’re doing and people to 
people relationships are important, but I can’t support the official sanction of 
this at this point.  
 
For Councillor Jeff Kingsbury (JK), not only was the proposal divisive, but the 
controversy he had seen enacted in his municipality had been generated 
unnecessarily by the act of bringing it before council for official approval. In 
his opinion, humanitarian or friendship projects did not require council 
involvement. Furthermore he could not understand why the ORSCP and its 
supporters would not accept a compromise in the form of a tripartite 
relationship, which would also include an Israeli community.  
 
JK: I wish that I could support this proposal, but I cannot. I am very 
concerned about entering into a sister city relationship with a city on the other 
side of the world, when our own community is clearly divided over this issue. 
If we cannot come to some unity here in our own community about it, then 
I’m not comfortable entering into a sister city relationship with this 
community. I am comfortable with having people-to-people relationships as 
well, and the truth of the matter is, it doesn’t require a government entity to 
enter into pen-pal relationships with people and to develop strong person-to-
person relationships with people all over the world, and I endorse such 
activities. And I’m actually dismayed that there has been some talk for some 
time about getting a tri-community relationship and I don‘t understand the 
reticence. And if it is not possible to do that, which I think sends a true 
message of trying to mitigate the kinds of things that are going on in that part 
of the world, which are horrendous, then I’m uncomfortable endorsing this 
and I’m afraid I’m going to have to vote against it.  
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Scanning the political horizon for signs of threat, local politicians as risk 
managers of the city must attend to three key questions (Kaplan and Garrick 
1981, cited in Little, 2007:99), namely: 
1. What can go wrong? 
2. What is the likelihood that it would go wrong? 
3. What are the consequences of failure? 
For the councillors who voted against the proposal, the answer to the first 
question lay in the conflicting interests and demands expressed by citizen 
speakers during the hearing. What could go wrong was an ongoing and 
possibly more acrimonious version of the local divisions they had already seen 
enacted before their eyes in City Hall, and they perceived the likelihood of this 
happening to be high. The consequences of failure were most clearly 
articulated in the response of Mayor Mark Foutch (MF) who, as Chair of the 
meeting, was the last panel member to speak.  
His response demonstrates that there was no doubt in his mind his mind that 
the venture was simply too risky to be allowed to proceed.  
 
MF: It comes down now to whether I think the great majority of the people of 
Olympia are comfortable with us sanctioning this relationship in their name, 
in their name. We’re not just seven people. We represent the entire 
community, or we should, or we try to. Many people of this community feel 
that this prior council, I would say, has not been very careful with the 
community’s reputation. Other people would disagree with that. But the 
council’s taken some pretty controversial stances in the past, and there are still 
some scars left from that and I hear about that every once in a while. There are 
still some mistaken impressions of some things we’ve done in the past, and 
that’s out there in the world and there’s very little we can do about that now. 
Speaking of the world now, we’re on streaming video. I have no idea who is 
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watching this right now and where, and what they think, but we’re now in a 
position, as someone said, that we will be seen to be taking a side in this Arab-
Israeli conflict tonight no matter what we do. We’re stuck with it. So I will 
fall back on a factor that council member Messmer cited and that is I don’t 
think our community as a whole is ready to have their city council sanction 
this relationship. I think we should continue to encourage the activities of the 
sister city project and assist them as much as possible, but as for speaking for 
the entire community right now, I don’t think that would be advisable. So I 
will not support the motion.  
 
In the mayor’s estimation, a highly salient ethical requirement of his office was 
to shield council from future blame, and the people it served from future 
distress, by means of present reflexivity and caution. Once formalised, the 
consequences of council decisions would be beyond the control of council. In 
contrast to the expectations of courageous leadership (or support for 
courageous citizen leadership)  voiced by supporters of the project, dissenting 
councillors agreed with citizen opponents that the appropriate role for council 
was conservation of the established order, and that sister city proposals should 
not be brought before council unless they had been previously and 
unanimously endorsed by all interest groups within the city.  
The repercussions for the sister city program in Olympia were 
immediate, with Councillors Johnson and Ware arguing that since the model 
had been shown not to operate without prejudice in all applications,  Olympia 
should have no sister cities at all. Cr. Johnson accordingly put forward a 
motion that the city of Olympia’s sister city ordinance be repealed.   
 
TJ:  If we are using the filter of taking sides as a reason to have or not have a 
sister city relationship, the current actions of current prime minister Abe’s 
government in Japan are absolutely reprehensible, and contrary to the long 
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term peace and stability of this country and this world and we should therefore 
not be having a sister city relationship with Kato. We have no evidence that a 
large majority of this community supports this relationship ... I think Karen 
made an interesting point. Why do you need government sanction of these 
things?  If it’s going to continue, it will continue without us. So based on what 
we’ve just seen tonight, Rafah can continue without city sanction. Why would 
we continue to spend money, which we do, on behalf of the Kato sister city 
relationship? And in terms of the proposed sister city with China, China’s one 
of the worst human rights abusers in the entire world. We had no interest in a 
sister city relationship with China prior to last year, when suddenly the 
Secretary of State dragged the mayor along on a trade mission, and suddenly it 
was all about money and all about trade, and human rights issues be damned. 
And the mayor came back and, I think in good faith, began engaging people in 
a discussion about a sister city relationship which, prior to last year, nobody in 
the community had even heard of. So again if we’re using a filter that these 
things can continue without government support, and we don’t want to take 
sides, why in the world would we be encouraging a sister city relationship 
with a Chinese city that is in one of the worst human rights abusers on the 
planet?  So I think it’s completely appropriate, given our vote a couple of 
minutes ago, to dissolve our existing relationship and not have any further 
encouragement to the China sister city and to repeal our sister city ordinance.  
 
The motion was seconded by Cr. Ware, but opposed by the remaining four 
councillors and consequently defeated. Cr. Johnson’s motion had been based 
on his interpretation that the rejection of the sister city proposal had been based 
of the stigmatised moral status afforded the city of Rafah. However the data 
from the study suggest a more theoretically complex explanation.  
Theoretical implications  
A month after the defeat of the Olympia-Rafah proposal, Andrew Ford Lyons, 
the president of the Board of Directors for the Olympia-Rafah sister city 
project, publicly posed the question as to how a proposal that been so strongly 
supported at the local level had come to be rejected by democratically elected 
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officials. His personal conclusion was that, in their responses to the Olympia-
Rafah and Madison-Rafah proposals, officials of both cities had submitted to 
the fear-mongering tactics of a vocal minority. “Our critics had fewer people in 
their ranks”, he reasoned, “but they were scarier” (Lyons, 2007). Based on my 
own, sociological analysis of the video of the Olympia-Rafah public meeting, I 
argue instead that the root cause of the proposal’s rejection is to be found in a 
weakness within the ‘structure’ component of the sister city model itself. The 
proposal was rejected primarily, I contend, not for reasons of racism, 
intimidation or ignorance - although instances of all three are notable to various 
degrees in the expressed views of a minority of opponents - but because it had 
been successfully emplaced as a ‘constructed’, division-generating risk object.  
As detailed in chapter two of this study, ‘constructed’ emplaced risk 
objects are material or abstract entities that have been successfully linked to 
putative harm (Hilgartner, 1992). They then become the focus of blame if 
adverse consequences eventuate (Kendra, 2007). In the lead-up to the public 
hearing, the proposed relationship had been successfully argued to pose a threat 
to cohesion within the local community and to the integrity of the local council, 
a perception which the display of local polarisation at the hearing only served 
to confirm.  As had been the case in Madison, the city council of Olympia 
reacted primarily to the manifest reality that its citizens were vocally, and 
apparently immutably, divided over the proposal. A citizenry that is at 
loggerheads over local government decisions is a politically disgruntled and 
unstable citizenry, and such a prospect is anathema to local councils, which, as 
democratic institutions, depend on public approval for their continued 
existence. Furthermore, unlike their institutionalised obligation to attend to 
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such mundane matters as planning permits or the maintenance of public 
facilities, sister city relationships are an optional extra for councils and they are 
under no obligation to accept the additional risks that contested proposals 
incur.   
The specific weakness demonstrated to inhere in the ‘structure’ 
component of the sister cities model is its incapacity to accommodate 
conflicting and incompatible understandings at the local scale, with regard to 
the nature and scope of sister city relationships and the mutual obligations they 
entail within the citizen group/local authority dyad. While high levels of 
semantic plasticity can be seen to operate on both of these dimensions, there 
was no core meaning to act as a referent when contesting interpretations 
collided. Proponents of the proposal all understood sister city relationships to 
be vehicles for bridging meaningful difference. They framed themselves as 
positive risk takers addressing peacelessness on an international scale, and 
expected their local authority to demonstrate innovative leadership in 
accordance with this stance. Opponents, by contrast, understood sister city 
relationships as a means for building friendships between people who are 
fundamentally similar. They, in turn, viewed the Rafah proposal and its 
instigators as a source of negative risk and cause of peacelessness, and 
expected their local authority to be cautious and risk avoidant. Hearing a 
cacophony of irreconcilable voices, a ‘categorical imperative of avoidance’ 
(Japp, 2000) inevitably emerged for the majority of decision makers within the 
Olympia city council. 
 The outcome of the Olympia-Rafah sister city proposal 
demonstrates the failure of the sister cities structure to withstand conflicting 
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and incompatible understandings of sister city relationships and the mutual 
obligations they entail within the citizen group/local authority dyad. Having 
watched the video of the Olympia public hearing several times, however, I 
argue that the hearing nevertheless represents a modest contribution to peace 
building, independently of the sister cities model. Of crucial significance is the 
fact that the event was videorecorded and subsequently posted on the Olympia 
council’s website. It would be difficult for a viewer in any part of the world 
with sufficient interest and patience to watch and listen throughout the entire 
hearing to leave the experience with the impression that the rejection of the 
proposal was simply the result of American prejudice against the Palestinian 
people. While expressions of hostility and anti-Palestinian sentiment are indeed 
evident in the video, they are by far outnumbered by demonstrations of 
humanitarian good will and of a strong political commitment to the peace 
process, often articulated by speakers identifying as Jewish. The justifications 
of the dissenting councillors can be seen to be focused on their primary duty to 
maintain local stability, rather than on any ‘malignant positioning’ (Sabat, 
2003) of Palestinian cities and their occupants. Finally, the mayor of Olympia 
can be seen to be stuck, in popular parlance, ‘between a rock and a hard place’, 
as he conveys what is evidently for him a difficult and even painful decision. 
His obligations as a risk manager for the city as a whole had demonstrably 
propelled him and his fellow dissenting colleagues inexorably towards 
rejection of the proposal. Collectively, these factors send a relatively 
accessible, moderating message to the residents of the rejected Palestinian city 
and to viewers elsewhere in the world as to the ethical, bureaucratic and 
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political complexities of seeking formal endorsement for controversial sister 
city projects.   
In the next chapter, I examine a contested proposal to link a Western 
city with a Palestinian city that met with similar resistance to that encountered 
by the Olympia-Rafah proposal, but which resulted in a very different 
outcome.  This is the successfully established sister city relationship between 
the Australian municipality of Marrickville, New South Wales, and the historic 
Palestinian city of Bethlehem.  
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Chapter Four: The Marrickville-Bethlehem sister 
city relationship 
Background to the relationship 
Three months after the defeat of the Olympia-Rafah proposal, a formal sister 
city relationship between Marrickville, an inner city municipality on Sydney, 
Australia, and Bethlehem, Palestine, was ratified by the mayors of both 
councils. The proposal had attracted no opposition in Bethlehem and was the 
thirty-sixth sister city for the municipality. As a site of high religious 
significance for Christians, Bethlehem is much sought after as a sister city in 
Western countries, with of ten of its sister cities and regions located in Italy 
alone. Marrickville had five existing sister city relationships at the time of the 
proposal, with Keelung in Taiwan, Kos in Greece, Funchal in Portugal, 
Lanarca in Cyprus and Safita in Syria. In contrast to the Olympia-Rafah 
proposal, the partnership with Bethlehem had also been unproblematic for the 
majority of Marrickville councillors, who had seen it as an expression of the 
council’s policy to implement programs reflecting the interests and concerns of 
its culturally diverse population. Nearly forty percent of Marrickville’s 
population of 76,000 was born overseas, with the most common languages 
other than English spoken at home being Greek (5270), Vietnamese (3771), 
Chinese (3259), Arabic (2689) and Portuguese (2236) (Marrickville 
Community Profile, 2004:19). For the serving mayor, Morris Hanna, the 
relationship with Bethlehem was particularly appropriate because both 
Marrickville and Bethlehem are ‘multicultural’ cities (Australian Local 
Government Association (ALGA) News, 2007). 
Within the council, the proposal was opposed by a single councillor, 
whose objection was based on his scepticism about the efficacy of existing 
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sister city programs in Marrickville. Otherwise, it was strongly supported by 
council and by the general community. Although driven by council rather than 
a citizen group, popular approval of the project was affirmed by calls and 
letters to council and by written comments in a guest book provided at the 
signing ceremony. The Community Development Officer for Marrickville 
Council later recalled that “people were ringing up, saying (things like), I was 
born in this local government area seventy years ago and I really support the 
signing of this agreement. They were the generic population, saying, we 
support that promotion of understanding and peace” (personal communication, 
2007).  In supporting the Bethlehem proposal, the people of Marrickville, like 
the people of Madison and Olympia before them, were putting their trust in the 
sister city model to help them to build peace and cross-cultural understanding 
with the people of a Palestinian city. That this was a normal and 
uncontroversial application of the model from the perspective of the council 
and citizens of Marrickville is borne out in the comments of Jennifer, a local 
supporter and member of the ‘Friends of Bethlehem’.  
 
Jennifer: I’ve often spoken at Marrickville council meetings when there’s an 
issue that concerns me or my neighbours, but this was so non-controversial, I 
didn’t go and waste their time by voicing support, because nobody was 
opposed to it. Why would I? The committee had the support of all the 
councillors on the issue of Bethlehem, although one was concerned about the 
nature of the sister city committee and the way the sister city program 
operates within Marrickville. There was no opposition from any of the 
councillors to this going ahead; there was no opposition from any residents to 
this going ahead; so therefore why would I go to the committee meeting and 
spend five minutes making a speech?  I have been to council meetings where 
you could not get in the door for residents who were concerned about the 
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issue. The airport issue - the third runway - you had people down the stairs, 
but there was no-one from the local community at that meeting.  
 
The proposal was also uncontroversial in the view of a Jewish resident who 
had attended the meeting and had commented that most of the Jewish 
community were likely to be “unconcerned” (Creagh, 2007). From the 
perspective of the Australian Federal Government and the mainstream news 
media, however, the proposal was far from unproblematic. Speaking indirectly 
through the media rather than to the council concerned, the Foreign Minister, 
Alexander Downer, declared that Marrickville council was “very foolish to 
associate itself with people who support terrorist organisations”, while 
Immigration Minister Kevin Andrews noted that the visiting delegation “would 
have to undergo stringent tests before being granted visas” to visit Australia. 
The Australian and the Sydney Morning Herald, two of Australia’s pre-
eminent broadsheets, featured the story prominently, with one entry making the 
front page of the Sydney Morning Herald. Interviews were also broadcast on 
several radio stations, including the multicultural, multilingual station SBS 
(Special Broadcasting Service). An anonymous journalist writing for the 
Australian (14/6/07) published one feature under the headline ‘Terrorist Twin’, 
while Sunanda Creagh of the Sydney Morning Herald asserted that the war in 
the Middle East had “come to the Inner West”.   
At issue was the victory in the 2006 Palestinian general elections of 
Hamas, which is classified as a terrorist organisation by the European Union, 
the United States and Australia. Although widely reported in the Western press 
as an unexpected outcome, Hamas’ success was unsurprising in the light of its 
perceived contributions to local stability, improved council services and lower 
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levels of corruption (see Zunes, 2006).  The term ‘Hamas’ therefore denotes a 
more morally and functionally ambiguous entity than the ‘terrorist’ 
classification would suggest, and this ambiguity allowed for polarised and 
sometimes confused understandings of the nature of the Bethlehem council to 
proliferate in media discourses. As indicated in the Olympia-Rafah debate, the 
name ‘Hamas’ is invoked in sister city discourses as a synonym for terrorists, 
functioning as a signal amplifier (Kasperson et al, 1988) connecting proposed 
sister city relationships with Palestinian cities to putative harm to Western 
urban populations. From that point it is but a short step to suggestions that the 
Bethlehem local council, which has a Christian mayor but includes five 
members of Hamas and one member of Islamic Jihad, will use sister city 
relationships to promote a terrorist agenda. Seriously misguided scenarios may 
then be envisaged via an imputed association of Hamas with the globally active 
terrorist group Al Qaeda, which was responsible for the September 11th attacks 
on the United States.  For example, the second page of an internet search in late 
2007, using the search engine Google and the keywords ‘Bethlehem’, 
‘Marrickville’ and ‘sister city’ yielded a blog under the pseudonym Aussie 
Bagel, in which a story from the Sydney Morning Herald was reproduced, 
interspersed with the blogger’s comments attacking the proposal. The text was 
preceded by the cartoon in Figure 3 (below). The blogger notes that the 
cartoons on the site are “often corny, but their innocence and cream cheesiness 
makes for a welcome break from the seriousness of life”.  
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.  
Figure 3. Cartoon from ‘Aussie Bagel’ blog, 20.07.07 
In the article reproduced in this blog, and in almost all other mainstream news 
coverage, the name of a single individual resonated as the voice of opposition 
to the Bethlehem sister city initiative.  This was Vic Alhadeff, the Chief 
Executive Officer of the New South Wales Jewish Board of Deputies, which is 
the representative body of the Jewish community in New South Wales.  
The Jewish Board of Deputies’ perspective 
Mr. Alhadeff’s profile on the web page of the Sydney Jewish Writers’ Festival 
reports that he grew up in South Africa after his parents had escaped from the 
Holocaust, and that, as a crusading journalist in South Africa, he had played a 
role in uncovering a scandal which brought down the Prime Minister of the 
day. After migrating to Australia, he was for some time editor of the Australian 
Jewish News. I interviewed him in his office at the headquarters of the New 
South Wales Jewish Board of Deputies, in Sydney. Upon my arrival for the 
interview, I was approached by two armed security guards, who asked and then 
checked by telephone the purpose of my visit. Unfamiliar with the area, I had 
arrived early for the interview and, as was common practice for such situations, 
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I asked if I could wait in the building. My request was refused by the guards, 
who suggested that I could spend some time in nearby café. This was my first 
experience of this strongly bounded and defended organisation. After returning 
at the appointed time, I was accompanied by one of the armed guards in the lift 
to the required floor, where I was greeted by a member of the administrative 
staff. The staff member then offered me refreshments and showed me to Mr. 
Alhadeff’s office, signifying my status transition from suspect intruder to 
invited guest. Mr. Alhadeff (VA) began the interview by situating my 
experience within a broader context of risks posed by anti-Semitism to the 
safety of the Jewish community in New South Wales.   
 
VA: Unfortunately, the Jewish community is subject to threats and to attacks 
as well. They can be anything from abusive calls to petrol bomb attacks. 
During the 1991 Gulf War, for example, six synagogues in Sydney were 
firebombed. Last year, in the space of a few weeks, Parramatta synagogue was 
physically attacked three times and there was an attempted arson attack on a 
youth centre. So it’s an unfortunate fact of life.  
 
Mr Alhadeff (VA) explained that he had been democratically elected to his 
position on the Jewish board of Deputies by the Jewish community of New 
South Wales, and that his organisation serves as the voice of the Jewish 
community in communications with state government and the media.  He 
identified fostering peaceful relations as an integral part of the work done by 
his organisation, which liaises and organises joint functions with religious 
groups from all faiths, as well as with schools, Rotary and RSL clubs. Earlier 
in 2007, they year when our interview took place, he had spoken out on behalf 
of his organisation against the views of an Israeli academic who had called for 
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a quota on Muslim immigrants to Australia. "The Jewish community 
dissociates itself from the comments by … Raphael Israeli," he had announced 
at the time.  "We do not believe in racial or ethnic quotas or stereotyping. 
These comments do not reflect the position of the Jewish community and are 
unhelpful in the extreme. The Jewish community has a strong and proud record 
in fighting racism, and condemns all expressions of bigotry” (Sydney Morning 
Herald, February 16, 2007).  
In the light of the diverse opinions that I had seen and heard expressed 
during sister city debates by people collectively identifying as Jewish, I asked 
him in what sense he understood the Jewish people of New South Wales to be 
a ‘community’. His response points to the permeability of boundaries 
separating political, religious and ethnic dimensions of individual and group 
identity construction. 
 
VA: They are a community in that, while there is an enormous range of 
opinion on all manner of issues, there are certain core beliefs which are central 
to Jewish identity. And they are beliefs which I guess straddle the boundary 
between religious and cultural and traditional and historical.  
 
BL: And political? 
 
VA: If you say that the existence of Israel is political, then yes, political too. If 
I say the existence of Israel is central to Jewish identity, to me that is not a 
political statement so much as a - I don’t know what bracket it actually is. Is it 
cultural?  Is it religious?  Because it’s something that is not just political. Jews 
have been in Israel for four thousand years. Is that political? Is it historical? Is 
it religious?  It’s all of the above.  
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VA’s personal and professional commitment to protect the Jewish people in the 
Australian state of New South Wales from symbolic and physical harm was, in 
his view, inseparable from his efforts to protect the reputation of the Israeli 
state. In this guardian capacity, he was constantly in a state of vigilance 
regarding any developments that could have impacted negatively, however 
indirectly, on the people who had elected him to safeguard their interests. VA 
told me that he had first heard about the Marrickville-Bethlehem sister city 
proposal when it was brought to his attention in an email message from a 
person who had seen the public minutes of a Marrickville City Council 
meeting. He was reluctant to speculate on what the goals of the proposed sister 
city relationship might have been, commenting that he was only interested in 
its possible, and in his view, likely, effects. 
 
VA: The intention itself can be presented as one thing, but there might be 
others which are not put down on paper. Our concern was the possible 
ramifications of such a relationship. The reason that we opposed a relationship 
between Marrickville and Bethlehem is that Bethlehem council is dominated 
by Hamas in the main, and Islamic Jihad as well. Hamas particularly is openly 
committed to the destruction of Israel. Its aim is to destroy the state of Israel, 
and to kill Jews, wherever they may be. So that transcends politics, transcends 
Israel, transcends the state of Palestine.  So our concern was that a formal 
sister city relationship with a council, wherever it may be, that is dominated 
by an entity that is committed to kill Jews, committed to destroy Israel, will 
give, well, ammunition is not the appropriate word, will give voice to that 
point of view.  
 
As had been the case with the opponents of the Olympia-Rafah sister city 
proposal, VA did not express concern about the possibility that terrorists might 
use the Marrickville relationship as a cover for entering Australia with 
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murderous intent; rather his preoccupation was with the reputational risk posed 
to the state of Israel by the relationship and the role that Marrickville council 
would play in giving voice to anti-Semitic interest groups. In the normative 
framing of VA, local councils should concern themselves with the material 
cleanliness, and also by implication, the symbolic cleanliness of the 
municipalities they had been elected to serve. 
 
VA: Such relationships, by definition, involve exchanges of personnel, 
exchanges of visits, reciprocal visits. Therefore - and this is exactly what 
happened - a delegation came out here from Bethlehem and within minutes of 
arriving here, the Mayor of Bethlehem was starting to talk about, quote 
unquote, “Israel’s apartheid wall”. It is not a wall, it is ninety six percent 
fence, and it is not an apartheid barrier. And that’s exactly the reason why we 
oppose this; because you enter into a relationship with someone who espouses 
a particular point of view. We considered that they would come out and start 
pushing that point of view, and that was precisely what happened.  
 
BL: Now that point of view is accessible to anybody on the internet, so what 
is the particular problem with the mayor coming here?  He is to be expected to 
be saying, to feel this way. If anybody knew anything about him, they would 
know that this is his position. What is the particular difficulty of him coming 
here as part of the sister city delegation?  
 
VA: The particular difficulty is that an Australian council, incidentally, whose 
responsibility should be, I imagine, keeping Marrickville clean and localised 
issues – but that’s an issue for ratepayers and not for me – is giving voice to 
an organisation which promotes killing of Jews, wherever they may be. To 
me, such a position is outrageous. It’s racist violence in the extreme.  
 
As with the Olympia-Rafah opponents, VA’s opposition to the project was 
directed specifically towards the ‘structure’ rather than the ‘concept’ 
component of the sister city model. While he was happy to support 
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humanitarian aid to the Palestinian community of Bethlehem, he balked at the 
legitimation that he believed a formal sister city relationship with an Australian 
city would confer on the expression of anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic views and 
sentiments. His subsequent comments also refer to a proposed sister city 
relationship between the neighbouring municipality of Leichhardt and the 
Palestinian city of Hebron, which is the focus of the next chapter in this study. 
 
VA: We do not oppose this because it’s a Palestinian city. Any project which 
is humanitarian, which is going to promote peace and goodwill, we would 
absolutely endorse. And this applies to the mooted relation between 
Leichhardt and Hebron. We have given them examples of humanitarian 
projects. For example, there is something called the Peres Center for Peace, 
which does wonderful humanitarian work. So we have said to both councils, 
Marrickville and Leichhardt, here is an organisation which is doing 
humanitarian work - supporting Palestinians who need humanitarian support, 
no question about it - and it’s promoting peace and goodwill on both sides. 
Even do projects such as this. Don’t enter into a partisan relationship which is 
promoting one side at the expense of the other, and to boot, an organisation, 
Hamas, which controls Bethlehem council and is openly committed to murder 
and terrorism.  
 
BL: So your objection to this particular sister city relationship, as I understand 
it, is to do with the sister city model being applied in this instance. Are you 
concerned with the sister city model being used as a form of communication 
of terrorist sympathies? Is that what you’re saying? 
 
VA: I am saying that the opposition to this project is not because it was a 
project that was supporting Palestinians. On the contrary, any humanitarian 
project we would support. The Peres Center works through Austcare – now 
there’s a credible Australian entity which does humanitarian work. The 
problem is that it promotes, and gives voice to, a terrorist organisation, yes.   
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For VA, the credibility afforded by Bethlehem’s numerous and hitherto 
unproblematic sister city relationships had been overshadowed by the election 
of Hamas members onto the Bethlehem council, and by politically motivated 
public  statements by the mayor of Bethlehem, both of which had brought into 
question the purported peace building agenda of the sister city relationship. 
 
BL:  Bethlehem has sister city relationships with other cities, and there has 
been no problem, no terrorist activity. What makes you think that things might 
be different in this case? 
 
VA: It’s not a question of things might be different in this case. First of all, 
those relationships may have predated Hamas acquiring a dominant presence 
on Bethlehem council. The other point is, our concern was borne out precisely 
by what happened, that is, within minutes of the mayor of Bethlehem arriving 
in Sydney as part of this sister city relationship, he was interviewed in the 
media, giving public meetings, attacking Israel and entering into politics. Now 
is this the domain of a local council?  Is this was Marrickville council should 
be doing? Is that peace making? 
 
In VA’s view, therefore, the symbolically potent council-to-council dimension 
of the sister city structure had been appropriated as conduit for conflict rather 
than for peace building, as it afforded legitimacy to proponents of the 
destruction of Israel and the killing of the very people that he, and the 
organisation he represented, were committed to protecting. What made this 
particular sister city relationship so perilous from his perspective was the 
introduction of a new element at the beginning of a chain of putative harm 
(Hilgartner, 1992) linking the Jewish people of New South Wales to Hamas, as 
shown in Figure 4 below. 
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Hamas    Bethlehem council    Sister City Relationship  
Marrickville council    Jewish people of New South Wales 
Figure 4. Chain of harm constituting the Bethlehem-
Marrickville sister city relationship as a risk object 
 
The councillor’s perspective 
For Sam Iskandar, the Marrickville councillor who had initiated the proposal, 
the sister city relationship with Bethlehem held an entirely different meaning.  
Originally from Lebanon, he had been a resident of Marrickville since 1977, 
and at the time of our interview was in his third term as a councillor.  His 
profile on the council website listed his interests as youth issues, environmental 
sustainability, social justice, peace and education. He was elected Mayor of 
Marrickville just over a year after our interview, which took place on the 
premises of Marrickville City Council. Councillor Iskandar (SI) had arranged a 
quiet room to be set aside for the purpose. He began our interview by 
explaining how the idea for a sister city relationship between Marrickville and 
Bethlehem had first occurred to him. In 2000, the municipality of Marrickville 
had hosted delegations from the Sydney Paralympics, and among the guests 
was a Palestinian team. Buoyed by the apparent success of the Madrid peace 
conference of 1991 and the Oslo Accords (see el-Nawawy 2002), and 
encouraged by strong support for peace building activities on the part of the 
Marrickville community, he had taken the opportunity to bring Arab speaking 
citizens of Marrickville together with the Palestinian delegation, in order to 
discuss ways in which they could work together to promote peaceful relations 
in the Middle East. His account locates the Marrickville-Bethlehem proposal 
within an established tradition of migrant-initiated sister city partnerships and 
the people-to-people frame of global peace-building.   
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SI: I was introduced to sister cities as a councillor, because Marrickville 
council had sister cities in different cities. I came to this and I tried to 
understand what the sister city movement is about. After Madrid and Oslo, 
there were about eight or nine years of talking and building peace between 
each other and everything was looking great. I said, why don’t we take this 
opportunity to push peace and make it something we should be very proud of 
in Marrickville? So I spoke to the councillors and they all agreed. It took us 
about six or seven months to prepare and understand things; then we sent a 
letter to the mayor of Bethlehem. Why did I choose Bethlehem? Because we 
have residents here in Marrickville from Bethlehem! They are Christians, they 
go to churches and the churches supported that [the proposal], so we had a 
very good community behind us.  
 
Soon after Marrickville council had sent the letter proposing the sister city 
relationship, however, negotiations were halted by an outbreak of hostilities in 
the Palestinian Territories. Although the normal processes for establishing a 
sister city relationship had to be suspended, the need for solidarity became 
even more urgent for the Marrickville council and for residents who had 
supported the proposal.  
 
SI: Then the violence escalated and we had problems. There were big, big 
crimes from both sides. And we were watching. This is Bethlehem. This is the 
city of God if you like. What could we do to save such a very important city?  
 
The following year, Western relations with the Middle East reached a crisis 
point as a result of the September 11th terrorist attacks in the United States. 
Councillor Iskandar’s experiences at the annual conference of ASCA, (the 
Australian Sister Cities Association) in the same year, however, confirmed and 
strengthened his confidence in the sister city model as a vehicle for addressing 
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even such an intense manifestation of hostility as those attacks. One of the 
speakers at the conference had been Mary Eisenhower, the granddaughter of 
the founder of the people-to-people movement, and her message of hope had a 
profound effect on SI, both as a city official and as a Muslim Lebanese-
Australian desperate to see peaceful relations established in the Middle East. 
 
SI: Bunbury was to me very educative and important conference. It came after 
the 11th of September attack. Mary Eisenhower is truly a big humanitarian 
leader. She was talking about the importance of peace at that time. Every one 
of us was very angry about what happened, very sad about what happened. 
The atmosphere was very nervous. And I come from a Muslim background. I 
was moved deeply by her speech, when she was talking about the importance 
of sister cities in delivering peace and harmony. She started talking about the 
history of her grandfather and she was educating us about the principles of the 
sister cities. So it was built on breaking the wall of hatred, building peace, 
getting to know each other, giving the opportunity for people to know other 
people, despite what the government politics are. I came from that region, the 
Middle East, where there are a lot of fights and war. I understand exactly what 
we really need from the sister city movement, which is peace, harmony, so I 
consider myself as a sister city advocate. I understand how much this 
movement can contribute to peace and understanding. 
 
I asked SI how getting to know people from other cultures could help to build 
world peace, and he answered using the example of two sister city relationships 
that had been established by Marrickville council prior to the Bethlehem 
proposal. His response draws on the citizen diplomat metaphor to affirm the 
efficacy of people to people contacts, which can bypass national governments 
in order to overcome hostilities based on stereotyping, ignorance and political 
conflict at the international scale. 
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SI: OK, we in Marrickville, we are like ambassadors for Australia. We went to 
Syria, we went to Lanarca, Cyprus, and we signed two agreements there. 
Australia is always supporting America and America is involved in the war in 
Iraq. And the Syrian people are against America because of that. But when we 
went there to have a sister city relation with Safita, they welcomed our 
delegation, which was talking about peace, about cultural exchange, about 
understanding each other, people-to-people. As an Arabic speaker there, I 
educated people about the importance of this movement and they really loved 
it. Australian society stereotypes these people because of the politics of the 
government, but the delegations found the Syrians very good people, humble 
people, they like to be visited, they respect guests, and we were treated very, 
very well. We were treated as honourable human beings, good friends, and 
that left a very good impression here in Marrickville community when we 
went back and started talking to the Marrickville community about it, through 
sister city celebrations, newsletters, radio programs in different languages. 
When you talk peace and harmony, you are respected right away. You are 
talking peace. We are sisters. And that has opened the door for peace and love 
and harmony between this people and that people. To achieve that, some 
people will say, ok we will send our performance group, to show you our 
culture. Some people will say, let’s have a trade delegation, or sport exchange, 
high school exchange, which, at the end of the day, award the relation 
understanding and peace. 
 
SI’s conviction that meeting and talking together will indirectly build peace is 
one of the primary features of the concept component of the sister city model, 
and is suggestive of the operation of a boundary object, but the logistics were 
still imprecise. I asked him to clarify the exact process through which talking to 
diverse others builds peace and, as Vic Alhadeff  had done for the opposing 
argument, he emphasised the importance of voice. For SI, direct people-to-
people contact was essential for bypassing blockages set in place not only by 
national governments, but also by commercial interests in the media.  
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SI: First of all, the media from both sides, they always write stories to tell 
about war, tell about conflict, tell about everything for their own benefit and 
regimes. And where is the voice of the people? Where is the voice of peace? 
Where is the voice of movements working for peace and harmony? I can tell 
you, through sister cities you have that voice. If you go to Jaffa for example, 
you will see that the Arabs and Christians and Israelis are together, supporting 
each other, and it’s everywhere! They live there as brothers.  The media are 
very reluctant to report what is going on there. The media always look for bad 
stories. If, any time, you go to Israel, you will see a very strong peace 
movement there, different politics. [Through sister city activities] you use the 
media to write about this. As a councillor, I have the platform to speak on 
behalf of the community; they elected me to do that. I can always use our 
humble newsletter, or the meetings we have which are covered by the local 
newspapers, to send a message. 
 
BL: How much effect can that have when the two governments are not at 
peace?  
 
SI: Look, this is a small scale of politics, but it can grow. Because you’re 
talking peace, you discover that the benefits of peace are going to be for your 
government, wherever you are.  It’s more than enough to see yourself building 
bridges between two different communities, for peace, for harmony, for 
understanding, setting goals to achieve.  
 
SI then turned his attention to constraints imposed by fiscal realities on the 
activities of local councils and on the ideals conveyed by the sister city 
concept, explaining that the reciprocity central to such relationships is 
hampered by the limited funds allocated by Marrickville council for sister city 
activities.  This had left him feeling a degree of discomfort about the level of 
hospitality his council was able to offer to delegations from sister cities, 
especially in the light of his personal vision of local needs driving an 
international scope for local councils. 
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SI: After what we’ve seen in Syria and Cyprus and everywhere we go, we 
were highly respected, we are the guests of honour everywhere, and here in 
Australia we have the tradition that we only invite them to one or two lunches 
and a reception to set the agreement and that’s it. I understand we have 
different cultures. People say, you are wasting money, what is its relevance to 
Marrickville?  Why don’t you fix the park? My response is that it’s a really 
important job for council to look at the infrastructure, the environment, the 
buildings etcetera, but also we have to look at the communities who live in 
our area, what they think about keeping a cultural bridge between Australia, 
the new country for them, and the country they came from.   
 
I asked SI about the degree of negative publicity that the Marrickville-
Bethlehem proposal had attracted in the news media. Since it had the backing 
of the local community he represented, he did not understand it in any sense as 
a risky endeavour, framing it instead, as the proponents of the Olympia 
proposal had done, as a positive opportunity.  He expressed a reluctance to 
comment on opposition to the project on the parts of the media and the Jewish 
Board of Deputies, based on his conviction that negative public comments on 
the views of others only serves to intensify existing conflict.  Instead, he 
preferred to emphasise the peaceful goals of the sister city initiative and his 
personal commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflict at all scales. As the 
previous mayor, Morris Hanna, had done when formalising the relationship, he 
foregrounded Australia’s commitment to multiculturalism as the basis of a 
culture of peace.7 
 
SI: Ninety-nine percent of the Marrickville community supports this very 
important sister city relationship. I am about building sister cities on a vision, 
which is about peace and harmony. And when you want to talk about peace, 
                                                 
7 For a discussion of the complexities of enacting the Australian ‘multicultural’ ideology at the 
level of local government, see Dunn et al, 2001. 
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you should do it in a peaceful way. I was able to attack all of the people who 
started to work against the sister city, but I don’t believe in that. I do believe 
that we should really work together. On sister cities day, we have all the 
communities of the sister cities in Marrickville; all these groups get together, 
and ambassadors come to it and they all speak about peace and harmony. 
Some people are too scared to have a sister city relation because they know 
nothing about it. I’m proud of being a good humanitarian person. I am 
Australian. I have values, Australian values, and I want to promote that 
culture, the acceptance, the multiculturalism, the understanding. We have 
something great and I want people everywhere to learn about us and the sister 
city is part of that.  
 
SI’s approach to the Marrickville-Bethlehem relationship was, in every respect,  
an expression of his confidence in the people-to-people principles put forward 
by Eisenhower and reproduced in current sister city discourses. In facilitating 
harmonious contact between the people of his municipality and the people of 
Bethlehem, he was, in Eisenhower’s terminology, helping ordinary people to 
give voice to their common desire for peace. In bypassing the oppositional 
stances of national governments, he was “leaping governments, if necessary’ in 
order to build a better world. For SI, sister city relationships provided a potent 
and accessible structure for addressing the global concerns of local citizens.  
The Friends of Bethlehem’s perspective 
A similar position was taken by Jennifer, the local peace activist whose views 
on the uncontroversial nature of the proposal were noted at the beginning of 
this chapter.  Jennifer was also a resident of Marrickville, and had supported 
the Marrickville-Bethlehem sister city relationship from its inception. She is 
also a founding member of a local grass roots peace group called Friends of 
Bethlehem, which was formed in order to support the Marrickville council in 
the face of opposition to the sister city relationship on the parts of non-local 
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‘outsiders’. The Friends of Bethlehem web page states that the group 
“encouraged Marrickville Council to engage Bethlehem as a sister city and 
their efforts to support the people of Bethlehem to live in peace”.  “If these 
efforts can help to let the people of Bethlehem know that others do care about 
their plight” the post continues, “then we have achieved something for the 
humanity of the world” (Friends of Bethlehem, 2007). Jennifer and I met in a 
room provided by the council of the neighbouring municipality of Leichhardt. 
As I set up the tape recorder, she showed me a Christmas card on sale by her 
group, which combined religious and political themes in depicting the three 
wise men of the nativity story, unable to access the city of Bethlehem because 
of the Israeli-built wall. Jennifer recalled how her first experience of sister city 
relationships had been associated with happy times travelling the world, 
including a visit to Palestine.  
 
Jennifer: When you go into lots of places they have a sign, ‘sister city to….’ 
And you think, that’s interesting! Why would they want to be a sister city with 
that city? And they might be a sister city with somewhere you’ve been and 
loved. 
 
Like Cr. Iskandar, Jennifer understood the Marrickville-Bethlehem sister city 
proposal to be a normal and unproblematic application of the sister cities 
people-to-people model. She had met the Mayor of Bethlehem, and respected 
him as a distinguished and international figure, and a totally improbable 
candidate for the role of terrorist sympathiser. Jennifer found suggestions that 
the sister city relationship linked Marrickville with terrorists irrational, partisan 
and counterproductive.  
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Jennifer: The mayor is a man in his seventies. He’s a very elegant 
man.  He is someone who travels extensively around the world.  He 
was received by the president of the European Union. He has travelled 
extensively in the United States, where his children live.  He has met 
the Pope. He’s obviously not a security risk, which was the 
impression being made. However, when he meets these people, the 
message he gives is not one that Israeli government or their supporters 
in other countries, want heard by the wider community. This word 
‘terror’ is used a lot to frighten people nowadays. I’m a maths teacher 
and statistics don’t support the fear of terror. If you want to be 
frightened about getting killed, start worrying about alcohol, road 
accidents. The assumption is that every Palestinian is a terrorist. Yes, 
there are terrorists in Palestine; however no-one is looking at the 
terror caused by the occupation for the occupants of Palestine.  
 
Jennifer was unconcerned about the presence of Hamas on the Bethlehem 
council, because the objective evidence, as she saw it, together with her own 
experience, gave her no cause to view this as a threat. Furthermore, it made 
sound political sense to her for the two councils to communicate across 
differences of ideology. Her concluding statement draws her argument into the 
citizen diplomat frame within the sister city concept.  
 
Jennifer: Now they said they were forming links with Hamas. Hamas has 
political and military wings. Hamas was elected because their political wing 
was a party that was not corrupt, provided good services and good 
organisation in local government. However in Bethlehem, they are a minority, 
five out of twelve. The mayor of Bethlehem is an independent, he’s Christian 
and frankly, as the EU is saying now, it is stupid of people not to work with an 
elected government even if you don’t like them. I mean, Australia has links 
with the Gaddafi regime and they are not a very pleasant regime. We have 
links with Indonesia; they are not a pleasant regime. The way to change 
people is to work with them. 
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The mayor’s perspective 
Councillor Dimitrios Thanos (DT), who had been elected mayor of 
Marrickville after the signing of the sister city agreement with Bethlehem, had 
been the only councillor to oppose the initiative. Cr. Thanos’ profile on the 
website of the Marrickville City Council noted that he had worked in a 
professional capacity with indigenous communities and “continues to take time 
from his own practice each year to volunteer his professional services to 
remote communities around Australia”. We met in the mayoral office, where 
he situated his opposition to the proposal within the wider context of his 
disillusionment with the sister city model, as he had personally observed it in 
practice. 
 
DT: I wouldn’t say that I’m against sister cities. I’m against the existing 
model that exits in Marrickville. I was once a supporter of sister cities 
generally, because I believed that it fostered friendship between communities, 
gave opportunities to open up different sorts of cultural experiences between 
communities in different continents, and all the usual jargon that comes along 
with sister cities. I was a believer at one stage.  
 
The event that had prompted Mayor Thanos to re-evaluate his support for sister 
city programs was the same one that Cr. Iskandar had identified as confirming 
in his mind the peace building capacity of the sister city model. However, DT’s 
conclusion had been that the sister cities visit had ultimately emerged as a 
pointless exercise that had drained scarce council funds from other, more 
pressing activities. 
 
DT: I voted against it on the grounds that we have seven sister cities and none 
of them are functional and why create another one. I went on a sister city trip 
to Lanarca in Cyprus and Safita in Syria. It was one trip and we made two 
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sister cities.  And I heard the usual rhetoric – oh, it’s not going to be an 
agreement on paper alone, we’re going to set up student exchange programs, 
sports exchange programs, we’re going to set up email and pen-pal exchanges 
between schools, cultural exchange, artists’ exchange programs, stuff like 
that, and none of that has happened. The Australians were saying it and so 
were the Syrians. Everyone was saying the usual stuff: we’re going to set up 
all these programs and aren’t we going to be fantastic, and we were going to 
foster friendship between our communities, and it just doesn’t happen. 
 
BL: Why doesn’t it happen, do you think? 
 
DT: It’s budgeting. You need a significant budget to set up these programs 
and you need an employee who is dedicated to those tasks. And it’s a really 
low priority item when you’re talking about budgeting in relations to matters 
that matter to the public that lives here. People are more concerned with local 
issues as opposed to international issues when it comes to local government 
and I agree with that point of view. I don’t want to spend a hundred thousand 
dollars a year on sister city programs when that hundred thousand dollars a 
year can go into programs for senior citizens, like a cultural centre, so they 
have somewhere to go, somewhere to read a paper, enjoy companionship 
between friends, meet new friends, set up things like programs for schools that 
senior citizens can go to as well; woodwork programs, things like that. We 
have so many things that we should be spending money on for local residents, 
that sister cities comes with a very low priority.  
 
DT had other reasons for feeling discomfited by the trip. In his view, 
expectations raised at a higher political scale were confounded by budgetary 
constraints, limiting Marrickville’s capacity to fulfil the reciprocity norms that 
help sustain the city model in practice. He explained that the sister city 
relationship between Marrickville and Safita had been initiated at the 
international rather than local scale of politics in Syria, and that this had had 
significant ramifications for the resources that each partner was prepared to 
invest in the relationship. 
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DT: With Safita, the Syrian government requested that we set up some sort of 
agreement. I don’t know why they selected Marrickville council. The embassy 
staff knew some of the councillors and spoke with them here and that’s why 
they set it up. But see, Syria’s got political reasons for wanting to engage the 
West and their view of sister cities is, if they can engage us on that level, it 
bypasses the federal blocks that exist on any dealings with Safita, Syria. My 
problem with all that is that the Syrians view sister city agreements seriously, 
and councillors take advantage of that.  
 
Furthermore, the high level of hospitality that Cr. Iskandar had interpreted as a 
demonstration of friendship and honour was for Cr. Thanos a source of 
considerable embarrassment.  
 
DT: On the trip to Syria, we were treated like royalty.  We were taken around 
all of Syria, we were given five star, seven star treatment; that’s the best 
hotels, the best food. We were driven around, we had a police escort. They 
closed down streets in Damascus so we could get through without problems of 
traffic and stuff like that, and I find it embarrassing. I find it embarrassing that 
we cannot reciprocate to the level that the Syrians would like, and their 
purposes go a lot deeper than our councillors, which is pretty much, it’s a 
junket. People paid for their own airfares, but while we were over there, we 
didn’t spend a dollar. I went there with money, expecting to pay for hotels, to 
pay for my own meals and so on and I wasn’t allowed to touch anything. 
When we were going through the streets of Damascus I went into some shops 
and the Syrian handlers were coming in and they were going to pay for things 
that I may have wanted, and I was like “it’s not..!” [Holds hands up in mock 
defensive gesture and laughs uncomfortably.]  … All our passes to 
archaeological sites, everything was covered. It was just done. And I find that 
embarrassing. We can’t reciprocate at that level. They view these international 
agreements much more seriously than we do. 
 
BL: Seriously in what respect? 
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DT: Well you see, Syria is being boycotted by the West and they want to 
create an image of tolerance to the West, and of inclusion. And Syria is a 
fantastic place, mind you. I mean the Western view of Syria is that they’re 
fundamentalists and they’re not. They’re probably one of the more moderate 
Muslim states in the Middle East and they want Westerners to see this …Their 
foreign minister has come here and we actually put something on in the main 
hall when she was here. It was very nice and very good to have such a 
relationship with them, but really, I’m embarrassed. We cannot reciprocate the 
level of care that they took.  
 
For Cr. Thanos, sister city relationships optimally involved interactions 
between ordinary citizens of diverse communities, with councillors playing 
only a supportive role at the local level. In his estimation, the rhetoric 
surrounding the sister city concept will remain at the level of rhetoric so long 
as it is councillors rather than citizens who do the travelling.  
 
DT: I’d prefer a model in which things happen between the communities that 
doesn’t involve just councillors travelling abroad. Everybody looks for an 
excuse to justify their going abroad on council business. And the fact is that 
no-one needs to travel abroad on council business in their function as 
councillor or as mayor. I’ve got no problem against Palestinian people, 
although a lot of people tried to portray me as such when I was voting against 
it. I’d support a concerned Palestinian group that believes very strongly in 
Palestinian issues to go over there and have an exchange of ideas and 
experiences with the people who actually live in Bethlehem. That’s what 
engenders friendship between communities. And those people who go over 
there come back. They speak to their friends about their experiences. It’s not 
council going over the top of everyone. That’s how you build relationships 
and foster friendship, not by the elected councillors going once every couple 
of years abroad.  
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While Councillor Iskandar and Jennifer had primarily valued local opinion, DT 
was also concerned about the reaction of the media and people outside the 
Marrickville local government area to the Bethlehem proposal, and of 
opposition to the idea of sister cities in general. I asked him whether he thought 
media reports of a shocked public reaction had been exaggerated. 
 
DT: There was a shock reaction, not probably so much from locals, but there 
was a very large response from the media. I got 2UE and 2 GB and everyone. 
People were interested, people were calling the radio stations, local residents, 
telling them what they thought of councillors creating new sister cities. It was 
a very negative reaction from the public in creating new sister cities, 
especially such as political city in Palestine. Mind you, I don’t have a problem 
with Palestine per se, I’ve got a problem with the fact the sister city 
agreements are non-functional; there hasn’t been any positive exchange or 
nothing positive has actually come out of them.  And until council actually 
decides to fund the sister cities program, I won’t have a bar of it.  
 
In his capacity as mayor, DT was untroubled by the demarcation aspect of 
criticisms directed against Marrickville councillors by Federal politicians over 
the sister city agreement, but he was concerned about issues of substantiation 
and the reputational risk that the comments by the Foreign Minister had 
engendered for Marrickville council.  
 
BL: Alexander Downer has made a statement about the Bethlehem link 
apparently, that Marrickville council is foolish to associate itself with people 
that support terrorist organisations. What would be your response to this sort 
of intervention in local government affairs? 
 
DT: Well I’m sure Alexander Downer would have said that it’s local 
government intervening in international affairs! Saying that someone supports 
terrorism is an easy thing to do. I don’t know how true that is. I’m not saying 
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that Alexander Downer is making it up, but my understanding is that that 
people who were here do not endorse terrorism and don’t endorse terrorist 
acts. That’s a very big statement by the former Foreign Minister. If the former 
Minister does have solid information, then he can present it to council and 
councillors will make up their minds. It’s very easy to make a statement and 
tarnish someone’s reputation, whether they’ve got evidence or not and I’d 
rather see something backed by evidence as opposed to just a broad, sweeping 
statement like that.  
 
DT acknowledged that some sister city relationships are more active than 
others, but considered that the kinds of activities they promote, such as school 
exchanges, do not go far enough to empower all members of each international 
city as potential participants.   
 
DT: There are some functional sister cities. I mean, the Japanese tend to take 
these things seriously and put a lot of effort into them. It’s not that far, so I 
think they set up exchange programs amongst the schools. But I’m not aware 
of any sister city agreements that have substantial community exchanges, and 
therefore fostering world peace and harmony. If you don’t get the community 
involved, you’re not fostering anything. If it’s just an excuse for councillors to 
go abroad and come back and say what wonderful things they learned, well 
that’s not enough. Either citizens go, get involved, community organisations 
that involve the citizens, and have exchange between them and overseas, as 
well as the government exchange, as well as the bureaucratic exchange, or 
there’s just no point to them. And what do you budget for? Do you budget for 
the needs of the elderly, or do you budget for something that is really the 
domain of the Federal government under the Foreign Minister?  
 
BL: So you see these sorts of issues as outside… 
 
DT: They’re outside the normal function of council. It’s not core business of 
council - it’s an addition to it. And it’s great in theory, but whether it works or 
not is a different story altogether. If you ask me out of all the sister cities 
which ones we should have, well, if we’re genuine in terms of social justice, 
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we would say the Palestinian one and probably the Syrian one. The rest, I’m 
looking at them and saying, fair enough, they were made, they were 
developed with good intentions, but whether or not there’s something genuine 
to be gained out of them is a different issue altogether. The ones with serious 
political connotations, like Palestine, like Safita, you also need funding for 
things like that to work, and if funding is not forthcoming, then we meed to 
think seriously about what we are doing in creating new sister cities.  
 
Unusually for an opponent of sister city relationships, Mayor Thanos had 
specifically identified politically motivated relationships as the most worthy 
and authentic expression of the sister cities concept. In explaining his position, 
he drew on a version of the Eisenhower story, and cited links that had been 
fostered between U.S. and Soviet cities created during the Cold War. He also 
considered the tripartite sister city arrangement suggested by some opponents 
of the Olympia-Rafah sister city project to constitute a means of avoiding 
divisive political partisanship at the level of local governance.  
 
BL: So the fact that they are politically sensitive is a reason for pursuing them 
in your opinion?  
 
DT: Yes. Sister cities were developed by Eisenhower’s wife when he was 
President. And the reason for the first sister cities - I can’t remember which 
ones they were, but there was one in Russia and one in America during the 
height of the Cold War. It was set up in a way that it was a low level contact, 
so that there could be cultural exchanges and political exchanges between the 
Soviet Union and the United States of America at a very low level, and that 
way, create friendship and understanding between communities, and 
therefore, hopefully, avoid a nuclear disaster. That’s the philosophy and 
rationale behind that and if we hope to follow through to today, well then 
you’d pick controversial sister cities so you could have cultural exchange. 
And another thing, if you’re going to pick one side, why not pick a town on 
the other side? So we’ve got an Israeli-Palestinian conflict, well, fine with 
Bethlehem, let’s pick a Jewish township and have a sister city agreement with 
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them as well … You can create quite a statement by making a sister city, just 
as what happened with Bethlehem in Palestine. The councillors who 
supported it wanted to make a political statement and that statement 
reverberated all around Australia.  
 
Again citing financial constraints, Mayor Thanos went on to express scepticism 
regarding the currently widely expressed argument that economically focused 
sister city relationships, in particular with Chinese cities, could benefit local 
councils and urban communities.  
 
DT: I question whether or not agreements between councils do actually create 
a financial, economic advantage. I don’t see how that’s going to create 
business interests between China and Australia. That’s something that’s above 
the level of council. Economic benefit requires economic policy, which is the 
domain of the state and federal governments. For council to create business 
opportunities, well councils like Marrickville do not have enough a big 
enough budget to actually set aside money to create investment opportunities. 
Businesses follow profit, and if they see a business opportunity here in 
Australia, they’ll be here whether there’s a sister city agreement or not. 
Business has been going on for so many centuries; it hasn’t needed sister city 
agreements. 
 
Postscript 
The year after the sister city agreement was signed, Marrickville Council made 
plans to visit its new municipal sister in Palestine. Learning of this 
development, the new Labor government of Australia, led by Prime Minister 
Kevin Rudd, warned the council - apparently indirectly through the media, in 
the manner of its predecessor – that it risked  breaking the law if it met with 
“representatives of terrorist organisations” in  Bethlehem. Foreign Minister 
Stephen Smith also warned the delegation it was a criminal offence to provide 
support or resources to [proscribed terrorist] Palestinian groups. "I urge the 
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Marrickville Council to be mindful of the Australian Government's policy 
when meeting with relevant members of the Bethlehem Council," Mr Smith 
said ...Opposition foreign affairs spokesman Andrew Robb said he was "very 
concerned" by the visit. "The Marrickville Council should reconsider any visit 
to meet with the Bethlehem Council and should denounce any association with 
terrorist organisations" (Salusinszky, 2008). 
In February of the following year, Marrickville Council approved a 
motion put forward by Greens councillor Cathy Peters, that it would write to 
the Australian government, the Israeli Ambassador and the Representative of 
the Palestinian Territories in Australia, condemning the Israeli occupation of 
Gaza and violence on both sides of the conflict, and calling for more equitable 
treatment for Palestinians (Marrickville City Council, 2009). Eight months 
later, an interfaith ceremony for Peace and Justice in Palestine and Bethlehem 
was planned, to be held in a local church.  As reported by Ainsworth (2009), 
the ceremony was designed to involve  
 
Palestinian representatives and faith leaders from Christian, Muslim and 
possibly other groups, as well as Aboriginal people. The Mayor and religious 
leaders from Bethlehem have sent pre-recorded messages and Al Jazeera 
television will be recording the ceremony for transmission through its 
networks. The ceremony is supported by Marrickville Council and the Mayor 
and many Councillors will be present.  
 
Through such activities, Marrickville council was explicitly positioning itself 
as an independent peace actor on the global, as well as the international, stage.  
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Theoretical implications  
 
The wide range of perspectives expressed by the various participants who 
engaged in the Bethlehem Marrickville debate demonstrates that, as was the 
case with the Olympia-Rafah proposal, participants’ understandings as to the 
proper nature and scope of sister city relationships, and of council’s role in 
relation to them, were ambiguous, conflicting and often incompatible. Despite 
encountering very similar obstacles to those that had derailed the Olympia 
proposal, however, the Bethlehem project was brought to a successful 
conclusion. Far from being ‘overwhelmed’, as one press report had suggested, 
the municipality of Marrickville had held fast to the reins of control throughout 
the entire procedure, at least within the Australian context. Unconcerned by 
indirect censure from the Federal government, it had also fended off opposition 
from the media and the Jewish Board of Deputies. Within the theoretical 
framework posited by Hilgartner (1991), the Bethlehem-Marrickville sister city 
relationship can thus be understood to have emerged as an ‘emplaced’, but 
successfully ‘resisted’, risk object.  
As will be recalled from the discussion in chapter two of this study, 
Hilgartner (1992) argues that risk objects can come to be emplaced through 
‘construction’, or being successfully liked to putative harm, as occurred in the 
case of the Olympia-Rafah proposal. However they can also be emplaced 
“through resistance to control; that is, if heterogeneous engineers cannot 
remove them from the system or enclose them in networks of control” 
(1992:49).  In the context of the Marrickville proposal, the ‘heterogeneous 
engineers’ had been the Australian Federal Government, the news media and 
the Jewish Board of Deputies. Its capacity to resist the control measures 
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mobilised by these powerful opponents identifies the council as a social and 
political institution of considerable strength within multi-scalar contexts. While 
the data suggest that the primary reason for the success of the Bethlehem sister 
city proposal at the local scale is that it encountered no significant opposition 
within the Marrickville jurisdiction, the resilience of this council to pressure 
from wider scales has significant implications for theorising civic engagement 
at the international-local interface. 
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Chapter Five: The Leichhardt-Hebron sister city 
proposal 
Background to the proposal 
In the inner west municipality of Leichhardt, which borders on Marrickville, a 
local pro-Palestinian peace group had been following developments in the 
Marrickville-Bethlehem sister city proposal since its inception. Greatly 
encouraged by the successful outcome of that initiative, members of the 
Leichhardt Peace group approached their own council a short time later, 
requesting consideration of what O’Toole (1999, 2000) calls a ‘sister city type 
relationship’ - a generic term denoting city to city partnerships with similar 
goals and structures - with the Palestinian West Bank city of Hebron. As their 
spokesperson, Carole, explained, the group was seeking a formalised city 
partnership, but had been unsure as to whether a sister city relationship or 
friendship agreement would better serve their goals. They had seen the 
potential for these goals realised through the sister city model in Marrickville, 
whereas in Leichhardt, an established friendship agreement with Maliana 
seemed to be serving the same purpose. The indeterminate and to some extent 
arbitrary nature of the conceptual boundary distinguishing sister cities and 
friendship agreements contributed to the classificatory confusion that 
characterised the ensuing debate.  
Unlike the Marrickville proposal, the Leichhardt-Hebron proposal was 
derailed in its formative stages. The only source of local opposition to this 
project emanated from the Inner West Chavurah, an informal group of Jewish 
people living in the Leichhardt area, who had met regularly for the past twenty 
years for social and cultural activities. I address in detail the perspective taken 
by the Inner West Chavurah at the end of this chapter, since it can be better 
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understood within the context of the nature or ‘habitus’ (Lee, 1997) of the 
municipality and the interactions of the group with other stakeholders. These 
were primarily officials from Leichhardt council and members of a local pro-
Palestinian peace group, some of whom had formed a separate group named 
‘Friends of Hebron’ by the time the interviews for this study took place.  
        If cities can be understood to have identities shaped by their enduring 
patterns of response to historical phenomena, the municipality of Leichhardt 
could have been expected to be favourably inclined towards a politically 
contentious sister city relationship. As noted by Lee (1997), 
 
(h)ow a city chooses to spend its budget, the ways in which it uses its land 
space and the way it tends to envisage its physical landscape, how it sees fit to 
preserve and predict its history and heritage, the emphasis it places on the 
collective welfare of its citizens, the choices it makes over styles of civic and 
public architecture, and so on, are all conditioned by a sort of governing logic 
which is not merely reducible to the actions of say a particular local 
government but actually constitutes the outcome of the ‘guiding hand’ of 
habitus   ….  a sometimes conscious, reflected upon and debated cultural 
disposition which is lived through and expressed concretely in its citizenry 
and public and private institutions (1997:134). 
 
The municipality of Leichhardt incorporates the suburbs of Annandale, 
Balmain, Glebe and Leichhardt, all of which were once working class, but have 
since been transformed by processes of gentrification. Like Madison in the 
United States, Leichhardt has a reputation as a prosperous and politically ‘left 
leaning’ municipality. As SM, the council’s Media Public Affairs Officer, 
explained, the area is home to a high population of supporters of the Greens 
and the left wing of the Labor party, and the council has long been at the 
forefront of Australian local authorities in developing environmental 
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sustainability strategies.  It has a growing population, as like-minded people 
continue to be drawn to the area in order to partake in the rich civic life to be 
found there. In some respects, SM saw his own official role as a product of this 
political and demographic profile. 
 
BL: Why does Leichhardt council need a media public affairs officer? 
 
SM: Because of the way this council operates. Some of the councillors are 
very progressive, so they make decisions and policies which are a bit out of 
the ordinary compared with other councils in other areas. 
 
BL: So it attracts more media attention. 
 
SM: Yes, and also with the community, there are quite a few people who work 
in the media, like journalists, who live here, so if they are writing a story 
about a local government issue, they’ll come to their own council first. … The 
councillors here are very switched on internationally. They know what’s 
going on in the world and some have interests in certain areas of the world in 
terms of trouble spots. Some are interested in European affairs, some are 
interested in South American affairs, some are [interested in] Asian affairs. 
They’ve got interests in certain countries which they will continue from 
outside of being a councillor or before they even become a councillor they 
will bring that into council. And I think it’s very healthy that they bring that 
in, because it goes beyond just thinking about localised issues. They’ll still 
focus on that, but they’ve got a broader scope of how they would like to see 
the world operate.   
 
Whereas Councillor Sam Iskandar had stressed the need for Marrickville 
council to create programs that reflected the multicultural interests and agendas 
of his municipality’s high migrant population, SM emphasised instead the 
importance of council being attuned to lifestyle factors as a basis for sound 
urban governance in his particular municipality.  While the primary focus of 
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council is by definition and by law local, he explained, there is a need for 
municipal councils to expand the scale of their activities to reflect the 
cosmopolitan preferences and concerns of the citizens that they have been 
elected to represent.    
 
SM: Local councils are governed by state legislation and the New South 
Wales Local Government Act is very clear on what a council should be 
focusing on, in terms of how it should operate, in terms of financial 
responsibilities, how they can raise revenue and what they can spend it on in 
terms of providing services to the community. But it’s not prescriptive in 
stopping things like this from happening, from creating sister city 
relationships or allowing a council to be a bit more outward focused in terms 
of how they want to reflect how the community feels about particular issues.  
This area is very upwardly mobile; it’s got a very affluent community that 
does a lot of travelling, a lot of overseas focus, and I think the council also has 
to reflect that in how it’s representing the community.  
 
Echoing the contexts in Madison, Olympia and Marrickville, the sister city 
model had been adopted by the Leichhardt peace group, in their view 
unproblematically, as a framework for building peace and social justice across 
cultural and political divides, and  Leichhardt council had been quick to 
endorse the proposal. As noted by SM, it accorded with a long-term interest in 
Middle East social justice issues on the part of the mayor of Leichhardt at the 
time, and was unanimously approved by the remaining members of council.  A 
mayoral minute announcing council approval of a sister city relationship was 
drafted, couched in political language explicitly attributing the plight of the 
people of Hebron to the Israeli occupation. The document identifies the 
proposed relationship as an appropriate opportunity for council to extend the 
scope of its engagement with issues of social justice from East Timor to the 
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Middle East, and cites the Marrickville-Bethlehem sister city relationship, as 
well as its own friendship agreement with the East Timorese town of Maliana, 
as precedents. 
 
(T)he trouble in the Middle East continues to get worse with daily reports of 
death and destruction, violence and suicide bombers.  Leaving Iraq aside, the 
escalating violence is being felt no more so than in Palestinian territories 
which have suffered years of destruction and occupation by Israeli forces. As 
with Maliana in Timor Leste, Council and community groups can work with 
local districts in Hebron to help put in place the infrastructure required for a 
modern democratic state. It can facilitate friendships and relationships 
between organisations and groups in the two cities; e.g. schools, churches, 
sporting groups (Leichhardt Municipal Council, 2007:4). 
 
The minute goes on to identify a single obstacle to implementing a sister city 
relationship with Hebron, namely the absence of a supporting civic 
infrastructure in that city as a result of devastation wrought by the occupation. 
In the perception of Leichhardt city council at that time, therefore, the 
problems they would encounter would be purely logistical.   
 
Leichhardt has led the way in establishing friendship relationships between 
local government in NSW and districts in Timor-Leste. In Palestine, as in 
Timor-Leste, many of the institutions of civil society have destroyed by many 
years of military occupation.  This means that it may be difficult to establish 
formal relationships between the municipalities. However the experience of 
working with Maliana in Timor-Leste means Leichhardt now has the 
opportunity to pioneer a similar, supportive relationship with a city in 
Occupied Palestine.  The Municipality of Marrickville has agreed to establish 
a sister city relationship with Bethlehem, now cut off by the wall. It is 
appropriate that the neighbouring municipality of Leichhardt establish a sister 
city relationship with a neighbouring Palestinian town (Leichhardt Municipal 
Council, 2007:4). 
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As was standard practice, a copy of the minute was sent to the local 
branches of political parties. At this point, the proposal came to the attention of 
Jewish groups and individuals for the first time. Upon viewing the document, a 
Jewish member of the Labor party, who also belonged to the Inner West 
Chavurah, immediately identified the initiative as a potential source of harm to 
the Jewish community, and set in motion the process of risk amplification by 
alerting the Chavurah, as well as Vic Alhadeff at the Jewish Board of Deputies. 
Once more, Mr. Alhadeff swung into action, in order to counter the threat he 
considered the relationship would pose to the people he had been assigned to 
protect. Articles began to appear in the mainstream and local press, mostly 
condemning the proposal, which was generally identified as a sister city rather 
than a friendship initiative.  
News reports included a story in The Daily Telegraph under the 
heading ‘It’s the Inner West Bank’ (Kaye, 2007), in which it was claimed that 
‘furious inner west ratepayers’ had ‘taken on the council’ over the proposal, 
and that the mayor of the Eastern Sydney municipality of Waverly had written 
to his Leichhardt counterpart, demanding that the project be abandoned. 
Waverly is a prosperous area on Sydney’s Eastern shore, which contains the 
city’s highest proportion of Jewish residents, and the Jewish mayor of that 
municipality was due to stand for re-election in the near future. Cautionary 
comparisons were drawn with the Marrickville-Bethlehem sister city 
‘controversy’, which the journalist erroneously claimed to have ‘engulfed’ 
neighbouring Marrickville. Quotes from VA highlighted the symbolic nature of 
the threat posed by the Leichhardt initiative and the inappropriate choice of 
sister city partner. "The real issue here is the symbolic import of what it’s 
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doing," he said. "It's taking a clear partisan political stance. This is very 
different to twinning with London or Paris" (Kaye, 2007). Writing for the 
Australian, the journalist Imre Salusinszky also quoted VA, in this instance as 
claiming that “the council had been led astray by a hard Left group and had no 
business getting involved in the global arena in a partisan political way”. 
Salusinszky’s article also conveys the words of the mayor of Waverly in more 
detail, calling attention to the risk posed to Leichhardt residents of symbolic 
contamination by association with the ‘morally polluted’ council of Hebron.  
 
George Newhouse, the Mayor of Waverley Council, in Sydney's eastern 
suburbs, said a sister-city relationship between Leichhardt and Hebron would 
be a gross abuse of ratepayer funds and trust … (W)hen informed of the 
content of the motion passed by council, Mr. Newhouse said its language was 
inflammatory and indicated a greater commitment of financial and in kind 
support than a mere fundraising exercise. "Do they know who's on Hebron 
council?" Mr. Newhouse said. "Do they know who runs that place? And what 
protections are in place to ensure the council isn't dealing with people with 
blood on their hands?" (Salusinszky, 2007). 
 
The print version of Kaye’s (2007) article in the Daily Telegraph was 
accompanied by two photographs, juxtaposing contrasting images of 
cosmopolitan Leichhardt and what Carole, a spokesperson from Friends of 
Hebron, later identified as probably a refugee camp outside war-torn Hebron 
(see Figure 5 below). In the online version, these images flashed alternately, 
accompanied by captions that had not appeared in the print version. One of 
these misleadingly assigns a distressed Palestinian woman in the foreground of 
the photograph, who is more likely to be a refugee, the debased status of an 
‘old beggar’. 
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Leichhardt ... famous for Dawn Fraser, Wests Tigers, pasta and Italian soccer fans 
 
 
Hebron ... famous for grapes, pottery workshops and, er, old beggars  
Figure 5. ‘It’s the Inner West Bank’ (The Daily Telegraph, May 
26, 2007)  
 
The Friends of Hebron’s  perspective 
Like other proponents of sister city relationships with Palestinian cities, Carole 
held a strong belief in the capacity of the sister city model to address issues of 
international peace and reconciliation. In her case, this was rooted in her 
childhood socialisation. She recalled the controversy that had surrounded a 
proposal for a sister city relationship between the large rural city where she had 
grown up and a Japanese city, due to the lingering stigmatised status of the 
Japanese as wartime enemies. She had seen this opposition overcome, 
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however, by a wider local commitment to international peace and friendship, 
and remembered sister city relationships as “a big part of municipal and 
community life” at the time. “We were always taught about it at school” she 
remembered. “It was about community building    …. It was a matter of great 
pride that Australia would reach out to a city in the United States, in Germany 
or Japan”.  Although Carole believed that the Leichhardt-Hebron proposal was 
a legitimate expression of the peace building sister city model that had inspired 
her in her school days, the strong reaction to the Marrickville proposal on the 
parts of the Federal government and the media had prepared her for a hostile 
response, which she understood as a racist bias against Palestinians in general. 
“Palestinians are regarded as subhuman in Australia by certain parts of society” 
she told me in a tone of exasperation. “One can have a sister city relationship 
with any city but one cannot have one with a Palestinian city”.  She pointed to 
the cartoon in the Aussie Bagel blog (Figure 3 in the preceding chapter) as an 
example of the serious threat posed by ignorant and petty expressions of 
racism, which her peace group was trying to curtail through awareness raising, 
asking “You know what it looks like? Like one of those terribly anti-Semitic 
cartoons in Germany in the thirties. With the hooked nose and the beard …  
just like one of those appalling Nazi graphics of Jewish people in the 1930s, 
and we know where that led!” 
The recent triumph of the stance taken by Marrickville council in the 
face of powerful opposition had given Carole hope that a broader base for 
Palestinian-focused peace projects could be created in Sydney, through an 
alliance between local ‘sister’ municipalities. “In developing the proposal”, she 
explained, “we thought that the two councils were sister, adjacent, the two 
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areas in Sydney. And we thought there would be synergies between the two 
groups; Bethlehem and Hebron and Leichhardt and Marrickville”. Carole felt 
confident that her group’s proposal would meet with success in Leichhardt, as 
she saw clear parallels between the plight of the residents of Maliana in East 
Timor and that of the people of Hebron in Palestine.  Both populations, as she 
saw it, had been the victims of oppressive occupations, which had left them in 
urgent need of humanitarian assistance and the moral support that international 
affirmations of friendship could provide. Her hope was that, if the citizens of 
Leichhardt were brought to understand that the people of Hebron were 
struggling for basic survival, they would respond with the same compassionate 
support that they were extending to the people of Maliana.  Carole was 
intensely committed to relieving the dire situation of what she understood as an 
unjustly oppressed people and had no doubt as to where the responsibility for 
the oppression lay. She described the city of Hebron as “increasingly strangled 
by the wall that Israel is building. Strangled by the Israeli occupation. A 
claustrophobic, strangled place, that’s how I see it”. She was excited about the 
kinds of projects that a sister city type relationship could open up for the people 
of Leichhardt as well as for the people of Hebron. 
 
CL: The Friends of Maliana were involved in information sharing and letting 
the community know what was happening in East Timor, having film nights 
and stalls at the local organic market and raising community awareness about 
how poor people in East Timor were after the Indonesian occupation, and the 
community was raising money for projects back in Maliana .. So that really 
gave the idea, this was another model with another city in the occupied West 
Bank, in every bit as much need as East Timor had been. They [the Friends of 
Maliana] are mixing with the local schools and involved in raising money for 
Maliana and getting books for the library.   I think that’s great. That would be 
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great if the local schools were raising money for books for schools in 
Palestine.  
 
Like Jennifer, Carole saw no evidence that the prospect of forming a sister city 
relationship with a Palestinian partner was creating the kind of outrage that the 
mainstream media had been representing as occurring in Marrickville or 
Leichhardt. Instead, she identified more mundane issues as more common 
generators of local controversy, and the management of diverse citizen 
perspectives as a regular and unremarkable aspect of urban governance.  
 
CL: It’s only controversial when Imre Salusinszky or the Australian Jewish 
News write about it or the Daily Telegraph write about it … What the 
community’s divided on are like someone’s extension that’s being built next 
door and the fact that Leichhardt council have chopped off half the parking in 
Norton Street.  Local government is constantly about division. If you go to 
any other those meetings, that’s what people are divided and going on about -  
the council’s put up our rates and they’ve blocked up the street. Leichhardt’s 
got parking meters – that was the most divisive decision in Leichhardt council 
- putting in parking meters. Some in the community wanted it and some 
didn’t.  
 
Redirecting her attention to the national level of politics, Carole tole me that a 
freedom of information request had been lodged regarding Australian Federal 
government intervention in the visa application of the mayor of Bethlehem, 
which had resulted in the disruption of his delegation’s travel arrangements and 
speaking commitments. She dismissed the argument put forward in the media 
and by Federal government officials to the effect that local governments 
exceed their capacity by engaging in international affairs. Instead, she 
suggested that the Australian government was the political actor out of its 
 185 
depth on the international stage in comparison with other global actors, and 
that framing sister city proposals as interference in international affairs is a 
misguided interpretation of what are essentially local to local connections.  
 
CL: The mayor of Bethlehem is a well respected Christian gynaecologist and 
his project has been endorsed by Archbishop Desmond Tutu and people far 
more eminent and well known on the international stage than Alexander 
Downer!  … No-one ’s engaging in international affairs. Engagement in 
international affairs is the province of government foreign affairs departments. 
Why is this said because one is engaging with a Palestinian city?  
 
Ultimately, she noted, local peace groups in democratic countries do not 
depend on the approval of local authorities in order to carry out their political 
and humanitarian activities, but official approval of such initiatives at the level 
of local government can confer symbolic benefits that make the effort of 
navigating oppositional stances worthwhile.  While local and international 
media coverage had represented the original mayoral minute as tantamount to 
an official sister city relationship, no formal connection yet existed between 
Leichhardt and Hebron, as no agreement had been signed. In response to the 
unanticipated levels of opposition it had received to the Hebron proposal, 
Leichhardt council had since retreated from the position it had taken in the 
minute, now insisting that local groups should come to an agreement about 
projects before seeking official council endorsement. The Friends of Hebron 
were willing to address this requirement; as Carole explained, council approval 
of a sister city agreement was needed for the symbolic legitimacy it would 
bestow upon the people of Hebron. As fictive sisters to the people of 
Leichhardt, they would be recognised not only as human beings, but as normal 
people capable of leading a structured and ordered civic life, in contrast to the 
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fearsome and chaotic existence suggested by the terrorist label, and by the 
essentialist incompatibilities implied by the juxtaposed photographs in Figure 
Five, above. 
 
Carole: It’s about the community using its own resources; it’s not about using 
council resources at all. It’s just moral really, in principle support from 
council and the use of their meeting rooms. Friends of Hebron can do 
whatever Friends of Hebron wants. It’s not council money. But if we want the 
imprimatur of the council we’re meant to work something out jointly with the 
Inner West Chavurah. We actually haven’t attempted that yet but we’ll do 
that.  
 
BL: So what’s the advantage for your project for this to become a sister city 
agreement or a friendship agreement? 
 
Carole: Because it publicises the plight; it endorses the fact that you can have 
a sister relationship with a Palestinian city. All this negative publicity has 
been good. I don’t regard it as being negative. It’s actually brought the issue 
out into the open. [It means] that Palestinians are people; that they have a 
government and a municipality and a community; people who eat, drink, go to 
school. That’s what it means- they’re like us.  That’s the whole idea of sister 
cities. 
 
In summing up her group’s position, Carole located the Leichhardt-Hebron 
sister city proposal within wider political discourses of multiculturalism, 
globalisation, and the proper moral as well as political and administrative scope 
of local governments in an interconnected world.  
 
Carole: It’s very important in Australia, because we do have an Arab 
population and a Muslim population. We’re a multicultural society. It’s very 
important that we reach out and say “Sydney is a global city and we’re a 
global municipality and we want to build bridges with other people”. And it’s 
not just the role of local government to deliver roads and fix potholes in roads.  
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Local government is the government closest to the people. It’s a democratic 
mission of local government to have happy, safe communities and to do that 
you need counter racism and demonisation and things like that cartoon, which 
I find really disturbing. You don’t want people like that in the community. 
You want to have strategies that stop racism and sister cities are just part of 
that; local government to community. At least sister city relationships enable 
people from one country to be able to make contact with another and to feel 
they have some stake in what might be happening, or care about what’s 
happening in another part of the world. And that’s certainly what attracted us, 
looking at friends of Maliana.  
 
The mayor’s perspective 
A very different understanding of the Leichhardt-Hebron proposal was 
expressed by Leichhardt mayor Carolyn Allen (CA), who had ‘inherited’ the 
issue from her predecessor, Alice Murphy. One of the main problems, in her 
view, was that, in its enthusiasm to embrace a worthwhile humanitarian 
project, Leichhardt council had failed to consider the risk implications of 
endorsing a potentially controversial sister city relationship before approving 
the mayoral minute. 
 
CA: This came up to a council meeting without any pre-knowledge. It just 
came up – Let’s have a sister city relationship! You wouldn’t enter into a 
contract to buy a house without looking at the contract and talking about it 
first. You don’t even go to a particular school without checking it out.   
 
The uncertainty that had been expressed by Carole as to the appropriate form 
that Leichhardt’s connection with Hebron should take is indicative of the 
absence of any uniform classificatory system for the various types of sister city 
type relationships in sister city discourses. The Greater Bendigo City Council 
(2007), for example, notes that “a Friendship City (in the Sister City context) 
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can be an official relationship but often is a more informal arrangement with 
less administrative and financial commitment than is expected of a Sister City 
(2007:27), while Rutherford (2004) observes that the term can be used to 
denote an interim stage before a sister city agreement is signed (2004:42). The 
Australian Sister Cities Association (ASCA) favours the expansion of the term 
‘sister city relationship’ to include all inter-city relationship building activities, 
such as friendship agreements, economic agreements and other memoranda of 
understanding (Rutherford, 2000:4)8.   
In the view of Mayor Allen, however, there was a clear division 
between the symbolic and practical functions of sister cities and friendship 
agreements. To her mind, the Hebron proposal fitted more within what she 
understood as the parameters of friendship agreements than those of sister city 
relationships.  CA interpreted sister city relationships as symbolic expressions 
of friendship between local councils of equal status, and friendship agreements 
as directed towards humanitarian support of less fortunate communities, 
illustrating the difference with reference to Leichhardt’s semi-dormant sister 
city relationship with an Italian town dating back to the 1980s, and to the 
friendship agreement with Maliana in East Timor that had so impressed the 
Leichhardt peace group. At the same time, however, she was aware that other 
members of her own council might define these relationships differently. With 
respect to the Leichhardt-Hebron proposal, she noted that 
 
(a)s far as I’m concerned, it’s not a sister city relationship … It depends on 
what you think a sister city is. Leichhardt for a very long time has had a sister 
city relationship with a town in Italy. For me a sister city is - I suppose if you 
                                                 
8  See also Spence (2005) and Kehi (2005) for discussions of Australian-Timorese Friendship 
Agreements. 
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had a real sister you’d give them more time -  but it’s sort of an agreement 
between equals. It’s nothing like what we do in Maliana. To me a sister city 
relationship is a formal and ceremonial thing. With the city in Italy, we have 
sent a delegation and that city has sent a delegation here. We gave them a 
reception; we invited all the local Italian people who had obviously lobbied to 
have this sister city relationship. It was just a friendship thing … That’s what I 
believe, but all the other councillors might not. I think that’s what a sister city 
is. I think what they’re asking for is more a humanitarian project similar to 
what we have in Maliana. It’s not a sister city, it’s a friendship. A friend 
implies that you’re helping someone more than, sister to me is more like, for 
sharing … That’s what our sister city is like with the town in Italy. To me, 
sister cities are symbolic. It’s more a symbolic thing rather than a real thing.  
 
BL: Do you think there’s a common understanding of what sister cities are in 
Australia? 
 
CA: I don’t think so and I don’t think there would be a common 
understanding on our council.   
 
For CA, the entailments of the ‘sister cities’ metaphor differed from those 
conveyed in standard sister city discourses.  To her mind, friendship was about 
providing help, which is, as noted earlier in this study, is typically associated 
with the family/sister metaphor, whereas sisterhood was about friendship, 
which served a more expressive function. CA went on to explain the historic 
and political context within which Leichhardt’s friendship agreement with 
Maliana had been established in 2001, and the reasons behind the almost 
universal support afforded its activities in her local area.  
 
CA: A lot of Australians felt a link to East Timor because our soldiers were 
there and the East Timorese, the Fretilin, helped out soldiers in the Second 
World War. So there’s a link that’s on our part, mostly generosity. Because 
we didn’t have any Indonesians here, we didn’t have a conflict here. We had a 
group in Leichhardt called Friends of Maliana and they raised money with a 
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lot of community action. It was not an official council thing at this point. They 
took on the project of refurbishing the library in Maliana and most of the 
money that did it came from the UN … They had elections in East Timor 
several years later and once they had an elected government [there were] 
various projects from different groups in Australia. There’s a person in 
Australia, the Consul General, who goes round to community groups trying to 
generate more of these. Two years ago, they developed this thing called a 
Friendship Agreement, which was devised by the Local Government 
Association here between us and the East Timorese government. We 
developed a protocol for this Friendship Agreement and it is agreed that we 
only do projects that are generated as community projects from that country. 
We went and visited the officials and we met the chiefs who are like the local 
councillors and we asked them what sort of things we could help with.  
 
CA’s observations draw attention to the multi-scalar character of urban 
connections that are commonly discursively understood as local-to-local. In 
practice, sister city relationships can be suggested at any scale, ranging from 
individual personal connections to national initiatives. In her capacity as 
elected representative of all of Leichhardt’s residents, CA acknowledged the 
legitimacy of objections received by council to its funding of non-local 
activities, noting that engagement with issues of social justice at an 
international level is essentially an optional extra for local authorities.  
 
CA: It’s ratepayers’ money. A lot of people don’t like us spending money in 
East Timor, not a lot, but some. They would say, you shouldn’t be spending 
my rates money in East Timor. You should be fixing the pothole in the street. 
And the essence is that the pothole is our primary responsibility, legislatively 
it is …  We give a lot of money to our own community groups and, as I said, 
we’ve got to look after the footpaths and the roads. We don’t get a lot of rates 
and I think our priority has to be our own community. I would like to live in a 
community that cares about the outside world but that is like the icing on the 
cake.  
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In addition to the obstacle posed by the conceptual distinctions outlined above, 
a recent structural development served to undermine further the chances of 
official endorsement of the Leichhardt-Hebron connection as a sister city 
relationship. The Australian Local Government Association had recently 
changed the scale and direction of its focus, and CA noted that there had been 
“a bit of a directive’ to local councils to confine new sister city initiatives to 
other Australian municipalities, particularly those in rural areas suffering 
hardship, rather than wasting scarce resources on overseas travel. CA affirmed 
the desirability of making sister city connections within Australia, provided 
that they were aimed at friendship and understanding rather than assistance.  
 
CA: It’s probably best to have one with a group in Australia because we need 
to understand, maybe, indigenous populations better. If we were going to have 
another one where they’d call it a sister city relationship, I’d like one with an 
Australian town that has a big indigenous population. We were one of the first 
councils to fly the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander flag at our council and 
we have done a lot of initiatives in the last fifteen to twenty years compared 
with other councils to do with indigenous people.  So to improve 
understanding between people, not an aid thing, about learning about how 
other people live and have an understanding of them, an empathy.  
 
Although she could see the merits of the Hebron proposal as a friendship 
agreement, CA was keen to protect Leichhardt council from unnecessary 
political controversy. Like many other citizens and officials opposed to sister 
city relationships with Palestinian cities, she understood the term ‘political’ in 
the context of the Leichhardt-Hebron debate as signifying danger to public 
order. Officially approving a politically contentious peace initiative was, to her, 
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tantamount to council voluntarily, unnecessarily and irresponsibly introducing 
acrimonious division into a hitherto thriving and harmonious municipality.    
 
CA:  The essence of the problem is that working on peace is a political thing. 
If we didn’t have competing groups in our own community, I would feel more 
comfortable about having a humanitarian project in Hebron. The conclusion 
we’ve now reached is that we would support projects that came from 
combined groups in our municipality. We had a local political situation and 
for me that was entirely the wrong atmosphere to move forward into a 
humanitarian project. … It was a nice idea, but it just causes too many 
problems.  
 
BL: What do you mean by political? 
 
CA: I mean political because the war’s still there and we’ve got people with 
different opinions of it and it’s a conflict within our community. How can we 
work on peace when the groups are fighting here?  
 
As had been the case in Olympia and Marrickville, Leichhardt council had 
received significant negative feedback from individuals and groups outside the 
local area. For Mayor Allen, accusations by the press and the Federal 
government to the effect that they were associating with terrorists were not an 
issue; it was the reputational risk posed to council that was her primary 
concern. It was therefore imperative that council convey a clear impression that 
it was cognizant of its primary responsibility to promote the wellbeing of the 
local community it had been elected to govern. To that end, she was 
determined to distance the council’s name from controversial international 
humanitarian projects. 
 
 193 
CA: We had press coverage. We had people ringing us. I’ve had abusive 
emails. I even had one the other day - I presume all councillors got them. It 
was just calling us “silly leftists, I hope you all rot”, things like that… No-one 
said to us that terrorists would come in. They were just telling us we were 
stupid. Our concern was we had different groups in our community and we 
would be causing friction between them in choosing something specific in 
Hebron. .. I think for us to be able to spend ratepayers’ money on those sort of 
projects we need a strong, non-council group. My problem is supporting a 
group when there are other groups that are -  it’s very emotive, highly political 
and emotive, and I just think we’re creating problems for ourselves. I will 
support an individual project if they all agree and I could see it’s apolitical, 
but it won’t be labelled our project. It will be our council helping a local group 
do something in Hebron.  
 
The Inner West Chavurah’s perspective 
In contrast to the relatively smooth trajectory of the Marrickville-Bethlehem 
proposal at the local level, the Leichhardt-Hebron proposal was a topic of 
considerable concern for the members of the Leichhardt based Jewish group, 
the Inner West Chavurah. One of their members, Gael, had agreed to be 
interviewed as a spokesperson for her group. Gael weighed her words very 
carefully throughout our interview, conscious of her responsibility to represent 
fairly and correctly the views of an internally diverse collectivity. She asked to 
begin the interview by explaining the nature and composition of the Inner West 
Chavurah, as she believed it would help me to understand better the position 
her group had taken. The Chavurah, which comprises about 140 Jewish people, 
was formed around twenty years ago, and members come together for social 
and educational activities and religious festivals. Their perspective in opposing 
the sister city initiative differed from that taken by the American pro-Israeli 
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lobby in Olympia, in that the Chavurah shared Friends of Hebron’s desire to 
help the people of Hebron and wanted to work with them to that end. 
 
Gael:  Our group is not typical of the mainstream Jewish community. We’re 
not a religious group. We identify as Jewish but many of us have partners who 
aren’t Jewish and we’re sort of a social/educational; we get together for 
Jewish festivals and we do our own celebrations. We all geographically live in 
the Inner West and we all kind of identify slightly differently than a lot of 
people who are part of the main stream Jewish community, which often live 
around the Eastern suburbs.  We don’t necessarily feel comfortable in a lot of 
the mainstream stuff. Being in the Chavurah has given us an opportunity to 
make friends with other Jewish people and do festivals in a way that we feel 
comfortable with and also to be creative … Many of us would be doing work 
with communities, like maybe working alongside aboriginal communities or 
East Timorese, and we’re probably more similar in many ways, we found that 
we had a lot of common with people in Friends of Hebron, for example.  
 
Gael explained that some members of the Chavurah had been less inclined than 
others to engage with the Hebron initiative, and that the perspective of those 
members needed to be honoured and respected.  The public stance taken by the 
Chavurah on the sister city issue had suddenly rendered their hitherto 
unobtrusive group visible, not only to non-Jewish residents of their own 
neighbourhood, but also to the wider Jewish community.  With these factors, as 
well as their group’s humanitarian ideals, in mind, it was formulating its public 
response to the Hebron proposal with caution.  
 
Gael: Initially we were very concerned about speaking to the media. We were 
worried that we would be misrepresented and we were misrepresented. Pretty 
quickly we decided that we needed to tell out own story. If we weren’t saying 
anything, there would be a vacuum that others would jump into. We’re a 
Leichhardt group. We had no elected members. We were not formed in a way 
that we have spokespeople and to get a mandate from our group took quite a 
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few meetings. Four of us were given a mandate to run with this and a strategy 
to deal with the media that we had to work out. And we were very careful to 
keep reporting back to our constituency, the bigger groups. We had to make 
decisions about how we would operate democratically within our group.  
 
Gael described her group’s position as like “walking a tightrope” in trying to 
communicate a balanced perspective while taking into account the views of all 
stakeholders. It was important to Chavurah members to reclaim a debate that 
they felt was essentially a local matter, but which had been appropriated at 
non-local scales.   
 
Gael: The majority of us felt that this was our neck of the woods. We are 
articulate. We are clever people. We can deal with this. And we were 
concerned that the line of the Jewish Board of Deputies is to stop anything 
that was critical of Israel. We don’t think like that. We wanted to work it our 
way. This is our council. We’re all ratepayers. We felt that if the council was 
going to put support into something it has to be something that would be good 
for the people of the municipality. Any sister city thing should be of benefit. 
And we could see from this there was a possibility that this could be negative 
and make some members of the community feel more uncomfortable and not 
benefit.  
 
Gael emphasised that it was not the idea of providing humanitarian assistance 
that troubled the Chavurah, but the partisan and inflammatory language in 
which the minute had been expressed. From her perspective, the chain of harm 
through which the sister city type proposal had become a putative risk to the 
Jewish community had begun, not with public criticism of the Israeli state per 
se, but with an officially endorsed criticism that was biased and superficial.   
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Gael: What we did take objection to was the language that the minute was 
couched in. We also felt concerned that going along the path of the way this 
minute was framed, starting with fundraising and building up things with 
sister city relationships could have a negative impact on us in the community, 
because if these things aren’t done carefully, they can lead to anti-Semitism. 
….It’s a very fine line between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism. Some of our 
members were deeply, deeply concerned and nervous because anti-Semitism 
is a very emotional topic for a lot of Jewish people, it hurts a lot. A lot of 
people in the Chavurah have parents who are Holocaust survivors, or family 
members, so they’re one generation from the Holocaust. So they’re very 
sensitive to that.  
 
Of further concern was the risk inherent in the inability of council to impose 
constraints on real world applications of the city agreement once it had been 
ratified. One such application that had troubled her group was a proposed 
public exhibition in the Leichhardt library of photographs depicting the 
suffering of Palestinians under the Israeli occupation. Since Israelis and 
Palestinians were both victims and perpetrators of the violence, she reasoned, it 
was dangerous and unhelpful to attribute blame to either party.  
 
Gael: It would depend on what that meant in reality. What would actually 
happen? Would it be a plaque on the wall saying ‘Sister City of Hebron’ or 
does it mean we invite people and they get up in the town hall and say 
inflammatory things because they’re Hamas people, or do they have 
exhibitions in libraries that show only one side of the story? … One of the 
things that Friends of Hebron wanted to do, and saw it as quite innocently that 
it would be a good thing to do, would be to have a photographic exhibition in 
the Leichhardt library about the impact of the Israeli occupation on the people 
living in Hebron. I’ll talk personally now, but I think other people would 
agree with me. By doing such a thing, people walk in the library, they get 
there and they see one side of the story.  They don’t see the towns in Israel 
being bombed every day from the Gaza strip. They don’t see the whole 
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history, the whole story. Both sides have had been oppressed and both sides 
are victims of violence and both sides have oppressed the other.   
 
Instead her group sought to “reframe the conflict” in a way that would allow 
them to move forward together with pro-Palestinian peace groups such as the 
Friends of Hebron, in order to address the humanitarian crisis caused by the 
Middle East conflict. 
 
Gael: The position we took, we did a lot of thinking about this. We did not 
want to just jump on this. We’re not all pro-Israel.  A lot of us are very critical 
of what the Israeli government has done. But where we drew the line was, we 
were saying that the Middle East is a quagmire, that’s the language we used, 
it’s a quagmire. And it’s a narrative. And you can start anywhere in that 
narrative, in any place and put a comma. And you can stop there and show 
your side of the story. So for everything that you can criticise Israel about, an 
Israeli or an anti- Palestinian person can put their side of the story and show 
the same events from their perspective:  And where does it take you? 
Nowhere!  It takes you into escalating violence. We were saying “Let’s 
reframe this, let’s not stomp on it. Let’s see what opportunities exist.”   
 
 
Like Cr. Iskandar of Marrickville council, Gael’s group was concerned that 
media discourses of the Middle East conflict were not allowing the voice of 
peace to be heard around the world, but their perspectives differed with respect 
to the capacity of the sister cities model to convey that voice. Both supported, 
in principle, local government engagement with issues of social justice in the 
Middle East. However, the Inner West Chavurah were concerned that the one-
to-one nature of sister city relationships - the symbolic connection of one 
homogenised urban population with another, in circumstances where one city 
is in conflict with a third party - necessarily requires sides to be taken. 
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Furthermore, Gael believed that peace activists living in areas other than the 
Middle East run the risk of oversimplifying complex issues that they are not in 
the best position to understand, finding themselves as a consequence “sucked 
into” never-ending conflict. A much more constructive approach, in her 
opinion, would be for councils to help peace groups in their municipalities to 
assist the projects of other organisations, composed of people who actually live 
and work in the conflict zone, and who are accordingly endowed with the 
benefit of practical local experience.  
 
Gael: Actually, other things are going on in the Middle East around peace 
building - Palestinians and Israelis getting together and doing good peace-
making work. We felt that, if our local council wanted to do anything in the 
Middle East, it should be about supporting actions towards peace making, 
where people of good will on both sides are working together. … We don’t 
need to drag Middle East politics into Leichhardt. We don’t live in the Middle 
East! This is what distresses me more than anything. Why do we need that 
conflict brought here into Leichhardt, where people all get on? It’s a 
harmonious place. A twin with a Middle East [city], whether it be in Israel, or 
probably more contentiously, with a Palestinian city, raises a whole lot of 
conflict.  … We’re saying, if you want to do anything in the Middle East, why 
not look at the people who are reframing the conflict and looking at 
peacemaking? We searched and we found practical things on the ground 
where groups are working together, people who are living in the Middle East, 
who are saying “We’re sick of conflict.  We actually want peace”.  
 
In particular, members of the Inner West Chavurah were inspired by a group 
known as ‘One Voice’. The web page of that group notes that it is composed of 
roughly equal numbers of Israeli and Palestinians working together to “amplify 
the voice of Israeli and Palestinian moderates, empowering them to seize back 
the agenda for conflict resolution and demand that their leaders achieve a two-
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state solution guaranteeing the end of occupation, establishing a viable 
independent Palestinian state, and ensuring the safety and security of the state 
of Israel - allowing both people to live in peace with all their neighbours”. 
What particularly appealed to the Chavurah was One Voice’s conceptual 
positioning of the conflict as between the moderate majority and violent 
extremists on both sides, rather than between Palestinians and Israelis as 
homogenised groups. In line with this vision, Gael did not endorse a tripartite 
sister city solution, since she felt that such arrangements perpetuate the kind of 
‘us’ and ‘them’ thinking that Chavurah members were trying to overcome.   
 
Gael: They [One Voice] are already light years ahead. Why are we creating 
conflict in our community based on taking sides in the Middle East when 
clever people in the Middle East are beyond that?  That’s what we believe we 
ought to be doing. Leichhardt council should be emulating that sort of stuff … 
If council’s going to support anything, let it support groups who are working 
together to support a project that is around peacemaking and shows 
Palestinians and Israelis working side by side to improve conditions in 
Hebron.  
 
BL: So you feel that instead of the peace going from the peaceful place here 
over to there, the conflict is coming from the conflict zone to here? 
 
Gael: Yes, that’s a really important point. That’s what we were feeling was 
happening.  
 
Gael went on to tell me about a paradoxical situation, in which peace workers 
from One Voice were travelling from the Middle East to speak at Western 
universities, in an attempt to defuse the secondary conflict that hostilities in 
their own area have provoked in the West. From the perspective of her own 
group, the best course of action for people in the Leichhardt area would be to 
 200 
listen to peace workers such as these, who have had direct experience of 
conditions in Israel and Palestine, and ask them for their suggestions as to how 
Australians could best support them in their local activities. Local Australian 
groups on both sides of the Middle East debate could then come together to 
play an important but secondary role in improving conditions in the Middle 
East, with the in-principle support of council.  Ultimately, the contention of the 
Chavurah was that it is unproductive to attempt to establish a direct sister city 
type relationship between an Australian city and either of two cities that are in 
conflict, since it only serves to perpetuate existing divisions.  “It isn’t about 
them and us”, she concluded. “It’s about them and them and we try to help”. 
Postscript 
Soon after I had conducted the interviews for this study, the Friends of Hebron 
approached the Leichhardt library, seeking permission to mount a public 
exhibition of photographs depicting the suffering of Palestinian civilians as a 
result of the Israeli occupation. The exhibition was intended to commemorate 
the sixtieth anniversary of the Nakba, the Palestinian word for ‘catastrophe'. 
After viewing the proposed content, the library gave its permission for the 
display to take place in May of the following year (2008). In the week before 
the scheduled opening, however, Leichhardt council officials became aware of 
the planned exhibit, which they believed did not accord with Friends of 
Hebron’s prior agreement with council to confine themselves to projects that 
included perspectives from both sides on any contentious topic. After 
consultation with the Inner West Chavurah, it was decided that the Chavurah 
would exhibit its own display at the same time and in the same location, in 
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order to present what council believed would be a balanced and non-divisive 
point of view to the wider public.   
As the final touches were being made to the Friends of Hebron’s 
exhibition, however, two officers from the Counter Terrorism and Special 
Tactics Group and the Community Contact Unit of the Federal police arrived at 
Leichhardt library, advising that they were there to view the exhibition, which 
they had expected to be already on public display.  The police officers 
informed the library staff that they had seen an advertisement for the exhibition 
on an internet website, and requested contact details for both the Friends of 
Hebron and the Inner West Chavurah. They then left the library, advising that 
that they would return to view the photographs at a later time.  
As noted in the official report of Leichhardt council, 
 
(t)he following morning the Director of Corporate & Information Services 
attended the Library. After calling the General Manager and Mayor to discuss 
the contents, a joint decision was taken to postpone both the exhibition by the 
Friends of Hebron as well as the exhibition planned for display by the Inner 
West Chavurah, until the groups could meet with the panel of Councillors. 
There was concern that the exhibition material, particularly the text around the 
photos, could be divisive, and therefore not in accordance with the Council 
policy. There was also some concern as to whether a public library was the 
appropriate place for the exhibitions, as opposed to a hall or gallery where 
people could make a choice as to whether they wished to view them. The 
Friends of Hebron and the Inner West Chavurah were contacted and informed 
of the decision and the need for a combined meeting of the two groups with 
the panel of Councillors (Leichhardt Municipal Council Report, 23 May 
2008).  
 
This story was immediately taken up by the mainstream news media, often in a 
tone of incredulity. The ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corporation) radio 
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program PM reported that the police had “swooped on’ the exhibition, and 
were now in damage control over accusations of McCarthyism (Bourke, 2008).  
The Sydney Morning Herald responded with scepticism to a claim by the 
Media Office of the Federal Police that the counter-terrorism officers had 
merely called in to “say hi to Friends of Hebron members” (Ramachandran, 
2008). In line with his unwavering support for the Israeli cause, a dissonant 
interpretation was expressed by the Australian journalist Imre Salusinszky, 
who framed the incident instead as a betrayal of council trust on the part of the 
Friends of Hebron group (Salusinszky, 2008).    
Theoretical implications  
 
Like the Olympia-Rafah sister city proposal, the Leichhardt-Hebron proposal 
had become emplaced as a risk object through the process of ‘construction’ 
(Hilgartner, 1991), having been successfully linked to putative harm at the 
local scale and consequently removed from the formal agenda of council.  
While opposition at the local scale had been much less confrontational in 
Leichhardt than that encountered by the Olympia council, with the Inner West 
Chavurah expressly seeking to work with the Friends of Hebron, Leichhardt 
Council nevertheless responded to the irrefutable evidence that its own 
municipality was divided over the issue of the proposed relationship. As with 
the other initiatives explored in this study, the interest groups concerned, as 
well as elected officials within city councils, expressed different 
understandings as to the proper nature and scope of sister city relationships, 
and of the mutual obligations of council and citizen groups in relation to them. 
Once again, the sister city model was revealed to be highly flexible, in that it 
allowed for multiple interpretations across domains, but insufficiently robust to 
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create a boundary object, since no core semantic component remained stable in 
all contexts.  
The closure of the photographic exhibition and its aftermath call into 
question the utility of local peace groups applying for official council 
endorsement of controversial sister city projects. In seeking the symbolic 
legitimacy afforded by an elected government’s recognition of solidarity with a 
Palestinian city, the Friends of Hebron had succeeded in calling public 
attention to human rights issues at both national and international scales. At the 
same time, however, they had effectively constrained their own capacity to act 
within a local context. Particularly in the light of Marrickville’s subsequent 
motion condemning Israeli aggression in Gaza (see chapter four), the effects of 
escalating Federal government intervention in sister city relationships between 
Australian and Palestinian cities is suggestive of a need for future research into 
contested sister city proposals in Australia.  
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Chapter Six: American-Iraqi sister city 
relationships  
Background to the relationships 
As will be recalled from chapter two of this study, this thesis posits the ideal 
case scenario for peace-building sister city relationships as the ‘boundary 
object’, through which productive communication is achieved without 
requiring interpretive consensus on the parts of cooperating social groups. The 
‘constructed’ risk objects exemplified by the Olympia-Rafah and Leichhardt-
Hebron proposals could not develop into boundary objects because no 
transnational communicative space was permitted for this to occur.  In this 
chapter, I develop the alternative concept of the ‘consensus object’. Consensus 
objects do constitute spaces of communication, but, as is indicated by the 
name, their raison d'être is consensus, or at least a demonstrated semblance 
thereof. Crucially, within consensus objects, the categories of people who 
interact and the basis and content of their interactions are closely regulated, 
both legally through visa restrictions (see Schweitzer and Neureiter, 2008), and 
culturally, through the denial or avoidance of negative sanctions. For these 
reasons, consensus objects cannot function as boundary objects, in which 
meaningfully diverse ‘definitions of the situation’ are accommodated in the 
interests of achieving productive change, although their advocates may claim 
that they do. Accordingly, I define a consensus object as ‘a pseudo boundary 
object’; a top-down, structured vehicle for public involvement and reassurance 
at a local scale, which mimics a boundary object by creating a misleading 
impression that communication across meaningful difference is being achieved 
in the interests of positive social change’. 
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 As with the other examples in this study, in categorising consensus 
objects as pseudo boundary objects, I do not mean to suggest that the people 
and organisations involved in consensus objects are not well intentioned, or 
that they do not achieve some productive outcomes. Rather, I argue that, 
almost to the extent of risk objects, consensus objects are deficient in their 
capacity for peace building under conditions of serious ongoing geopolitical 
conflict.  In order to illustrate the concept of the consensus object, I examine 
the discursive representation of state-initiated ‘sister city’ type relationships 
between US cities and their putative ‘counterparts’ in Iraq during the 
conservative administration of U.S. President George W. Bush.  
 Once classified as a ‘no-no’ area for sister city relationships 
(Zelinsky, 1990), Iraqi cities became the focus of intense preoccupation on the 
part of the Bush administration in the years following the ‘9/11 attacks’ on US 
soil.  Amid the onslaught of security fears and ‘war on terror’ propaganda that 
ensued, anti-Muslim sentiment in the United States was high (Cainkar, 2002). 
In his now infamous “State of the Union’ address, Bush made specific 
reference to Iraq as a site of danger that needed to be contained by a strong and 
righteous America, and called upon US citizens to exercise vigilance on their 
home territories. 
 
Thousands of dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of murder, often 
supported by outlaw regimes, are now spread throughout the world like 
ticking time bombs, set to go off without warning … Iraq continues to flaunt 
its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted 
to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade … 
States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to 
threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, 
these regimes pose a grave and growing danger … America will do what is 
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necessary to ensure our nation’s security… We are protected from attack only 
by vigorous action abroad, and increased vigilance at home (Bush, 2002). 
 
Bush’s reference to ‘ticking time bombs, spread throughout the world’ 
emphasised to his American audience the threat to public order posed by 
terrorism (see Weigert, 2003) and the need for caution when dealing with 
unknown others  - by implication, Muslim - who originate from dangerous 
places. Not long after the US invasion and occupation of Iraq, however, these 
images of the threatening Muslim ‘other’ needed to be reversed as a matter of 
urgency, in order to confer moral legitimacy on what had come widely to be 
seen as a catastrophic error of judgment in US foreign policy. Like the 
Japanese, who had been collectively demonised during the Second World War, 
the Iraqi people needed to be re-humanised in the American imaginary to 
correspond with a changed political climate. As part of a rapid national revival 
of public diplomacy  - “this time on steroids” (Freeman, 2006) -  the U.S. 
government was seeking to transform fearful and suspicious US cities into 
uncritically welcoming domestic spaces, at least in the eyes of select Muslim 
visitors and sceptical international ‘others’ who might be open to conversion to 
the “American way’. The operative word in this strategic agenda was ‘visitors’.  
Unlike Simmel’s unsettling  stranger who ‘comes today and stays tomorrow’ 
(Bauman, 2001c), non-American Muslims especially targeted in this scenario 
would return reassuringly to their own places, there to disseminate happy 
memories and good will towards their erstwhile American hosts.  The reality of 
US acceptance of Iraqi refugees, for example, was quite different, with the US 
accepting only 400, compared with over two million absorbed by nations 
bordering on Iraq (Kretsedemas and Brotherton, 2008:20).  
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 For the architects of US ‘soft power’ (Nye, 2004), a plausibility 
structure (Berger, 1967) needed to be mobilised at short notice to support such 
a rapid and unlikely ideological transformation on the part of American cities, 
and, as Honorary President of Sister Cities International, President Bush found 
such a structure readily at hand. The date on which the precursor of SCI, the 
People to People program, had been launched - September 11th, 1956 – 
corresponded, by coincidence, to the date of the terrorist attacks that had 
spawned the U.S.-led ‘war on terror’. This historical accident facilitated a 
seemingly ‘natural’ conceptual transfer, via sister city discourses, of the moral 
legitimacy and charisma historically conferred upon Eisenhower (see Davies, 
1954) onto the internationally discredited policies of a decidedly uncharismatic 
serving President. American civilisation and compassion could thence be 
publicly enacted as the peaceful and virtuous ‘other’ to the unbridled 
aggression of the uncivilised terrorist.  In a ceremony simultaneously marking 
both occasions in the city of Austin on September 11, 2006, for example, 
solemn memorial was combined with a performance of the sister city song  We 
are one (see chapter two of this study) and a sing-along of the Beatles song All 
you need is love (City of Austin website, 2006).  
Situating the consensus object 
In contrast to risk objects, which result from ambiguity and disjuncture within 
the ‘structure’ component of the sister cities model, consensus objects are 
generated by ambiguity and disjuncture within the ‘concept’ component of the 
model. The concept component, as will be recalled from chapter two, 
comprises a conceptual blend of universal and particular metaphors, 
respectively the ‘human family’ and the ‘citizen diplomat’. The ‘human 
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family’ is an institutional and affective categorisation, denoting a networked 
human connectivity resembling an extended family on a global scale. It is also 
a moral categorisation, in which normative role obligations pertaining to the 
private sphere, especially those governing reciprocity and nurturance, are 
mapped onto international relations between cities. The ‘citizen diplomat’, by 
contrast,  is a state-centric (Kavaloski, 1990) expression of civic obligation, 
which effects a metaphorical status upgrade of ordinary citizens, who lack the 
power, authority or resources of real diplomats, to endorsed emissaries of 
national governments.  For Americans living under the Bush regime, the 
originally ‘achieved’ or elective status of ‘citizen diplomat’ was becoming 
increasingly ‘ascribed’, or allocated by others, as the occupation in Iraq 
dragged on, serving as a strategy of stigma management for national identity. 
As Sherri Mueller, a prolific public speaker as President of the National 
Council for International Visitors informed her fellow Americans in 2004, 
“you may not refer to yourselves as citizen diplomats, but that’s exactly what 
you are”. Four years later, taking advantage of a wider audience to be accessed 
via the electronic social networking site Facebook, Mueller posted an article 
she had written earlier for the Stanley Foundation, in which she addressed a 
rhetorical question as to what could be done to improve America’s 
international standing.   
 
One essential response is that you - the individual citizen - can take steps to 
ameliorate the situation. Citizen diplomacy is the concept that, in a vibrant 
democracy, the individual has the responsibility to help shape foreign 
relations "one handshake at a time." Participants in international exchange 
programs, whether guests or hosts, are often referred to as citizen diplomats or 
citizen ambassadors. However, it is critical that all of our citizens understand 
that they, too, are citizen diplomats. As you go about your daily lives you can 
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make a difference in how America is perceived and portrayed abroad. You 
can help shatter negative stereotypes. Whether you are a student in a college 
class sitting next to a foreign scholar, an athlete welcoming a teammate from 
overseas, a church member helping to resettle an immigrant family, a rock 
star, or a business representative negotiating a deal abroad, you have an 
opportunity—an obligation—to put Uncle Sam’s best foot forward (Mueller, 
2008). 
 
Once accepted and embraced, volunteers’ identification with the citizen 
diplomat role can be reinforced and affirmed through participation in public 
ceremonies and rituals and via material signifiers of commitment. These 
include campaign-style buttons emblazoned with the Stars and Stripes emblem, 
reading ‘I’m a citizen diplomat. Are you?’ (see Tulsa Global Alliance, n/d) and 
public declarations through Sister Cities International’s ‘Raise my Voice’ 
pledge campaign, in which volunteers can sign a pledge card committing 
themselves  “to fostering a world of mutual respect, understanding and 
cooperation”. Once ‘pledged’, citizen diplomats are given a blue and white 
ribbon to wear as a sign of their commitment” (Sister Cities International, 
2005).  
Under normal conditions, allegiance to the nation state complements 
rather than precludes allegiance to the human family;  personified states are 
commonly understood metaphorically as masculine patriarchs (Lakoff, 2002, 
2005), each attending primarily to his responsibilities to his own nuclear unit, 
while supporting and being supported by less proximate extended kin.  Blended 
imageries of family, nation and the world were introduced into the American 
collective consciousness during the 1950s, when the metaphor of the global 
family was strategically mobilised by the Eisenhower administration in support 
of its Cold War foreign policy.  Klein (2003) demonstrates how Eisenhower 
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drew upon a ‘familial language of political obligation’ expressed through the 
metaphor of the ‘multiracial, international family’ to support his party’s 
ideology of international interdependence.  This abstract concept was given 
tangible form by a highly influential travelling photographic exhibition bearing 
the title ‘The Family of Man’. Launched during the same period as the People 
to People program, the exhibition of 503 images from various countries was 
constructed around a theme of humanistic universalism, emphasising the deep 
commonalities claimed to underlie ‘superficial’ differences between cultures. It 
was seen by over nine million people around the world, both in allied countries 
and in those the US hoped to win over as allies (2003:187-188).  Klein (2003) 
explains how the exhibition combined the seemingly incompatible conceptual 
systems of kinship and international relations by creating a common ‘structure 
of feeling’ which helped to establish American legitimacy as a comfortable 
concept within the ‘common sense’ knowledge of domestic lifeworlds.  
 
In publicizing the idea that all humanity belonged to the same family, the 
show reinforced the terms through which the U.S. explained and justified its 
reshaping of the international order. America’s claims of global 
“responsibilities,’ “obligations,” and “commitments” became more acceptable 
when they were embedded in a logic of family. Imagined as an extension of 
family love, the extension of American power became somewhat less 
objectionable. The bonds of family rendered the inequalities of political and 
economic power less visible and partially defused the charges of racism and 
imperialism (2003:188).  
 
The Family of Man exhibition calls to mind Fish’s (1997) critique of what he 
terms ‘boutique multiculturalism’, an intercultural orientation through which 
the legitimacy of alternative cultural perspectives is celebrated by eating, 
singing and other aesthetic practices, but evaporates when representatives of 
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those cultures exhibit beliefs and practices that to them are neither superficial 
nor negotiable, and are antithetical to those of the boutique multiculturalist.  As 
Fish (1997) explains,  
 
a boutique multiculturalist does not and cannot take seriously the core values 
of the cultures he tolerates. The reason he cannot is that he does not see those 
values as truly "core" but as overlays on a substratum of essential humanity. 
That is the true core, and the differences that mark us externally - differences 
in language, clothing, religious practices, race, gender, class, and so on - are 
for the boutique multiculturalist no more than what Milton calls in his 
Areopagitica "moderat varieties and brotherly dissimilitudes that are not 
vastly disproportionall." We may dress differently, speak differently, woo 
differently, worship or not worship differently, but underneath (or so the 
argument goes) there is something we all share (or that shares us) and that 
something constitutes the core of our identities (1997:379). 
 
Boutique multiculturalism thrives in an environment of consensus, and the 
success of Eisenhower’s strategy to represent all people as united by their 
fundamental likeness under a benevolent US leadership was due in part to the 
ideological climate of the time. As a victor in a ‘just’ war, the US enjoyed high 
international standing and credibility as the world looked towards a more 
promising future, but nearly fifty years later, America’s position in the global 
moral order was much less secure.  In the same way that extended kinship 
relationships in real human families can break down when the behaviour of one 
member is perceived by the others to be morally culpable, states acting 
aggressively in their own interests to the detriment of others, and, by 
association, their citizens, can be negatively sanctioned, even to the extent of 
normative ejection from the conceptual category of humanity. Such a message 
was conveyed to the states of North Korea, Iran and Iraq by President Bush, 
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when, as noted above, he had collectively and publicly categorised them as an 
‘axis of evil’.   
Not long into the second year of the US occupation of Iraq, however, 
the boot of culpability was beginning to shift to the other foot. American 
standing in the world had undergone a deep and rapid deterioration (Singler, 
2008) and American political elites had begun to realise, with considerable 
incredulity, that their vision of themselves as global peacemakers and saviours 
was not widely shared by the rest of the world. The Bush administration was 
faced with a dilemma as to how to ensure the security of the United States 
while regaining and recruiting the support and approval of its critics, both at 
home and abroad. In line with the U.S. Conservatives’ tradition of publicly 
framing their foreign policy in terms of values rather than issues (Lakoff, 
2002), and more deeply, as I will ague, as an expression of ‘bypassed’ (Lewis, 
1971) ‘political shame’ (Alweiss, 2003, Murphy, 2004), discourses emanating 
from the Bush administration and its supporters identified the cause of the 
problem as a failure of the international community to understand the true 
nature of the moral American. Greater exposure to real Americans going about 
their daily business in the domestic sphere, they reasoned, would correct this 
misunderstanding and lead to enhanced security and prosperity for the 
American people. A report from the 2004 conference of the US Coalition for 
Citizen Diplomacy, for example, noted that  
 
lack of first-hand knowledge of the United States facilitates vicious 
stereotyping that diminishes foreign regard for our country and fuels 
terrorism. A strong web of person to-person contacts supports U.S. national 
security by undercutting these stereotypes. Even a person who strongly 
opposes our policies will have a hard time hating the United States if he or she 
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has had dinner in an American home, worked cooperatively with American 
counterparts, learned English from an American teacher, or attended an 
American school (McCarry, 2004). 
 
Two years later, however, international goodwill towards the United States had 
plummeted still further. Debusmann (2006:5) reported at the time that 
“(d)istaste for America  … runs so deep that, at the recent World Cup in 
Germany the American team was the only one asked not to display its national 
flag on the team bus. In South Korea, traditionally a U.S. ally, two-thirds of 
people under 30 said in a recent poll that if there were a war between North 
Korea and the United States, they would side with North Korea”. In the same 
year, Melnyk (2006) conveyed the distress felt by Business for Diplomatic 
Action chairman Keith Reinhard over the ‘spoiled identity’ (Goffman, 1963) of 
his country and its people: “It is now politically correct in most regions of the 
world to dump on America”, reported Reinhard. “In Australia now if you want 
to say something is really stupid, or really bad, or really evil, you say: Oh, it’s 
so American”.  Seemingly oblivious, however, to the increasing intensity of 
such signals, the Bush government’s framing of the cause of the apparent 
disjuncture between its high positive self image and its low standing in global 
public opinion remained constant. Speaking at the 2006 Community Citizen 
Diplomacy Summit in Missouri, US ambassador Kenton Keith, later to be 
curiously described by Schneider (2009: 51) as “a lightly complected African 
American with a trim build, dapper attire and diplomat’s mustache”, lamented 
the alarming distance between the rightful and actual positioning in 
international discourse of the misunderstood American.   
 
 214 
We Americans see ourselves as a force for good in the world. Opinion polls 
show that our self image is largely positive. We have sacrificed our soldiers 
and our treasure to defeat tyranny, eradicate poverty, promote just solutions to 
conflicts around the world, fight the spread of nuclear weapons, and keep the 
peace. We have protected the weak against the strong, we have opened our 
markets to the exports of poor nations, and we have sent volunteers – young 
and old – around the world to give a helping hand where it is wanted. Most of 
us believe these things sincerely, and we want them to be true. But how do 
others see us? They largely see us as selfish, inefficient, hypocritical, and 
callous (Keith, 2006).  
 
An essentialist representation of the misunderstood ‘good American’, with a 
belief in fairness “written into the American DNA” (Keith, 2006, quoted in 
Schneider, 2009:51) is the master frame organising post 9/11 discourses of 
citizen diplomacy. Once conceptualised in these terms, the obvious and rational 
course of action for citizen diplomats became one of revealing this essential 
truth to unbelievers, whose perceptions had been clouded because of 
misleading or misunderstood communication. In extreme mode, this 
assumption is neatly satirised in a cartoon by Alex Gregory, published in the 
New Yorker on February 2nd, 2002. A group of scantly clad and obviously 
affluent Americans is shown drinking martinis, smoking cigarettes and 
sunbathing, apparently at a seaside resort.  The caption reads ‘I think that if 
these Islamic Fundamentalists got to know us they’d like us’.  
They key to the widespread and uncritical popular acceptance of the 
‘misunderstood American’ frame is to be found, I contend,  in Keith’s (2006) 
qualifying phrase “we want them to be true’.  The repetitive, seemingly 
obsessive nature of appeals to an essential moral goodness collectively 
distinguishing Americans from other publics, together with a refusal to 
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acknowledge the legitimacy of other interpretations of their behaviour, marks 
them as manifestations of an identity management strategy identified by Lewis 
(1971) as ‘bypassed shame’.  Recognition of a devalued self in the eyes of 
salient others produces painful feelings of rejection, which are most 
productively addressed by attempts to repair patently damaged or broken social 
bonds.  However, in Western societies, in which the autonomous individual is 
valorised, shame has itself become shameful, and is consequently typically 
disguised, denied or ignored – in Lewis’ (1971) terminology, 
‘unacknowledged’ - in social interactions. Lewis (1971, cited in Scheff, 1990) 
identified two categories of unacknowledged shame: overt, undifferentiated 
shame and bypassed shame.  “The former involves emotional pain which is 
misnamed (I feel uncomfortable); the latter, successful distraction from the 
pain through hyperactive thought, speech or behaviour” (Scheff, 1990:201).  
As noted by Giddens (1991), “bypassed shame links directly to feelings of 
ontological insecurity: it consists of repressed fears that the narrative of self-
identity cannot withstand engulfing pressures on its coherence or social 
acceptability” (1991:65). Rather than adapting a flawed identity narrative to 
incorporate disconfirming evidence from others, the original narrative is 
repeated with ever-increasing intensity, effectively blocking processes of 
critical introspection necessary for reintegration into the wider collectivity. 
In a demonstration of what, by Lewis’ criteria, would suggest a 
condition of bypassed shame, Keith (2006), as others had done before him, 
went on to exhort his American audience to engage more often, and with 
greater familiarity, with their international brothers and sisters.  More intimate 
experiences of American life would, he reasoned, correct unjust and unfounded 
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perceptions and build a more appealing image of America as the only 
remaining superpower in the post Cold War world. 
 
America’s place in the world can be enhanced by more exchanges. If people 
knew us better, they would be less likely to oppose us, they would be more 
likely to join with us in a war against international terrorism; they would more 
likely to send their sons and daughters to study among us, and more likely to 
welcome our own sons and daughters; and they would be more likely to buy 
our products. Of course there is another side to the coin: if Americans knew 
the rest of the world better we would wear the mantle of our unipolar 
superpower status with more dignity and empathy (Keith, 2006). 
 
As noted above, such people to people exchanges were already in place at the 
time of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, in the form of hundreds of sister city 
relationships between US cities and international cities. In the immediate 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, SCI had identified deeper understanding between 
the U.S and the Muslim world as new priority for the organisation.  
Furthermore, in the perception of the President of the Board of Directors at 
Sister Cities International, Sherman Banks, the intrinsically moral organisation 
he represented was ideally positioned to answer the national call.  “As a citizen 
diplomacy organization”, he announced in a 2005 SCI newsletter,  
 
we are naturally an organization made up of givers, working as instruments of 
justice and truth. We find great satisfaction when the hungry are fed, when the 
immobile are mobile, when the deprived are provided for, when the fearful are 
made fearless, and when the self-righteous are made humble. We do more 
than talk about the role of Citizen Diplomacy in the world—we walk through 
the world as diplomats in action. We possess the ability to open doors to the 
future and bring down any bigotry and hatred (Banks, 2005). 
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Back in 2002, however, there had still been work to be done in order to bring 
the notion of citizen diplomacy more closely into line with the national agenda 
in the minds of ordinary Americans. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, 
hundreds of messages of sympathy, many in spontaneous, imperfect English, 
had poured into American cities from sister cities around the world (Sister 
Cities International, n/d). Some had sent photographs of floral tributes placed 
outside the US embassies in their own countries, while others had simply 
underscored the seemingly secure status of Americans as morally blameless 
victims of atrocity. As understood by at least one commentator at the time, this 
overwhelmingly sympathetic response was evidence that the sister city 
movement had achieved “exactly what it was designed to do - make folks who 
live a world apart feel like family” (Hedelt, 2002).  
For a short period thereafter, the human family and citizen diplomat 
metaphors had remained in alignment: US citizen diplomats, in supporting 
their own government, had been understood to be making their own 
contribution to building a safer and more peaceful world for all, free of the evil 
threat posed by terrorists, who, by dint of their barbaric actions, had confirmed 
their own unworthiness to be classified as part of humanity. After the invasion 
of Iraq, however, on the spurious pretext of uncovering and neutralising 
weapons of mass destruction, the legitimacy of the metaphorical blend was 
called into question by protests within America and around the world, and, by 
implication, the legitimacy of America’s place in the human family. As an 
internationally renowned and prestigious network credited with helping to 
bring an end to the Cold War (Richmond, 2003), the sister cities movement 
provided a crucial ideological resource for enabling the US government – and, 
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by extension, its supporters – to repair this dissonance, whilst warding off 
challenges to a policy it had no intention of changing.  
Constructing the consensus object 
Interviewed in April, 2002, Tim Honey (then Executive Director of Sister 
Cities International), while noting that sister city relations could only proceed 
with cities in countries with which the U.S. had diplomatic relations, stressed 
the need for his organisation to remain apolitical “in order to maintain its 
credibility and retain its international stance”. “We are not a political 
organization”, he asserted, “We’re not involved in advocacy.  We are truly 
grassroots in our communities, and that is the common thread that binds us all 
together”. No sister city connection yet existed in countries such as Iraq, he 
explained, because there was no current U.S. recognition for the current 
regime; “We use a safety lens. Is it safe to go?”  Despite such  reservations, 
Honey expressed his hope that, in the future, cities in Afghanistan, Iraq and 
North Korea would become part of the Sister Cities phenomenon, “possibly in 
time for the organization’s 50th anniversary in 2006”.  As it happened, he did 
not need to wait quite so long to see the establishment of U.S.-Iraqi ‘sister city’ 
relationships.  
On June 9th, 2004, Laura Bush, then the First Lady of the United States, 
introduced an unexpected element into her remarks following the Spouses 
Roundtable at the G8 summit in Sea Island, Georgia. After responding to a 
question about the death of former US President Ronald Reagan, she turned to 
the reporter who had asked the question, adding  
 
I thought maybe you were going to ask about - since you're from Dallas - 
about the Sister City project that we are announcing today. Dallas is going to 
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be a sister city with Kirkuk in Iraq, and they've already agreed to that. Tucson 
and Sulaymaniyah are going to be sister cities and Denver and Baghdad are 
going to be sister cities …The sister city program, that is a way for two cities 
to work together for economic development, for friendship, to have pen pals 
with each other, to try to have mutual understanding. So I'm really proud 
today to announce that these three American cities have joined with three 
cities in Iraq to be sister cities (U.S. Office of the First Lady, 2004). 
 
This announcement, which was as much of a surprise to the Denver city 
council as it was to the assembled reporters, signalled the introduction of a new 
paradigm in sister city relationships, the overtly state initiated, putatively 
culture-focused, strategic sister city partnership. Both legally and ideologically, 
its development had been enabled by the  ‘Freedom Promotion Act’, which 
was introduced in 2002 for the purposes of using “international exchanges, 
sister cities programs, English-language training, international broadcasting, 
and so forth, to make U.S. values a reality for others” (Snow, 2004: 20). The 
US government had been directly involved in setting up strategic sister city 
relationships in the past, for example, non-proliferation programs aimed at 
preventing entrepreneurship on the parts of disgruntled nuclear scientists in the 
former Soviet Union (Weiner, 2002), and was continuing to regulate heavily 
the operations of grass roots sister city projects between American and Cuban 
cities (Parrish, 2002). However this was the first instance of a nationally 
announced application of the sister cities model, which, despite  a White House 
statement applauding the cities concerned on their ‘initiative’ (Office of the 
First Lady, 2004), appears to have been the result of decisions made at the level 
of the U.S. state. In a rare instance of serious and insightful press commentary 
on the issue, the Denver Post (2004) reported that “(a)t best, the White House 
mischaracterised the partnership and jumped the gun in announcing it. At 
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worst, it’s another example –albeit a small and insignificant one – of the 
troubling way post-war Iraq is being handled … Sister city compacts can be 
beneficial if both cities have common goals or challenges. The compacts 
typically take months – if not years – to forge. The goal is to connect citizens. 
The compacts can’t really be thrust upon cities”. Regrettably, no further 
mention is made in the editorial of the implications of the incident for the 
management of ‘post-war Iraq’.  
Caught off guard by the White House announcement, officials 
representing Sister Cities International and the Denver City Council hastened 
to coordinate a response. The office of the Denver mayor requested 
clarification of the program and the role that the city would play, while 
expressing concerns that it might become a target for terrorists by virtue of its 
association with Baghdad (Fong, 2004). Spokespeople for the Denver city 
council were quoted in the press as saying that the city had as yet received no 
proposal from the national government and had not made any formal 
applications for such a program, but had verbally expressed interest in 
participating in US-Iraqi partnerships at a regional level. They were surprised, 
however, “that people thought it was a done deal," (Banda, 2004). By the 
following day, the situation had been normalised; the First Lady had been 
mistaken, it was reported (Fong, 2004). These were not to be sister city 
relationships, but part of a new program designed to promote friendship and 
understanding between the West and the Islamic world, to be known as 
‘Partners for Peace’. 
Sister cities International issued a press release, which included  a 
statement regarding the  Denver Regional Council of Governments’ 
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commitment to “improve cross cultural understanding and further the cause 
and development of peace”,  together with an outline of the scope of the 
program by Tim Honey. The project was to be administered by Sister Cities 
International, with initial funding from the federal government, and would 
concentrate initially on humanitarian projects such as Wheelchairs for Peace 
and Operation Iraqi Children. SCI was accepting letters of interest from U.S 
communities so that partners could be found for three additional Iraqi cities 
(SCI, 2004). The SCI website subsequently explained the difference between 
‘sister cities’ and ‘international partners’ as being one of duration and 
development, announcing that ‘International Partners’ programs were  
 
not like traditional "sister city" relationships. Because it can take a year or 
more to establish a formalized sister city arrangement, Sister Cities 
International utilized its partnership category for this program. The 
"partnership" designation is especially helpful in situations where 
communities may want to conduct a short-term project without formalizing 
sister city ties. Organizers hope that ultimately sister city relationships will 
grow out of the program (SCI, 2005).  
 
Although the Partners for Peace program officially concluded in 2006, the 
U.S-Iraqi ‘partnerships’ announced by the White House were still shown as 
‘current’ on SCI’s list of U.S. - Iraq Sister Cities as of November, 2009.  I 
therefore situate them in the category of ‘sister city relationships’ in my 
discussion, in line with the categorisation adopted by Zelinsky (1991).  
U.S-Iraqi sister city activities 
Almost completely absent from discourses generated by and about U.S. Iraqi 
sister city type  ‘partnerships’ are acknowledgments that the United states had 
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so recently bombed and invaded, and continued to occupy against vehement 
resistance, the homeland of its Middle Eastern municipal partners.  No hint of 
culpability or responsibility for the devastation wrought by the U.S-led 
invasion of Iraq taints these stories of municipal sisterhood. Instead, in joyful 
scenes conveyed by the print and electronic media, we read, see and hear of 
impressed Iraqi mayors and students eager to learn about democratic 
government and the American way of life, American troops handing out soft 
toys and school supplies to Iraqi children, and other heart-warming 
humanitarian projects undertaken by more fortunate members of the human 
family for the benefit of their afflicted kin. The direct cause of much of that 
affliction is either attributed to the corrupt regime of Saddam Hussein, from 
which U.S. led forces had liberated a discursively homogenised Iraqi 
population, or is concealed altogether through the convenient grammatical 
device of the passive voice.  Alternative ‘definitions of the situation’, such as 
the chaos caused by the invaders’ destruction of Iraq’s civic infrastructure, or 
U.S. economic and political, rather than humanitarian, motives for the invasion 
- for example, the desire on the part of the U.S. to secure the country’s oil 
reserves and affirm its own global hegemony (Žižek, 2005:4) - are effectively 
excluded from collective consideration. Sister city relationships which, in 
practice, provide domestic ideological and material support for the U.S. 
occupation of Iraq, are successfully framed in public discourses as essentially 
cultural and moral, and ‘therefore’ apolitical.  
This extraordinary feat of alternative reality construction is achieved 
primarily, I argue, through the narrative device of framing U.S.-Iraqi 
partnerships with reference to the unthreatening social categories of disability 
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and childhood. I illustrate this process using the examples of Wheelchairs for 
Peace, Operation Iraqi Children, Shoes for Orphan Souls and student 
exchange programs.  
The Wheelchairs for Peace project was founded in 2002, and is 
operated jointly by Sister Cities International and the Wheelchair Foundation. 
It has since become a core humanitarian assistance program for Sister Cities 
International (SCI, 2006). As indicated by the organisation’s name, the targets 
of their humanitarian efforts are disabled people of all ages living in parts of 
the world that require peace building interventions.  Tempe was the fifth and 
smallest American city chosen to participate in the Partners for Peace 
program, and was ‘on the road to becoming sister cities” with the Iraqi town of 
Hilla when its manager, Mike Conner, was interviewed by Gutel (2005). 
Conner framed the Partners for Peace project as taking the sister cities concept 
of fostering friendship and business ties “one step further”, as he explained the 
benefits of the program in terms that would be familiar to Lofland’s (1993) 
consensus movement actors of the 1980s: “When you meet someone and you 
become their friend”, he advised, “the chance for conflict is greatly reduced; 
you’re not gonna bomb your friend. And that’s what’s important about 
partnership for peace”. Gutel (2005) goes on to note that “(o)fficials with Sister 
Cities International say Iraqis in Hilla are also enthused about the partnership. 
Hilla officials couldn’t be reached for their comments. But a delegation is 
coming to the United States in the next 6 months to work out details of the 
developing program”. 
 A month after the publication of Gutel’s interview, which was 
available in both print and audio versions, author Gail Fisher of the Wheelchair 
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Foundation posted a story identifying the relationship between Tempe and 
Hilla as one of sister cities, but in an alternative form. In a pattern reminiscent 
of Eliasoph’s (1999) avowedly ‘apolitical’ environmental activists, whose 
activities were decidedly political by objective standards, Fisher takes tentative 
steps towards an oppositional stance to the U.S occupation, only to retreat 
almost immediately into a position of polite bewilderment and grief. “The war 
in Iraq seems so remote from the comfortable lives we lead in the East Valley”, 
she begins. “It’s not like World War 11 where citizens felt a real engagement 
with the war. This is a questionable, dubious war whose conflict is beyond 
understanding. We mourn the tragic loss of lives in this struggle.” She then 
goes on to offer a ray of hope for others who, like herself, might be seeking a 
degree of agency to address a catastrophic political situation with which they 
feel very little connection. However, typically for sister cities discourses, 
confrontation with the elected national government over its foreign policies is 
not on the agenda, nor any allocation of direct or indirect responsibility for the 
‘brutal killings’, ‘maiming, and ‘other atrocities’. Rather, she notes that 
 
(f)or most of us, our only connection to this war is through the news media. 
There are daily stories of tragic car bombings and other violent atrocities. 
Beside the brutal killings, there's another aspect of this war not always 
portrayed by the media: The suffering of the downtrodden and weaker 
members of a war-torn society. The already physically disabled and ill endure 
even more.  Thousands of Iraqi people have been maimed and are physically 
disabled from this conflict. While most of us feel powerless to make a 
difference in the lives of these people, Tempe Sister Cities recently announced 
that they will send wheelchairs to victims of wartime violence in the city of 
Hilla. They are participating in the Partners for Peace project with Iraq 
through Sister Cities International. … As you see, there is a way for East 
Valley residents who want to make a positive difference in this war, after all. 
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Disabled Iraqis, many of whom may owe their condition to the invasion’s 
legacy of conflict and violence, are thus constituted as needy and unthreatening 
recipients of American largesse, whose desperate plight offers a way for U.S. 
citizens to enact an unproblematically positive aspect of their country’s foreign 
policy, while seemingly remaining disengaged from political debate. More 
extensive and direct in their representation in U.S.-Iraqi sister city narratives, 
however, as apolitical actors par excellence, are children, both Iraqi and 
American.   
The innocent child 
As quintessential signifiers of innocence (Warner, 1995, Rubinstein, 2000) and 
strategic symbolic substitutes for “complex, speaking persons” (Barker-
Plummer & Boaz, 2005, cited in Schwalbe, 2008:6), children feature heavily in 
U.S.-Iraqi ‘sister cities’  discourses, principally through the projects ‘Operation 
Iraqi children’, ‘Shoes for Orphan Souls’ and the ‘Iraqi Young Leaders 
Exchange program’. As noted by Giroux (2000) as “an ethical referent, 
innocence humanizes children and makes a claim on adults to provide security 
and protection” (2000:61). Standing metonymically for the Iraqi people as a 
whole, Iraqi children are represented in sister city discourses as expressing 
uncritical and unqualified appreciation of the U.S. military personnel in their 
midst and gratitude towards their generous American benefactors.  Moral 
legitimacy is thus bestowed upon the U.S. presence in, and transformation of, 
their politically, economically and socially fractured homeland.  
A humanitarian project of Sister Cities International (SCI, 2007), 
Operation Iraqi Children (OIC) was formed in March, 2004 by actor Gary 
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Sinise and author Laura Hillenbrand. The program provided a structured 
medium through which Americans could send school supplies overseas to Iraqi 
children, to be distributed in person by American troops, and, by June, 2005, it 
had delivered 125,000 kits of supplies (Blankenship, 2005). The organisation 
later partnered with People to People International and changed its name to 
Operation International Children, to signify the extension of its services to 
children in other nations with an American military presence (OIC web page, 
n/d). In keeping with its stated aim of providing support for U.S. troops, 
discourses emanating from Operation Iraqi Children adopt a uniformly 
positive stance on the American presence in Iraq.  The following excerpts from 
the OIC website, for example, mobilise an “American rescuers’ frame, 
explicitly situated within the wider justificatory ‘freedom frame’ employed on 
a regular basis by the Bush administration, thereby affirming the credibility of 
official government discourses. 
 
During and after Operation Iraqi Freedom, American soldiers passing through 
Iraqi villages were horrified at the squalor of Iraqi schools, which had been 
severely neglected under the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein.... The future of 
the Iraqi nation is being squandered for lack of basic school supplies. Moved 
by the plight of these children, many American soldiers have taken it upon 
themselves to help. Working in small groups on their days off, soldiers gather 
supplies sent by family members, friends, and various groups and take them to 
villages, sometimes coming under fire as they work to reconstruct the schools 
and deliver learning tools to Iraqi kids. Their efforts have met with immense 
gratitude from local Iraqis and their children, who now have access to the 
basic tools of education for the first time in their lives. "I have seen Iraqi kids 
climbing on our soldiers and hugging them and kissing them," remembers 
Sinise, who accompanied Army soldiers to a dilapidated school they were 
rebuilding. "I have seen their smiling faces and their attempts to say 'I love 
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you' in broken English. The folks I saw had hope in their eyes and gratitude in 
their hearts for what was done for them." 
 
Citing its founders’ connection to Mary Jean Eisenhower, who, in addition to 
being the granddaughter of the 1950s President, is President of People to 
People International and the 2006 recipient of the Sister Cities International 
"Eisenhower Legacy Award for Global Citizenship", the website goes on to 
align OIC’s humanitarian efforts ideologically with the U.S. ‘soft power’ (Nye, 
2004) campaign for the ‘hearts and minds’ of erstwhile and current adversaries. 
The gifts and supplies distributed by American troops to Iraqi children can be 
seen to perform a double ideological function for the U.S state in terms of their 
temporal orientation. In present time, they create affective bridges between the 
U.S military and private Iraqi lifeworlds by addressing the needs and hopes of 
emotionally appealing child intermediaries, while at the same time serving as a 
means for shaping uncertain future political relations between the two countries 
in accordance with U.S interests.  
 
Sinise, Hillenbrand and Eisenhower believe that the benefits of this program 
will reach far beyond the recipients of the supplies. By bringing Americans 
together with citizens of war-torn nations and demonstrating American 
devotion to these people’s welfare, the program can foster understanding 
between our nations and generate goodwill between local citizens and 
American soldiers. "Every time a box of school supplies is delivered by our 
troops it will be another small victory for them in helping win hearts and 
minds," says Sinise. "It is a beautiful way to begin a relationship with the 
future leaders of Iraq, Afghanistan and other war-torn nations (OIC website, 
n/d).  
 
Unlike Lofland’s (1993) consensus movement actors, who travelled to 
politically problematic countries in the 1980s in order to interact directly with 
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foreign populations, most volunteers for Operation Iraqi Children do not 
personally visit the country targeted for their humanitarian efforts, and the 
organisation itself does not have a base in Iraq. Rather, the testimony of a 
young volunteer at the Sister Cities Youth Conference in 2008 suggests a 
unilateral American vision of ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 2003), in 
which the imaginer will never know or meet most of his or her fellow 
members, but nevertheless holds a mental “image of their communion” (2003: 
6). “(O)ur major community service project with Operation Iraqi Children and 
People to People was very heartwarming”, she reports.  “Even though I got two 
major paper cuts from putting notebooks into plastic bags, I just knew that the 
children in Iraq would love their school supplies, and maybe it would help 
them get a better education. This made me feel really motivated to do more 
because I realized that even though I would probably never directly see those 
children in Iraq, it still made me happy to imagine their smiles” (Roeder, 
2008). 
The smiles of Iraqi children can be experienced more directly in 
internet videos, such that narrated by Joe Montagna, who presented OIC co-
founder Gary Sinese with the  ‘God of Fire Man of the Year’ award in 2007. 
To the tune of tinkling piano music,  followed by Louis Armstrong’s rendition 
of the song What a wonderful world, Sinese is shown helping U.S troops to 
distribute gifts to delighted Iraqi children, while in one scene, an Iraqi child, 
held by a man who might be his father, kisses a U.S. soldier on the cheek 
(‘Prokkp’, 2007). In a web video from Parents TV (2008), billed as a ‘video 
resource for parenting’ for ‘It Moms’, participation in Operation Iraqi 
Children is revealed as a nationally focused vehicle for self-congratulation and 
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for enacting the American dream of individual advancement, rather than one of 
international political awareness raising. Presenters Marni Renison and Holly 
Resnick are filmed visiting a local American elementary school, where 
children are busily drawing posters to raise funds for an OIC project sponsored 
by Campfire USA, which, it is claimed by the area director, will give them an 
‘authentic experience in leadership’. Asked “what excites you about doing 
Operation Iraqi Children?” a girl named Caitlin replies “I’ve seen a lot of 
pictures of children who don’t have school supplies and they’re kinda poor, so 
I wanted to get some stuff out to them so that they have good lives, just like 
us”. Turning to the camera, Renison responds “Good job, Caitlin’s parents!” 
Mentally conjuring an image of an Iraqi child beneficiary of the OIC project, 
an earnest looking boy whose name appears to be Tanner, then explains, “by 
giving him these school supplies, I can give him a chance to learn, just the 
same as anyone else in this school could”. Resnick responds by asking the 
child “Are you going to be President someday? Tanner for President!” “OK It 
Moms”, she concludes to camera, “our children truly are tomorrow’s leaders 
and Campfire USA helps empower them and develop them into those leaders” 
(Parents TV, 2008).  
The Shoes for Orphan Souls project is listed on the SCI website as the 
major project undertaken in the Dallas-Kirkuk Partners for Peace program. It is 
operated by Buckner International, a religious organisation described on its 
website as “a global Christian ministry that seeks justice for ‘the least of these’ 
by providing care and resources for orphans and at-risk children in the United 
States and more than 50 countries around the world. Through international 
orphanage support, humanitarian aid, short-term missions, foster care and 
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adoption, Buckner has made a lasting impact in some of the world’s most 
poverty-stricken and socially desperate countries” (Buckner International, n/d). 
During the period covered by the Partners for Peace project, the city of Dallas 
donated 7,000 pairs of shoes and 10,000 pairs of socks for distribution to 
children in Kirkuk (SCI: ‘U.S. - Iraq Sister Cities’, n/d).  
Via Buckner’s partnership with Sister Cities International, Iraq’s 
‘desperation’ is ideologically constituted as social and humanitarian rather than 
political in nature. Dilday (2004), for example, relays the statement of Tiffany 
Taylor, marketing director for Buckner Orphan Care International (BOCI) and 
Shoes for Orphan Souls, that the situation of Iraqi children is “a humanitarian 
crisis of epic proportions, and we want to do our part to render aid. Thousands 
of Iraqi children live like refugees in camps where food, water, clothing and 
proper sanitation are scarce. Buckner is humbled to be able to touch these 
children in a tangible way". Like Operation Iraqi Children, Shoes for Orphan 
Souls links the American and Iraqi domestic spheres by personalising and 
privatising the role of American troops stationed in Iraq, undergirded by a 
religious missionary agenda. Jeff Jones, the director of operations at BOCI, is 
quoted on the Shoes for Orphan Soles website as noting that the gift of shoes to 
Iraqi children “opens the door for us to minister to a lot of the children and 
orphans in Iraq. The sister city venue is a wonderful way for us to do that”. For 
Jones, the presentation of the shoes demonstrates “our objective with the Shoes 
for Orphan Souls project – for us to be a help to orphans and children allows us 
to see our ministry vision validated” (BOCI, n/d).  
In the following story posted by Mission Network News (2005), the 
concrete causes of the displacement of Iraqi child refugees ‘since the fall of 
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Saddam Hussein’ are glossed over, in favour of an emphasis on Iraqi gratitude 
for American good will and practical assistance. 
 
In the days since the fall of Saddam Hussein, tens of thousands have been 
displaced in Kirkuk, Iraq. That translates to thousands of children living in 
refugee camp situations, without the basic necessities. When Buckner Orphan 
Care International’s Tiffany Taylor met with Kirkuk's governor, she told him 
they were sending over ten thousand pairs of shoes for the orphans in the area. 
"He was just blown away when he saw the shoes about ready to leave, and 
could not believe that the people of America would care enough about his 
children to help him… Taylor says while the shoes will be distributed by the 
military, the team is working to share the hope of Christ. "This donation is 
really going to help us open the doors there for a partnership with orphanages 
in Iraq, for us being able to tell the children that they are so loved by their 
heavenly Father. That's a really exciting part of being able to send over so 
many shoes because it means more than ten thousand children hearing that 
they're loved." (Mission Network News, 2005) 
 
Along with Shoes for Orphan Souls, the city of Dallas also initiated a sports 
program called ‘Soccer for Life’, in which a youth team from Kirkuk was 
selected to participate in the annual Dallas Cup Tournament.  According to the 
SCI website, the game would provide “a needed outlet and distraction for 
young people currently living in a tumultuous reality” (SCI, n/d).   
Joe Rice, a former mayor of Denver who had served in Iraq with the 
U.S. Army Reserve in 2004, is widely credited as the instigator of the Denver-
Baghdad regional partnership.  The title of a power point presentation given by 
Rice at the Sister Cities International conference in July 2005 - Two regions, 
One Goal: Partners for Peace - posits an exact correspondence between U.S 
and Iraqi interests and an implied correspondence between the regions 
themselves.  Rice begins his optimistically toned presentation by explaining to 
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his American audience the reasons why they should care about the situation in 
Iraq. Explicitly bracketing “the righteousness of the war” as a “separate 
discussion”, Rice notes that “(w)hat’s happening is worth our understanding 
and our investment. Stability is in our interests and that of the Iraq’s.  [There 
are] (s)o many trying to do right thing for the right reasons”. “The bad is 
happening”, he acknowledges, “ (b)ut there’s also more...Life on the streets is 
surprisingly normal, [the] economy is good, Iraqis are developing important 
grass roots organizations and Iraqis are optimistic about their future (Rice, 
2005, emphasis in original). Rice goes on to name the activities of the 
partnership as including email and phone friendships and advice and the 
shipping of school supplies through the Sister Cities program, illustrated on 
one slide by a photograph of a former Baghdad Governor surrounded by 
attentive children in the ‘Butterfly Pavilion’.  
As with Operation Iraqi Children and Shoes for Orphan Souls, children 
feature significantly in the activities and discourses of the Denver-Baghdad 
partnership. For the project ‘Boxes for Baghdad’ for example, Denver sent 
over 2,500 school supply kits that had been donated directly to the organisation 
or collected by local Boy Scouts, while the ‘Bears for Baghdad’ project saw 
over 400 teddy bears and other stuffed animals sent to children in the Karada 
and Sadr City Districts of Baghdad (DRCOG, 2009). A story by independent 
journalist Tamie Ross (2004) for the United Methodist Church (of which Rice 
is member) shows a smiling Rice in his army uniform, holding a small, shy-
looking Iraqi child. The accompanying text links the Iraqi child to Rice’s own 
children, and their innocent endorsement of his military role.  
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Now home in Littleton, Colo., with his wife, Kendall, and 3 ½-year-old twins, 
Harrison and Lexie, Rice talks by phone and e-mail with Iraqi council 
members several times a week … Harrison and Lexie were toddlers when 
their father went off to war. They told anyone who would listen that their 
daddy was off helping to put a bad, bad man in time-out. When Rice came 
home, he brought a portrait of Saddam Hussein with him, “One of those 
portraits that was everywhere there … we all got one.” Now his children 
shake their fingers at the imprisoned dictator’s image and tell their daddy he 
did a good job (Ross, 2004). 
While small Iraqi children play an important role as visible objects of 
American altruistic love and care, the selected voices of older Iraqi children 
play a more tangible role in affirming the legitimacy of the Bush 
administration’s policies through sister city discourses.   More articulate than 
their younger counterparts, Iraqi teenagers and their American hosts are 
reported in the following story as taking a Democrat politician to task over his 
opposition to the continued U.S. military presence in their country.  
Gov. Bill Ritter got more than he bargained for when he entertained questions 
Wednesday from 30 Iraqi teenagers touring the United States. Speaking to the 
students, the Democratic governor explained that he believes the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq was preemptive and that America’s presence has “greatly 
jeopardized” security in the country. Do you know the real situation over 
there? the students asked. Saying unguarded cities and towns are far more 
dangerous than they’ve been described in the American media, the students 
peppered Ritter with questions about whether he would pull U.S. troops out if 
it meant more Iraqi civilians would get killed.  “It’s a bad situation. It’s a very 
bad situation,” one boy told the governor. “We need someone to help us” 
(Sealover, 2007). 
The article goes on to expand at length upon Iraqi and American teenagers’ 
interpretations of America’s foreign policy obligations – after bracketing the 
legitimacy of the original invasion in order to focus on current priorities – 
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including their dismissal of the Democrat governor’s competence to comment 
on areas outside his jurisdiction.  
After the meeting with Ritter at the state Capitol, several of the Iraqi 
teenagers said regardless of how they felt about the initial U.S. 
invasion, the troops are needed now … One boy said the U.S. needs to 
concentrate on closing off Iraq’s borders so that terrorists can’t enter 
the country. Another boy said America must make the Iraqi 
government be more honest with the people and explain where the 
country’s money and resources are going. “I don’t think any of them 
want the troops to withdraw,” said 14-year-old Rachel Sabey, whose 
family is one of several in the Denver area hosting the students while 
they are in Colorado learning about local government. Judging 
Ritter’s answers, one girl said that foreign policy wasn’t his job, and a 
boy added that Ritter, like most American leaders, only knows what 
he hears from major media sources. “They know the upper level of 
the situation. They don’t know in deep,” the boy said …The trip to 
Colorado was organized through the Baghdad-Denver Region 
Partnership, a program of Sister Cities International, and funded 
largely by the U.S. State Department (Sealover, 2007).  
 
While children are not the sole focus of U.S.-Iraqi sister city discourses, the 
prevalence of child-centred, largely care-themed stories in discursive 
representations of this manifestly macro-political exercise in international 
relations would appear to defy rational explanation. Also puzzling is the 
seemingly universal uncritical acceptance on the parts of U.S. urban 
populations of state-initiated sister city type relationships between U.S. and 
Iraqi cities as a credible and appropriate means of addressing the ongoing crisis 
in Iraq. When situated within their wider national political and cultural context, 
however, these phenomena can be recognised as conforming to a wider 
symbolic logic organised around a gendered division of labour between the 
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state and the city. Whereas the manifest function of U.S.-Iraqi sister city 
relationships is to enhance communication across difference in order to 
reinforce American legitimacy and security at the international scale, the latent 
function can be understood to be the management of a particular emotion – 
identified as political shame - in the interests of national identity construction. 
The work of the cognitive linguist George Lakoff enables the first step to be 
taken in understanding this conceptually complex process.  
Family values and the metaphoric gendering of political 
space 
 
As (Ringmar, 2008:57) observes, all political systems need to promote in their 
citizenries a level of hermeneutic stability sufficient to enable coherent 
interpretations of their social worlds, and the strategic selection of metaphor 
can play a prominent role is this process. However according to Lakoff (2002), 
the two principal political parties in U.S. politics - the conservative 
Republicans and the liberal Democrats - are unevenly matched in their 
cognizance of the power of metaphor in this regard, and in their skill in its 
manipulation. Conservatives, argues Lakoff (2002), have ‘left liberals in the 
dust’, employing a sophisticated rhetoric of family values to justify their 
policies with such success that they have attracted the votes of 
socioeconomically disadvantaged Americans, the very people most harmed by 
those policies.   
Lakoff (2002) contends that all political thought is inherently moral, 
and that election results are the collective outcome of individual judgements as 
to what constitutes the good society. In line with a central tenet of cognitive 
linguistics theory, namely that humans understand new and complex 
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phenomena in terms of simpler and more familiar ones (Lakoff and Johnson, 
1980), he argues that Americans understand their complex national political 
sphere in terms of domestic kinship relations. This connection is unsurprising, 
he reminds us, since primary moral socialisation is produced by and within the 
family. Metaphoric reasoning subsequently allows personal moral meanings 
acquired through family socialisation to be transferred from the domestic 
sphere to the public sphere of the nation, which is also conceptualised as a kind 
of family (Lakoff, 2002:13). Whether progressive, conservative or moderate in 
orientation, all political decisions, argues Lakoff, rest on a cognitive foundation 
of normative belief systems regarding the proper nature of family relations, 
particularly with regard to parental authority.   
Lakoff’s (2002) theory of ‘moral politics’ can be summed up as 
follows. For political conservatives, the salient normative referent is that of the 
‘strict father’. A strict father figure is considered necessary for families and 
nations alike, since there is evil in the world from which he must protect his 
family, or, by metaphoric extension, the citizens he governs. A strict father is 
also needed to teach his children to distinguish right from wrong, and to shape 
their own behaviour accordingly. Wives have their place in this conceptual 
scheme, which, in accordance with patriarchal ideology, is to support their 
husbands by abiding by their decisions, and to care for their families. The strict 
father is a potent metaphor, combining authority, morality and power. Its 
consequences for political and economic policy include support for ‘righteous’ 
wars, a punitive criminal justice system and an ethic of individual 
responsibility.  For political liberals, on the other hand, the guiding metaphor is 
the ‘nurturant parent’. This is a gender-neutral metaphor, which prioritises 
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care, empathy and protection of less powerful or able family members. The 
nurturant parent model in turn supports negotiation, rehabilitation and the 
welfare state (Lakoff, 2002). 
According to Lakoff (2002), the crucial point that U.S. conservatives 
understand and that liberals do not, is that Americans vote according to 
ephemeral value systems rather than concrete issues of policy, a situation 
which explains the continuing popularity and support of a President whose 
policies were detrimental to many of the citizens he was charged to govern. 
These people voted for Bush, Lakoff contends, because the family-based moral 
worldview he presented to them resonated with their own private worldviews. 
While metaphoric reasoning in itself has no moral loading, its manipulation 
through the use of ‘Orwellian language’  - saying the opposite of what is the 
case - in the promotion of harmful policies is reprehensible, because it 
undermines the democratic process by mystifying the true nature and causes of 
negative phenomena . Lakoff (2005) maintains that political parties use this 
strategy when they know themselves to be in a weak position; that is, when the 
majority of the public objects to their actual practices. He gives as an example 
the Bush administration’s ‘Clear Skies’ initiative, which, in practice, weakens 
mercury pollution controls and poisons the skies over America.  
Despite the growing unpopularity to the war in Iraq and its massive loss 
of moral ground on the world stage, not least as a result of the Abu Ghraib 
scandal, the Bush administration was returned to government in the elections of 
November, 2004. Clearly, according to Lakoff’s formulation, Americans 
wanted to see a strong father figure in action, protecting their nation from 
further attacks at home through pre-emptive interventions abroad.  However in 
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the view of Faludi (2007), what the Bush government was actually defending 
was not the nation itself, but a more abstract and even more compelling 
national resource - the cultural myth of American invincibility.  
Reflecting on the response of the American government and media in 
the immediate aftermath of ‘9/11’, Faludi (2007) noticed a marked discrepancy 
between U.S. reactions to terrorist attacks and those of other countries, notably 
Spain and the United Kingdom. While the national governments of European 
cities had framed the attacks as the work of politically motivated criminals who 
needed to be brought to justice through the criminal justice system, the 
conservative U.S. government and media had, improbably, framed the assaults 
on the symbols of U.S. political and economic power as attacks on its domestic 
homes and hearths. Such frames included a highly fanciful description of the 
twin towers by New York Times Magazine writer Virginia Heffernan as a long-
married couple, in which, in the manner of human relationships, one partner 
had perished shortly after the demise of its companion (2007:116-117).  
A broader response from the predominantly conservative U.S. press 
called for a revival of ‘traditional’ family values, whereby working women 
would return to the domestic space of the home to produce and care for 
children, while supporting the efforts of their re-masculinised men to defend 
their country through military and political action. Searching for an explanation 
for such improbable responses to what had been explicitly identified by their 
perpetrators as politically motivated attacks, Faludi came to a realisation that 
the national response had it roots in traumas experienced far back in American 
history during the period of white ‘settlement’ of Indian lands.  In that period, 
as on September 11th, 2001, American men had been demonstrably unable to 
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protect their domestic spaces, and the white women they contained, from 
savage attacks by dark-skinned aggressors, giving rise to the national torment 
of  in what she terms, drawing on a 1954 novel of the Wild West, ‘the terror 
dream’ (2007:208). Fleeing from unbearable shame resulting from such 
devastating public revelations of inadequacy, Americans of both eras, argues 
Faludi, sought refuge in a collective fantasy of masculine invincibility and 
feminine dependency. “If the myth’s constructions ran afoul of the average 
American woman’s reality”, she writes, “well, defying reality was the point. 
What mattered was restoring the illusion of mythic America where women 
needed men’s protection and men succeeded in providing it. What mattered 
was vanquishing the myth’s dark twin, the humiliating “terror-dream” that 9/11 
had forced to the surface of national consciousness” (2007:118). 
Such was the prevailing ideological climate in the United States at the 
time of Laura Bush’s announcement of the new ‘sister city’ partnerships 
between U.S and Iraqi cities. That such a novel development in U.S. foreign 
policy in the region was introduced to the American public by the President’s 
wife, rather than the President himself, is in keeping with the gendered division 
of labour characteristic of the patriarchal family values demonstrated by Lakoff 
(2002) and Faludi (2007) to have been rating highly in the American 
consciousness during that period. The First Lady’s appropriation of the 
metaphorically feminine ‘sister cities’ movement to further a political agenda 
set by her husband parallels a conceptual shift in the role of the urban-based 
American citizen diplomat. In their unqualified support of U.S-Iraqi ‘sister 
city’ relationships, the heirs of the citizen diplomats of the 1980s - who had 
harnessed the symbolic power of people to people connections as a means of 
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politely protesting their country’s foreign policies (Lofland, 1993) - had ceased 
to protest at all, having transformed themselves in accordance with the 
prevailing national ideological agenda into diplomatic wives.  
In an early “exploratory” analysis of the role of the diplomatic wife, 
Hochschild (1969) draws attention to the functions of the American 
ambassador’s wife as an informal and indirect actor in the service of the U.S. 
state.  As a wife, her interactions with representatives of other countries are 
mediated by her personal relationship to her husband. These can thus be 
understood as taking place within a liminal conceptual space, in which the 
boundaries between public and private are deliberately and permanently 
blurred, allowing covert messages to move easily across individual and 
national scales without any political responsibility being taken for those 
messages. 
 
As an unofficial representative of American foreign policy and American 
people, the ambassador's wife has a full-time position made up of 
responsibilities, restrictions, and privileges which carry over from her 
husband's official position. In this "vicarious role" (a role by virtue of one's 
association with another person's role) she must not only meet, know, and 
entertain a large variety of politically relevant people, she must communicate 
political and social messages to them. Thus, hers is a particular kind of 
vicarious role. It involves being a symbol to others and dealing with the 
symbolic side of other people, for in diplomatic life, public behavior even in 
apparently private places is "diplomatically significant" and carries with it 
messages which have less to do with personal feelings than with the decisions 
of higher state department officials in Washington. Furthermore, the 
ambassador's wife, because she has no official rights and responsibilities, 
tends to specialize in the more purely symbolic aspects of diplomatic life and 
in the communication of political messages through nonofficial channels 
(Hochschild,1969:73) .  
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Hochschild (1969) distinguishes between two kinds of ‘message system’ used 
by diplomatic wives in the furtherance of their husbands’ careers. The ‘political 
message system’ indirectly reminds non-Americans of the position held by the 
U.S. government on specific issues, while the ‘social message system’ sends 
messages about status differences. The diplomatic wife is also a culturally 
astute and a skilled manager of political ‘facework’ (Goffman, 1955) within 
domestic spaces of hospitality, remaining impeccably polite and skilled at 
putting at their ease those guests politically courted by her husband, while 
shutting out others whose governments have fallen into disfavour. By way of 
illustration, Hochschild (1969) relates the following account of a putatively 
‘social’ event given by an ambassador’s wife: “The wife of the Mauritanian 
ambassador gave a tea last Thursday for the diplomatic corps wives”, the wife 
recounted.  “The Red Chinese came - as usual there were three of them - and 
shook hands with me and found the Yugoslav. The Pakistani kissed the Red 
Chinese on the cheek, while the Indonesian, formerly the Chinese' best friend, 
turned her back and sat down with the Swede and the South Vietnamese” 
(1969:73). Clearly, these encounters were not expressions of ‘authentic’ 
friendships arising from personal inclination, but metonymic relationships 
dictated by the foreign policies of the various governments indirectly 
represented by the assembled wives.  
Like those of Hochschild’s (1969) diplomatic wives, the ‘friendships’ 
between visiting Iraqis and their American hosts through sister city type 
projects do not derive from spontaneous affection, or even from the ‘deep 
identification’ attempted by sister city activists such as those operating in El 
Salvador in the 1980s (see Munkres, 2008). As noted by Scandlen (2004), for 
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example, agencies seeking to place Muslim students in American homes have 
to work hard to reassure potential host families that the students “take a written 
test, go through one or two interviews and undergo background screenings” 
before qualifying as guests of American families.  Rather, such relationships 
are expressions of strategic necessity, requiring, as is suggested by the 
Pakistani wife’s kiss, at least a degree of what Hochschild (1979) was later to 
call ‘emotion work’, in the indirect service of the U.S. state. Furthermore, 
through the education campaigns of organisations such as Business for 
Diplomatic Action and the Coalition for Citizen Diplomacy, sister city 
volunteers, like budding diplomatic wives, are taught to refine their skills in 
cross-cultural etiquette and communication so as to convey a positive image of 
America to currently salient international others.  Once established, these skills 
enable the transfer of covert messages as to the legitimacy of the U.S. 
occupation of Iraq and of broader American ideologies - messages which have 
been patently picked up by the youthful Iraqis in the examples given above.  
Theoretical implications  
In this chapter, I have intentionally adopted a more critical stance towards the 
subject material, in order to draw attention to (a) the dominance of a single, 
overarching ‘definition of the situation’ prevailing in U.S.-Iraqi sister city type 
discourses and (b) the discrepancy between that frame and those mobilised by 
opponents of U.S. policy and actions in Iraq. Both are crucial to what I argue is 
a breakdown of the sister model proposed in chapter two of this study, as the 
result of a vulnerability in the ‘concept’ component of the model. This 
vulnerability facilitates a propensity towards unacknowledged or ‘bypassed’ 
(Lewis, 1971) shame on the parts of sister city actors, for whom both national 
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identity (the ‘citizen diplomat’ role) and humanity as a whole (the ‘human 
family’ allegiance) constitute highly salient referents.  When the national 
governments of such actors, or representatives of their nations, are publicly 
accused of wrongdoing, a disjuncture arises between these two aspects of the 
concept component. Becoming aware - however briefly and at whatever level 
of consciousness – of their collective responsibility, the actors themselves feel 
the pain of vicarious shame (see Johns, Schmader and Lickel, 2005). As noted 
by Wouters (1998:12), in a condition of shame, “one’s conscience is at least 
partly in agreement” with critical others. Political shame arises from 
identification with the discredited actions of one’s own government, which 
stands metonymically for the people who elected it to power. In its most 
extreme form, it can transcend the particular scale of the national to take 
universal form, such as the ‘species shame’ – felt “for belonging to a species 
capable of such crimes” -  evoked by reflection on the holocaust (Alexander, 
2007:167).  In political contexts, as Alweiss (2003) explains,  
the most important aspect of shame for our understanding of collective 
responsibility is that it can also express our political and moral expectations. 
When I say that it makes a difference whether a German or a non-German 
constructs a Holocaust memorial in Berlin in the name of humanity, I am 
saying that a German has to recognise the specificity of her responsibility.  
She has to acknowledge that the political world of which she is a part, is 
unjust. A German should thus feel a tension between her moral outlook – the 
aspirations she has for the world at large – and the socio-political situation in 
which she finds herself. I expect her to feel uncomfortable about her German 
identity, because it does not converge with the idea of a common humanity. 
Shame expresses exactly this tension … The internalized other, whose 
judgment we respect at that instant, is not a particular person or institution but 
the ideal of a common humanity which provides the focus for our political and 
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moral expectations. When our expectations of the world and what the world 
expects of us no longer coincide, we feel shame (2003:315).  
The widespread domestic support of U.S. Iraqi sister city relationships can be 
understood, I contend, as a collective manifestation of bypassed political 
shame. Dale (2005:1) reports that “Americans are highly vulnerable when it 
comes to public perceptions in other countries, partly because they like their 
foreign policy to have a moral dimension”. However, in American culture, 
perhaps even more than other Western societies, feelings of shame are 
themselves understood as shameful, and consequently avoided or denied, in an 
effort to maintain the coherence of desired self-evaluations (see Lickel, 
Schmader, Curtis, Scarnier and Ames, 2005). By acknowledging only morally 
and emotionally positive aspects of U.S. interventions in Iraq, Americans can 
continue to support a desired understanding of themselves as quintessentially 
moral actors.  
Conceptually, through a gendered division of ideological labour 
rendered plausible by the cultural conditions described by Lakoff (2002) and 
Faludi (2007), morally problematic aspects of the situation in Iraq can be 
bracketed from awareness as the province of the protective masculine state, left 
free to pursue projects such as Operation Warrior’s Rage (American Forces 
Press Service, 2005), while the feminised sistered city attends to programs with 
titles such as Operation Iraqi Children and Shoes for Orphan Souls.  As with 
the religious vision celebrated by Buckner Orphan Care, American ‘citizen 
diplomats’, through their engagement in sister city activities with select Iraqi 
‘partners’, can see the ideologies of their country’s political administration 
validated in specific humanitarian activities. As consensus objects, the sister 
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city relationships coordinating these programs exist to be ‘pointed or referred 
to’ (Blumer, 1967) as evidence of American goodness, rather than as a medium 
for productive communication across meaningful difference, as would be 
required for a boundary object.  
Returning now to the implications for the sister cites model, the 
particular national metaphor of the citizen diplomat can be seen to have to 
come to dominate or engulf the universal metaphor of the human family within 
the concept component of the model, allowing for only one acceptable 
‘definition of the situation’. The denial or avoidance of alternative perspectives 
on the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq is argued to have conferred 
disparate rewards at different scales of diplomatic engagement in sister city 
activities. For the conservative Bush administration, the urban subjects who 
answered its call to citizen diplomacy can be theoretically understood using 
Marxian terminology as a ‘reserve army’ of ideological labour, ready to be 
mobilised via the emotionally and morally resonant metaphor of sistered cities.  
For the American sister city actors themselves, however, the principal 
advantage of withdrawal into the compliant and vicarious role of ‘diplomatic 
wife’ is, I contend, the avoidance of political shame for their nation’s 
unacknowledged abuse of the human rights of the Iraqi people.  
As of late 2009, it would appear that citizen diplomacy efforts such as 
U.S.-Iraqi sister city relationships have accomplished little by way of stemming 
the tide of global anti-Americanism (see Chiozza, 2009). Freeman (2006), who 
is a former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia, calls attention to the deficiency 
of the ‘misunderstood American’ frame, arguing for a more realistic self-
appraisal of the country’s role in Middle Eastern affairs on the part of the 
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American political public. “We have lost international support”, he asserts, 
“not because foreigners hate our values but because they believe we are 
repudiating them and behaving contrary to them. … We are a far better and 
courageous people than we currently appear. But when we do restore ourselves 
to mental balance, we will, I fear, find that decades are required – it will take 
decades – to rebuild the appeal and influence our post-9/11 psychosis took a 
mere five years to destroy”.  
Regrettably, however, suggestions such as that proffered by Carlin 
(2008) indicate that popular understandings of U.S.-Iraqi sister city 
relationships may be moving even further towards a conceptual abstraction of 
the Iraqi people as homogenised and depersonalised recipients of American 
beneficence. Carlin’s (2008) sister city ‘plan’ is entirely U.S-centric, 
positioning Iraqi cities and their people as passive, apolitical objects in a lottery 
draw, preoccupied with American approval and manifesting a dormant 
potential that can only be awoken through the intervention of blameless and 
loving urban Americans.  
  
Here’s the Plan: At a Mayor’s convention where the Mayors of every city in 
the Country come together, each city of Afghanistan and Iraq is entered into a 
lottery and every city in America adopts a village or city in one of these 
countries. Each American city makes a commitment to partner with their sister 
city to help the people uncover needs and to orchestrate solutions to meet each 
other to discuss specific problems that can be solved. Each city in America 
rallies the resources of that city to bring solutions to the problems that are 
uncovered in their sister city. What we may find is that the Afghanis and 
Iraqis need most is to know that people in America care about them. They 
need to know that we want to reach out to them to love them (2008:18).  
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A final cautionary note for participants in what I have termed ‘consensus 
objects’ is sounded by a case reported by Speckman (2003). After celebrating 
the fact that her home town’s sister city ties were remaining  strong, despite 
international disagreement over the Iraqi war, Jennifer Andelin, chair of the 
West Jordan Sister City foundation recalled a difficult situation which, to her 
mind, had been solved by her skills as a citizen diplomat. “With the war”, 
writes Speckman,  
Andelin has found herself more in the role of diplomat with her Russian 
friends, who e-mail or call and ask what she thinks of America's involvement 
in Iraq. Andelin's 20-year-old daughter, Kimberly, is serving in the military in 
Kuwait, which makes answering questions even more tricky. Russian leaders 
have spoken out against attacking Iraq. Andelin concluded a long answer to 
Votkinsk teacher, Natalia Rebrova, by calling for continued strong ties 
between the two countries. She called for peace, but also for a liberated people 
everywhere and to rid the world of a threat from a country believed to possess 
weapons of mass destruction (Speckman, 2003). 
 
This chapter concludes my analysis of the sister city peace model. In the next 
chapter, I situate the insights of chapters three to six of this study within the 
wider context of culture-based sister city relationships, in which peace building 
can play a role that is less direct and purposive, but nevertheless of value in 
facilitating international communication. 
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Chapter Seven: Alternative directions 
Background 
The principal focus of this study has been the capacity of the sister cities peace 
model - applicable to sister city relationships in which international peace 
building is claimed to be a primary goal - to facilitate constructive 
communication across meaningful difference under conditions of ongoing 
geopolitical conflict. Through an analysis of four particular case studies, points 
of vulnerability have been identified in both the ‘concept’ and ‘structure’ 
components of the model, which, I propose, compromise the capacity of the 
model to deliver on the high expectations invested in it in political, academic 
and popular discourses.   
In this penultimate chapter I change direction, in order to conduct an 
overview of three forms of practice which I propose are currently leading sister 
city enactments away from the goal of international peace building altogether. 
Culture based sister city relationships that are not specifically aimed at peace 
building, and which operate under conditions of less extreme stress than that 
generated by the Middle East conflict, have important implications for this 
study, in that they provide what are probably the most hospitable conditions for 
the creation of boundary objects. Such relationships are enacted when peaceful 
relations already exist between the countries concerned, and take on more of a 
‘peace maintenance’ role. However, as seen in the examples discussed in 
chapters one and two, sister city relationships, like human relationships 
(Giddens, 1993), are fragile and easily undermined. The question directing the 
analysis in this chapter is therefore: how likely are existing cultural sister city 
relationships to foster international understanding and peace, albeit on a more 
modest scale? 
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The first, and least analytically complex of the three practices identified 
is the use of ‘separate spheres and hostile worlds’ (Zelizer, 2005) reasoning in 
strategic commerce-focused sister cities discourses. Temporal and spatial 
metaphors are employed in these discourses, effectively marginalising culture-
focused inter-municipal relationships in favour of those that can be seen to be 
producing quantifiable economic return.  The second is the enactment of 
metonymic wedding ceremonies in sistered cities, in which Chinese couples 
exchange marriage vows in ceremonies officiated by city mayors in their own 
city’s Western partner. The third is an as yet embryonic, but problematic turn 
towards sister city relationships with a national/ist focus in Australia. These 
include the development of urban-rural connections at the expense of 
international partnerships and an increasing preoccupation with the symbolism 
of the two World Wars.  
Metaphors of ‘separate spheres and hostile worlds’ 
As a result of the global economic reforms affecting all levels of government in 
recent decades (see Farazmand, 1994, O’Toole, 2001b, Wallis and Dollery, 
2002), local authorities are under increasing pressure to incorporate an 
economic focus into culture-based sister city relationships. In itself, this trend 
is by no means antithetical to a peace building agenda. On the contrary, as 
suggested in chapter two of this study, urban actors working towards the 
economic development of their own cities may act as productive contributors 
to sister city relationships as boundary objects, facilitating cooperation between 
participants from diverse social worlds at both local and international scales. 
Strong economic ties have also been argued to act independently as a deterrent 
to war between nations, since they harm the economies of assailant nations as 
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well as those of the assailed (Glick and Taylor, 2005). Carlone (2008) notes the 
permeability of symbolic boundaries dividing the cultural and economic 
spheres in actual practices of economic exchange. “Business people speak of 
corporate cultures, product manufacturers engage in identity branding, and 
work, friendships, and play merge at knowledge-intensive companies. The 
‘soft’ sphere of values, ideas and meaning and the ‘hard’ domain of labor, 
wages and profit seem to draw nearer to one another” (2008:158).  However in 
what Zelizer (2005) identifies as ‘separate spheres and hostile worlds’ 
reasoning, personal and economic transactions are commonly held to be not 
only mutually exclusive, but also mutually contaminating and generative of 
social disorder.  
 
An old, influential tradition asserts the existence of separate spheres and 
hostile worlds. In this account, a sharp divide exists between intimate social 
relations and economic transactions. On one side, we discover a sphere of 
sentiment and solidarity; on the other, a sphere of calculation and efficiency. 
Left to itself, goes the doctrine, each works more or less automatically and 
well. But the two spheres remain hostile to each other. … Their mixing, goes 
the theory, contaminates both; invasion of the sentimental world by 
instrumental rationality desiccates that world, while introduction of sentiment 
into rational transactions produces inefficiency, favoritism, cronyism, and 
other forms of corruption. Only markets cleansed of sentiment can generate 
true efficiency (2005:22-24).  
 
Metaphors implying a symbolic contamination of ‘rightfully’ separate domains 
are ubiquitous in discourses asserting the sole legitimacy of instrumental 
rationality in sister city relationships. The principal contaminant suggested by 
such discourses is emotion – often conflated with ‘culture’, which, because of 
its indeterminate nature, “cannot be completely anticipated nor controlled” 
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(Bandelj, 2009:363). Nor can the benefits of emotionally gratifying exchanges 
be quantified, in order to justify to political adversaries, and to an often 
sceptical electorate, the allocation of ‘hard’ currency to their maintenance. 
‘Separate spheres and hostile worlds’ reasoning in sister cities discourses is 
organised primarily around notions of time and space, which operate according 
to different conceptual logics.  
Through temporal metaphors, culture-focused sister city relationships 
are represented as earlier phases in the life course or evolution of cities, or 
relics of a bygone era. Human life course metaphors, for example, portray 
cultural and ‘emotional’ sister city relationships as immature stages of 
international urban development, as seen in one Miami city commissioner’s 
declaration that he was unconvinced that the city was getting value for money, 
and wanted to see it “wean itself of these feel-good programs” (Fooksman, 
2001). At the other end of ‘life’, cultural/emotional sister city relationships are 
framed as dead or dying, with an editorial piece from the Adelaide Advertiser 
(2000) describing a shift to an emphasis on trade in the local sister cities 
program as “breathing new life into old ties” that had previously focused on 
cultural exchange. Evolutionary metaphors have a similar theme, but position 
cultural sister city relationships as a less developed or backward-looking stage 
of the species development of sister cities. Prominent urban sociologist Saskia 
Sassen (2002) invokes this frame when she argues that  
 
(i)f cities were just places for theatres, et cetera, which is great, it would be 
different, but cities actually are crucial places in this global economic system.  
That makes for a certain kind of political possibility …. We are way beyond 
the sister-city programme. There was a time when the internationalism of 
cities was about sister cities which is more symbolic, cultural, which is very 
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fine, very important, today we have objective, binding cities into sort of 
necessary network, multiple necessary networks vis-à-vis some of these 
economic issues.  
 
In the same vein, journalist Jake Batsell (2006) questions whether the sister 
cities program “has become a quaint relic in an era in which global business 
and multiculturalism pervade everyday life”, U.S. sister city official Ed Fisher 
reports that “sister city locations are chosen more strategically now, leaving 
symbolism in the past” (Newman, 2008), Japanese petroleum entrepreneur and 
sister cities delegate Soichiro Oya declares that “(t)he last decade was for 
cultural exchanges. The next decade will be for business” (Honan, 2000) and 
Australian Lord Mayor Lisa Scaffidi announces that she will outlaw sister-city 
‘junkets’ that do not serve business purposes. “I think sister-city relationships 
have their place and have to be respected,” notes Scaffidi, “but there has to be a 
bit of evolution to make the sister cities useful in terms of trade and potential 
business connections” (Mayes, 2007). Of most concern for the peace building 
potential of sister city relationships is the fact that, when commercial 
interaction is understood in terms of evolution, moral and ethical issues are 
bracketed as irrelevant; “only the most appropriate (“fittest”) technologies 
survive and these will be the most advantageous and desirable” (Stahl, 
2008:157-158). 
Spatial metaphors mobilised in ‘separate spheres and hostile worlds’ 
rejections of culture based sister city relationships target their perceived loose 
and unbounded form. While economic relationships are typically represented 
as “hard-nosed” (The Age, 2004) and well defined, enabling “real benefits” to 
be “nailed down” (Batsell, 2006), spatial metaphors code cultural sister city 
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relationships as ‘soft’ and liminal. In the face of public scepticism, McCarten 
(2007), for example, argues that 
 
all the council needs to do is put out some hard financial numbers and other 
benefits that justify these relationships. And if it can't, then scrap the idea of 
sister cities and be done with it. If the council doesn't justify them, these trips 
really do look like junkets for local-body politicians. Given the furore over 
rate rises, it doesn't take much to imagine what their political opponents will 
be saying during the city council elections this October.  
 
In an editorial from the New Zealand Times (2007) a temporal metaphor 
(‘outdated’) is followed by spatially coded references to the intangible 
(‘unbounded’), faded (‘indeterminate colour’) and jaded (‘indeterminate 
appeal’) of sister city relationships in general, which are consequently framed 
by a local mayor as deviant practices, whose very name can contaminate by 
association. 
The very term "sister cities" has a 1980s sound to it. It evokes the goodwill 
and friendship festivals of a Cold War world, the era before globalisation in 
which such relationships might have opened bridges to cultural and economic 
ties. Many would have been surprised this week to learn that not only is 
Auckland City still investing in such intangible associations but is expanding 
its repertoire to include a "strategic alliance" with Hamburg, Germany's 
second city. That Mayor Dick Hubbard objects to one of his councillors 
having likened the Hamburg tie to a sister city relationship perhaps 
underscores the faded, jaded appeal of that programme (Editorial, New 
Zealand Times, 3/3/2007). 
 
In their study of links between north and south healthcare institutions, James, 
Minett and Ollier (2008) note that “government bureaucrats like what they 
know and can manage directly. The twinning process ... is perceived as “warm 
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and fuzzy” therefore many are not particularly interested in it” (2008:74). The 
perils of emotional involvement in fiscal matters are suggested in one 
councillor’s assessment of a ‘backflip’ on the part Douglas Shire Council, 
which, having been ‘carried away by altruistic emotion’ in the aftermath of the 
2005 Asian tsunami, had committed itself to a large annual donation to a 
humanitarian sister city program. “There are times when decisions are made in 
the heat of the moment and there was a warm fuzzy feeling about donating, Cr. 
Egan said. I think it is time to sit back and look at it. This year is a tight budget 
and there are plenty of local community groups looking for donations as well” 
(Port Douglas and Mossman Gazette, 2005). 
 Both spatial and temporal metaphors are invoked in another 
councillor’s statement that “the world had changed since sister city 
relationships first started. It used to be all warm fuzzies, but now there was no 
longer the need to have civic contacts” (Cousins, 2008). Anxiety and hostility 
regarding the indeterminate nature of cultural sister city relationships is 
implicit once again in the concluding comments of Kanelis (1998), who reports 
that 
 
Amarillo has two "sister cities." But this city does next to nothing to promote 
those relationships …   [Mayor Kel Seliger] makes a persuasive case that 
sister city programs crafted between and among cities too often are a waste of 
time and, more importantly, taxpayers' money …"We don't spend any money 
on the program," Seliger said recently in dismissing the notion that Amarillo 
somehow is missing a vital link with the rest of the world. "These sister city 
programs tend to be all fluff and little, if any, substance”. 
 
“What’s problematic about Sister Cities programs” argues yet another 
journalist, “is that when you peer behind the gauzy promise of some soft-edged 
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civic good, it’s hard to see any real benefits for the taxpayers who foot the bill” 
(The Daily Press, 2006).  According to the editor of the Northern Territory 
News (2005), attempts to link the ‘separate spheres’ of economics and emotion 
are themselves ‘shaky’.  “Some aldermen say the Territory benefits from trade 
and tourism because of the program”, writes the editor. “This is a shaky 
argument. Business people do trade deals for profit, not sentiment.” To 
underscore his own scepticism, a Lakeland Economic Development Councillor 
declares that “Sister Cities is a warm and fuzzy thing, not something for 
economic benefit” (Rousos, 2000), while the Mayor of the Central Otago 
District uses the same dismissive metaphor to argue that instrumental economic 
connections can transcend what he sees as the limitations of emotional/cultural 
relationships.  
So what might a sister city relationship with 800,000 people on the Great 
China Plain bring to Central Otago? First, a beachhead into China. If we want 
to sell into that market, then this can be our way in – with their government’s 
support and endorsement, and the security of knowing that if something goes 
wrong, we can pick up the phone and hope to get it put right. In China, almost 
all the real power rests in the mayor’s office. Then there are a wealth of 
educational opportunities – for Chinese students in New Zealand (the biggest 
and best chef’s school in China has just been built in our prospective sister 
city), and for Kiwi students and teachers in China. There are labour supply 
opportunities, and investment opportunities – in both directions. If we endorse 
it, this will not just be a warm and fuzzy, let’s be friends, kind of relationship. 
It can work for us, and it can work for our potential Chinese partners 
(Macpherson, 2008). 
 
Since metaphors are, as noted by Miller (2006), “the very stuff of worlds 
promised or denied”, the use of ‘separate spheres and hostile worlds’ reasoning 
can be seen to deny the crucial exchange of symbolic meaning necessary to 
 256 
sustain a peace building boundary object, promising only a possibility of the 
hard and quantifiable reward of cash in the coffers of the instrumentally 
rational city. Much less overtly  ‘rational’, but still nevertheless geared towards 
economic return, is the second alternative practice identified in current sister 
city relationships,  the metonymic sister city wedding, in which ‘romantic’ 
cities are reflected back to urban subjects as objects of emotional and material 
consumption. 
City symbolism: The spectacle of the metonymic 
wedding 
In March, 2004, the Australian city of Melbourne entered into a sister city 
agreement with the Italian city of Milan. This was a strategic relationship, 
designed to develop economic ties between the fashion industries of both cities 
(Panichi, 2003), but the master frame invoked by both city officials and 
journalists for the signing of the agreement was not commerce but the highly 
personalised and aestheticised trope of romance. The commonly overlooked 
metaphoric slippage between ‘sisters’ and ‘marriage partners’ noted in chapter 
two is manifest in Munro’s (2004) observation that 
 
d)espite engaging in a sisterly association, officials from both cities insisted 
the relationship was romantic. Deputy Mayor Susan Riley revealed it was 
Melbourne who had "courted" Milan to form the association. "Now we are 
ready to fall in love," she said. Cr So acknowledged that the two cities had 
already had a long association and that Melbourne had been influenced by 
Milan's food, fashion, culture and streetscapes. "But it's like any relationship, 
it takes time to build, this is a fruition of a love".  
 
On the following day, an unnamed journalist from The Age described the 
relationship in similar terms.  
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Love was in the air in the Town Hall when the cities of Milan and Melbourne 
agreed to form a new sister city relationship this week. Italian and Australian 
officials waxed passionately about the new bond, abandoning the pretence that 
things were just platonic. "What is going on between Milano and Melbourne 
is a long, how can I say it, love story between two people," declared Italy's 
ambassador to Australia Dino Volpicelli (The Age, 2004).  
 
The media coverage of this event performed two strategic functions in 
establishing interpretive consensus in the framing of this sister city 
relationship. In the first instance, it affirmed the discursive ‘rebranding’ of 
Melbourne as ‘The City of Love’ in the context of sister city relationships. City 
branding is a strategy of place marketing, in which a city presents a self-image 
of high distinctiveness and special appeal, designed to set it apart as unique in 
the minds of potential consumers (Kavaratzis and Ashworth, 2005). It is part of 
a wider trend for mayors and public officials of Western cities to include “not 
just production and growth, but consumption and entertainment in their 
agendas (Clark, 2004:8). Welsch (1997) notes that ‘postmodern’ 
aestheticisation processes designed to delight and attract consumers to urban 
spaces have become a feature of cities around the world.  
 
The urban environment on the whole is being highly polished, embellished 
and beautified. This is called aestheticization. Nothing in our public space – 
no paving-stone, no door-handle, and certainly no public square – has been 
spared this aestheticization-boom. ‘Live more beautifully’ was yesterday’s 
motto. Today it runs ‘live, shop, communicate and sleep more beautifully … 
The aestheticization wave … is breaking everywhere. It has long-since 
conquered and washed over public space. Everything in this space is styled 
through and through. And the beauty which is thus engendered is full of gloss 
… This is the finding from which one must today set out when speaking about 
public space: public space has become hyperaesthetic (Welsch, 1997:118-119) 
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Hage (2003) argues that the contemporary aestheticised city is geared more 
towards attracting wealthy visitors than enriching the lives of emplaced urban 
citizens, and reflects the global dominance of economic growth imperatives 
over obligations of democratic urban governance. People and practices that are 
not considered beautiful accordingly have no ‘business’ rendering themselves 
visible in such cities.  
National and sub-national (such as state or provincial) governments all over 
the world are transformed from being primarily the managers of a national 
society to being the managers of the aesthetics of investment space. Among 
the many questions that guide government policy, one becomes increasingly 
paramount: how are we to make ourselves attractive enough to entice this 
transcendental capital hovering above us to land in our nation? …The global 
aestheticised city is thus made beautiful to attract others rather than to make 
its local occupants feel at home within it. Thus even the government's 
commitment to city space stops being a commitment to society …More so 
than any of its predecessors, the global city has no room for marginals 
(2003:19-20, emphasis in original). 
 
The second function of the media framing of the Melbourne-Milan sister city 
relationship as a ‘love match’ also prioritises the aesthetic, and concerns the 
shaping of popular emotion with regard to that relationship. Through the 
imagery of cities – and, by metonymic implication, their populations -  falling 
in love, potential urban consumers are guided towards understanding 
economically focused  relationships within an aesthetic-emotional frame. 
Campbell (1989:76) contends that the easy capacity of human individuals to 
use their imaginations to evoke satisfyingly intense emotions is an achievement 
of a distinctively modern form of subjectivity, which valorises emotional 
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intensity as an end in itself.  In the cultural transition to modernity, he argues, 
visibly being moved by experiences, even to the point of tears, became a means 
of identifying the person of sensibility, who could experience empathy with 
others and would therefore act benevolently towards them (1989:140). 
As a later development in this same process, romantic love became 
historically embedded as a cultural value in Western society, and its continued 
salience underlies the success of the superficial romantic gloss seen in much 
consumer advertising.  Illouz (1997) explains the benefits for positive identity 
maintenance of understanding consumption processes as romantic experiences. 
Romance-themed products and experiences, she argues, enable a subjective 
transcendence of less appealing aspects of commercial activity, such as status 
competition. “(S)ymbolic meanings enhance the ritualistic, no-utilitarian, and 
emotionally intense character of romance, thereby defusing the perception that 
one is involved in an act of consumption. The deeper the objective hold of the 
market on the romantic experience, the more ritualized and therefore more 
subjectively remote from the market this experience becomes” (1997:137).   
Two years after the inauguration of the Melbourne-Milan sister city 
agreement, the public focus of Melbourne’s ‘love’ had shifted to its Chinese 
sister city of Tianjin. In this instance, the romantic attachment of the urban 
‘lovers’ had progressed to its ultimate fruition, the metonymic ‘wedding’ of the 
cities through a public ceremony involving participants from both partners.  On 
the 19th of November, 2006, seventy-one couples from the Tianjin took part in 
a collective ‘wedding’ ceremony in Melbourne’s Federation Square. This was a 
symbolic spectacle rather than an actual marriage contract, since the couples 
had already been married in civil ceremonies in China. Each couple had paid 
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approximately $4000 to participate in the event, which was broadcast to 900 
million Chinese viewers by Tianjin television. Also included the package, 
termed the ‘romance tour’, was a shopping expedition (Kelly, 2006). After 
alighting from water taxis, each couple, attired in Western-style white gowns 
and dark suits, walked down an aisle prepared for the purpose in Melbourne’s 
Federation Square.  A wedding march was played by the Chinese Music 
Ensemble, whilst assembled onlookers sprinkled the couples with fresh rose 
petals donated, as the result of a public appeal, by the people of Melbourne.  As 
one local newspaper reported,  
 
(b)efore saying their vows, the brides and grooms bowed three times in 
Chinese custom – once facing east in recognition of their parents, again to 
Melbourne Lord mayor John So and Tianjin Vice Mayor Madam Zhang, and 
then to each other. Cr So and Madam Zhang acted as witnesses. Melbourne 
City councillor David Wilson read the vows. Cr. So declared Melbourne the 
city of love. “Today we celebrate the most beautiful cultural exchange 
undertaken by the people of these two cities,” he said (Herald Sun, 2006).  
 
Three levels of metaphoric representation can be seen to be in operation in this 
description: the ‘wedding’ of the couples stands for a marriage of love between 
the cities of Melbourne and Tianjin, the exchange of wedding vows stands for 
the exchange of cultural meaning popularly expected of sistered cities, and the 
city officials – particularly Madam Zhang and the Australian ‘celebrity mayor’ 
(Kelly, 2006) John So - stand for the absent ‘heads of family’ of the couples on 
display.  
Something of an oddity for twenty first century Western audiences, 
mass weddings are a common feature of non-Western kinship practices, 
enabling poor couples to take part in a government-funded, culturally 
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appropriate ceremony of commitment that would otherwise be beyond their 
means. The spirit of collective joy they engender (Jad, 2009) can also provide 
national and local politicians with an opportunity to invest romantic spectacles 
with political significance, ranging in intensity from the affirmation of national 
strength and resilience through politically charged group nuptials in Iraqi, 
Israeli and Palestinian towns (see Hawley, 2002, Kraft, 2006 and RiaNovisti, 
2009, respectively) to the kind of publicity photo opportunity described in the 
following press release.  
 
The sun was setting. The sky was clear, Soft wind was blowing from the sea. 
It was a most romantic moment and a place to say "I do" for 160 couples who 
participated in a mass wedding officiated by [the] Alaminos City Mayor … 
Among their witnesses were Sorsogon Rep. Francis Escudero, a senatorial 
candidate and Vice Gov. Oscar Lambino. Elsewhere on the same day in 
Lucena City, at least 294 couples, the eldest in their 70s, were married in a 
mass wedding ceremony, which later became another campaign occasion for 
election candidates. Politicians of all stripes made a beeline to greet the 
newlyweds, with some posing for pictures with every couple. (Philippine 
Daily Inquirer, February 17, 2007). 
 
The promotion of group wedding practices by economically beleaguered 
Western cities as a means of income generation could suggest a tenuous 
correspondence between the neoliberal imperative of governmental cost-saving 
and the need for human couples wanting a spectacular wedding to reduce the 
financial costs of such luxuries. However frugality was unlikely to have been 
on the minds of the Chinese couples who were to be ‘married’ in Tianjin’s 
sister city of Melbourne. Not only had each couple paid a considerable sum to 
be part of the spectacle, but the formal confirmation of their marriage contracts 
had been attended to well in advance of their departure. A more plausible 
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motivation is found with reference to the collective modernisation of Chinese 
cultural traditions, made possible by that country’s emergence as a major force 
in the world economy. Citing Davis (2000), Gillette (2000:81) notes that 
“marketization and privatization have opened up a new space for Chinese 
citizens to express their personal taste, ideals and values”.  As material 
signifiers of cultural meaning, Western style wedding clothes have played an 
important role in this process. In China,  
 
the introduction of “Western style wedding gowns and other consumer goods 
associated with weddings allowed young women and their families to define 
and present themselves publicly. The gowns evoked images of the West, 
cosmopolitanness, development, and to some extent wife – and motherhood. 
By choosing to wear these gowns, young women and their family members 
and friends who encouraged and collaborated in such consumption, associated 
themselves with these ideas (Gillette, 2000:81).  
 
Group weddings are not entirely absent from the Western urban 
tradition, but operate exclusively as vehicles for expressive consumption. In the 
mid 1960s, for example, a group of Brooklyn businessmen, in conjunction with 
the city Parks Department, announced that Brooklyn would hold a   
 
group wedding of unusual scale and beauty. The wedding festival seeks to 
revive the old Brooklyn tradition of marriage ceremonies held in Prospect 
Park at the turn of the century. Various Brooklyn stores have promised 
flowers, wedding gowns and assorted gifts for the bridal couples, and a 
gigantic wedding cake will be created for the event.  In keeping with the spirit 
of love being celebrated, the community will be invited to come bearing 
flowers, rice, and food for the wedding feast.  Couples who were wed in the 
park are also sought to share in the festivities as guests of honor.  Only the 
first 50 couples who write to CUPID c/o Department of Parks … may 
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participate in the Prospect Park Wedding (City of New York Department of 
Parks, 1967). 
 
The involvement of city stores in the preparation of the forthcoming event, 
together with the public request for potential ‘guests’ to augment their good 
will with  specific wedding-themed commodities, points to the overt and 
officially sanctioned appropriation of private sentiment by the growing  
wedding industry -  a commercial force to be reckoned with in the twentieth 
century Western city. As noted by Boden (2003), the wedding industry 
mobilises a powerful rhetoric of romance in order to arouse previously unfelt 
desires in potential consumers.  
Rather than a private commitment, the sister city wedding ritual as 
public spectacle resembles mass-mediated ‘celebrity weddings’ performed by 
stars of the entertainment industry and by members of royal families.  For local 
onlookers and bystanders, the Melbourne-Tianjin sister city wedding offered a 
chance to vicariously consume a ‘romantic utopia’ (Illouz, 1997) of 
aestheticised love, rendered visible through product-mediated ritual and 
emotional expression. For the Melbourne city officials present at the sister city 
wedding, however, the significance of the public ceremony was more likely to 
be located in the commercial return it portended for their own municipality 
than its expressive framing as a romantic event. As well as the local sales it had 
generated, the film of the occasion was set to broadcast a highly positive image 
of the city to the millions of Chinese viewers who would, as a consequence, be 
encouraged to visit, and perhaps even court and marry in, the City of Love. As 
allegories of urban partnerships in the twenty first century, but in a form more 
akin to advertising than classical literary tradition, metonymic weddings allow 
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direct expression of a competitive commercial message that would otherwise 
not fit well within the sister cities imagery of romance and expressive 
commitment. Combining cognitive and emotional ‘message types’ and  
nostalgic and bizarre appeal, and evoking responses of both attention and 
empathy in potential consumers, (Stern, 1990)9, they offer an ideal vehicle for 
marketing the aestheticised twenty first century city within the global symbolic 
economy.  
Public weddings do not, however, need to be conducted en masse to 
achieve these goals.  Perhaps the most successful of such ventures in terms of 
its extensively publicised and multifaceted rewards for participants was a sister 
city ‘wedding’ that took place in the New Zealand city of Hastings in 
September, 2008, between a single Chinese couple, Chen Yanyan (also known 
as Caroline) and Gan Dan (also known as Daniel), from the Longsheng District 
of Guilin.  Caroline and Daniel had won the wedding as the first prize in the 
cultural component of a promotional competition called ‘Ultimate Challenge’, 
in which couples from Guilin who were planning to marry in 2008 had 
answered questionnaires and taken part in interviews, in response to an 
advertisement placed in the Guilin Daily.  The project was subsequently judged 
to be the best cultural project of the year at the annual Sister Cities Conference 
in Hamilton, New Zealand (Hastings City Council, 2009). The submission 
presented at that conference provides detailed information about the goals, 
development and outcome of the event. Its purpose had been both strategic, on 
the sense of bringing a range of economic benefits to Hastings, and expressive. 
                                                 
9 Stern (1990) provides an innovative study of the alignment of classical literary allegory and 
modern advertising, the implications of which suggest interesting possibilities for further 
research into the promotion of sister cities via metaphor and metonymy. Unfortunately 
however, a comprehensive account of Stern’s argument is beyond the scope of the present 
study.  
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In the city of Hastings, it reads, “it allowed our people to learn and share in the 
love story of a young couple from Guilin, culminating in their “dream” 
wedding in Hastings” (Sister Cities New Zealand, 2008:2).  
The expressive value of the event for the Chinese couple and their New 
Zealand hosts is emphasised throughout the submission. When Caroline and 
Daniel were informed of their win, the submission reports, “(b)ig hugs, 
excitement, tears flowed as the realisation that their “impossible dream” could 
now become a beautiful reality” (2008:3).  The dress worn by the bride, which 
“would capture all those elements a bride dreams of on her wedding day” was 
designed and made in, and donated by, the municipality of Hastings, thereby 
positioning the city within the gift economies of kinship (Zelizer, 2005) and of 
friendship (Leeds-Hurwitz, 2002:79)  symbolised by hand-made wedding 
gowns in private weddings. During the ceremony itself, fictive kinship is 
formally and emotionally affirmed, as 
 
a pure and majestic voice floats across the pagoda lake singing Pokarekare 
Ana, New Zealands’ most famous, internationally recognised love song. The 
setting, the voice, the emotion as cultures come together sharing their most 
precious gifts in the name of love and goodwill is a poignant moment. 
Emotions cannot hold back the tears that are flowing freely when it is 
announced that [the singer,] Erina is the granddaughter of … the writer of this 
most loved song … Magnificent flowers, magnificent setting, magnificent 
music, candles, vestments, and cameras to catch the moments. This couple are 
so far away from their families on this day, yet the warmth and love of the 
people surrounding them would have left Caroline and Daniel in no doubt that 
they were now welcomed members of a far bigger, “international family” 
(2008:6-7). 
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In the retrospective framing of this metonymic wedding by its organisers, the 
event was an unqualified success -  not only for the obvious pleasure it had 
brought to participants, and the publicity it had generated for the municipality 
and Hastings businesses, but for the contribution it was argued to have made to 
building world peace. Despite the liberal promotion of Hastings businesses 
throughout the submission, the wedding is identified primarily as a cultural 
project. “On reflection”, they concluded,  
 
we believe the project delivered on all … objectives, in some cases, even 
exceeding what we had dreamed of … This project has reinforced our 
confidence in the value of community based Sister Cities projects. The 
international opportunities they create for people to people contact, cultural 
understanding and the bringing together of a new generation of people who 
through friendships and understanding across the globe daily, help make our 
world a safer place to live” (2008:1). 
 
As vehicles of aestheticised communication, sister city ‘weddings’ can clearly 
bring positive returns to urban citizens and governments in terms of lifestyle 
enhancement and economic development.  However their focus on expressive, 
commercialised ritual does not allow for the length or depth of interaction 
across difference necessary to sustain a boundary object. Furthermore, they 
divert attention away from more challenging, political forms of participation 
(Lofland, 1993) aimed at building peaceful relationships across less 
aesthetically attractive manifestations of difference.  
From national to nationalist sister city discourses 
The final example of alternative directions in sister city practices is the most 
troubling for its implications for international peace building. Although much 
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less common than international linkages, sister city relationships can also be 
formed between cities in the same country. Both economic and cultural factors 
are driving a developing Australian phenomenon noted by the Mayor of 
Leichhardt in chapter five of this study, namely the Local Government 
Association’s encouragement of Australian municipalities to form sister city 
linkages within their own subnational spaces, rather than with international 
cities.  While the stated aim of this suggestion is to address the disparity 
between the resources and capacities of urban and rural municipalities, 
discourses about such partnerships also mobilise culturally specific signifiers 
of moral meaning, in particular that of the Australian ‘battler’. The concept of 
the battler symbolises cherished Australian national values of courage, 
egalitarianism and ‘mateship’.  It carries a particular meaning in the Australian 
vernacular, of a “person with few natural advantages, who works doggedly and 
with little reward, who struggles for a livelihood (and who displays courage in 
so doing)” (Australian National Dictionary Centre, 2008). Living and working 
in drought and flood prone rural areas of Australia, non-urban populations are 
common exemplars of the term in popular discourses. In May, 2007, the Local 
Government Association of New South Wales made a public announcement 
that the Minister for Local Government, Paul Lynch, had 
 
urged city-based local councils to reach out and establish sister cities with 
rural and regional councils. Mr Lynch said a number of councils were actively 
pursuing sister city ties, going as far as staff exchanges and sharing IT 
services. "These sister cities are a great way to break down the barriers 
between the city and the bush," he said. "More significantly, city councils can 
play a very useful role in assisting rural and regional councils with planning 
and engineering work …Sister city relationships between city and country 
councils can also open economic opportunities for regional and rural 
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councils’. He said international sister cities that were merely junkets for 
councillors were unfair on ratepayers …Mr Lynch praised other councils that 
have established sister cities within New South Wales (Local Government 
Association of NSW, 2007). 
 
One Victorian council that responded to the call, albeit in an unofficial 
capacity, was that of the inner-Eastern Melbourne municipality of Boroondara.  
In an article entitled City offers country battlers a helping hand, Bolling (2008) 
describes the mobilising of fictive kinship ties between the residents of a 
‘leafy’ – hence water-rich – urban municipality and their ‘cousins’ living in an 
arid inland area of the state, mediated through their respective local authorities. 
 
Victoria’s leafiest council has adopted one of the state's driest areas as an 
unofficial sister city, teaming with community groups to support drought-
ravaged Moira Shire residents. Boroondara Council, along with eight Rotary 
clubs, has opened its doors to the struggling northern Victorian council, 
offering fundraising and friendship. The Boroondara Cares program grew 
from residents who wanted to help battling country cousins. The program 
includes support for Moira produce, fundraising events, and exchange 
programs to give kids and families a break in Melbourne (2008:19). 
 
The New South Wales minister’s reference to international junkets points to a 
moral dimension of the recommended shift towards cheaper travel to same-
state municipal partners. Rural Australian sistered cities and towns are 
consistently framed in such discourses as more worthy of assistance than their 
international counterparts. When scrutinised against the patent needs of country 
areas experiencing ‘tough times’, overseas travel by councillors funded through 
rates paid by battling farmers can seem like “a kick in the teeth” to local 
populations, especially when the destination – such a medieval German town 
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with “not one sheep within its walls” - is understood to be irrelevant to the 
realities of country life (Sikora, 2007). Within subnational states framed as 
domestic spaces, city councils are said to be ‘ignoring their backyards’ and 
‘insulting’ their ratepayers through their appropriation of public funds to 
address international issues (Saleh, 2007). Grennan (2008) frames a turning 
away from the terminology of ‘sister cities’ as evidence of an improved moral 
direction for local councils, exemplified by Australian city-to-country 
partnerships. 
 
Like many remote shires with a very limited revenue base Central Darling 
struggles to find the resources to service its far-flung community. And like 
many urban councils Ryde is not exactly flush with resources but wants to 
develop ties with its Australian bush heritage. They are two of about 20 NSW 
councils which have formed a new type of "sister city" relationship, one 
between city and country rather than with an exotic overseas destination 
offering the occasional junket for mayors and councillors. There's even a 
politically correct term for these new, more altruistic relationships: "strategic 
partnership alliances" (2008:31). 
 
Similarly, in his article Modest sister cities doing it for ourselves, Lewis (2007) 
frames mateship-driven urban-rural partnerships as deeper and more morally 
worthy than what he sees as status-driven international partnerships. As an 
added bonus, these incur little or no backlash from local voters, who 
understand the relationships as part of a more authentically emplaced system of 
social obligations. 
 
There was a time when the must-have status symbol for Sydney councils was 
a sister city in the US, Japan or Europe … But with encouragement from the 
State Government, relationships are increasingly being built with bush 
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councils instead. A trip to West Wyalong may not be as glamorous as one to 
Paris, but it does not spark ratepayer fury. And some of the new relationships 
go deeper than the traditional sporting and cultural exchanges. On the rain-
soaked North Shore yesterday, the mayor of drought-parched Bland Shire in 
western NSW sealed his council's new relationship with Ku-ring-gai Council 
…Cr Malicki said there had been a lot of talk at last year's Local Government 
Association annual conference about the drought, and Ku-ring-gai had always 
received great help from country people when it had been affected by 
bushfires and storms. "I always wanted to pay back the favour," she said. "I 
said to the mayor [of Bland], we can't bring rain but we can bring mateship." 
 
Such discursive constructions of partnerships between urban and rural 
municipalities indicate a categorical rejection of the international peace 
building model of peace building, and, as a consequence, of the international 
boundary object function that they could potentially serve.  Nevertheless, the 
goodwill and reciprocity they mobilise carries a potential for enhancing 
communication across difference within nations, especially between indigenous 
and non-indigenous populations, as suggested by Mayor Allen in chapter five.  
In this respect, they may complement, rather than undermine, more traditional 
forms of sister city relations. However the inauguration of what an unnamed 
reporter for the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) frames as a 
“unique sister city arrangement” between two Australian municipalities 
suggests that a step further along the path of social exclusion of particular 
international others may be about to be taken. 
 
The Lachlan Shire Council has officially been taken under the wing of a 
western Sydney council. A special ceremony was held in Condobolin last 
night. The Mayors of Lachlan and Penrith signed the friendship agreement 
watched over by Local Government Minister Kerry Hickey as guests broke 
into an impromptu rendition of We Are Australian.  The unique sister city 
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arrangement will see the councils facilitate exchanges between schools, sports 
clubs, arts groups and their own employees. The Mayor of Penrith, John 
Thain, says the deal meant his city was already better understanding of the 
complex issues of rural areas and the values they are built on. The Mayors of 
Orange, Narromine, Forbes, Cobar, Weddin and Carathool were among more 
than 200 guests to hear Mr Hickey say he would be pushing for similar deals 
among more of the state's councils (ABC, 2006, emphasis in original). 
 
The title of the song chosen - seemingly spontaneously - to express the 
collective emotion of the assembled guests that night in Condobolin 
foreshadows the emergence of a potentially problematic aspect of this 
development in Australian sister city discourses:  the combined mobilisation of 
national and sister city symbolism around ideologies of nationalism. As can be 
seen in the essentialist logic demonstrated by American journalist Logan 
Jenkins (2004, below), the entailments of kinship metaphors with respect to 
national space, and particularly those that invoke blood connections, can lead 
to a parochial reduction of scope in the identification of ‘worthy’ sister city 
partners. The outcome is an agenda less concerned with peace building than 
with ‘consumer nationalism’ (Wang, 2005) -  a preference for the aesthetic 
consumption of cultural difference through sister cities within the space of the 
nation. Lamenting the fact that “not one of San Diego's sisters lives in the 
United States”, Jenkins writes that 
 
I confess I was shocked at what a huge sorority San Diego has assembled over 
the years. To my mind, Tijuana is the only one of the bevy that makes 
practical sense. San Diego and Tijuana … share history and geography, the 
DNA of civic existence … San Diego's Horton is also the father of 
Hortonville, the child to which he gave his name. Now, it can be argued that 
San Diego and Hortonville are worlds apart.  For example, 97 percent of the 
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residents of Hortonville are white non-Hispanics. Diversity appears to be a 
foreign concept.  Still, a case can be made that Hortonville should be adopted 
as San Diego's "little sister," if you will. After all, the two cities spring from 
the loins of the same father, which is more than can be said of the others in the 
globe-trotting sorority.  In honor of their prolific father, two blood relations, 
worlds apart in every way, should embrace each other like the sisters they are 
(Jenkins, 2004).  
 
Jenkins’ article may be at least partly tongue-in-cheek, but it is significant for 
its overt illustration of the perils of understanding inter-municipal relations in 
terms of blood ties.  Even more potent than the image of consanguinal kinship, 
however, is that of blood shed in the defence of home and hearth. In the 
context of Australian sister cities, nationalist discourses draw on the revered 
Anzac (Australian and New Zealand Army Corps) Day commemorations of  
the blood sacrifice of Australian and New Zealand youth in the First World 
War. Slade (2003) summarises the historical significance of this tradition as 
follows.  
 
At dawn on April 25, 1915, Australian soldiers went into battle against Turks 
at Gallipoli. New Zealanders followed them at around 9:15 am on the same 
day. About eight months later, during the night of December 19, 1915, the 
combined force withdrew from the peninsula by boarding ships. … These 
summary facts point to a military defeat for the Australian and New Zealand 
Army Corps (ANZAC) and the rest of the allied force involved, yet the 
debacle gave rise to the legend of the army, the introduction of some new 
words into the English language, and a belief that the people from the two 
countries were different from those originating from the United Kingdom. 
However, probably the greatest significance of Gallipoli for Australians and 
New Zealanders is that it marks and represents the psychological birthplace of 
both countries as nations (2003:779-780). 
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As British journalist Bridget Kendall (2010) remarks, the intensity of 
Australian attachment to the Anzac tradition can be difficult for non-
Australians to comprehend. Slade (2003) also comments that “(t)here can be 
few, if any, other places and instances in the world where a battle site marks 
the birth of a nation, thousands of kilometres away from it, and fighting which 
represents an ostensible defeat” (2003:780).  Light is shed on this apparent 
puzzle by the observations of Australian historian Marilyn Lake (2010). In a 
public discussion broadcast as part of the 2010 Melbourne International Arts 
Festival, Lake explained the cultural resonance of the events at Gallipoli by 
identifying the Anzac hero as the central figure in Australia’s ‘creation story’. 
While other countries’ independence days constitute their ‘national day’, she 
argued, Australia is not yet independent, so looks to a historical war for a 
symbol of its ‘coming of age’. As a consequence, the ‘blooding’ of young 
Australian men at Gallipoli has been elevated into Australia’s national legend, 
symbolising the young country’s loss of its colonial status. Crucially, argues 
Lake (2010), the fact that the Australian force was defeated in that battle is of 
little significance. Rather, what is celebrated is “the mettle of the men 
themselves; their loyalty, mateship and courage”.  
The symbolism of blood imagery in Anzac themed sister city discourses 
renders more concrete and literal the hitherto metaphorical allusion to battle in 
the notion of the Australian ‘battler’.  In July, 2008, an unnamed writer for the 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) reported on the efforts of a 
Victorian local official to mobilise an ‘ethnic ties’ variant of the traditional 
sister cities model, in order to recognise the historical bond that had been 
created between Australia and Turkey through the experience of Gallipoli.  
 274 
Both sides had shed blood in the same time and place, but the Turks had been 
the enemies of the fallen troops, and directly responsible for their demise. 
However the respect that the Turks had demonstrated for the courage of dead 
Australian soldiers, and the compassion they had expressed for their families10, 
marked Australians and Turks as moral ‘comrades in arms’ (see Slade, 2003). 
This was the basis of a sister city proposal, over ninety years later, presented to 
the Turkish authorities.  
 
A Mildura Rural City councillor is pushing for the city to forge a sister city 
relationship with a city in Turkey. Cr Knight, who has recently returned from 
a Turkish study tour, says a quarter of Mildura's non-Australian born 
population comes from Turkey. He says it is also the basis for one of 
Australia's most important national days, Anzac Day. "As soon as we and our 
delegation were identified as Australians the immediate response was 'you are 
an Anzac' and you were almost embraced," he said."[It is a] community on the 
other side of the world who almost regard us as blood brothers" (ABC, 2008).  
 
In the same month, Mark Day of the Australian newspaper reported that the 
Western Australian city of Albany was about to enter into a sister city 
agreement with the French town of Peronne on the basis of historical wartime 
connections. The Anzac connection is again invoked in Day’s account, as is the 
metaphor of kinship through blood shed in battle, but in this case, the 
Australian soldiers are unambiguously identified as victors.  
 
Ninety years ago next month, Australian soldiers … liberated the French 
market town of Peronne. Today, the people of Peronne are saying thank you 
by establishing a sister-city relationship with the West Australian city of 
                                                 
10 Brown (2008) also notes that “the Anzac site … is Turkish land and ultimately it is due to 
the good grace of the Turkish Government that Anzac Day [ceremonial commemoration] 
continues on site”. 
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Albany. It is a relationship rich in Anzac history. Albany was the first stop for 
thousands of Australian troops destined to fight in Gallipoli and the Western 
front of France … Albany was also the site of the first Anzac dawn service, 
now a tradition around the world. In a speech welcoming the 750 tour 
participants, Peronne Mayor Valerie Kumm said … ``We consider Australians 
as our brothers. The memory of the price which Australian soldiers paid for 
our freedom is still vivid here'' … Following discussions with local MP Matt 
Benson and council officers, Ms Kumm last week wrote to her Albany 
counterpart, Mayor Milton Evans, inviting him and a delegation from 
Australia to Peronne's Armistice Day 90th anniversary commemorations in 
November, when the relationship is expected to be formally signed. “This is a 
relationship built on blood'', Mr Benson said (Day, 2008:7). 
 
The trope of blood connection is one of the most significant conceptual frames 
connecting individual subjects with ‘imagined national communities’ 
(Anderson, 1983).  Blood symbolism links what is universally recognisable – 
the experience of embodiment – with the more selective awareness of 
belonging to a nation. Via rituals of remembrance such as Anzac Day services, 
the symbolism of the spilt blood of national heroes and fallen soldiers travels 
across time to ennoble present populations (see James, 2006:179).  The 
incorporation of nationalist, blood-themed Anzac ceremonies into sister city 
relationships enables consanguinal and fictive forms of kinship ties to combine, 
adding strength and verisimilitude to the cultural/historical matrix supporting 
this ‘invented tradition’ (Hobsbawm, 2003:1). 
 
(T)he ‘blood’ of consanguinal ties is always already a cultural category that 
only comes to social life in and through other modalities of integration. … 
[One] form, defined primarily in terms of temporality, involves ritual 
relations of connection, for example, as extended kinship rituals through 
marriage or adoption – the kith side of ‘kith and kin’. These rituals serve 
initially to place and then continually to reconfirm the ongoing presence of the 
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persons in simultaneous time across generational separation. [Another] can be 
understood in terms of a particular way of knowing, that is, through perceptual 
relations … In intersection with consanguinal relations, the notion of 
perceptual relations allows us to understand what the anthropologists call 
‘fictive kinship’, - consanguineous relations that are not based on actual blood 
ties but nevertheless involve an enacting of the perception that the blood-like 
ties do exist and are binding (James, 2006:84-85, emphasis in original).  
 
Of particular significance for the present study are the observations of 
Australian novelist Kate Grenville, who throws light upon a ‘shadow’ 
dimension of the Anzac legend; namely the role it plays in masking the 
collective shame felt by Australians for their country’s treatment of indigenous 
populations in the distant past11. In a manifestation of what Lewis (1971) 
would recognise as unacknowledged, or bypassed shame, and which I have 
identified specifically in the context of U.S-Iraqi sister city discourses as 
‘political shame’, Grenville argues that the Gallipoli legend serves as a positive 
mirror image of Australia’s discreditable past.  “Gallipoli is like the public face 
of our history”, she explains, “and it’s actually a very neat parallel with the 
hidden, shameful history of our country. In 1788, a boatload of mainly British 
people was sent, at the behest of the British government, to invade a foreign 
country, which is precisely the Gallipoli image. So in a way, it’s like we’re 
prepared to celebrate the sort of shadow of the real history. We’re not quite yet 
up to saying, let’s have a look at the stuff that happened in 1788”.  
A major risk posed by the use of sister city relationships to merge 
themes of embodied and fictive kinship based on spilt blood is that it can 
revive, or perpetuate in the collective memory, hostility towards former 
                                                 
11 This argument is equally if not more pertinent to the present. In recent times, Australia has 
been condemned by the United Nations for its treatment of its indigenous populations (see 
Sharp and Arup, 2009). 
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wartime enemies who, unlike the Turks, have not been publicly redeemed and 
emotionally reclassified as kin. An obvious candidate to be singled out in the 
context of Australian history is Japan, which, through its bombing of the 
Northern Territory capital of Darwin in 1942, became the only foreign 
adversary to mount an attack on Australian soil. Two stories from the Northern 
Territory News illustrate the framing of the Japanese as a morally problematic 
‘other’ to the Australians and Chinese, who are linked both as fictive sisters 
and as wartime victims of the Japanese. 
 
Five Darwin council delegates will visit China as part of a $45,000 plan to 
commemorate a group of Territory prisoners of war. The delegation will visit 
Darwin's sister city Haikou on Hainan Island, off the southern Chinese coast. 
Darwin Lord Mayor Peter Adamson will lead the delegation to unveil a 
memorial plaque to the soldiers of Gull Force …In October 1942 the Japanese 
took 263 captured Gull Force soldiers to Hainan Island. In two-and-a-half 
years, 81 had died from malnutrition, overwork or beatings. Of the survivors, 
only eight are alive. It is planned the plaque in China will be unveiled on 
Anzac Day - April 25 (The Northern Territory News, March 2003) 
 
Four months later, reminders of the harsh wartime treatment of Australians at 
the hands of the Japanese were again brought to the public’s attention, with the 
same newspaper reporting that 
 
Australian prisoners of war will be recognised for their suffering at the hands 
of the Japanese during World War II. A ceremony to honour the PoWs will be 
held at the Cenotaph in Darwin's Bicentennial Park on Saturday at 4.30pm. 
Darwin and its sister city in China, Haikou, will lay duplicate plaques in 
memory of the Australian men and women taken prisoner by the Japanese. 
Lord Mayor Peter Adamson and former prisoner of war Athol ``Tom'' Pledger 
will dedicate the memorial (The Northern Territory News, July 2003). 
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This event represents just a single instance of two countries ‘teaming 
up’ against a former wartime adversary in the context of sister city 
relationships, but it becomes more disturbing when considered in the light of 
other expressions of anti-Japanese sentiment in sister city discourses. In 1997, 
a proposal to establish the ‘Canberra-Nara Peace Park’ to commemorate 
Canberra's sister city relationship with the Japanese city of Nara was strongly 
opposed by the local branch of the Returned and Services League, on the 
grounds of reprehensible Japanese conduct during World War Two. As noted 
in chapter one, the founding of that sister city relationship is attributed to a 
priest and former Japanese prisoner-of-war who had since worked to promote 
reconciliation between the Australian and Japanese people (Ochi, 2001, 
Northern Rivers Echo, 2003). Given this historical context, objections to the 
use of the term ‘peace’ in the naming of the park are particularly worrisome in 
their implications. Also interesting, in the light of the ‘sister city weddings’ 
trend detailed above, is the consequence of the dispute for a local international 
wedding venue.  
 
Peace parks in other countries in the region have met with opposition, but 
many within and outside the ACT saw this proposal as particularly 
inappropriate in the nation's capital. The national president of the Returned 
and Services League of Australia (RSL) was concerned about "something so 
offensive to so many Australians [being] placed in such an important national 
precinct, launched so close to Anzac Day and without consultation" … The 
word "peace" became the focus of the dispute. This contentious word was 
dropped in April after the Commonwealth threatened to refuse to gazette 
approval of the park. This allowed the project to go ahead, but a casualty of 
the dispute was a chapel to be built in the park for hosting Japanese overseas 
weddings, which did not proceed (Hughes, 1997:380). 
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 More recently, Australian cities have been called upon to take their Japanese 
partners to task over their country’s hunting of whales. In 2005, the Federal 
Minister for the Environment and Heritage, Ian Campbell, urged the mayors of 
all Australian local authorities with a sister city in Japan to write to their 
Japanese counterparts conveying their disapproval of whaling (Department of 
the Environment and Heritage, 2005). Having received no response from its 
sister city Tanabe to its expressions of concern, however, and noting the 
intention of the Japanese government “to escalate its 2007/08 kill by targeting 
whales such as Wyong Shire’s sponsored Norah, the majestic and endangered 
humpback”, the Wyong council voted to annul the relationship, so as to 
“recognise and respect its residents’ and ratepayers’ outrage on this issue”. The 
minutes of the meeting also record the council’s decision to redirect ratepayer 
funds that had supported the sister city relationship into local roads and 
footpath programs (Wyong Shire Council, 2007).  
Whales have a particular symbolic resonance in the imaginaries of 
many, but not all, cultures. For the Inuit, present-day whaling provides a 
symbolic link to their spiritual and cultural heritage (Freeman, 1998:29).  In 
most Western cultures, whales became key symbols of environmental risk in 
the early 1970s, achieving also a spiritual status through the seeming resistance 
of their species to unambiguous classification (Einarsson, 1993).  
 
In the whale mythology of contemporary environmental discourse, whales 
straddle the Cartesian divide between animals and humans … The moral 
consequences of humanizing whales is great as it transforms them from being 
potential natural resources into a very different category of animals … Within 
this axiom there is no possibility of allowing the hunting of whales (1993:78) . 
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The whale, together with the other highly symbolic cetacean, the dolphin, is 
often understood to be motivated towards moral behaviour through being 
endowed with human values, as is seen stories of dolphins rescuing drowning 
swimmers (Einarsson, 1993:79).  It is this attribution in particular that renders 
the killing of whales and dolphins repugnant to many Western sensibilities, and 
the perpetrators of such acts contaminating to the domestic spaces of the more 
morally worthy.  Oquist (2005), for example, records Australian Greens 
Senator Bob Brown’s call on the national government to ban whaling ships 
from ports such as Hobart in his home state of Tasmania.  For Senator Brown, 
the very idea that whalers could obtain sustenance therein constituted symbolic 
pollution of the city. "It will run a shudder down Tasmanian spines” his 
statement reads, “to think that these whale killers are being replenished in 
Hobart". 
Two years later, following shocking images of dolphin hunting 
publicised in the documentary film The Cove (Pepper, 2009), the New South 
Wales council of Warringah contacted its Japanese sister city of Chichibu, 
requesting the city’s cooperation in bringing an immediate end to the 
“massacre” of dolphins in nearby Taiji (ABC News, 2009). A few weeks 
beforehand, the council of the Northern Territory pearling town of Broome had 
voted to suspend its sister city relationship with Taiji, a decision welcomed by 
environmentalist groups and by the Federal Minister for the Environment, 
Senator Campbell (Taylor, 2009). Several unintended consequences for some 
human inhabitants of Broome, however, cast a shadow over this putatively 
moral endeavour. The ABC News of August 27th reported that “councillors of 
Japanese heritage” had been “bombarded with hate mail” over the issue, and 
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that pictures of dolphins had been hung over graves in the local Japanese 
cemetery. On hearing of these developments, Senator Campbell, who had 
“personally urged the shire to abandon its connections with Taiji” (Taylor, 
2009) declared himself to be “absolutely peeved that there’s a certain element 
in this town who are, in my opinion, inciting racist activities” (ABC News, 
2009).  
Theoretical implications 
Taken in conjunction with the previous chapters, the evidence from this chapter 
suggests that the sister city movement as a peace building entity is in 
something of a crisis, and that, as far as a peace agenda is concerned, there may 
be no such stable category as a ‘safe sister’ for local authorities. The 
implications of this situation for local government endorsement and support of 
sister city peace projects are considered in the following chapter. 
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Chapter Eight: Discussion and conclusions 
Ambiguity and ambivalence in sister city relationships  
The data examined in this study speak to a longing for a more peaceful and 
interconnected world on the parts of sister city peace actors, but indicate that 
sister city relationships have a limited and possibly declining capacity to serve 
as a vehicle for achieving that goal. Sister city discourses raise the hopes and 
expectations of Americans and Australians that they can personally contribute 
to building world peace through structured collaborations between citizen 
groups and local governments. In practice, however, the peace building 
potential of such relationships is undermined by pervasive ambiguity and 
uncertainty as to their meaning and practice. When those meanings and 
practices are rendered visible by means of the analytical model I have 
provided, they are seen to generate instability, conflict or denial, which cause 
the model to fail under conditions of contextual stress.  In the case of the 
relationships that formed the principal focus of this study, the catalyst for that 
stress was the ongoing conflict in the Middle East. The processes through 
which the model failed can be summed up as follows. 
Sister city relationships are socially constructed objects that are brought 
into existence by the ways in which human actors think about and act towards 
them (Hewitt, 2003). Public discussions about particular proposals and 
relationships constitute discursive spaces in which the construction of formally 
institutionalised sister city partnerships is either enabled or prevented, via 
political lobbying, public gatherings, formal hearings and media 
representations. Responding to the risk event of the Middle East conflict, 
stakeholders, including national governments, local authorities and citizen 
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groups, converged within these spaces in order to send messages to each other 
about the sister city projects connected with that event. Sometimes these 
messages identified an external risk that the sister city relationship or proposal 
would alleviate, as in the case of peace actors who saw them as tools for 
reducing conflict and bloodshed in other parts of the world, and national 
governments seeking to ward off attacks on their legitimacy. Alternatively, 
they identified proposed sister city relationships as risks in themselves, in the 
form of threats to public order or symbolic pollutants of urban spaces, 
governments and citizens. Subsequently accepted or rejected sister city peace 
relationships involving Iraqi or Palestinian cities can thus be understood as 
purposive public achievements, through which individual and collective 
semantic distinctions, or symbolic boundaries, were translated into social 
boundaries, or structural inclusion or exclusion, at local, national and 
international scales.  
Establishing productive communication across significant political and 
cultural difference is essential for building peace under the conditions of 
ongoing hostility that continue to endanger the future of the human race. As 
noted in a publication of the  United Nations (2006:3), “(t)he need to build 
bridges between societies, to promote dialogue and understanding and to forge 
the collective political will to address the world’s imbalances has never been 
greater”. The ideal conceptual facilitator for this process has been identified in 
this study as the boundary object, whereby actors from different social worlds, 
who have diverse understandings of their joint endeavour, nevertheless work 
compatibly through their common orientation towards the object in question. In 
the process, all participants are exposed to, and become accustomed to, 
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disparate, but equally legitimate, perspectives. As elaborated in chapter two, a 
boundary object has two essential attributes: it is flexible enough to be 
adaptable within the wider meaning systems of diverse social worlds, but 
sufficiently robust to retain a stable core meaning across all of those worlds 
(Star and Griesemer, 1989).  
 Popular, scholarly and institutional sister city discourses stress the 
capacity of the sister cities movement for fostering constructive understanding 
across political, cultural and geographical difference, thereby suggesting that 
these relationships can serve a boundary object function. Under conditions of 
stress, however, the model structuring sister city peace focused relationships is 
found to possess only one of the necessary conditions of a boundary object. It 
exhibits a high level of semantic plasticity, allowing for a remarkably wide 
range of interpretations, but is insufficiently robust, retaining no core meaning 
across social worlds that can serve as a common referent when definitions of 
its proper application are disputed.  
As will be recalled from chapter two, the sister cities model comprises a 
combination of ‘concept’ and ‘structure’ components. These, in turn, are 
composed of two parts, respectively the human family/citizen diplomat 
metaphoric blend and the local authority/citizen group dyad. Each of these 
components is vulnerable in a different way to pressures generated by 
contextual ambiguity. Under unchallenging conditions, the model is kept stable 
by an internal balance within its component parts. As attempts are sought to 
resolve high levels of ambiguity under conditions of risk, however, one part of 
each component comes to dominate or engulf the other, and this loss of 
stability weakens the model as a whole.   
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When a sister city relationship is proposed or established under stressful 
conditions, the model breaks down in each of its component parts and becomes 
incapable of forming a boundary object. Instead, two different kinds of objects 
are produced. Within the ‘structure’ component, a risk object is generated, in 
that particular proposals are understood by local authorities to be hazardous to 
social order. The agency of the citizen group proposing the relationship is 
engulfed by that of the local authority, and the proposal is consequently ejected 
from council agendas. As a result, no officially sanctioned communicative 
space for cooperation across meaningful difference is set up at the local level. 
This was the outcome of the Olympia-Rafah and Leichhardt-Hebron case 
studies examined in chapters three and five. Within the ‘concept’ component, a 
consensus object is produced.  Consensus objects mimic boundary objects by 
creating an impression that communication across meaningful difference is 
being achieved, but in practice they only allow the legitimacy of one 
‘definition of the situation’. In consensus objects, participants’ allegiance 
towards the universal construct (the human family) is engulfed by their 
allegiance to the particular construct (the nation state). This process has been 
illustrated through the case study of U.S-Iraqi sister city relationships in 
chapter six. 
The Marrickville Bethlehem sister city relationship is a theoretical 
anomaly in this study, which can be explained by the uneven placement of 
stress on the sister cities model. In debates concerning this relationship, the 
contextual ambiguities, and hence the pressure on the model, were less severe, 
having been defused by an absence of contestation at the local scale. These 
conditions shaped the production of a more moderate, ‘resisted’ (Hilgarner, 
 
Consensus object                   Boundary object                                     Risk object  
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1992) form of risk object, which retained the essential quality of agency on the 
international scale.  The positions of these sister city projects on the ‘object 
continuum’ introduced in chapter two are seen in Figure 6, below. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Position of Middle East focused sister city peace 
projects on the object continuum 
 
In applications of boundary objects, the focus of diverse interacting 
others is on action. Participants with different understandings of what a 
particular sister city relationship is for and about ‘get behind’ the relationship 
and push it forward, being exposed in the process to alternative, yet valid, 
interpretive frameworks.  In the risk and consensus objects that were generated 
when the sister city model was placed under external pressures, the focus of 
sister city initiatives is seen to have shifted from action to perception – 
specifically, the perception of threatening risk. In risk objects, the sister city 
proposal is constructed as a source of risk, which, being held by local 
authorities to be of an unacceptable level, is ejected from councils’ agendas. In 
the case of a consensus object, the sister city relationship is mobilised as a tool 
for managing risk, which is regulated via sister city type relationships that 
affirm the risk manager’s perspective to the exclusion of all others. Either way, 
preoccupation with risk leads to the avoidance, denial or rejection of 
oppositional and threatening world views, effectively blocking the 
establishment of boundary objects that could facilitate sufficiently meaningful 
communicative interaction. The moderate, ‘resisted’ risk object, as exemplified 
 
Consensus object                      Boundary object                                     Risk object  
(U.S./Iraqi)      U.S./Iraqi                                                                                             Olympia and
                                     Marrickville        Leichhardt                                   
                                                                                                                                                                        
              
Marrickville                                    
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by the Marrickville-Bethlehem sister city relationship, is more ambiguous, in 
that it retains agency, but remains a site of contestation with regard to its status 
as a cause of or solution to negative risk. Questions of political power at local 
and national scales will inevitably determine the trajectory of this significant 
example of inter-municipal peace building at the international scale. 
Naming the problem 
The first step towards addressing what I have argued in the previous chapter 
may be a current crisis in sister city peace relationships has now been taken, in 
that the problem limiting the capacity of these relationships to serve as vehicles 
for global peace building has been named as ambiguity. Based on my own 
experience researching this thesis, I suspect that the ambiguity that pervades 
sister city discourses also accounts for the paucity of prior research into sister 
city relationships in general.  The proposals and relationships that I have 
classified as consensus or risk objects were formed within social and structural 
contexts that were replete with ambiguity in multiple dimensions: the greater 
the ambiguity, the greater the stress, and the greater the likelihood that the 
hoped-for boundary object would fail. As Martin and Meyerson (1986) 
observe, ambiguity cannot be neatly classified as a negative or positive 
condition, since it can stimulate innovation as well as cause behavioural 
paralysis. Ambiguity with regard to organisational goals can aid in recruiting a 
wide range of support, as Lofland (1993) found in his study of consensus 
movements, but can cause frustration when the accomplishments of particular 
projects need to be evaluated (Sharkansky, 1999:54). In politically ambiguous 
contexts, “participants do not know exactly where they stand. There are no 
fixed boundaries or guidelines to behaviour that can be described as legitimate, 
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reasonable or acceptable. At the very least, ambiguity produces the stress of not 
knowing one’s own limits or those of one’s adversaries” (Sharkansky, 
1999:60).  
The necessary balance, I have contended, can be found by applying Star 
and Griesemer’s (1989) concept of the boundary object. Some measure of 
ambiguity is indispensible for a boundary object, since it allows the semantic 
flexibility necessary for the transference of the object across domains. As noted 
by Martin and Meyerson (1986:23), “when innovation is the objective, people 
may be more willing to accept ambiguity”, and keep working together 
regardless of interpretive disjuncture. However ambiguity overwhelms and 
undermines human creativity when it cannot be contained, so the plasticity of 
the object must be limited by a stable core meaning. Without this essential 
feature, stakeholders are unsure as to the limits of sister city peace 
relationships, or of their own capacities and obligations in relation to them. As 
a result, they tend to expect either too much or too little from the relationships, 
and to consider their own interpretations to be the only valid recipes for action.  
In the case of the sister city proposals and relationships discussed in this 
thesis, highly ambiguous contextual conditions placed additional insupportable 
stresses on an already ambiguous and unstable model. The first of these was 
the ambiguity present in urban life in general. As noted in the introduction to 
this thesis, cities are inherently ambiguous entities, a condition attributed to 
classical sociological scholars to processes of modernisation.  
 
Urban life is both the outcome and symbol of modernity and is indicative of 
the ambiguity of modernity itself. Thus, Durkheim, Marx and Weber … all 
regarded urbanization with ambivalence. Durkheim hoped that urban life 
would be a space for creativity, progress and a new moral order while fearing 
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it would be the site of moral decay and anomie. For Weber, urban life was the 
cradle of modern industrial democracy whilst also engendering instrumental 
reason and the ‘iron cage’ of bureaucratic organization. Marx viewed the city 
as a sign of progress and the great leap of productivity which capitalism 
brought about while also observing that urban life was a site of poverty, 
indifference and squalor (Barker 2004:204),. 
 
Compounding what may be termed the ‘regular’ ambiguities of urban life are 
specific conditions of uncertainty with respect to the sister city proposals 
discussed in this study. Taking first the example of the risk objects, ambiguities 
can be seen to inhere in understandings of (a) each of the cities involved and 
their governments, (b) the nature of sister city relationships in general,  
(c) council and citizen obligations towards sister city relationships, and (d) 
boundaries between political and cultural activities within the relationships 
under discussion.  In the case of the Olympia-Rafah proposal, the setting itself 
was also a source of ambiguity (Buttny and Cohen, 2006).  
Ambiguity in the ‘risk objects’ 
Efforts to foster constructive communication with those who have very 
different and, from some perspectives, threatening worldviews will usually 
attract resistance from some quarter within the socio-politically diverse late 
modern city. In the case of Palestinian proposals, boundary ambiguity between 
anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism and between Hamas the proscribed terrorist 
organisation and Hamas the stabilising local authority further complicated the 
process of resolution. For Vic Alhadeff of the New South Wales Jewish Board 
of Deputies, and for many Jewish opponents of the Olympia proposal, support 
for the state of Israel was an essential component of their Jewish identity. For 
these social actors, the boundary separating anti Zionism and anti-Semitism 
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was highly permeable12, and in protecting the interests of the Israeli state they 
were protecting their own ontological security and that of the groups they 
represented. In the light of Bauman’s (1995) insights into the link between the 
holocaust and Jewish statelessness quoted in chapter one of this study, this 
cannot be considered an irrational perspective, independently of its merits on 
other dimensions. For Jewish supporters of the Olympia relationship, and for 
Gael from the Inner West Chavurah13, however, there was no automatic 
connection between the two, and a critical stance on Israeli foreign policy was 
as pertinent and necessary as it was for that of any other macro-political power.  
Also highly salient for Jewish opponents of the proposals was the 
widespread proscription of Hamas as a terrorist organisation in the Western 
world, although the exact application of that proscription varies between 
national and supranational governments and organisations.14 For supporters of 
the Olympia proposal, the status of Hamas was not a relevant aspect of their 
campaign, since Fatah, not Hamas, had won the 2006 elections in Rafah, but 
their efforts to communicate this distinction fell largely on deaf ears. For 
Jennifer, who represented the Friends of Bethlehem in our interview, the 
distinction between what she described as the political and military wings of 
Hamas was clear and also unproblematic, since she considered engagement 
with all dissenting political groups to be an imperative for peace building, 
regardless of acts of violence committed by those groups.  
                                                 
12 See Zunes (1998) for an account of the discomfort felt by Middle East peace activists over 
this issue.  
13 While her political orientation towards the Israeli state differed from that articulated by Vic 
Alhadeff, Gael also expressed serious concerns as to the permeable boundary separating anti-
Zionism and anti-Semitism (see chapter five).  
14A  ‘List of proscribed terrorist organisations’ in the West is available at  
http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/%28153683DB7E984D23214BD871B2A
C75E8%29~Attachment+A+-+AG_s.PDF/$file/Attachment+A+-+AG_s.PDF 
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Also dissonant from the perspectives of councils were proponents’ and 
opponents’ understandings of the proper role of local authorities within their 
own cities. In the view of many proponents, local councils were required to 
demonstrate courage in leading their cities towards participation in a global 
society, while for opponents, the legitimate scope and orientation of council 
was local and conservative. For the majority of councillors and some 
opponents in Olympia, as well as for the mayor of Leichhardt, citizen groups 
had an obligation to arrive at consensus before requesting council endorsement 
of sister city relationships. However in the views of proponents and the two 
councillors who voted in favour of the Rafah proposal, as well as for the 
Friends of Hebron peace group, it was incumbent upon council to overrule 
misguided local dissent in the higher interest of global peace building.  
Culture and politics are ambiguous concepts and the boundary between 
them is unclear (Martin and Meyerson, 1986).  Both, in addition, can carry 
both positive and negative valence. For most opponents of the Palestinian 
proposals, the term ‘political’ had disturbing connotations, but it was 
considered enabling by supporters. Proponents also drew less rigid distinctions 
between the cultural and the political, while opponents tended to see them as 
separate. As a result, the opposing councillors of Olympia, echoing those 
quoted by Maier (1987) in chapter one of this study, sought the security of 
drawing a clear line between the two.  For the residents of Olympia, the context 
within which they debated the issue was also ambiguous, since public hearings 
are popularly understood as contradictory spaces, both enabling and 
constraining effective democratic participation (Buttny and Cohen, 2006).   
 292 
Required to make an unambiguous decision within this context of high 
semantic and normative confusion, city councils understandably reject locally 
contested proposals. Sister city relationships are, after all, an optional extra for 
councils; in the terminology of the mayor of Leichhardt, they are ‘the icing on 
the cake’. Two entailments follow from Mayor Allen’s chosen metaphor: A 
cake that already tastes good does not need to be iced, although icing might 
make it taste a little better. Ideally, if enough resources are available to make 
icing an option, this is the action that will be taken. If, however, the icing is 
known to contain a contaminant, its addition will compromise the soundness 
and appeal of the cake as a whole, and it would be foolish and irresponsible for 
the baker to take that course.  In the case of locally controversial sister city 
relationships, the contaminant is the negative risk they are seen to pose to the 
reputations of local authorities and to the stability of the cities they have been 
charged to govern.  
Rendering a negative outcome for such proposals even more inevitable 
are the low consequences for councils of deciding against them.  As clearly 
indicated by the councillors at the Olympia hearing, for example, the good 
work of the ORSCP could and would continue without council approval, and a 
perusal of that peace group’s current activities via an internet search engine 
reveals that that was exactly what occurred. Ultimately, however, the greatest 
source of reassurance for local councillors as risk managers is that they can fall 
back on legal definitions of their proper priorities, as exemplified in Mayor 
Allen’s comment in chapter four, that “the essence is that the pothole is our 
primary responsibility, legislatively it is”.  
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In the case of the Marrickville-Bethlehem relationship, the level of 
contextual ambiguity was considerably reduced by an absence of dissent at the 
local scale, resulting in a much less debilitating amount of pressure on the 
sister cities model. The Marrickville sister city initiative had been far from 
unproblematic outside its own local government area, attracting strong 
opposition from the Australian Federal Government, which was concerned 
about the risks it posed to the boundaries of its sovereignty, and from Vic 
Alhadeff on behalf of the New South Wales Jewish Board of Deputies, whose 
views were widely disseminated through the mainstream press. Inside the 
communicative space of the Marrickville local government area, however, 
‘definitions of the situation’ were comparatively stable and coherent. No 
boundary object was therefore required to facilitate cooperation between the 
local authority and citizen groups, but the success of this proposal suggests that 
it carries the potential to develop into a boundary object at international and 
global scales. Local consensus can be seen to have been paramount in ensuring 
the success of this proposal, affording it sufficient strength to withstand the 
resistance of powerful non-local forces, but it does not constitute a consensus 
object, since it was produced spontaneously within the city as an outcome of 
collaboration within the local authority/citizen group dyad.  
Like the ORSCP and its supporters in Olympia and the Friends of 
Hebron in Leichhardt, Councillor Iskandar and Friends of Bethlehem 
representative Jennifer understood their sister city endeavour to be a standard 
and unproblematic application of the sister cities peace building model.  Cr. 
Iskandar’s responses demonstrate the resonance of the sister cities ideal within 
his personal and professional moral worldview, with respect to both 
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components of the sister cities model. Within the concept component, the 
human family metaphor expressed his deep desire for a resolution of the 
Middle East conflict in a way that would benefit the entire global community, 
while the citizen diplomat metaphor gave voice to his commitment to act as an 
international ambassador for Australia’s multicultural values. In his estimation, 
all of Marrickville’s sister city relationships represented opportunities to 
attenuate the risk amplification role played by the media in reporting peace 
issues in general, and to reduce the risks posed by misunderstanding and 
suspicion across cultural and political divisions.  Within the ‘structure’ 
component of the model, his high level of community involvement and 
personal consultations with representatives of interest groups in his 
constituency had reassured him that council’s pursuit of a sister city 
relationship with Bethlehem was a low risk endeavour, since it was endorsed 
by both elements of the citizen group/local authority dyad. Jennifer’s responses 
were consistent with Cr. Iskandar’s framing of the Bethlehem sister city 
project. To her mind, media representations of the relationship as inherently 
perilous were unsupported by logical reasoning, the objective evidence, or the 
principal tenet of peace building, namely that constructive communication with 
confronting and possibly disliked others15 is essential for overcoming 
peacelessness.  
The focus of concern for the single dissenter within the council, Mayor 
Dimitrios Thanos, was the sister cities model as it was enacted within his own 
municipality, and his opposition to the Bethlehem project was moderated 
accordingly.  For Mayor Thanos, there was a clear discrepancy between the 
                                                 
15 See Hess (2000) on productive interaction with disliked others as a regular and mundane 
requirement of modern societies.  
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promises suggested in discourses of sister city relationships in general, and 
what they actually delivered in practice. The local sister cities program was a 
source of negative risk for Marrickville council, in his opinion, on two 
dimensions.  Neither of these compromised the validity of the Bethlehem peace 
initiative, which he supported in principle. In the first instance, its diversion of 
very limited municipal funds from much-needed local service delivery to 
international travel for councillors undermined the ethical integrity of council 
as a local authority. In the second, it attracted reputational risk to council as a 
violator of international civic hospitality norms, since Marrickville was 
demonstrably unable to match the luxury standard of treatment that had been 
extended by sister city partners on their home territory. In an ideal world, 
however, in which councils received a level of funding sufficient to address all 
of the legitimate expectations of stakeholders, he would have endorsed formal 
council approval of a sister city relationship with Bethlehem, since it reflected  
the international peace building ethos of local residents.   
Because of the high level of risk it was understood to pose by powerful 
non-local opponents such as the Australian Federal government, the 
mainstream press and the Jewish Board of Deputies, the Marrickville-
Bethlehem relationship became emplaced, but as the particular kind of risk 
object identified by Hilgartner (1992) as ‘resistant to control’. Unlike the 
‘constructed’ risk objects of Leichhardt and Olympia, this sister city risk object 
retained the crucial quality of agency, affording it the capacity to move towards 
serving a boundary object function at the international scale.  
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Ambiguity in the ‘consensus objects’ 
A high level of ambiguity was also present in the U.S.-Iraqi sister city 
relationships that I have identified as ‘consensus objects’, but it was 
differentially located, being generative of the projects rather than a defining 
feature of their practice.  Like constructed risk objects, such as those that arose 
in Olympia and Leichhardt, consensus objects keep communication across 
challenging levels of difference - a crucial component of peace building - off 
the agenda of local councils. In the examples of the U.S-Iraqi sister city type 
relationships discussed in chapter six, there were no ambiguous and conflicting 
perspectives on the relationships to manage, since dissent had been screened 
out of the process from its inception. These relationships had been strategically 
produced as a tool for managing a negative risk; specifically, the reputational 
risk posed to the U.S. government and its citizens by the global negative 
reaction to its invasion of Iraq. As noted in chapter two, consensus objects are 
pseudo boundary objects, in that they deliver an erroneous impression that 
significant cultural and political difference is being transcended through their 
practice. For those who set up or rally around consensus objects, the 
management of reputational risk to the nation is paramount. Distressing 
ambiguity is central to this endeavour only in that it provides the catalyst for 
action. 
       Consensus objects are produced when the sister cities peace model is 
appropriated by the state, and by those who seek to preserve its interests, in 
order to resolve cognitive and emotional dissonance at national and 
international scales. In the U.S-Iraqi sister city peace relationships discussed in 
chapter six, American citizen diplomats understood their government to be 
reducing the risk of perpetual peacelessness in Iraq, but in the view of most 
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international members of the ‘human family’, their government was a source of 
risk to the peace process.  Underscoring the cognitive and emotional work 
necessary to address shameful or embarrassing episodes in national histories, 
Rivera (2008:613) poses the question “How does a country publicly come to 
terms with reputation-damaging events on an international stage?” In response, 
she argues that 
  
public acknowledgment of reputation-damaging events is likely not to occur 
… (C)ountries are likely to pursue a strategy of covering, rather than 
commemoration, when there are significant rewards for dissociation, 
concealment can be achieved “believably”, the event is recent, and there are 
no strong “agents of memory” other than the state to implement alternative 
visions of the past (2008:631).  
 
In the case of the US-Iraqi consensus objects, the stigma under management 
was in the present, and it became incumbent on the state to mobilise and 
stabilise - via a process of ‘institutionalisation of public purpose’ (Krotz, 
2007:406) - the marginalisation of alternative visions of its current policy. 
Social practices become powerful to the extent that they are able to reproduce 
the intersubjective meanings through which both social actors and social 
structures are constituted (Hopf, 1998:178).  The objective truth of such 
meanings is not necessarily at issue, since “the hidden central issue in world 
risk society is how to feign control over the uncontrollable – in politics … and 
in everyday life” (Beck, 2002:41, emphasis added).  As Zerubavel (2002) 
observes, the psychological benefits to stakeholders of blocking unpleasant and 
difficult information from awareness increase the likelihood that the status quo 
will be preserved. Citizens who are strongly motivated to believe in the 
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righteousness of their political institutions are inclined to bracket disconfirming 
information in order to preserve an uncritical trust in governments that, on the 
basis of their policies and actions, do not deserve to be trusted (Scheff, 
2005:376). This is not simply a matter of projection, since those experiences 
that are permitted to reach the conscious awareness of individuals provide 
external support for their attributions (2005:377). By presenting Americans 
with a pre-packaged variant of a trusted national-based peace building model, 
the U.S. government was able to strengthen domestic support for its foreign 
policies in Iraq by bringing local civic engagement into line with those 
policies. The exercise also appears to have been psychologically and 
emotionally gratifying for citizen volunteers, who understood themselves to be 
acting congruently as both members of the human family and diplomatic 
ambassadors for their country. 
For much of the rest of the world, however, the U.S. government, and, 
by extension, the citizens who had elected it to power, were in breach of their 
moral obligations to the human family and their status within that family was 
consequently called into question. The internalisation of the critical perspective 
of a global scale ‘generalised other’ (Mead, 1922, cited in Gillespie, 2005) 
produced painful feelings of ambiguity and ‘political shame’ (Alweiss, 2003, 
Murphy, 2004) in the minds of the American public. Two resolutions to this 
discomfort were possible: Americans could either demonstrate attunement 
(Scheff, 2005) with challenging alternative perspectives by engaging in critical 
self-reflection, or ‘bypass’ the shame through repeatedly and uncritically re-
asserting their own original perspective.  The evidence from this study 
indicates that the latter path was chosen, and travelled by means of engaging in 
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cognitively and emotionally distractive sister city activities oriented towards 
discursively homogenised Iraqi cities.   
As consensus objects, U.S-Iraqi sister city relationships provided both 
local politicians and citizen volunteers with an institutional enabling structure, 
by means of which they could avoid confronting political shame for the 
disastrous consequences of U.S. foreign policy in Iraq, even within their own 
minds.  This phenomenon has been identified by Lewis (1971) as ‘bypassed 
shame’. For Americans involved in U.S-Iraqi sister city type relationships, 
positive stories and images of the U.S. occupation, together with carefully 
regulated interactions with Iraqis who had been previously classified as 
unlikely to challenge the U.S. or its citizens on any significant dimension, 
served to confirm their belief that their activities were helping to resolve the 
conflict. Negative outcomes of the U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq 
had become the ‘elephant in the room’, of which everyone was aware, but 
which no-one who wanted to retain membership in the ‘primary reference 
group’ of American patriots was normatively permitted to acknowledge (see 
Zerubavel, 2002:23). 
Lacking the semantic strength to withstand dissonance within its 
constituent mobilising metaphors, the concept component of the sister cities 
peace model collapsed, with engulfment of the imperatives of the universal 
‘human family’ metaphor by those of the particular ‘citizen diplomat’ 
metaphor. The consequent restitution of their positive subjective experience of 
American identity afforded tangible rewards for the sister city peace actors 
involved, but in a fragile form that constantly needed to be reinforced by 
affirmations of essential American goodness. In terms of political practice, the 
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willing and enthusiastic compliance of sister city actors with the Bush 
administration’s framing of the causes of anti-Americanism allowed no avenue 
for receiving the strong corrective message being sent by the rest of the world – 
that it was not American values that were being condemned, but American 
actions as expressions of U.S. foreign policy. By ignoring this vital signal, 
American sister city peace actors were unwittingly perpetuating the very 
peacelessness that they were striving to correct.  
Ideally, as asserted by Gawerc (2006:459), “people-to-people initiatives 
and dialogue would occur alongside political movement and structural 
change”. As illustrated in Figure 7 (below), however, in enactments of 
consensus objects, political dissent within the sister cities movement moves 
further back along the continuum of productive political engagement suggested 
by Lofland (1993), together with a corresponding shift in the dominant 
emotional motif he identifies in 1980s sister city peace actors. In place of the 
joy of spontaneous altruism that characterised ‘polite protestors’ involved in 
consensus movements, consensus object actors exhibit the uneasy and 
ambivalent emotional gratifications of  an ever-vigilant and anxious 
conformity. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Position of consensus objects in relation to social 
and consensus movements. 
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(no political 
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Peaceful cities and belligerent states 
The data and analysis from this study also reveal implications for 
understanding ambiguities in the relationship between cities and states in the 
late modern world. As discussed in chapter one, academic discourses 
commonly theorise the rise of the city as a global actor in terms of deficits 
exhibited by nation states. In this interpretation, cities perform a vacuum-filling 
rather than a strategic role, and are normatively cast in essentialist terms as 
innovative and pacifist alternatives to obsolete, inherently belligerent nation 
states. The sister city relationships examined in chapters three to seven, 
however, reveal a more ambiguous and ambivalent relationship between cities 
and states in American and Australian contexts, located within a high level of 
ambiguity and ambivalence in the very notion of ‘the city’.  
For the contemporary urban subject, cities, and, by extension, 
relationships between cities, serve as salient cognitive resources for making 
sense of and addressing wider social processes. They are clearly ‘good to think 
with’16, in the anthropological sense posited by Lèvi- Strauss (1963). 
Metaphorical representations of cities as expressive actors capable of ‘falling in 
love’ and other forms of romantic or sympathetic identification demonstrate 
that they are also ‘good to feel with’. A disjuncture is uncovered between 
theory and practice, however, when attempts are made to ‘think and feel 
beyond the nation’ (Cheah and Robbins, 1998) via formalised sister city 
relationships. In such concrete instances, the symbolic and structural 
organisation of the late modern Western city can be seen to undermine rather 
than support a more inclusive, ‘cosmopolitan’ consciousness.  Under 
                                                 
16 Although Lèvi-Strauss’ original phrase “bonnes à penser” is widely translated literally as 
“good to think”, this expression does not work well in English. The correct English language 
adaptation “good to think with” captures the meaning intended by Lèvi-Strauss (Leach, 1970).  
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conditions of ongoing geopolitical conflict, the nation state is shown to be an 
enduring primary referent constraining sister city relationships as a mode of 
local-to-global civic engagement. This finding is in direct opposition to 
optimistic predictions of a cohesive new order based on human solidarity and 
to notions of the nation state as an enfeebled irrelevance in a borderless, 
globalised world.  Although its specific focus has been sister city relationships, 
this thesis has thus made a grounded contribution to the wider debate and 
academic literature concerning the role of cities in processes of globalisation. 
Municipal partnerships operating as consensus objects cast doubt on 
Honig’s (1997:131) claim that sister city relationships may “interrupt projects 
of (re)nationalisation” and on Galtung’s (2000) contention that “cities do not 
act as depositories of national traumas and myths, which can foster a 
pathological sense of special status and unique destiny”. As suggested by the 
U.S-Iraqi sister city discourses examined in chapter six, harnessing the sister 
city model in order to produce consensus objects allows the transfer of just 
such ideologies from the state to the city, and thence to collective and 
individual consciousness. Such processes do not bode well for visions of a 
global peace culture through sister city relationships. An ideological transition 
from ‘national’ to ‘nationalist’ orientations, together with a transfer of 
“national traumas and myths” from the national to the urban scale can also be 
seen in the data on Australian Anzac themed sister city relationships in chapter 
seven. Here, the focus of the relationships shifts from future peace to past wars, 
resurrecting fading enmities in the process. When combined with assertions of 
a more ‘civilised’ national sensibility, as seen in the debate over the hunting of 
whales and dolphins, they can result in a targeting of particular nationalities for 
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exclusion from the sister city sorority, and perhaps even from the human 
family. In the post-war period, the Japanese government strongly embraced the 
healing potential of sister city relationships, despite the appalling devastation 
wrought on its home territory, and continues to be among the strongest 
supporters of the movement. If this nation can be marginalised from the 
‘human family’ on the basis of past and present misdemeanours, the question 
arises as to whether any nation at all can be consistently held to be worthy of 
the sister city ideal.  
Another source of conceptual indeterminacy is the ‘Eisenhower story’ 
invoked in Australian as well as American sister city discourses. The entreaty 
of a serving U.S. president for ‘ordinary’ citizens to “get together and … leap 
governments - if necessary to evade governments” (Eisenhower, 1956) in order 
to build cross-cultural peace implies a global rather than a national agenda, and 
distances people to people programs from the taint of nationalist propaganda 
(Endy, 2004:146).   What is obscured in this faming, however, is the reality 
that the governments to be ‘leapt’ and ‘evaded’ are not meant to include those 
of the Western peace actors themselves. In democratic societies, both urban 
and national governments are elected by the people, but sister city discourses 
frame national governments as separate, independent entities, which can be 
‘helped’, but not confronted or opposed. The consequences of  dissent are 
evident in the extensive restrictions and even harassment (see Venceremos 
Brigade, n/d) experienced by Cuban sister city peace actors over the past three 
decades in the United States, and in the opposition of the Australian 
government to Palestinian focused sister city peace relationships within its 
borders.  
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Generating further ambiguity are indirect forms of communication 
between the national governments of the United States and Australia and the 
urban authorities that formally approve, and direct the activities of, sister city 
relationships. As illustrated by First Lady Laura Bush’s spontaneous 
announcement of the U.S-Iraqi sister city partnerships, under conditions of 
national crisis, communication with local councils may come only after 
decisions have been made ‘behind closed doors’ at the national scale. Although 
subsequently recognised by urban authorities, an uneasy tension overshadows 
the integrity and authenticity of such relationships. Most American sister city 
relationships are mediated through the organisation Sister Cities International 
(SCI), which itself has an ambiguous relationship to the Federal government. 
SCI consistently promotes itself as having a global agenda, but acknowledges 
that it is first and foremost a national organisation with a primary responsibility 
to American cities. In order to maintain an illusion of distance, the U.S. 
government has historically used this organisation as an intermediary to 
regulate official recognition and support of sister city activities.  The honorary 
president of SCI is the serving President of the United States, and the 
organisation has historically refused to approve relationships with cities located 
in countries that do not have diplomatic relations with its own nation state. At 
the same time, it describes itself (‘Sister Cities International Statistics’, n/d) as 
an independently operating, ‘grassroots’ organisation, which petitions the 
Federal government on issues such as visa restrictions that prohibit sister city 
delegates from politically problematic countries from attending sister city 
conventions and related activities on American soil (see Kasang, 2006).    
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As the Bush administration had done in introducing the ‘positive’ 
initiative of U.S-Iraqi sister city relationships to the American people, the 
Australian government is seen in chapters four and five to have used the news 
media and its own police force as conduits for communicating its disapproval 
of formal sister city connections between the Marrickville and Leichhardt 
municipalities and the Palestinian cities of Bethlehem and Hebron. Lacking 
any legislative power with respect to sister city relationships (O’Toole, 2000), 
both the Howard and Rudd governments shied away from direct 
communication with the municipal authorities they were censuring. Instead, 
they made sweeping, normative statements to the mainstream press that sought 
to undermine the integrity of those peace projects and intervened in the 
activities of a local community peace group. In these instances, the ‘timid’ and 
bypassed dissent of Lofland’s (1993) ‘consensus movement’ actors is 
incongruously displayed by the Australian state. 
More generally, the essentialist framing of cities as peace actors in 
sister city discourses glosses over dissident elements and forces that also 
constitute the demographically and ideologically complex twenty-first century 
city and which need to be taken into account in urban governance. As Marcuse 
(2005) observes, understanding the city as a unified and homogenous entity 
 
can deny the legitimacy of conflict: what is good for any part of the city is 
good for all within it … (I)n fact the city is not one actor; actors within it 
determine its course, and that course generally favours some more than others, 
some to the detriment of others. …These views of ‘the city’ support a search 
for consensus politics, in which the claims of minority or powerless or 
disenfranchised or non-mainstream groups are considered disturbing factors in 
the quest for policies benefiting ‘the whole’ … (A)ny socially just public 
policy must deal with the conflicts of interest, the contradictions, the issues of 
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distributional equity, the varying possession of power and economic position, 
of the multiple elements that are located within the physical and jurisdictional 
space of cities … By using the term as if there really were such a thing as 
‘the’ city, a homogeneous entity, a unified actor, we divert attention from real 
issues of policy and planning, and generally in a direction supporting the idea 
that what is good for the dominant sectors of the city is good for the people of 
the city as a whole (2005:252). 
 
From ‘class society’ to ‘risk society’ 
As noted in chapter one, sister city relationships have always been predicated 
on the need to manage risk, but historical changes in understandings of the 
nature of risk, and the kinds of risks perceived as most salient, pose challenges 
to the viability of this essentially modern project in the late modern world.  In 
their belief that a more peaceful and just world can and should be created 
through human endeavour, sister city peace actors articulate the positive value 
system that Beck (2005) equates with ‘class society’. Class society values are 
oriented towards constructive change in the pursuit of equality and improved 
quality of life for all human beings. Accordingly, sister city peace actors focus 
on areas of the world that are most in need, such as war-torn areas in the 
Middle East, and are confident that their joint contributions can make a 
positive difference. The interpretive frames utilised by most opponents of the 
Palestinian proposals in this study, in contrast, demonstrate aspects of the 
defensive value system that Beck (2005) sees as indicative of ‘risk society’. 
Beck (2005:49) contends that the “basis and motivating force” in risk society is 
not progress, but safety. Risk society actors are thus constantly attentive, 
reflexively monitoring all instances of social change and speculating as to what 
the consequences of those changes might be. Not only are risks now 
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understood to be less predictable, they are also framed in exclusively negative 
terms that emphasise security and stability at the expense of positive 
innovation.  As a result, voices of concern and alarm are more likely to be 
received, amplified and given credence in contested sister city debates than 
voices of optimism and hope. This tendency can be seen in the Olympia and 
Leichhardt case studies in chapters three and five. The risks that both citizen 
opponents and the majority of councillors in Olympia perceived that a formal 
sister city relationship with Rafah would pose for their city were ultimately 
judged to be more relevant and pressing than the peace building agenda of the 
ORSCP and its supporters. The sister city debates examined in this thesis can 
thus be theoretically located on the cusp of change from ‘class society’ to ‘risk 
society’. 
 Of particular interest is the nature of the risks preoccupying those 
who reject or oppose sister city proposals with Palestinian cities, thereby 
producing risk objects.  Since the terrorist attacks of ‘9/11’, urban spaces have 
become the focus of a dominant politics of fear (Furedi, 2002, Mythen and 
Walklate, 2006), and protecting them from the risk of attack is now a priority 
for urban managers (Coaffee, O'Hare and Hawkesworth, 2009). Weigert (2003) 
frames the threat of the terrorist ‘other’ as a threat to public order, in that it 
undermines generalised trust in unknown ‘others’. Citing Rapoport (1999), he 
notes that terrorists erase “classical distinctions between innocent and guilty or 
combatant or noncombatant by defining all participants in a target nation as 
worthy of death” (2003:95).  Gray and Wyly (2007:338) argue that “a 
pervasive discourse of risk and fear is changing the purpose, scope and 
methods of urban planning” (see also Denzin, 2003:223). “Increased attention 
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is now being paid to how individuals and a broad range of local communities 
might become more responsible for their own risk management”, reflect 
Coaffee and Rogers (2008), and “citizens are being mobilised in pursuit of this 
goal” (2008:102). Sister city relationships extend the boundaries of the 
contemporary insecure city in fictive kinship with international urban others 
who are, in reality, strangers to each other, but who come together for sister 
city activities. Ultimately, as Bauman (2005) reminds us, the intentions of 
strangers cannot be known; “(t)he gathering of strangers is a site of endemic 
and incurable unpredictability … Strangers embody risk” (2005:166, emphasis 
in original).  Given this climate of vigilance and suspicion, it could be 
anticipated that, in proposed partnerships with cities that are commonly 
associated with terrorist activity in Western political discourses, the kind of 
negative risks prioritised by national and urban governments and their citizens 
would be directly related to the fear of physical attack. Almost nowhere to be 
seen in the data, however, are overt expressions of concern that emissaries 
from Rafah, Hebron or Bethlehem might betray their fictive kin by carrying out 
physical acts of terror in their midst. Instead, the focus is overwhelmingly on 
one particular variant of risk outlined in chapter one, that of reputational risk.  
 Reputational risk awareness is a form of identity management, 
involving the protection and defence of a preferred version of the self 
(Goffman, 1956). This is enabled in part by the avoidance of both personal and 
‘courtesy’ stigma. The term ‘courtesy stigma’ refers to the acquisition of a 
‘spoiled identity’ via association with the attributes and actions of deviant 
others (Goffman, 1963). Within the context of sister city relationships, 
reputational risk is of central concern to governments, whose likelihood of re-
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election is greatly diminished by a tarnished image, but it is also defended 
against by citizens for whom national and place identities are salient aspects of 
their valued self perceptions. For opponents of Palestinian relationships for 
whom the defence of the Israeli state was inseparable from other aspects of 
their personal identities, the notion of connecting themselves as figurative 
‘relatives’ to enemies of Israel was out of the question.   
The affective connotations of the ‘sister cities’ metaphor afforded 
debates involving Palestinian cities a deep emotional intensity for proponents, 
since it reinforced their contention that Palestinians are valued members of the 
human family. However that very intensity did not allow for any 
acknowledgment of social distance, which might have enabled opponents who 
balked at being classified as fictive kin with Palestinians for biographical 
reasons to engage in cooperative peace building projects out of more pragmatic 
motivations. Several speakers who objected to the Olympia proposal, for 
example, voiced support for the provision of humanitarian aid to Rafah, but 
were offended at the suggestion that sister city ties with the people of Rafah 
might be made in their names. In the case of the U.S-Iraqi sister city 
relationships discussed in chapter six, it was reputational risk to their own 
nation state that Americans were defending against, and, by association, their 
own identities as American patriots. Highly flexible and unstable meanings 
within the human family and citizen diplomat metaphors allowed image 
ultimately to triumph over reality for consensus movement peace actors. 
Implications for policy and practice 
The data and analysis from this study lead me to conclude that it is it is 
unrealistic and unreasonable to expect local authorities to address issues of 
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serious, ongoing international conflict by means of locally contested sister city 
relationships. As noted in chapter one, the capacity of urban governments 
around the world has been compromised in recent decades by a debilitating 
combination of reduced income and an expanding array of responsibilities and 
expectations, including an ever-present imperative to manage risk. In addition, 
councils are exposed to the constant scrutiny of a sceptical press and the often 
incompatible demands of culturally and politically diverse urban populations. 
Pro-Palestinian peace actors who responded to the promise of the ‘Eisenhower 
story’ found their hopes and expectations dashed when local authorities 
inevitably rejected proposals that caused unrest within their own 
municipalities, leaving council members collectively vulnerable to suggestions 
of cowardice or racism. Such outcomes are in the interests of neither the citizen 
peace groups who have worked hard to attain council endorsement nor the 
councils themselves, which must be seen to be responding to the requirements 
of the ‘people of the city’ as a whole.   
Crucially, in attempting to manage contested sister city proposals and 
relationships, councils are dealing with an ill-defined and highly unstable 
entity, engagement with which attracts negative risk to individual councillors 
and their municipalities without adequate compensating rewards. The high 
semantic plasticity of the sister cities model means that neither councils nor 
citizens have recourse to any consistent definitions that could clarify the 
boundaries of sister city relationships, or their mutual obligations in relation to 
them. In practice, the idea of sister cities is so elastic in meaning and 
application as to enable it to be appropriated as ‘all things to all people’, and 
imposes a similar role on local authorities. As Healey (2002) argues,  
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(i)n the sphere of politics and public administration, images of the city are 
filtered and used, to present the city to outsiders and citizens. … It is in the 
arena of city governance that the multiple mental images of the city frequently 
jostle for expression and attention … However, developing a politically and 
organisationally useful conception of a city is no easy task. Any city is many 
cities …It therefore matters which city images are called up and consolidated 
in public policy and how this is achieved (2002:1782). 
 
Having identified the problem preventing sister city peace relationships from 
fulfilling the high expectations placed upon them as pervasive and excessive 
ambiguity, the next step is to consider options for reducing that ambiguity at 
the level of local governance. One possible alternative is to abandon the sister 
cities model altogether for the purposes of peace building, in favour of one that 
is considerably less ambiguous in its name, intent and operation, such as the 
Peace Commission established by the City Council of Cambridge, 
Massachusetts in 1982. Officially titled the Cambridge Commission on Nuclear 
Disarmament and Peace Education, the original purpose of the commission 
was “to address the concerns of war and peace in the age of nuclear weapons”.  
It currently  
 
promotes peace and social justice within Cambridge – at the personal, 
neighborhood, and citywide levels – and in the wider world. It challenges 
local forms of discrimination that foster violence and promotes ideas and 
programs that affirm diversity and build community … It links peace groups, 
social justice efforts, anti-violence coalitions, communities, and the municipal 
government” (City of Cambridge website, 2009).  
 
Although this particular Commission supports Cambridge’s sister cities as part 
of its activities, it is an independent body that is not aligned to any single 
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international municipal partner, has a clearly defined goal, involves no council 
funded travel and has the added advantage of addressing social injustice within 
its own city as well as at the international scale. In principle, such a municipal 
institution could satisfy the requirements of both the Friends of Hebron and the 
Inner West Chavurah in Leichhardt, as discussed in chapter five, by placing 
discussions of controversial political issues, and organisational and identity 
constraints on addressing potential responses to those issues, openly upon the 
municipal table.  In addition, it could provide an enabling structure through 
which national and local governments might communicate more directly on 
issues of foreign policy. City Peace Commissions or similar offices might 
therefore constitute a viable alternative to sister city peace relationships at local 
and international scales. 
The second option is to disambiguate the existing sister city model by 
rendering explicit and problematising the metaphoric entailments that pervade 
sister city discourses. Elaborating on the work of Schön (1979), an unnamed 
scholar from the ‘Governance through Metaphor’ project of the Union of 
International Associations (n/d) writes that  
 
(t)here is a marked tendency to be unaware of the metaphors that shape 
perceptions and understanding of social situations. Although metaphors are at 
once tacit and often outside of explicit experience, they represent a special 
way of seeing, a way of selecting and naming "facts" that can filter or distort 
what is taken in. For Schön, if the metaphor remains tacit, it effectively exerts 
a "spell" that conditions the way in which a situation is perceived as 
problematic. The consequence of such tacit metaphors can be dangerously 
counter-productive. Metaphors can constrain and sometimes dangerously 
control the way in which people and groups construct the world in which they 
act. If, however, the metaphor no longer remains tacit, because an effort is 
made to "spell it out", other possibilities emerge. The assumptions which flow 
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from the metaphor can be elaborated in terms of the appropriateness of the 
metaphor to the circumstances in question.  
 
Furedi (2002:113) notes that “a lack of clarity about the terms on which 
relationships are built” reinforces perceptions that it is better to ‘play safe’ 
when dealing with unknown others.  The data and analysis provided by this 
study demonstrate that the sister cities metaphor calls up confusing and 
conflicting images of the city in the minds of citizens, which are 
counterproductive for the peace building potential of local civic action. The 
‘sister’ metaphor and the fictive kinship sentiments and obligations it entails 
are open to a variety of interpretations across time and space, which are 
inevitably resisted by some groups, and exploited by others, within the 
politically and culturally diverse late modern city. Furthermore, dissonant 
applications of the ‘sister’ trope as ‘lovers’ and ‘marriage partners’ in sister 
city discourses indicate that the original metaphor is out of step with the speed 
of change and complexities of late modern human relationships.  
Czarniawska (2004) acknowledges the need for just enough ambiguity 
of meaning to allow for flexibility in organisations, suggesting a boundary 
object function for metaphorical expression. In her own research, she found 
that 
 
metaphors were an invaluable tool of organizing. One reason was that they 
provided ambiguity, indispensable for people with many different interests to 
unite in a collective endeavour without necessarily uniting their points of 
view. Another, and opposite, reason was that, by familiarising the unknown, 
they reduced the uncertainty caused by new and surprising situations, 
abundant in organising efforts. The third reason was that they provided color 
and entertainment to the sometimes dreary everyday-life in work 
organizations (2004:46).  
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At the same time, however, she became aware that “metaphors can disorganize 
a city while organizing the understanding of its citizens” (2004:62). Likening 
metaphorical representations of the urban milieu to “an exotic flower in the 
midst of the evenly cut lawn – frightening, disgusting, appealing, but always 
evoking strong emotions”, she warns of “the possibility of another state of 
affairs, a lawn so filled with exotic flowers that the tired eye longs for the 
tranquilizing effect of cut grass” (2004:47). In line with Czarniawska’s simile, 
I contend that what is required if the sister city model is to be retained, is fewer 
exotic flowers and more cut grass.  A transition to a much less metaphoric, 
‘flat’ form of public discourse is in order for international municipal 
cooperation with a peace building agenda. 
Sister city relationships may appear to contain enough resilience to 
function as boundary objects when their proposed or existing municipal 
partners are relatively ‘safe sisters’, and remain so under conditions of cultural 
and political change. The primary focus of most cultural sister city 
relationships is not addressing such extreme issues as violence and bloodshed, 
since peaceful relations between the nations concerned are already in place. 
Even so, relatively minor political and cultural differences can undermine 
peaceful coexistence, and relationships involving cultural exchange projects in 
less challenging contexts have a less urgent, but nevertheless significant, role 
to play in facilitating peaceful and productive endeavours between people from 
diverse social worlds.  
As indicated in chapter seven, however, problematic trends are 
emerging at less politically and ideologically intense registers, which serve to 
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nudge peace building further off the agenda for even these relationships. 
‘Separate spheres and hostile worlds’ reasoning calls for clearer, quantifiable 
objectives in sister city relationships, with specific regard to economic return.  
The desired model for its proponents is the purely strategic economic 
relationship, for which peace building is not an issue. Metonymic sister city 
weddings are of some concern for their prioritisation of aesthetic and 
commercial dimensions of international exchange, thereby diverting local civic 
energies and attention away from issues of social justice, and from political 
avenues more appropriate and functional for addressing those issues. These 
urban extravaganzas are benign inventions which bring considerable pleasure 
to participants and promote local economic development, but it is difficult to 
justify claims that such staged and superficial interactions address the current 
political imperative for international peace building. Finally, the embryonic 
turn towards nationalist ideologies indicated in war and blood themed sister 
city discourses is by far the most troubling of the alternative directions 
identified, for its potential to play a peace-diminishing role in future 
international relations.  
Limitations and strengths of the study 
The scope of this thesis has been limited by logistical constraints of time, space 
and funding. Under ideal conditions, a study of the capacity of sister city 
relationships to build international peace under conditions of serious, ongoing 
geopolitical conflict would include qualitative interviews with a wider sample 
of participants drawn from both international cities for which a partnership is 
proposed, but this was beyond the reach of a doctoral thesis. I have also 
addressed in less detail than I would have preferred the role played the news 
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media in amplifying or attenuating public perceptions of risks posed by 
particular sister city relationships. This was due to space limitations and the 
need to prioritise the perspectives of embodied social actors.  
In spite of these unavoidable constraints, I am confident that this study 
constitutes a strong and valuable contribution to the scholarly literature on 
sister city relationships, on several dimensions. The first is that I have 
identified a specific objective sought by sister city peace actors, in the form of 
the boundary object.  This concept affords substance to the imprecise notion of 
‘building peace through understanding’ that is commonly invoked in sister city 
discourses. It also provides a focus for evaluating the progress and utility of 
existing relationships, in terms of increased awareness of the perspectives of 
diverse interactional partners. The second is that I have constructed an 
analytical model to ‘pin down’ sister city relationships as an object of empirical 
research, thereby forging a pathway for future researchers to address the 
serious deficiency that has been identified in the academic literature on sister 
city relationships in general, and on culture and peace based relationships in 
particular. Thirdly, I have identified the problem obstructing both the peace 
building capacity of sister city peace relationships and research into those 
relationships as excessive ambiguity, and suggested options for addressing that 
problem at the scale of local governance.  
 Finally, the research process itself has been of significant value to my 
own development as a researcher, in that it has helped to restore my sense of 
optimism regarding the capacities, inclinations and motivations of American 
and Australian citizens and local authorities under the anomic conditions that 
characterise late modern ‘risk society’. Beck (1997) remarks on the 
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satisfactions to be gained from obtaining evidence that pessimistic claims of a 
pervasive ‘ego-society’ may be proven wrong (1997:121). Sociological theory 
and popular discourses often frame late twentieth century and early twenty-first 
century urban subjects as highly individualistic, suspicious of unknown others, 
and disinclined to engage in civic activities, and local authorities as resistant to 
change and lacking the capacity and experience to deal with issues of wider 
significance than local service delivery. Challenging such negative and 
generalised evaluations, the data from this study suggest that the contemporary 
urban subject may be just as likely to be enthusiastic, altruistic, and possessed 
of a sophisticated understanding of political issues at local, international and 
global scales.  
Delving deeply into the subjective perceptions of participants in the 
course of qualitative research can have an emotional impact on researchers 
Gilbert (2001), and I have referred earlier to feelings of discomfort and 
frustration experienced during my research for this project. However the 
process also afforded moments of joy and encouragement, most specifically in 
the context of the qualitative interviews. The three citizen volunteers whose 
perspectives I sought on the Marrickville and Leichhardt sister city initiatives, 
Jennifer, Carole and Gael, were not united as a group in terms of the stance 
they had taken toward the proposals under discussion, since Gael was opposed 
to the Hebron proposal on several accounts. However, they are uniformly 
revealed to be morally motivated, politically aware, reflexively conscious and 
simultaneously locally/ globally orientated subjects, who have jointly elevated 
the standard of public debate on Palestinian sister relationships for Australian 
municipalities far beyond that represented in the mainstream press. The CEO 
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of the New South Wales Jewish Board of Deputies, Mr Vic Alhadeff, is seen to 
be fulfilling the obligations of an institutional role that accords with his 
personal moral beliefs, through his tireless efforts to defend the interests of the 
disparate collectivity he was elected to represent.  
In my personal experience, however, it was the interviews with the 
local councillors that were the primary source of satisfaction, since my 
expectations of local authorities, based on previous, unrelated experiences and 
on academic and media framings, had not been high. While the Mayor of 
Leichhardt had demonstrably taken a considered and capable approach in her 
response to the Hebron proposal, the fact that the proposal had been put on 
hold in the initial stages meant that I did not seek, and was not offered, as deep 
an understanding of her personal stance in relation to the debate as occurred 
with the two representatives from Marrickville council. The data from my 
interviews with Councillors Iskandar and Thanos disconfirm dismissive media 
representations of local officials as ‘p-plate politicians’, ‘well-meaning 
amateurs’ and ‘self-serving junketeers’. Both officials are shown to be ethical, 
responsible and highly competent political actors, who had reflected deeply 
and at length as to the implications of sister city relationships for their own 
municipality and for peace building at the international level. The fact that 
Mayor Thanos and Councillor Iskandar expressed differing and sometimes 
conflicting interpretations as to the proper nature and scope of sister city 
relationships, and their value for both local and international partners, points to 
the high semantic plasticity of the sister cities model rather than to any 
deficiencies of insight, understanding or capacity on the parts of these 
impressive local politicians.  The strong and innovative direction taken by 
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Marrickville council on Middle Eastern peace issues underscores the reality 
that Australian cities have now moved onto the national political agenda (Troy, 
2003), and clearly marks the trajectory of this particular council as a priority 
for future research into international peace building at the local scale.      
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Appendix 1. Profiles of Olympia, Marrickville and 
Leichhardt 
Municipality of Olympia 
For many generations the area now known as Olympia was a favorite shellfish 
gathering site for Coastal Salish tribes, including the Nisqually, Duwamish and 
Squaxin … The name of Olympia was selected by Isaac N. Ebey, a local 
resident, in honor of the majestic Olympic mountains visible to the north on a 
clear day. With an economic engine fueled to a great extent by state 
government activity, Olympia - the Capital City of Washington State - enjoys 
the benefits of a stable work force, engaged and educated community, and 
well-supported school system. Mild winters and pleasantly warm summers 
make the Olympia area an ideal place for outdoor recreation … Public trails 
lead to saltwater beaches where native Americans once met for potlatches, 
through woods thick with big-leaf maples and towering Douglas firs. Salmon 
return to Budd Inlet each fall and run the ladder under the 5th Avenue Bridge. 
Olympia's strategic geographic location along Interstate 5 at the gateway to the 
Olympic Peninsula puts one within two hours or less of regional recreational 
attractions - from hiking and skiing in the mountains to beachcombing along 
ocean shores. 
Olympia City Council webpage, ‘About Olympia’ 
http://www.ci.olympia.wa.us/community/about-olympia.aspx 
 
Municipality of Marrickville 
The Marrickville area is a great place to live and visit and represents the best of 
multicultural inner-city living. Marrickville has a vibrant, ethnically diverse 
population of approximately 75,000 residents with people from more than 100 
different cultures, speaking more than 70 different languages. The community 
acknowledges and is proud of its original people - the Cadigal-Wangal - and of 
each new generation of immigrants that have settled here. The area is less than 
10 kilometres from the city centre, and comprises some of Sydney's oldest 
suburbs - Camperdown, Dulwich Hill, Enmore, Lewisham, Marrickville, 
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Newtown, Petersham, St Peters, Stanmore, Sydenham and Tempe. People are 
attracted to the Marrickville area because of its convenience and inner city 
character, its vibrant street culture, multicultural influences, eating and 
shopping experiences, and its friendly community feel. 
Marrickville City Council webpage, ‘Welcome to Marrickville: Information for new 
citizens’ http://www.marrickville.nsw.gov.au/council/welcome.htm 
 
Muncipality of Leichhardt 
Leichhardt was incorporated as a local government area in 1871. In 1949 the 
municipalities of Annandale and Balmain were amalgamated with Leichhardt. 
In 1967, the municipaliity boundary was varied to include Glebe and parts of 
Camperdown. In 2003, the municipal boundary was again varied, this time to 
exclude Glebe and Forest Lodge which are now part of the City of Sydney. The 
suburbs within the Leichhardt local government area are Leichhardt, Lilyfield, 
Balmain (including Balmain East), Birchgrove, Rozelle and Annandale. The 
municipality of Leichhardt has an estimated resident population of 51,142 
(ABS June 2005 preliminary figures) within an area of 1,003 hectares. There 
are 79 parks, gardens or reserves covering 84 hectares providing both active 
and passive recreation. The municipality also has a 17km frontage to Sydney 
harbour and Parramatta River.   
Leichhardt City Council webpage, ‘Snapshot of Leichhardt’ 
http://www.leichhardt.nsw.gov.au/Snapshot-of-Leichhardt.html 
